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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Nathan  Jessen 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of History 
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Title:  Populism and Imperialism:  Politics in the U.S. West, 1890-1900 
 
 
 Historians have long been fascinated by the last decade of the nineteenth century.  
It was in these years that one of the great industrial reform movements arose, 
spearheaded in much of the West and South by the Populists.  It was also a decade in 
which the nation fought its first foreign war in half a century and forcibly took possession 
of its first major overseas colonial possessions.  Scholars have frequently attempted to 
discuss the two phenomena in conjunction, but their attempts thus far have been shallow 
and unsatisfactory.  This study examines the Populists of the U.S. West in detail, with a 
special focus upon the years from 1898 to 1900.   
Within the first years of the decade, the Populists had developed a substantial 
following by demanding a reorganization of the national economy for the benefit of 
small-scale producers and laborers.  By 1896, the party formed a vital component of the 
reform coalition that won most of the elected offices of the region.  The Populists and 
their allies appeared poised to become a substantial force for change, but it was not to be.  
Wars—the first with Spain over Cuba, the second in the Philippines to quash an 
independence movement—shifted public attention to other matters.  Western Populists 
and Democrats responded by extending their critique of concentrated wealth to foreign 
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affairs, and they attributed the drive for empire to the demands of financiers and 
industrialists.  Yet by attacking the American war efforts, they laid themselves open to 
charges of disloyalty.     
President McKinley and the western Republicans who followed him saw the 
opportunities provided by the conflicts.  They declared that colonies would promote trade 
and promised that the wealth generated by this commerce would trickle down to all 
classes.  To an even greater degree, they skillfully used the wars to rally support around 
the nation‟s soldiers and the “flag.”  And finally, western Republicans successfully 
labeled the Populists and Democrats who opposed the wars as traitors and “copperheads.”  
In this way conservatives destroyed the most serious challenge to the American industrial 
order.     
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Historians of the United States have long been fascinated by the convergence of 
certain events in the 1890s.  The first years of the decade saw the development of a large-
scale movement organized by farmers and laborers for political and economic reform, 
culminating in the formation of the Populist Party.  The end of the decade saw what had 
been a rarity, a declared war with a European power, and in its wake came the formal 
beginning of an American overseas empire.  Historians have at times attempted to explain 
how one has related to another, but somehow they have largely ignored both the Populist 
response to empire and imperialism‟s impact upon the movement for reform.   
The use of an example may demonstrate at least some of what historians have 
missed up to this point.  On January 26, 1899, California Representative Curtis Castle 
delivered one of his last addresses in Congress.  The Populist was increasingly troubled 
by the aggressive rhetoric in which his colleagues across the aisle engaged.  Hawaii had 
been annexed the previous summer, American soldiers occupied Cuba—as some 
suggested they must in perpetuity—and now many had focused their attention across the 
Pacific at the Philippine archipelago.  For Castle, the policy that they proposed was 
utterly at variance with American principles.  Like other anti-imperialists, he decried it as 
a violation of the principle of self-governance, a bedrock concept upon which all other 
freedoms rested.  But that was not the only reason he opposed the creation of an 
American empire.  Empire was both a distraction from needed change at home and a 
boon only for the wealthy few, he said.  “We have begun the glorious struggle, and I call 
upon you, my countrymen, to let no paltry bauble divert your energies or turn you from 
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these radical reforms—this greatest work of all the ages.”  Though “Plutocracy beckons 
you to the feast,” those who held America‟s wealth had “provided no seat for you at the 
banquet board.  You are asked to furnish a great army to provide the feast, which will be 
used, after the banquet is over, to fasten upon your arms the gyves of industrial slavery.”  
The growth of empire was responsible for the concentration of wealth in ancient Rome, 
he said, and this trend continued until finally the Roman elite overthrew the Republic.  
“The wealth of imperial America, drawn from conquered lands, will be distributed as 
Rome's wealth was.  With colonial conquests America's imperial plutocrats will grow 
richer and more insolent.  With one sucker in the Philippines, one in Cuba, one in Porto 
Rico, and the remaining five in the United States, the wealth-absorbing octopus will grow 
apace.”  Empire encouraged the agglomeration of wealth and power, and these would 
lead inevitably to the death of American economic and political freedom.
1
 
Castle‟s interpretation of the purpose and consequences of overseas imperialism 
bears little resemblance to that which has commonly been represented by historians.  
Academics have made little note of the anti-imperialism of Populists like Jerry Simpson 
of Kansas, John C. Bell of Colorado, William V. Allen of Nebraska, and many others 
both inside and outside the halls of Congress, and those few who have pointed it out have 
not explained it in any substantive way.  These western Populists had followed the 
Democrat William Jennings Bryan in 1896, and most would again in 1900 when he made 
opposition to empire one of the cornerstones of his campaign, yet that contest and its 
                                                 
1
 Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., Jan. 26, 1899, App. 90-94.  All material taken from the 
Appendix in this and all sections of this dissertation were read or spoken aloud while Congress was in 
session unless otherwise stated.   
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impact has also been largely ignored.  There are a variety of reasons why those who have 
attempted to connect the industrial reform movement with either the War of 1898 or the 
territorial acquisitions that followed have failed to do so in an accurate or insightful way.  
Some sought to use history to provide a commentary upon the politics and society of their 
own eras, and in the process they exaggerated certain facts and left further details out 
altogether.  Other scholars have merely been limited by the assumptions of those who 
came before.  Whatever the methods of the scholar, the true nature of the relationship 
between Populism and American empire has remained beyond the reach of historians.   
Richard Hofstadter was one of the first to associate American entry into the War 
of 1898 with Populist frustrations.  The Populists were some of the loudest jingoes, 
Hofstadter pointed out, so surely it was the people of the hinterland who most desperately 
sought the unnecessary war with Spain.  As he came to identify it in a later work, the 
United States was going through a “psychic crisis” in the 1890s, and the Populists 
simultaneously represented the results of that frustration and were harbingers of what 
could follow.  He certainly understood that only a small portion of the electorate ever 
joined the party, but Hofstadter also explained that those who loathed the reformers 
sensed that there were many other Americans who held thoughts like those of the 
Populists.  Many of these middle- and upper-class Americans had frustrations and 
ambitions of their own that they believed could be resolved through a foreign war, and 
some among them already believed that such a conflict could smooth over unrest at 
home.  As a consequence, when middle America lashed out against Spain, no substantial 
group was left to oppose them.  The Philippine archipelago was added as a consequence 
of the war, and after war came it was too late to prevent what had ostensibly been a war 
4 
 
for humanity from evolving into a war of conquest.  While he remarkably called the 
Populist regions the center of “opposition to the fruits of war” after the conflict had 
ended, in his depiction the Populists held a central place in the great psychic convulsion 
that led to the creation of an American overseas empire.
2
   
 Other historians who have focused instead on the economic causes of American 
imperialism have likewise attributed some of the drive for empire to the reformers.  
While they primarily attributed the drive for empire to businessmen and conservative 
politicians (at least by 1898), the works of Walter LaFeber and William Appleman 
Williams also included statements on the importance of overseas markets that came from 
Populists and others who questioned the rising industrial order.  The purpose of their 
works was to demonstrate an American foreign policy consensus, and there was no more 
direct way to demonstrate uniformity than by using the words of nonconformists.  They 
demonstrated that among those who favored bimetallism were some ardent advocates of 
trade with Asia, and members of nearly all sectors of society did call for increased 
foreign trade to offset the effects of “overproduction.”  Williams in particular singled out 
agriculturalists and Populists and contended that they were the source of the search for 
markets that characterized the policies of America‟s foreign policy leaders in the last 
years of the nineteenth century.  Yet for both, any anti-imperialist sentiment expressed 
after the war with Spain seems either meaningless or something done merely for political 
effect.  The single-mindedness of their works makes imperialism seem the inevitable 
                                                 
2
 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform:  From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York:  Random House, 1955), 88-
93; Hofstadter, “Cuba, the Philippines, and Manifest Destiny,” in The Paranoid Style in American Politics, 
and Other Essays (1952; Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1996), 145-187.   
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consequence of popularly held beliefs and capitalist ambitions.  The Populists were as 
guilty of this as anyone, they claimed.
3
   
 More recent works have followed along these lines, casting the Populists and their 
allies as instigators who helped bring on the war with Spain.  Kristin Hoganson 
recognized that the followers of Bryan were especially keen to argue that greed had come 
to suppress American manhood—which they did on the campaign trail in 1896 and in the 
halls of Congress in 1898.  She pointed out that manhood and critiques of wealth were 
deployed simultaneously to demand the protection of the Cubans and an assertion of 
American power.  At the same time, she generally described the Populists as 
warmongering jingoes, and in her depiction that was the extent of their role in the drama.  
Paul T. McCartney, while focusing on the influence of American exceptionalist ideology 
on the national foreign policy discourse, also noted how the campaign rhetoric of 1896 
crept into the debates that led up to war in 1898.  Populist frustration demanded a war for 
humanity in 1898.  He did note some Populists who opposed the retention of the 
Philippines, but Populism as a movement of its own had no real place in the narrative and 
his thorough emphasis on the rhetoric of exceptionalism left all anti-imperialists to be 
lumped together rather than dissected as constituent groups.  Neither Hoganson nor 
McCartney stated that Populists forced the nation into war, but the way they included a 
number of the Bryanite reformers in their narratives certainly did not discredit the old 
                                                 
3
 For just a few examples of their depiction of Populist involvement, see Walter Lafeber, New Empire:  An 
Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1963), 201, 205, 
414-416; William Appleman Williams, The Roots of Modern American Empire:  A Study of the Growth 
and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society (New York:  Random House, 1969), 34-36, 
362-365, 370-375.   
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arguments.
4
   
 Clearly, a number of historians have suggested that the Populist movement played 
a part in the development of America‟s overseas empire, but they have not painted a clear 
picture of what that role really was.  The motives of the reform politicians are presented 
so differently in each study that it is impossible to use them to explain the course of 
events or the motives of Populists.  Worse yet, most of them have not expounded upon 
Populist anti-imperialism, and so the reformers are identified as war-mongers and jingoes 
without any acknowledgement of the complexity of the views.  In fact the vast majority 
of Populist Party leaders and their closest associates in the Democratic and breakaway 
Silver Republican parties opposed American possession of the Philippines, and together 
they made up one of the largest blocs in the Senate.  Despite that fact, even historians of 
the anti-imperialist movement have discounted their significance.   
 Anti-imperialism has a literature of its own, but the few who have researched the 
opposition to territorial expansion following the War of 1898 have limited their focus and 
left the Populists out of the narrative.  Historians Richard Beisner, E. Berkeley Tompkins, 
Daniel B. Schirmer, and recently Michael Cullinane put the greatest emphasis upon the 
Anti-Imperialist League, an organization led by members of the upper echelons of 
Northeastern society, including prominent social critics, industrialists, and a smattering of 
                                                 
4
 Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting For American Manhood:  How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-
American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1998), 28-30, 50, 57, 
63, 81, 103-104, 118; Paul T. McCartney, Power and Progress:  American National Identity, the War of 
1898, and the Rise of American Imperialism (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press, 2006), 122-
125, 238, 256.   
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politicians.
5
  While Bryan and a few Populists were given honorary vice presidential 
positions, all of the real power lay with mugwumps and conservatives who thought Bryan 
and his followers were dangerous.   
The anti-imperialist literature largely ignores the Populist contribution, and even 
the brief snippets on the subject outside of that literature are often better.
6
  Of the 
histories of anti-imperialism, less than a handful have devoted a few paragraphs to the 
westerners and other radicals they claim made up a substantial part of the movement.  
These authors then dedicate the rest of their studies to the same conservatives who 
occupy the core of all the other examinations of the anti-imperialists of this era.
7
  Robert 
Beisner, the first to develop a book-length study to these opponents of expansion, 
emphatically attributed the movement to classical liberal mugwumps and regular 
Republicans who broke ranks with McKinley on this issue alone.  As he put it in a later 
                                                 
5
 Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire:  The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900 (New York:  McGraw Hill, 
1968); E. Berkeley Tompkins, Anti-imperialism in the United States:  The Great Debate, 1890-1900 
(Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970); Daniel B. Schirmer, Republic or Empire:  
American Resistance to the Philippine War (Cambridge, MA:  Schenkman Publising, 1972); Michael 
Patrick Cullinane, Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism, 1898-1909 (New York:  Palgrave MacMillan, 
2012).  On the earlier works on the subject, see Maria C. Lanzar, “The Anti-Imperialist League,” The 
Philippine Social Science Review 3, no. 1 (1930):  7-41; Fred H. Harrington, “The Anti-Imperialist 
Movement in the United States, 1898-1900,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 22, no. 2 (1935):  
211-230.   
6
 Several works have mentioned the anti-imperialism of Populists and their allies without examining it in 
any detail.  One, a work by political scientist Aziz Rana, includes an apt analysis of the Populist view of 
empire, but because the author used almost exclusively secondary sources he does not effectively prove it.  
See Aziz Rana, Two Faces of American Freedom (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 2010), 179, 
200-205.  For other examples, see Kendrick A. Clements, William Jennings Bryan:  Missionary Isolationist 
(Knoxville:  University of Tennessee Press, 1982), 30-41; Robert David Johnson, The Peace Progressives 
and American Foreign Relations (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1995), 29-32.   
7
 Daniel B. Schirmer, Republic or Empire, 149-150, 161-169, 175-176, 205-206; Michael Cullinane, 
American Anti-Imperialism, 43-46, 55-56; Jim Zwick, “The Anti-Imperialist Movement, 1898-1921,” in 
Whose America?  The War of 1898 and the Battles to Define the Nation, ed. Virginia M. Bouvier 
(Westport, CT:  Praeger Publishers, 2001), 171-192, especially 172, 176.   
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article, Democrats (and he says nothing of anyone else) were “basically anti-imperialist 
in 1898 and 1900, but largely out of ritualistic partisanship.”8  Conservatives alone were 
the genuine anti-imperialists.  For all practical purposes, his thesis has yet to be 
disproved.   As a consequence, there is no literature on American anti-imperialism that 
has anything substantial to say about those who questioned the nation‟s economic order.   
Other scholars have instead attempted to measure the influence of imperialism 
upon domestic life, and several recent works have suggested that it had a significant 
impact on culture, conceptions of race and citizenship, and even the scope of American 
governmentality.
9
  Yet practically no recent works have attempted to explain the political 
effects of the war and imperialism.  The two most important studies are somewhat dated, 
and both thoroughly discount the importance of imperialism on the election of 1900—the 
first national contest to follow the annexation of overseas territories.  Thomas A. Bailey, 
in an eleven-page article published in 1937, stated emphatically that the questions that 
followed the acquisition of the Philippines had a negligible impact upon the election of 
1900.  There were, he said, too many other issues at stake, all of which seemed more 
pressing to average voters.
10
  His is still the most widely cited secondary source on the 
                                                 
8
 Robert Beisner, “1898 and 1968:  The Anti-Imperialists and the Doves,” Political Science Quarterly 85, 
no. 2 (1970): 192.   
9
 Amy Kaplan, The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press, 2002); Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government:  Race, Empire, the United States, & 
the Philippines (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Alfred W. McCoy, Policing 
America’s Empire:  The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State (Madison, 
WI:  University of Wisconsin Press, 2009); Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano, eds., Colonial 
Crucible:  Empire in the Making of the Modern American State (Madison, WI:  University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2009).   
10
 Thomas A. Bailey, “Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate on Imperialism?” The Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review 24, no. 1 (1937):  43-52.   
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campaign.  The second is a book-length study by a Swedish historian, Göran Rystad.  
While he did believe that imperialism had been a major component of the campaign, 
other factors decided the election.  Both Bailey and Rystad claimed that “prosperity” and 
opposition to the silver issue left over from 1896 were the truly decisive factors.
11
   
 The works of Bailey and Rystad make their claims based on several potentially 
flawed suppositions.   First, they have discussed the situation as though “the nation” was 
a singular entity, relatively homogeneous throughout.  In fact, a look at the electoral map 
of 1896 reveals the tremendous regionalization of American politics at the end of the 
century.  Rystad devoted a substantial portion of his work to the state of Indiana, which 
he used as a stand-in for the whole of the United States.  Bailey, too, rarely looked any 
further west than Chicago.  Any study that focused on the Midwest or East would have 
neglected the regions most opposed to the economic orthodoxy of William McKinley and 
his conservative Republican allies.  Such as study would only then be able to detect the 
impact of McKinley‟s imperialist policies if there was widespread opposition to them in 
those areas because support or tolerance of them would merely involve acceptance of the 
status quo.  Most importantly, any historian with a focus elsewhere would miss the 
biggest change that took place over last few years of the decade:  the collapse of 
Populism in the West.   
                                                 
11
 Göran Rystad, Ambiguous Imperialism:  American Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics at the Turn of 
the Century (Lund, Sweden:  Esselte Studium, 1975), especially 294.  For works that cite either or both 
Bailey and Rystad, see Stuart Creighton Miller, “Benevolent Assimilation”:  The American Conquest of the 
Philippines, 1899-1903 (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1982); David M. Pletcher, The 
Diplomacy of Involvement:  American Economic Expansion across the Pacific, 1784-1900 (Columbia, MO:  
University of Missouri Press, 2001), especially 304-305; Noel Jacob Kent, America in 1900 (New York:  
M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2002); Michael Kazin, A Godly Hero:  The Life of William Jennings Bryan (New York:  
Random House, 2006).     
10 
 
 The area that would be the most appropriate one for such a study would be the 
trans-Missouri West.  There, Populists, Democrats, and Silver Republicans had united in 
1896 to challenge the status quo, and they still held sway in much of the region by 1900.  
McKinley‟s supporters had failed to defeat them by supporting the gold standard and 
business-as-usual in 1896, so if new issues were to appeal to any, it would have been 
them.  But of course, they could just appeal to the “full dinner pail,” according to most 
historians.   
   While those who have evaluated the election have typically declared that 
“prosperity” doomed McKinley‟s opponents, that kind of economic determinism is not an 
effective tool to examine American politics in the 1890s, especially that of the western 
states.  Grover Cleveland and the Democratic Party had been swept into power in 1892, 
replacing Republican control of the presidency and both Houses of Congress, all at a time 
when the economy still appeared strong.
12
  As will be demonstrated later, Populists in the 
West also did well against their Republican adversaries in good times, but suffered one of 
their worst defeats following the onset of the economic collapse in 1893.  Additionally, 
one of the more prominent authorities on Populism noted that the plight of the farmers, 
especially in the form of increasing indebtedness and rising levels of tenancy, only 
became worse in the years after 1896.
13
  Whatever minimal changes westerners had seen 
regarding the economic situation cannot explain the sudden collapse of Populism and the 
                                                 
12
 J. Rogers Hollingsworth, The Whirligig of Poltics:  The Democracy of Cleveland and Bryan (Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press, 1963), 1-10; R. Hal Williams, Realigning America:  McKinley, Bryan, and the 
Remarkable Election of 1896 (Lawrence, KS:  University Press of Kansas, 2010), 4-23.   
13
 Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise:  The Populist Moment in America (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 1976), 544.   
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return of Republican Party dominance at the turn of the century.   
 Historians of Populism have largely ignored the War of 1898, if for no other 
reason than a commitment to the claim that the movement had committed suicide through 
fusion with the Democrats in 1896.  This well-worn explanation has been the most 
common one employed in all the literature of the third party.
14
  Yet this thesis has some 
important weaknesses.  First, Populists had already waged numerous “fusion” campaigns 
in western states without suffering any precipitous decline.  Just as vitally, this alliance of 
parties in 1896 had resulted in more Populist victories than had been recorded in any 
previous election.  Historians who blame fusion for the party‟s decline seem to attribute 
political failure to electoral success.  Finally, the histories of western state Populist 
parties demonstrate that they went through a slow decline, not immediate dissolution.
15
  
While the national party undoubtedly lost much of its viability following the election of 
1896 and the disavowal of the movement by many southerners, it had never been 
anything more than a collection of state parties anyhow.
16
  In 1897, there would not have 
                                                 
14
 Perhaps the strongest advocate of this is Lawrence Goodwyn, in Democratic Promise, but even John D. 
Hicks referred to the Populist view of cooperation with the Democrats as “the holocaust of fusion,” (380-
381), and Charles Postel has largely agreed.  See Hicks, The Populist Revolt:  A History of the Farmers’ 
Alliance and the People’s Party, 3rd ed. (1931; Lincoln:  University of Nebraska Press, 1961); Charles 
Postel, The Populist Vision (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2007).      
15
 Among the studies that describe Populists parties that maintained relevance in the western states for some 
time after 1896, see:  Walter T. K. Nugent, The Tolerant Populists:  Kansas Populism and Nativism 
(Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1963); O. Gene Clanton, Kansas Populism:  Ideas and Men 
(Lawrence, KS:  University Press of Kansas, 1969); James Edward Wright, The Politics of Populism:  
Dissent in Colorado (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1974); Robert W. Cherny, Populism, 
Progressivism, and the Transformation of Nebraska Politics (Lincoln:  University of Nebraska Press, 
1981); Thomas W. Riddle, The Old Radicalism:  John R. Rogers and the Populist Movement in Washington 
(New York:  Garland Publishing, Inc., 1991); R. Alton Lee, Principle Over Party:  The Farmers’ Alliance 
and Populism in South Dakota (Pierre, SD:  South Dakota State Historical Society Press, 2011).   
16
 For just a few examples of the difficulties of fusion in the southern context, see Sheldon Hackney, 
Populism to Progressivism in Alabama (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1969), 96-104;  Connie L. 
Lester, Up From the Mudsills of Hell:  The Farmers’ Alliance, Populism, and Progressive Agriculture in 
 
12 
 
appeared any reason to believe that state-level parties could not continue to thrive in the 
West for some time to come.   
Populism maintained some vibrance, but even those studies that have dealt with 
the period after 1896 have not really examined the sources or extent of the Populist 
analysis of empire.  Many of these works are local studies, and obviously these are 
limited vehicles for the study of overseas policy.  Yet even one of the few works that was 
capable of dealing with the movement‟s response to empire—O. Gene Clanton‟s study of 
congressional Populism—focuses on the moralistic statements of the anti-imperialists 
rather than their analysis of empire.  Neither he nor anyone else have paid much attention 
to declarations like those made by Congressman Castle.
17
       
 The purpose of this study, then, is to examine the relationship between western 
Populists and their political allies and imperialism in the last years of the 1890s.  The 
inclusion of Populists into the narrative of intervention in 1898 and anti-imperialism 
thereafter actually provides a unique perspective that is currently absent from the 
literature.  This study finds that the Populists differed markedly from the typically 
described portrayals of both eastern interventionists and the conservative opponents of 
territorial conquest.  Core elements of the Populist ideology had a much stronger 
influence upon their views of the international situation then have hitherto been 
recognized.  Their analysis of global finance and capitalism strongly influenced their 
                                                                                                 
Tennessee, 1870-1915 (Athens, GA:  University of Georgia Press, 2006), 203-205; James L. Hunt, Marion 
Butler and American Populism (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 107-123 .   
17
 For those that have discussed Populism locally, and have included references to the debate over empire, 
see those works listed in footnote 14 above.  For O. Gene Clanton‟s work on Populism at the national level, 
see Populism:  The Humane Preference in America, 1890-1900 (Boston:  Twayne Publishers, 1991); and 
Congressional Populism and the Crisis of the 1890s (Lawrence, KS:  University Press of Kansas, 1998).   
13 
 
interpretation of colonialism, both in Cuba and the Philippines.  Their basic republican 
conceptions of what America should be also shaped their critique of the impact of 
imperialism at home.  It built upon their fears of growing domestic militarism and 
undemocratic governance, and it was simultaneously rooted in their misgivings about the 
declining prospects of labor and small capitalists in an exploitative global marketplace.   
 Because of its place as the home of economic and political dissent, the West was 
also the most contested political battlefield from 1896 to the opening years of the 
twentieth century.  War and imperialism provided new issues that western conservatives 
could employ to their advantage.  What followed were considerable reverses for the 
Populists and their western allies.  After notable losses in the 1898 off-year election, in 
1900 the Populists were driven from statewide office and their Congressional 
representation nearly disappeared.  While it could be suggested that these losses were 
unrelated to the wider national campaign and cannot be linked to the expansion debate, 
few politicians acted as though that were true.  The political scientist Richard Bensel has 
suggested that national concerns were significant to politics at all levels, and he supported 
his claim by demonstrating that the most significant planks of the state party platforms of 
this era usually pertained to national issues.
 18
  In the years when United States Senators 
were selected by legislatures, few elections could be considered “just” local.  There was 
no definitive line separating national contests from local elections.  While the contests of 
1898 and 1900 did not provide a mandate for imperialism, in the West they signaled the 
death knell of a political movement that provided the most serious political challenge to 
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the capitalist order to be seen in nineteenth-century.   
 Though it is the aim of this work to describe the politics of the West broadly, it 
would be impossible to conduct a detailed study of the politics of so large a swath of the 
country.  Generalizations always prove to be unfair to the exceptions, and any serious 
examination requires a close study of the issues and candidates in a local environment.  In 
order to conduct this survey of the West, a small number of states have been selected for 
close inspection.  A set of criteria was used to determine which states would best serve 
this purpose.  First, the state should have gone through some sort of political changes 
during the 1890s associated with the Populist reform movement.  Second, because few 
states will be incorporated into the study, each state selected should be unlike the others 
chosen—i.e., only one Plains state.  Third, each state should have possessed a large and 
stable population, relatively speaking.  The three states that best fit the above criteria are 
Colorado, Nebraska, and Washington.  Each represents a different subregion of the West, 
each had been powerfully affected by the political movements of the 1890s, and each 
held a population of over half a million.    
 The opening chapters of the study will provide ideological background and 
political context necessary for the study.  The second chapter will describe the basis of 
Populist thought, primarily by tracing both the republican and liberal foundations of their 
program.  The chapter will also cover the oft-neglected “money power” conspiracy as 
well as Populist conceptions of civic nationalism and proper manhood.  These are core 
concepts that can help explain Populist interpretations of both domestic politics and, 
especially later, foreign affairs.  The third chapter will cover the political histories of 
Nebraska, Colorado, and Washington from roughly the beginning of the decade to 1897.  
15 
 
In each state, unique geography and histories of development played significant roles in 
determining the way individuals and parties reacted to monopolistic capitalism and tight 
credit.  Despite the differences, Populists filled an important niche, and they succeeded in 
shifting the political discourse from a focus upon cultural issues to an emphasis upon 
political economy.  Additionally, the complexities associated with party “fusion” will be 
fleshed out to explain the impact it had upon the organizations and politics in each state.  
This context is necessary to better understand the impact of the War of 1898 and 
imperialism upon local politics.   
 The three chapters that follow will examine the contributions of western Populists 
and allied reformers in Congress in 1898 and the changes in the political situation that 
occurred that year.  The fourth chapter will focus upon the beginning of the Fifty-fifth 
Congress and western contribution to the debates over entry into the War of 1898 and 
how it should be paid for.  It will be argued that both the plight of the Cubans and the 
administration‟s war funding measure came to be seen through the Populist economic 
lens.  Their suspicion of McKinley‟s motives and policies foreshadowed the fight over 
empire that followed.  The fifth chapter covers the debate over Hawaiian annexation and 
the development of a Populist critique of imperialism.  Populists viewed the acquisition 
and administration of distant territories and diverse peoples a threat to the decentralized, 
self-governing republic they sought to restore, and for that reason many opposed 
annexation.  The sixth chapter concludes the events of 1898, with a special focus on the 
state elections of that year.  Republicans in many western states succeeded in shifting 
political debate to the new issues that arose out of the war, and by doing so they were 
able to hand their opponents some of the worst defeats they would suffer in the 1890s.    
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 The final three chapters examine Populist anti-imperialism and their contests in 
Congress and at the polls to alter the course of both the nation‟s foreign policy and its 
political development.  Chapter VII discusses the situation in early 1899.   War broke out 
between the Americans and Filipinos, western reformers in Congress voiced their 
opposition to colonialism, and even western state politics became partially tied up in the 
imperial issue.  Populists united to stand against empire, and they explained both the 
cause and results of imperialism in economic terms.  As Castle pointed out, wealth and 
power would become concentrated, and freedom at home would decline.  The eighth 
chapter will cover some of the major issues that appeared in Congress and the media in 
1900, at a time when many events nationally and globally were coming to be viewed as 
related to overseas imperialism.  A controversial bill that defined the colonial status of 
the newly acquired territories and federal military intervention in the Coeur d‟Alene‟s 
only served to sharpen the western reformers‟ attack on colonialism and governance by 
force.  The final chapter will deal with the election of 1900, the second consecutive 
presidential contest waged between William Jennings Bryan and William McKinley.  As 
they had in 1898, Republicans in the West gained the upper hand, and they did so by 
emphasizing their role in support of the war and the soldiers.     
 The conclusion will recount the end of both anti-imperialism and Populist-style 
reform in the West.  Though greatly diminished in number, those western reformers who 
remained in Congress continued the fight.  They remained opposed to what they 
considered the unconstitutional and immoral measures applied to the colonies, but they 
were too few in number to fundamentally change the situation.  Republicans opened the 
century in firm control of the western states and the federal government.  A new epoch of 
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national reform was about to begin under a party whose leaders never seriously 
questioned the growing disparities of wealth that accompanied industrialization.  Foreign 
policy would be directed by one of the loudest proponents of American expansion 
(Theodore Roosevelt), who was then succeeded by the nation‟s foremost colonial 
administrator (William Howard Taft).  These were the leaders who would set the agenda 
for the country at the beginning of the new century.   
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CHAPTER II 
WESTERN POPULIST IDEOLOGY AND WORLDVIEW 
Amidst the turmoil of the 1890s, increasing numbers of Americans demonstrated 
a frustration with growing economic inequality and sought new alternatives to the system 
of unrestrained selfish accumulation that they considered a threat to their wellbeing.  In 
the western United States, the most influential of the movements that responded to this 
sentiment was the People‟s Party (Populists)—a coalition of farmers and laborers who 
provided the most serious challenge to the existing order of American capitalism of any 
major group during the Gilded Age.  These facts are beyond dispute, but historians have 
long struggled to define the ideology that drove the movement.   
There are challenges inherent in any attempt to define a singular vision held by 
Populists. A quick comparison of two examples can highlight some the difficulties 
scholars face when they attempt to classify Populist thought.  The first of these samples is 
taken from The Advocate, a Populist organ in Topeka, Kansas, a region that some have 
considered the heart of the political insurgency.  One editorial from this paper, from April 
of 1894, focused on the monopolistic control of labor.  “Look at the multitudes who have 
been but recently thrown out of employment, and whose families have been destitute in 
consequence,” the author demanded.  “It is cruel, it is inhuman, to attribute these 
conditions to laziness, drunkenness, and incompetency.  They are the natural product of a 
false and vicious system by which the few grow rich beyond all need, and the many are 
doomed to eternal poverty and want.”  The writer went on to propose that those who were 
willing should have a right to work and be justly compensated.  According to the editors 
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of The Advocate, modern capitalism had made no adjustments for common laborers and 
there was a social responsibility to change that order to fit these needs.
1
   
 At the other end of the spectrum was John Rankin Rogers.   In the years from 
1887 to 1889 he was the editor of the Kansas Commoner, a Union Laborite paper in 
Newton, Kansas.  In 1890, he moved to Washington state, and there devoted more of his 
time to the publication of reform pamphlets and, later, building the organization that 
would become the Pacific Coast‟s strongest Populist Party.  He was elected governor of 
his new state in 1896, but he continued to write, and he maintained a correspondence 
with other reformers nationally.  In his response to one such activist, he explained his 
views on the struggling urban laborers.  “[T]he destitute poor of the cities can only be 
helped by what is ordinarily termed „charity‟.  They are for the most part incapable of 
helping themselves.  As a matter of fact I do not believe that very much can be done for 
them.  If they were transported to a good farming region and each given a farm it is 
probable that they would fail as farmers.”  American laborers had their greatest 
opportunities in the era when land was cheap and readily available, he said, and he 
informed his correspondent that only land reform and a return of workers to the 
countryside would improve the situation for those “who lacked the ability to take the 
initiative.”  While he did call for structural changes in the American economic order, he 
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embraced Spencerian ideas regarding “survival of the fittest,” and in most cases he 
considered the urban poor to be the dregs and castoffs of American society.
2
   
 The two perspectives could not be more different.  One focused on the assumed 
rights of producers, the other came close to blaming the poor for their own failures.  
Despite the obvious differences, Rogers was every bit the Populist that the editor of The 
Advocate was.  Western Populists were necessarily a diverse bunch.  Many had sided 
with the Union during the Civil War, a few others for the Confederacy, while at least as 
many had been either too young or not yet residents of the United States.  Long-time 
third party organizers were often important in the development of the first state parties, 
but the largest share of their supporters at the outset had been Republicans, and over the 
course of the 1890s ex-Democrats would make up an increasing percentage of the voters 
and leaders.  As a result, they were just as ideologically diverse.  Among them were 
aging Jacksonians and young single-taxers, Bellamyite “nationalists” and Knights of 
Labor.  While few of their views were necessarily incompatible, the result was regular 
struggle within the many state parties over the limits and meaning of reform.
3
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Populism, Liberalism, and Republicanism 
 The historians‟ debate over Populist ideology reaches back over roughly sixty 
years now.  From the time of Richard Hofstadter‟s Age of Reform in the mid-1950s into 
the 1970s, the conflict was between those who considered the Populists to the left of 
center and those who viewed them as backward-looking conservatives.  In his widely 
read book, Hofstadter had classed them as the latter, a conclusion that some eastern 
intellectuals were increasingly accepting by that time.  But the historians of Populism—
more commonly academics from the state institutions of the Midwest—quickly attempted 
to stamp out this heresy.
4
  In the clash that followed, as one historian has put it, 
“Reactionary Populists chased socialist Populists through the learned journals in a quarrel 
that generated considerably more heat than light.”5  That debate only subsided as overt 
studies of politics fell from their place of dominance in American history generally.  A 
more recent debate is now taking its place, based on the remnants of the previous 
struggle.      
 The contemporary debate centers upon conceptions of “modernity,” and with it 
capitalism and liberalism.  While historians responded to Hofstadter‟s claims of Populist 
conservatism in a variety of ways, many came to explain Populist ideology as rooted in 
traditional “republicanism” and “producerism.”  This model provided an alternative, 
allowing scholars to see in the agrarian and labor movement a set of ideals that ignored 
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the individualism and self-interest they believed was inherent in liberal thought.  Instead, 
producerist and republican ideology prioritized the collective good over the individual‟s 
rights to property and private gain.  It contended that economic independence was a pre-
requisite to political freedom.  In the process, some portrayed these farmers and workers 
as harkening back to pre-industrial ideals of political equality and economic opportunity.
6
  
 Yet the invocation of republicanism has led to its own controversies.  Some have 
suggested that the Populists were unquestionably following in the republican tradition, 
but that their dated ideas doomed them to failure as their contemporaries came to accept 
the liberal emphasis on individual rights and self-interest.  By this way of thinking, 
Populism‟s collapse was not because of tactical blunders, but instead the movement‟s 
demise was due to antiquated ideas and their refusal to join the modern world.
7
 
 Rather than accept either of these analyses, two historians have attempted to bring 
Populism back into line with modernity, and with it, liberalism.  Norman Pollack, who 
had previously claimed that the Populists were class-conscious proto-socialists, reversed 
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course to claim that the agrarian reformers were “modern” capitalists, though they 
favored serious alterations to the system then in place.  He claimed that the Populists only 
sought to restore “competitive capitalism”—a state in which unnatural monopolies would 
no longer hold economic power over farmers and laborers and government assured all 
access to the market.  While Pollack claimed to be unsure about whether producer 
republicanism had any influence on the movement, his refusal to seriously evaluate it 
suggests he had come to his ultimate conclusion on the subject.
8
    
More recently, Charles Postel has joined in this effort to define the Populists as 
“modern” reformers.  As he put it in the introduction of his recent book, Populists were 
focused on “power and interest,” and they had a tendency to view the world “through a 
narrow materialist lens.”  By the 1890s, he said, all Americans were too thoroughly 
integrated into national—and increasingly, global—systems of trade and communication 
to have maintained traditionalist fears of the market.  The Farmers‟ Alliance was an 
organization like many others of their era—it was a conglomeration built to increase 
efficiency and place agrarians on a competitive foundation.  Populists supported science 
and rationality, even to the point that they accepted increasingly popular scientific 
justifications for segregation.  Their references to Jeffersonian or Jacksonian forms of 
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freedom represented little more than “rhetorical alchemy,” he said.  Postel‟s Populists 
were almost incapable of invoking “traditional” values as they searched for solutions.9   
 While the truth does not always lie in the middle, in this case it would seem 
difficult to believe either side to the exclusion of the others.  Postel is absolutely right that 
the world that Populists inhabited left them better connected to the world than rural 
people ever had been, that these connections were not totally new in 1890 or even the 
decade before, and that Populists certainly were not the deluded followers of an agrarian 
myth.  Populists did believe in capitalism, industrialization, private property, and 
individualism.  However, Postel‟s work did not discredit the material other historians had 
presented so much as he found evidence that, to his readers, would seem to speak of 
values that contradicted classical republicanism.
10
   
One problem that arises with these works has to do with the use of the word 
“modern.”  As employed by both Pollack and Postel, it is used in direct contradistinction 
with the term “traditional,” and also by extension “republican.”  Yet neither 
acknowledges that most individuals in history have not been as intellectually rigorous or 
coherent in their views as later historians have sought to make them.  Just as they 
connected traditionalism and republicanism, Postel and Pollack conflated liberalism and 
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capitalism with late-nineteenth-century conceptions of “modernity.”  Neither openly 
addressed the fact that no one in late nineteenth-century America was a strict adherent of 
“modern” liberalism.  As a useful point of comparison, even the classical liberal 
mugwump reformers maintained a strong connection with traditional republican values.  
Though they believed the market alone was the best tool for the distribution of resources 
and that economic self-interest was the primary determinant of human action, these high-
minded intellectuals also aspired to find men for elected office who were civic-minded 
and immune to selfishness.  They wanted individuals who were economically 
independent (thus beyond corruption) and educated—those they simply called the “best 
men,”—to control the apparatus of state.  At the same time, they attempted to promote a 
harmonious society bereft of class conflict.  They were not opposed to progress, and their 
views of modernity and development were not so different from others of the period, but 
they detested both the crass excesses of some of the nouveaux riches and feared the 
whims of the unwashed masses.  Though they spoke of laissez-faire, they dreamed of a 
paternalistic society that had much in common with the antebellum era and, 
fundamentally, the era of the nation‟s founding.  The mugwumps held republican and 
liberal values simultaneously, just as others of their era certainly did.
11
 
Obviously, the rigid definitions that have been attributed to the concepts of 
republicanism or liberalism are incongruous with the historically loose application of 
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elements from both the traditions.  Other historians have demonstrated that liberalism and 
republicanism shared much in common, and that the seminal liberal thinkers still 
accepted much from the republican tradition.
12
  Further, James Kloppenberg has 
explained how the two concepts should not be seen as mutually exclusive even in the 
context of the late nineteenth century.  Republicanism and liberalism were two streams of 
thought that “comprised a multitude of arguments developed in different contexts to solve 
different problems and to articulate different ideals,” he said.  As such, they need not be 
seen as mutually exclusive.  Kloppenberg also suggests that this language should be seen 
as more than just rhetoric.  The two streams of thought invoked different values, but both 
could claim to be the authentic heirs of the founding generation.  It must be assumed that 
speakers and writers would not have invoked the language of either tradition if the words 
had no special meaning to either themselves or their audiences.  If the Populists did 
employ both liberal and republican concepts in the formulation of their ideology, then 
they must have had a need to argue for something not easily fitted into either ideological 
framework.
13
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The reform agenda of the 1890s needs to be seen as the product of this patchwork 
ideology.  Populists were liberal to the extent they believed in the market, property rights 
(with serious limitations), and individual rights.  Part of their frustration did pertain to 
what they saw as a perversion of the market by capitalists and their allies in government, 
and they also worked to carve out an economic niche based on the needs of the market 
sectors they represented.  But any liberal emphasis on the individual was incapable of 
embodying their most serious critiques of the capitalist system and its structures of 
power.  No liberal of the era rejected the principles of virtuous citizenship, and certainly 
older conceptions of rights lingered on, but Populists more than most employed 
republican discourse to justify their agenda.  In the eyes of many Populists, the 
unchecked greed of the financiers threatened to turn whole classes of society into 
economic dependents.  Producerist ideals—which, among other things, they invoked to 
demand greater wealth for those who created value and to question the legal rights of 
non-human-persons (corporations)—provided a more effective rationalization for things 
like the total restructuring of the financial system or the nationalization of certain 
industries.
14
  These planks of their platform were not merely adjustments of Smithian or 
Lockean models, but a different model altogether.
15
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While the primary elements of Populist ideology will be explained and 
demonstrated throughout the following chapters, it is still useful to lay out their basic 
principles here.  For the purposes of simplicity, the bases of Populist ideology can be 
revealed through an examination of their tracts and commentaries.  Among those 
examined for this brief survey are William Peffer‟s The Farmers Side (1891), James B. 
Weaver‟s A Call to Action (1892), and John Rankin Rogers‟s Politics (1894), 
supplemented with articles from selected Populist newspapers such as Davis Waite‟s 
Aspen Union Era.   Obviously such an investigation cannot come close to covering the 
breadth of western Populist thought.  Still, this examination should make one point clear:  
when they launched into their attacks on the power of monopolies or growing wealth 
inequality, or when they explained elements of their programs such as financial reform or 
the nationalization of industries, Populist thinkers—even individually—did not follow 
what present historians would consider a single ideological tradition.  Additionally, this 
brief examination should clarify certain elements of their agenda and make distinctions 
between the reforms proposed by Populists and those enacted in the generation that 
followed them.  Populists were most certainly not conservatives who desired to return 
America to a pre-industrial condition, nor were they a movement that represented 
entrenched interests.  Theirs was instead largely a movement of those at the middle and 
the bottom who were trying to stake a claim to economic justice in an era of growing 
wealth disparities.  While they did seek to harness the powers of the federal government 
to transform American capitalism, they did so as a necessary expedient rather than due to 
any ideological preference for centralization.  Furthermore, the notions with which they 
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proceeded made them quite different from the regulatory progressives of the twentieth 
century.      
Perhaps the single strongest point that united all western Populists was their “anti-
monopoly” position.   Large capital enterprises held tremendous power in these relatively 
new states, and incumbent Republicans had encouraged the growth of that power by 
taking an unabashedly pro-growth stance.
16
  When James B. Weaver, a former 
Republican and Greenback congressman, informed readers that “monstrous 
combinations” now controlled “the business of every city,” and they “thrust their paid 
lobbyists within the corridors and onto the floor of every legislative assembly,” he was 
telling them something that many already knew.  The national government was not 
immune to this phenomenon.  Weaver claimed that not even Alexander Hamilton had 
contemplated that the Senate “should become the stronghold of monopoly, nor that it 
should hedge up the way to all reform and make impossible the peaceful overthrow of 
conceded abuses.”17  In addition to their control of Congress, many argued that great 
corporations had taken over the courts as well.  In the case of the railroads, even if one 
were willing to face down the “probably not less than one thousand lawyers,” employed 
by tycoons such as Jay Gould, William Peffer told readers that one would find that “all 
important avenues to the courts are brought under control of the interested corporation.”18  
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Furthermore, Populists felt that the industrialists‟ use of force against labor amounted to a 
challenge to the sovereign rights of the government.  Weaver compared the use of 
Pinkertons—a force that he believed outnumbered the regular army—to the use of private 
armies by feudal barons.
19
  A writer for the publication The Coming Crisis, based in 
Pueblo, Colorado, turned to a more recent example by comparing the private forces of 
Carnegie during the Homestead strike to the British use of Hessian mercenaries during 
the American Revolution.  Both the British king and Carnegie, he said, had attempted to 
quash American freedom.
20
      
As Pollack most clearly defined it, the Populist critique focused most intensely on 
the development of a “class state.”21  Populists wanted to put an end to what they saw as 
preferential laws—and the interpretation of law—that seemed to only to benefit the few.  
While their opponents would sometimes claim that it was the Populists who advocated 
“class legislation,” or legislation for the benefit of certain interests, the reformers pointed 
out that unfair legislation was already the norm and that they were only attempting to 
correct the earlier mistake.
22
  To an extent, they believed that the great concentrations of 
wealth were a product of laws that created special privilege.  In early 1890 a future 
Populist Congressman from Nebraska, William McKeighan, wrote to the newspaper 
Farmers’ Alliance stating that “reference to the history of other nations fails to afford a 
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single instance of the accumulation of so great wealth in the hands of a few individuals.”  
Some unusual causes “must exist to produce such abnormal results.  They are found in 
the special legislation of the country, extending aid and protection to capital.”23   Davis 
Waite‟s paper informed readers that, in order to save freedom and have a just distribution 
of wealth, “monopoly and special privilege, which are created by law, must be destroyed 
by the repeal of such laws.”24  The partnership of government and big business had to be 
stopped.   
For westerners, the most obvious beneficiary of friendly government policies had 
been the railroad industry.   Weaver pointed to one of the most obvious gifts given to the 
railroads, the enormous land grants.  “In Dakota,” he said, “the Northern Pacific gets as 
much land as there is in the two States of New Jersey and Connecticut.  In Montana the 
grant to the same company is as large as the whole of Maryland, New Jersey, and 
Massachusetts…. [A]nd in Washington Territory its grant equals in extent the size of the 
three states of New Jersey, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts.”  Weaver declared these 
subsidies to be unnecessary, because almost “none of the aided roads…were built until a 
profit in construction could be seen without the aid of land grants.”25  These were not 
grants designed to promote progress, but favors given by friends in high places.  A writer 
for the Aspen Union Era came to even more serious conclusions in an analysis of the 
Civil War-era actions of Congress, taken in favor of the transcontinental lines.  The huge 
                                                 
23
 William A. McKeighan, “Wealth as a Political Power,” Farmers Alliance (Lincoln), Mar. 1, 1890; see 
also Pollack, Just Polity, 179-180.   
24
 “A Message to the People of Aspen and Vicinity,” Aspen Union Era, Jan. 7, 1892, p. 1.   
25
 Weaver, Call to Action, 153-155.   
32 
 
gifts given the railroads in 1862 and 1864 hinted at bribery even greater in scale than that 
exposed in the Credit Mobilier scandal.  As evidence, the writer pointed to the 
Congressional votes in 1864, in which nearly half the Senators and almost the same 
proportion of Congressmen had refused to vote at all.  It was impossible to dare say “that 
a large part of the absent, or not voting senators and representatives were not bribe-
takers.”  That such favoritism had become public policy only encouraged this type of 
corruption.
26
   
Another of the more obvious targets of the critics was the system of protective 
tariffs, which were implemented by Republicans in Congress for the support of “infant 
industries.”27  Populists declared that these combinations were infants no longer.  The 
Aspen Union Era stated that organizations like the steel trust were able to become 
monopolies “by the assistance of the protective duty on steel rails,” and by this “control 
the markets and fix the prices at which its products are to be sold.”28  Peffer, too, wrote 
that it appeared “there is a very strong disposition in certain quarters to pervert our tariff 
legislation from its original design into one for the benefit of a particular class of people, 
and that class represented by a very small number of persons.”29  This analysis was very 
much in line with classical liberal ideals, and it was already a familiar idea to mugwump 
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reformers and laissez faire Democrats.
30
  While Populists did not believe the tariff was 
itself a major concern, they were sure that it represented congressional favoritism for 
those who needed little help.   
In comments similar to those of the Union Era, other Populists explained how 
trusts had been consciously built to avoid competition.  Weaver wrote that “monopolies 
organized to destroy competition and restrain trade.”  A sound policy for the public 
interest “favors competition in the present condition of organized society.”  Restated just 
a few paragraphs later, he added that monopolies hated competition “because the people 
share in the spoils.”31   Monopolies were strangling competition; of this all Populists were 
sure.  John Rankin Rogers stated it most simply:  “The competitive system, or the war of 
business, is slowly dying.”  An age of monopolies was about to dawn unless serious 
action was taken against them.
32
   
There was a general consensus among Populists that large business combinations 
dominated the American economy and that they threatened all common people.  “Once 
they secure control of a given line of business,” wrote Weaver, “they are masters of the 
situation and can dictate to the two great classes with which they deal—the producer of 
the raw material and the consumer of the finished product.”33  Weaver explained the 
abstract potential of monopolies, but much of western Populist literature focused on more 
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tangible examples familiar to the people of their region.  Peffer pointed to a combination 
by meat packers and others who he claimed controlled the sale price of all livestock.  
“[W]hen cattle from the West reached Chicago there was no competition among buyers.  
The stock business there was controlled by commission merchants, railroad companies, 
and packing houses, who divided the profits among themselves.”34  This industrial cartel 
guaranteed competition was kept to a minimum.  Similarly, Waite‟s paper told readers to 
be wary when two major western coal companies merged.  Aside from the thousands the 
editor predicted would be fired from their jobs in the process of consolidation, he warned 
that another result was sure to be that “coal users would be squeezed.”35   
Many of the specific criticisms of trusts levied by Populists focused on concerns 
that fit well with principles of liberal interest-group politics.  Their grievances 
represented the frustrations of the producers and consumers of certain goods against those 
who they felt had been abusing the system of exchange.  The free market was collapsing 
they said, and they often stated that their platform called only for a return of equitable 
competition.  However, in the process they also characterized large corporations as 
something unnatural, delegitimizing their very existence.   Populists claimed to represent 
the small producer who was (by virtue of his independence) the backbone of the republic.  
While they did make demands for fairness based on their perceived right to a reasonable 
economic opportunity, their attacks on perceived inequality went farther than liberal 
arguments would allow.  They did not just claim that those with interests similar to their 
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own were being treated unfairly, but instead they claimed that the system of predatory 
wealth that had become an integral part of the economy was fundamentally oppressive to 
the masses.  In such a way, they leveled a producerist critique of late-nineteenth-century 
American capitalism.    
Populists characterized the system of economics in their own era as inherently 
parasitic.  Rogers accused the employers of wage-workers of “stealing from men and 
women who are placed by our system of slavery in such a deprived and dependent 
position that they can no more help themselves than could the negroes in chattel 
slavery.”36  All employers, he said, robbed workers of the fruits of their labor.  Weaver 
made a more complex analogy.  Corporations received legislative approval of their 
charters, which he claimed were the equivalent of letters of marque bestowed on 
privateers who had targeted enemy shipping in previous eras.  These persons had been 
“little else than licensed pirates,” but at least they had attacked the commerce of an 
enemy state.  In his own time, “The corporation is always authorized by the Sovereign to 
make its reprisals upon an unoffending people.”  Weaver employed the pirate analogy 
throughout his lengthy work, starting on the first page of the preface.
37
  One writer for the 
Aspen Union Era likewise flayed the wealthy for their crimes.  “One-half the wealth of 
our nation is now owned by 31,000 people of an entire population of 62,000,000” due to 
the power of monopolies, the author said.   This was no better than “Legalized robbery,” 
the writer continued, which was fundamentally “the parent and cause of all other forms of 
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robbery.”  The author offered no suggestion that this wealth had been amassed through 
any form of recognized criminal mischief; instead the collection of such a sum was 
innately a crime against the community.
38
  This kind of language demonstrated a hatred 
for an economic power relationship that Populists understood to be unsuited to the 
historic foundations of the American system.         
Populists responded to this system of economic exclusion with calls for 
cooperation, or, as Postel sometimes refers to it, combination.  According to Postel, 
Populists were living in an era of growing corporate combinations and trusts and he 
describes the reaction of farmers as one that followed the business model of the day.  
Each farmer was merely “a country business person whose commercial self-interest 
pointed to level-headed business strategies,” he said.  Cooperation was simply a tactic to 
allow individual entrepreneurs to compete in the modern market system.
39
   
Postel is partly right when he attempts to de-mythologize the history of farmer 
cooperation.   Cooperation was not solely based on some traditional community instinct 
or some sense of class solidarity beyond the desire of people in the same occupation to 
share in the benefits that pooled resources could provide.  For many Populists, 
cooperation was an option that promised the possibility of leverage against the power of 
the monopolistic industries and cartels of buyers.  “The railroad companies and the cattle 
dealers united their forces years ago for the purpose of making money,” wrote William 
Peffer.  “So it has been with the ranchmen of the West.  So it is with manufacturers.  So it 
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is with bankers.  While their individual and local interests are separate and distinct from 
one another, yet they have a common interest.  Hence they form organizations.”  Peffer 
had his grievances with such associations, but they were not the only ones who could 
cooperate.  “Now, let the farmers and their co-workers learn from the lessons which these 
things teach; let them organize, not only for social purposes… but for business.”40   
Time and again, Populist writers informed the rank and file that cooperation was a 
way of business and must be adopted.  It was in this tone that a writer for The Advocate 
told readers that “When farmer competes with farmer for a chance to sell his products, 
and when wage-worker competes with wage-worker for an opportunity to sell his labor, 
capital is king.”  Cooperative selling could reverse that, for “when capital competes with 
capital to secure the products of the soil or the services of the wage worker, labor will be 
king.”41  One piece in the Aspen Union Era explained details regarding a new Kansas 
cooperative mortgage company in a similar tone.  “The scheme of co-operation which is 
to rid the world of the ruinous system of competition will be applied to the payment of 
mortgaged indebtedness,” the author claimed.42  Cooperative buying and selling was the 
tactic of the business world, and it was time for farmers and laborers to experience the 
benefits it could provide.    
Cooperation was ultimately described as a modern necessity if farmers or laborers 
were to maintain any semblance of economic independence.  One writer for a newspaper 
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used an allegorical tale to explain the simple value of cooperation.  The author began 
with a description of his earlier life, ten years before, when he had been a resident of a 
town in Kansas.  There, roughly a hundred men “were constantly employed dressing 
stone.”  One day a machine salesman came with an offer for the stoneworkers:   
If you gentlemen will chip in ten dollars apiece I‟ll put up a machine that will do 
the work you are doing better and faster; so fast that ten of you with the machine 
will do as much work as all are doing.  You will own the machine and can divide 
up into squads of ten, each squad work one month and lay off nine months and 
accomplish as much as you are all doing now and get the same pay for it.    
 
The men refused, preferring to work in their own way.  Soon, the story went, a capitalist 
met up with the salesman and made the purchase the artisans had just refused.  In little 
time, he had ten unskilled workers running the machine and producing at full capacity, 
while “the one hundred men cursed the machine, the inventor, and the capitalist, and 
struck out to swell the army of the unemployed.”43  The moral of the story was direct 
enough.  Cooperation, in conjunction with the acceptance of technology and modern 
methods, was necessary if individuals were to compete in the world of modern business.   
Cooperation was a theme in the work of all Populist writers, no matter how 
difficult it was for them to reconcile with their other beliefs.  For example, cooperation 
would not have seemed the most logical topic for the thoroughgoing individualist John 
Rankin Rogers.  He was far more likely to cite Herbert Spencer‟s social views or David 
Ricardo‟s iron law of wages—the latter of which he used in Politics—rather than 
something like Laurence Gronlund‟s Cooperative Commonwealth.44  His private letters 
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demonstrate his tentative views of mutual aid.  As governor of Washington, he was in 
communication with a group that was working to establish a cooperative colony inside 
the state.  Rogers told the group‟s secretary that he believed the key to their success was 
individual property rights.  Each family must be “owners of their separate homes.”  Only 
then would “combining together for active assistance in industries” be possible, he said.  
Private property and accumulation remained too vital for him to reject.  People had to 
have something to work for, an aspiration to reach for.  As he would put in one of his 
later works, “Man lives to acquire; to gain in some direction…. Some small gain, in one 
direction or another, must be his.”45  Cooperation had its merits, but it would not enable 
participants to transcend the individual‟s drive to improve their situation.46     
For those who consider Populist acceptance of the principle of material self-
interest proof that they were “modern,” these statements seem appropriate enough.  They 
appear absolutely fitting for individuals who were trying to fit into a world in which 
individual rights were supreme and business practices were adapted to the forces of the 
market.  Yet many of the same individuals who wrote or publicized these statements 
made remarks that hardly suggest their approval of this new order of things.  They mixed 
in attacks on the rights of property, and several even wrote of the supremacy of 
community needs over the rights of any individual (or, for that matter, any corporation).    
In the case of Rogers, his extreme emphasis on an individual‟s right to property 
actually led him to question the entire concept of inheritable property titles.  All people 
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had a God-given right to the resources of nature—but his natural rights philosophy was 
quite different from that of the liberal philosophers.  Rogers believed that those who 
claimed sole possession of any naturally-available resource denied the free use of that 
resource to all other individuals (or, as others would put it, the community).  The theory 
that such substantial rights could belong to one individual—“the principle upon which 
this deprivation of the masses is based”—necessarily violated the rights of all other 
persons.  It was in this way that monopolies “gain their power and exert their sway by 
depriving the people, under various alluring and deceptive pretexts of their natural 
rights.”  Perhaps Rogers‟s greatest fear was the development of “land monopolies” that 
would reduce all farmers of the future to the status of mere tenants.  “Land and its natural 
products,” he explained, “form the provision made by nature—of the Creator—for the 
use and sustenance of men, of all men, during life…. Natural title, right title, comes 
simply from the nature of man—from his necessities.  His need is his warrant.”  An 
individual‟s need for the resources of nature was paramount, and any other claim was 
secondary, created by society to impose a sort of order.  Furthermore, that right to use 
ended with the life of an individual.  “When life is done need ceases, and title, natural 
title, come to an end.”  Ultimately, he believed every person was entitled to a grant of 
land, for free and not subject to any taxation, for the duration of one‟s life.  Instead of 
title in perpetuity, “The right to occupy and use could be sold precisely as men now sell 
government „claims.‟”  This, he said, was the only legitimate system for land tenure; any 
alternative amounted to robbery.
47
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Others, too, leveled their own serious attacks on the recognized rights of property.  
Like Rogers, Weaver feared the development of a land monopoly, which he considered a 
violation of natural rights to the soil.  The right to “till it unmolested, as soon as he has 
the strength to do so and to live upon the fruits of his toil without paying tribute to any 
other creature” was “among the most sacred and essential” rights that all must share.  The 
recently declared “end of the frontier” had convinced him that all of the suitable lands 
had been claimed. In order to restore the God-given right of common people to property 
of their own, Weaver predicted a “complete readjustment” in the very near future.48  
Davis Waite‟s partner in the Aspen Union Era, G. C. Rohde, came even closer to Rogers‟ 
statements when he wrote that “Private property in land is legalized robbery… The 
sooner we recognize the fact that the earth belongs to all the people in usufruct, and not to 
those who have chanced to secure possession thereof, the sooner justice is done to labor.”  
Like Rogers, he argued for a right to use the land but against inheritable title to a type of 
property that should be reserved for the benefit of all.
49
   
Populist interest in property stemmed from their acceptance of the traditional 
belief that economic independence and political freedom were complementary.  Each, 
logically, put their own spin on it, but the great majority of Populist writers did not 
believe that one could work for another and still maintain political autonomy.  William 
Peffer described the dehumanization faced by contemporary wage workers.  Of those 
compelled to work in factories, he said:  
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They are practically as much machines as the unconscious mechanical 
combinations to which they attend.  By this process of absorption in large 
manufacturing establishments the individuality of the separate workers is virtually 
lost.  The man who was once an individual citizen among the farmers is now a 
part of a great manufacturing establishment in the city, doing his work with the 
same precision, the same regularity, the same method that an inanimate 
implement does.   
 
This also created a power relationship of such imbalance that a worker had little power to 
resist the demands of a corporate master.  This had given the employer “a practical 
ownership of his work-people,” resulting in the loss of workers‟ political freedom.50  
Others told laborers that economic independence must remain their ultimate goal if they 
wanted true freedom.  A writer for the Coming Crisis asked, “You producers of wealth, 
you workman, do you think you were born to work for wages, and other men born to hire 
you and make a profit?”  Responding to their own question, the writer answered in the 
negative.  “When you study politics more, you will find nature never intended you as a 
beast of burden.”51  For John Rankin Rogers, it was as much a character issue as 
anything.  He contended that access to property was a natural right, and economic 
independence created republican citizens.  “Either [man] will be a producer of values or a 
mere dead weight upon the body politic,” he wrote.  Through control of land and their 
own labor, “liberty and independence can be maintained and the individual freed from 
that soul debasing dependence which is so destructive of manhood and character.”52  
Independence, and with it manliness, required access to property of one‟s own.   
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In order to facilitate the advancement of political and economic equality, 
Populists called for federal government control of certain industries, especially the lines 
of transportation and communication.  While their proposal was largely intended to 
facilitate a more equitable system for use by small producers—and thus enable them to 
better compete in the capitalist system—it was also designed to destroy private 
enterprises that had become too powerful to control by any other means.  A brief article 
in the Topeka Advocate told those who questioned the propriety of federal ownership of 
the railroads to cease their hypocrisy:  “Those who express so much horror in the 
paternalism involved in the proposition of government ownership of the means of 
transportation and communication have no fears of the centralization of power in the 
hands of a few irresponsible men resulting from corporate control of the same franchises 
and the absorption of more than one half of the aggregate wealth of the entire country by 
less than 50,000 people.”  This writer did not emphasize the public role of these 
networks, but instead noted the power they held over the community and the benefits 
they provided for the few.
53
  Some Populists adopted the principle of government 
ownership for other industries, again because they had allegedly abused their 
overwhelming power.  For example, a writer for The Coming Crisis called for the 
nationalization of the iron and steel industry in response to the violence in Homestead.  
“When Americans have to choose between liberty and the „rights‟ of private monopoly 
the latter will have to go.  If one man is to have his way, and that way deprives 10,000 
citizens of their opportunity to work, then the one man‟s interests must give way to the 
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many.”  Monopolies such as those of Carnegie “must perish from the land or freedom is a 
mockery.”  Nationalization was the only way, the author said, since “there is no other 
way to run it and not have it oppressive.”  Monopolies would only operate humanely if 
they were under direct control of democratic government.
54
    
 Despite the attempts of some to link Populist reform with the development of the 
federal regulatory state, Populists themselves did not believe that the most dangerous 
capital combinations could be regulated in such a way.  While it is certainly true that the 
Alliances had sought to use local government authority to limit the power of railroads and 
that the Populist Party did attempt to add new laws for just that purpose, by the beginning 
of the 1890s most Populist writers argued that these combinations should instead be 
either destroyed or nationalized.
55
  As their presidential candidate stated in his book, “we 
have experimented through the lifetime of a whole generation and have demonstrated that 
avarice is an untrustworthy public servant, and that greed cannot be regulated or made to 
work in harmony with the public welfare.”  Populists had lost faith in regulatory agencies 
and, more generally, in the government‟s willingness to prosecute large combinations.  
“Laws are made now-a-days to shield men of wealth—not poor men,” claimed one writer 
for the The Advocate.  The “interstate commerce law is no exception to the rule,” he 
continued, and “Neither that or the so-called Sherman anti-trust law were ever designed 
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to operate against the interests of organized capital.  They were designed solely as covers 
for legislation by which organized capital should be enabled to make further conquests 
over labor.”   Government ownership was the only way they believed common citizens 
could be protected from the exploitation of large capital.
56
   
 Yet it was only with some hesitation that Populists advocated such enlargement of 
the federal government‟s power.  Turning to the national government was a last resort.  
Some, including such leaders as William Peffer, did not even favor government 
ownership of the railroads.
57
  Federal power was also at stake in regards to the 
subtreasury plan.   This proposal, first laid out by Charles Macune of the Texas-based 
Farmers‟ Alliance and Industrial Union in 1889, called for the construction of a system of 
government-owned warehouses for the storage of agricultural produce.  Farmers could 
bring in their harvest, and in exchange they would receive a low-interest loan worth up to 
eighty percent of the value of crop.   This system would have allowed southern farmers to 
avoid the abuses associated with crop-liens and furnishing merchants, while at the same 
time it created an outlet for more government-issued greenbacks.  Despite its potential 
benefits, support for the plan was rather limited in areas outside of the former 
Confederacy.
58
   
Unfortunately for proponents of the plan, westerners did not believe that the 
subtreasury dealt with their own unique problems.  Jay Burrows, the leader of the 
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Nebraska Alliance and a founder of the state‟s Populist Party, called the scheme “too 
hair-brained [sic] for even patient criticism.”  One local Kansas Alliance called it 
“detrimental to the farmers and industrial classes,” and rather damningly identified it as 
“class legislation.”59  Its reception was no better in Colorado.  There, the president of the 
state Farmers‟ Alliance felt the need to remind members that the subtreasury was “now 
one of the most vital and importance principles of our order,” and he expressed surprise 
that “we have members who oppose it on every occasion.”  He concluded his address by 
threatening expulsion to any who publicly opposed the measure.
60
    
 Populists did seek to employ the power of the federal government to reshape the 
national economy, but they also held a certain distrust of centralized control.  They 
demonstrated elements of this attitude when they attributed the rise of monopolies to the 
intrigues of congressmen.  But as frustrated as Populists were with the regular abuse of 
power, they were especially alarmed by those conservatives who intended to turn the 
federal government into a tool for the maintenance of “law and order.”  They employed 
language of this sort most frequently at moments of labor unrest.  In the weeks after 
Homestead, a writer for The Advocate reminded readers that a growing American 
aristocracy “is determined to control the policy of our government and debase the masses 
of our people.”  The author then cited an article from the “hireling press” which had 
recently declared “When we reach the point where we are forced to choose between a 
change in our institutions or a subversion of the rights of individual liberty and 
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property…we will welcome the rise of centralized government whose arm is long enough 
to reach and strong enough to hold by the collar all rebels against the government near 
and far.”61  At nearly the same time, a remarkably similar piece appeared in the Aspen 
Union Era.  The author in this case quoted an article in the “leading plutocrat paper of the 
western coast” in which the author had expressed confidence that “Slowly but surely this 
country is drifting toward centralization.”  States were to be federal districts, and 
governors would be appointed by the national administration.  “Behind them will be 
arrayed the Federal government and the army of the United States—that pitiless machine.  
Bayonets do not think… If they were ordered to shoot down the mass of Huns, Slavs, 
Croats, Irishmen and the few Americans who make up the mob at Homestead, they would 
do so without a moment‟s hesitation.”  According to that “plutocrat paper,” the American 
economic elite was coming to support such a plan, and “it is the workingmen who are 
driving them.”62   
Two years later, shortly after the federal intervention in Chicago to put down the 
widespread American Railway Union strike—shortly after Governor John Peter Altgeld 
of Illinois had explicitly denied the need for the Army—a local Kansas Farmers‟ Alliance 
put its fears on record.  “[W]e view with alarm the tendency of the ruling powers of the 
United States to a strong centralized government,” it declared.  Especially menacing was 
the way in which local authorities had been ignored “and deprived of their lawful rights 
in controling [sic] their domestic affairs” so that “United States troops” could be 
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deployed “at the beck and call of monied [sic] corporations.”63  John Rankin Rogers also 
included a hint of these fears in his tract Politics.  While producers created “$10 in wealth 
monopoly has announced its decision to bring on the army and a „stronger government‟ 
unless $9 out of each $10 be obsequiously handed over.”64   These examples do not 
suggest that Populists were universally anti-government—the majority of their platform 
clearly suggests the opposite.  Nonetheless, some did fear that local sovereignty would be 
eroded and increasing power wielded by a (physically and psychically) distant 
government, something that had thus far only been done for the benefit of the powerful.   
  For a majority of Populists, the most pressing reform they advocated did pertain 
directly to the federal government.  Financial and currency issues were the foremost 
concerns of most who joined the new party in the 1890s, and it was the change that 
Populists predicted would have had the widest effect in their efforts to restructure the 
national economy.  While the struggle of the 1890s has often been stereotyped as the 
“battle” over silver currency, the majority of Populist leaders and writers were 
committed, in varying degrees, to greenback theories of money.  The primary component 
of a greenback system would be paper fiat currency printed and controlled solely by the 
federal government.  Instead, the system in place was (to say the least) untidy.  Gold, 
silver, and various paper currencies all circulated simultaneously and, unsurprisingly, 
different exchange rates developed for each.  Silver had been demonetized in 1873, and 
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only supplementary acts passed in 1875, 1878, and 1890 had allowed any of the white 
metal to remain in circulation at all.  Greenbacks issued by the federal government had 
been issued since the Civil War, but as the only currency without an intrinsic value—
combined with a legal limitation prohibiting their use for the payment of import tariffs—
it is easy to see how they held the lowest exchange rate of all.  Gold had become the de 
facto standard, but its rarity meant that hard currency remained in short supply.  Private 
bank notes filled in the gaps, but the whole system fostered incessant currency 
speculation.  Additionally, the relative inflexibility of a structure based at its heart upon 
specie had led to chronic deflation by the 1890s.
65
   
 When Populists demanded an inflated currency, they were fulfilling the needs of 
the market sector they represented.  Farmers almost universally desired currency 
inflation, but before 1892 these calls had resulted only in useless platform planks by both 
major parties, and most knew that the leaders of neither the Republican nor Democratic 
parties intended to enact such proposals.
66
  The new party promised something different.  
Yet deciphering precisely what that meant or understanding how its members viewed 
contemporary capitalist finance is no less challenging than it is for any other Populist 
concern.    
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Populists did argue for currency reform so they could better take their place in the 
market, and most Populist writers described the serious impact of the Treasury‟s 
engineered monetary contraction in their works.  They attacked the government‟s policy 
of currency contraction that had followed the Civil War from the perspective of farmers 
and small producers.   In his book The Farmer’s Side, William Peffer described the 
results of these policies in pragmatic terms.  As a result of deflation, “values of farm 
products have fallen 50 per cent since the great war, and farm values have depreciated 25 
to 50 per cent during the last ten years.”  Just as the “population had increased 15 per cent 
and the volume of business 40 to 50 per cent,” and “when the business of the people 
required more money instead of less money for its proper transaction,” Congress reduced 
the circulating currency by over half.  When he stated these facts, Peffer was not 
harkening back to a simpler time before the coming of a complex market, but instead he 
said that farmers needed the market.  “One of the essential parts of this vast system of 
trade,” he wrote, “absolutely necessary for transacting it, is money.  Without money 
commerce would cease; without money, all movement of trade would stop; without 
money there would be no business; all exchange would be barter, and that would take us 
back to barbarism.”67     
 At the same time, Peffer suggested that the structures of transaction had been 
contrived for the benefit of the financial sector and with the intent of crippling farmers.  
The agriculturalist had been “shorn of his power to help himself in a thousand and one 
little ways,” and he was now “at the mercy of combinations which are in effect 
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conspiracies against the common rights of the people.”  From that point he attacked the 
futures market and questioned “why it is that money is the only commodity which the 
law specially protects.  There is nothing in our legal codes fixing the prices at which 
wheat, or corn, or cattle, or cotton…or anything except money shall be sold.”  While he 
had argued that money was necessary for the transaction of business, Peffer eventually 
came to explain that the financial services sector acted in a way that harmed others 
because it was a business.  At the heart of it was the commercial model:  “the pecuniary 
interest of these useful agencies is to maintain the interest business.”  The only solution, 
wrote Peffer, was to “relieve the individual money lender of his present responsibility in 
that behalf and substitute a disinterested agency”—namely, a nationalized banking sector.  
Summing up his ideas in this regard, Peffer emphasized that “The proper function of 
money is to serve a public use” (emphasis in original).  He compared this government 
function to control over roadways.  Just as other Populists had argued in regard to the 
railways, he contended that if the public good required the expropriation of a part of the 
economy then no claim of individual ownership could legitimately stand in opposition.
68
   
 Leading Populists came to many of the same conclusions regarding the currency 
issue, and on this matter there was likely greater unanimity than on any other subject.  
After the government took over banking, Peffer believed Congress should make money 
by fiat.  The Constitution gave Congress the power to “make money for the people; it is 
duty bound to do so, and it is not limited to any particular article out of which to prepare 
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the money.”  Certainly paper would work as well as any other material.69  While John 
Rankin Rogers was beginning to put a greater emphasis on land and property reform, 
when he wrote in 1894 he still believed that all other reforms would be fruitless without 
proper money.  For him, “National paper money…unredeemable in gold” was the 
“touchstone of industrial freedom; this will protect the manufacturer and protect the 
laborer.”70  The editor of the Aspen Union Era called money “a representative or token of 
value for labor performed, and in order to be honest money must pass from hand to hand 
without losing this token of value.”  The government set and enforced the values by its 
fiat, the editor explained.
71
  While many of these same writers also made brief references 
to free silver, western Populist editors, authors, and leaders were firmly committed to 
greenback currency.   
 The Populist view of banks and financiers was necessarily complicated, and the 
language they used pertaining to the financial system mixed their own self-interest with 
the traditional language of reform.  Obviously, the party took up economic causes that 
were thought to benefit the sectors that felt neglected in the existing partisan 
environment.  But there is another side to the Populists‟ analysis that cannot be accounted 
for in histories that depict them as little more than orderly and business-like.  One whole 
strain of Populist thought on the subject has, in fact, been largely neglected by historians 
on both sides of the modern-versus-traditional debate, and it is tied intimately to their 
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views on finance.  Convenient as it is to say that Populists self-identified as “rational 
actors,” their use of conspiratorial language must also be evaluated.   
 
Money Power Conspiracy and Global Finance 
Conspiratorial thought is a subject that has practically vanished from recent works 
on American Populism, despite both ample evidence for its importance and a current 
environment which strongly warrants its inclusion.  For reasons that will be explained, it 
has been easier to avoid the subject than to exorcise the ghosts that still haunt the 
historiography of Populist thought.  In this study, the money power conspiracy theory 
will be evaluated as a reflection of Populist ideology and, in particular, an example that 
demonstrates Populist views of the confrontational relationship that existed between 
themselves and those who managed the government and financial systems.   
The money power conspiracy theory was one of the most powerful and 
widespread ideas of the late nineteenth century.  The term “money power” had originated 
in the Jacksonian era, and it was based on a fear of the accumulation of economic and 
political power that many believed would accompany the growth of the Second Bank of 
the United States.
72
  The growing power of the banking sector continued to fuel persistent 
fears of financial conspiracy in the years that followed, though by the end of the 
nineteenth century the precise meaning of the term had changed.  In 1890, the year the 
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first Alliance or independent political tickets ran in states such as Kansas and Nebraska, 
President Leonidas Polk of the National Farmers‟ Alliance and Industrial Union said that 
it was time to discard “all the rubbish of the negro question, bloody shirt, tariff and 
federal control of elections.  It is the money power, the rule of plutocracy, that has been 
keeping people down, and the slogan henceforth is financial reform.”73  Grand Master 
Workman of the Knights of Labor, James R. Sovereign, warned in 1896 that “Whenever 
the money power becomes stronger than the people, it will apply its arrogant lash with 
relentless fury, and liberty will be lost until through a reign of terror the oppressors have 
exhausted their forces in the gloom of another night.”74  As noted by Richard Hofstadter, 
the eccentric novelist Ignatius Donnelly included language based on the money power in 
his preamble to the Populist Party platform in 1892.  “A vast conspiracy against mankind 
has been organized on two continents,” he said, “and it is rapidly taking possession of the 
world.”75  Furthermore, the money power conspiracy features prominently in all the 
Populist books, pamphlets, and newspapers analyzed earlier in this chapter.  But if it was 
so common, why have historians said so little on the subject?   
 Richard Hofstadter is probably the individual most responsible for delegitimizing 
academic investigation of the money power conspiracy theory.  While others had 
emphasized the economic stresses faced by rural Americans in the 1890s, Hofstadter was 
more interested in the psychological needs of people who had felt that their position in 
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society had been undermined.  This “status anxiety,” he believed, pushed them to make 
frequently irrational statements, including conspiratorial and anti-Semitic ones.  He 
believed progressive historians had ignored the anti-Semitism and conspiratorial rhetoric 
of Populists—something he defined as important components of the “soft side” of 
Populist thought.  According to Hofstadter, conspiracy theory was attractive for anyone 
“who lived in isolation from the great world in which his fate was actually decided.”  By 
labeling the farmers—previously depicted by historians as the paragons of virtuous 
citizenship—as frustrated and deluded, his claims were already sure to stir controversy.  
But because Hofstadter focused on what he saw as the irrationality and hatred held by 
Populists—as he wrote in the immediate aftermath of World War II, no less—it could 
appear that Hofstadter was drawing a parallel between Populists and fascists.  Certainly 
two graduate students working under him at the time, Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, 
thought such an interpretation was likely:  “When one describes evidences of anti-
semitism as you do, the modern reader cannot avoid the picture of fascism & the gas 
chambers.”  Hofstadter did not fully heed their advice.76 
 Predictably, the backlash against Hofstadter was fierce.  Rarely has one book 
solicited the kind of response that Age of Reform did.  The majority of historians of 
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Populism believed Hofstadter had caricatured individuals who they considered the 
exemplars of rural Jeffersonian democracy.  While his use of a psychological tool that 
could be used indiscriminately sparked the ire of many, others objected specifically to his 
stereotyped formulation of rural people as especially bigoted and irrational.  Perhaps the 
best example of the rebuttals to Age of Reform was Walter Nugent‟s The Tolerant 
Populists.  In this close study of 1890s Kansas, Nugent detected no hint that the Populists 
were any more racist than their neighbors, and suggested that in fact they may have been 
a good deal more accepting of some peoples than many in America were at the time.  As 
for the conspiratorial elements of their speech, Nugent dismissed it as the language of 
discouraged but reasonable rural Americans, and added that if only they had “traveled to 
New York, Washington, Chicago, and London and seen at first hand what cities, industry, 
and finance were actually like, they would have realized that dogged competition, not 
class conspiracy,” was responsible for their plight.  Anti-Semites—and the conspiracy 
theorists presumed to go with them—were rare among rural Americans, and outside of 
the mainstream of Populism in any case.
77
   
 The historians of Populism had such a strong revulsion toward the perceived 
slander of their subjects by Hofstadter that few engaged the conspiracy theme seriously.  
They had effectively refuted Hofstadter‟s claim that the Populist Party was made up of 
hateful provincials upset by their declining status, but they largely ignored the strain of 
conspiratorial language that clearly did pervade Populist literature.  In the process, 
discussion of either anti-Semitism or conspiratorial language among Populists became 
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taboo.  One of the few historians after Hofstadter who took the money power conspiracy 
seriously was Jeffrey Ostler.  In his article “The Rhetoric of Conspiracy and the 
Formation of Kansas Populism,” Ostler put the money power into its place within a long 
history American political conspiracy.  He observed that works published since the late 
1960s on the American Revolution as well as on the development of the Republican Party 
had noted the important place of conspiratorial language in the writings of some of the 
nation‟s most important political leaders.  Similarly, Hofstadter had hinted that the 
Populists were not alone in this, but he had still felt the need to call conspiracy language 
the stuff of “cranks and political fakirs.”  Instead of falling into that trap, Ostler argued 
that the money power provided the ultimate motivation to take extreme action:  it 
justified the abandonment of the existing political framework and the transformation of 
the non-partisan Farmers‟ Alliance into a viable alternative.78   
 Where Ostler went—a full four decades after the publication of Age of Reform—
few have followed.  In his recently acclaimed book on Populist ideology, Charles Postel 
devoted fewer than a handful of pages to a discussion of conspiratorial language, and not 
once did he reference the money power theory specifically.  He may have even misread 
one of the major texts on the subject.
79
  As his goal was to create the image of a rational, 
“modern” movement, Postel‟s lack of attention should not be surprising.  The image 
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created (or played upon) by Hofstadter, of a frustrated and simple hayseed, has lingered 
on.  Few have been willing to characterize Populists as anything that even superficially 
resembles the stereotype employed in Age of Reform, and so historians have found it 
easier to give the subject a wide berth.
80
   
Still, if it was so commonly held a belief then surely it must have represented 
some thing or things that were important to the Populist view of the world in which they 
lived.  The story was already old by the 1890s.  As noted earlier, conspiracies regarding a 
“money power” had circulated since the Jacksonian era, but the form of these theories 
changed to fit the growing frustrations of workers and laborers in the post-bellum era.  
The development of a modernized money power thesis was likely stimulated by the 
tumult associated with the Panic of 1873.  In July of 1878, the official organ of the 
Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers printed an article that the author 
identified as a “Second Declaration of Independence.”  The piece listed a series of 
Congressional acts it identified as responsible for currency contraction and special favors 
to financiers, beginning with the acts designed to fund the Civil War.  Silver was 
demonetized, the author declared, due to “the lobbying influence of one Ernest Seyd, of 
London, by the use of $500,000 furnished for that purpose,” to bribe American 
Congressmen.  Financial hardship was the result.  “Farming and other real property has 
lost its normal value,” the author said, for “the stock of monopolies have taken the front 
rank.”  It called on readers to renounce these travesties, reject the two old parties that had 
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supported these policies, and join the Greenback-Labor Party.  This greenback tradition 
filtered into the Populist Party through the work of dedicated third-party thinkers and 
pamphleteers.
81
   
The money power conspiracy was not left only to those outside of the two main 
parties.  Historian Mark Wahlgren Summers has suggested that conspiratorial language 
was the norm during the Gilded Age, and in this the Populists should not be viewed as 
outliers.
82
  In one example, in late 1877 members of Congress incorporated portions of 
the conspiracy into their speeches—including details about the story of Ernest Seyd—to 
such an extent that Senator Henry Dawes (Republican, Massachusetts) felt the need to 
openly refute them and defend the character of a now a deceased colleague (Republican 
Congressman Samuel Hooper) who had supposedly been implicated in the plot.  A 
similar event occurred in 1893, when Senator George Frisbie Hoar (Republican, 
Massachusetts) rose in defense of that same dead colleague against the imputations made 
by those like Democratic Senator Stephen White of California.  White had directly 
quoted a conspiratorial pamphlet in one of his speeches, and yet again the talk of bribery 
by a British agent proved too much for the men who had been in Washington when it 
allegedly transpired.  Despite the vigorous counterattack by Hoar—later aided by former 
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Secretary of the Treasury (and supposed co-conspirator) Senator John Sherman—
discussion of the money power continued unabated.
83
   
Clearly, some rather sophisticated people came to embrace the money power 
theory, and to appreciate its importance it must be seen as more than the product of small 
minds from small towns.  To determine its significance and meaning, it is useful to 
discuss a sample conspiracy tract in some detail.  Probably the best known tract that 
explained the money power conspiracy—and what may have been the most influential in 
the 1890s—was Sarah E. V. Emery‟s Seven Financial Conspiracies Which Have 
Enslaved the American People.  Though published half a decade before the national 
People‟s Party would be formed, it was adopted widely by those in the new organization 
as a statement of the movement‟s sentiment regarding currency and finance.84    
 Unlike so many who would become Populists, Emery was a resident of neither the 
South nor the West, but had lived in Michigan since shortly after the close of the Civil 
War.  She was not, however, an ideological outlier.  She was a member of the Greenback 
Party earlier in her life, and she also maintained some ties to other Gilded Age reform 
organizations such as the Knights of Labor and Women‟s Christian Temperance Union.  
But in the opening of her best-known work, she suggested that her beliefs had their roots 
in her early life.  On one of the first pages of Seven Financial Conspiracies she 
memorialized her father, “who, foreseeing the results of our Civil War, and the conditions 
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that must arise from the system adopted in its early stages, gave warning to his children, 
entreating them ever to remember the cause of the oppressed, and ever to condemn a 
system of legislation calculated to reduce the laboring classes to abject and hopeless 
servitude.”  It would seem that conspiratorial thought ran in the family.85 
Emery opened as Henry George had, by pointing to the great contradiction of the 
age—the existence of great wealth and progress alongside squalor and poverty.86  This, 
she claimed, was the result of an eons-old system of parasitism that people had 
unnecessarily endured.  Emery broke all people down into one of two groups:  “the one 
class who live by honest labor, the other who live off of honest labor.”  In old times, the 
parasites had been “roving bandits,” she said, some of whom might occasionally settle 
down to become kings.  In modern times, contemporary “robber chiefs” did not resort so 
openly to violence.  They had replaced “spoils and plunders” with “interests, dividends, 
revenues, and rents.”  They had become the monopolists and financiers.87  Emery‟s basic 
division of society was based on greenback producerist interpretations of value, and it fit 
well with the ideology of contemporary reform movements that presaged the new party.
88
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 Yet according to Emery the “plunderers” were not given much of an opportunity 
to prey on their fellow citizens in early America.  It was her contention that predatory 
wealth had been deprived of any place by the new nation‟s founders.  In fact, she tied 
economic fairness to national independence.  “The system of American government as 
instituted by our fathers afforded little if any opportunity for robbery and oppression,” 
she said.  “Having successfully repelled their enemies across the water their prowess was 
established... Not a crowned head in Europe aspired to clip the wings of the young 
American eagle.”  But all of that was about to change, for, “in an evil hour, the tempter 
came, the guardians were betrayed, and the very sanctuary of our liberties became the 
charnal-house [sic] of American freedom, and the market place of American honor.”  
Emery contrasted the freedom that existed in an imagined economically egalitarian early 
Republic with the stratification that followed just a few generations later, a system which 
she essentially described as the Old World model.
89
   
The evil hour that Emery referenced was the American Civil War.  While some 
dreaded the coming of the conflict and others readied themselves to serve, some groups 
were thrilled by the opportunities that the war would provide.  For the “money kings of 
Wall Street” and certain of the “great political chieftains,” their desire for wealth “had 
stifled the finer instincts of their nature, and they rejoiced because they saw in the 
preparation for the war their long-coveted opportunity for plunder.”  The national 
government soon found itself short on money with which to fight the war, and hard 
currency became scarce (which Emery said had been true of “the history of metallic 
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money in all ages, in the hour of peril”).    She claimed investors had been willing to loan 
to the government only at between twenty-four and thirty-six percent interest, causing 
Emery to mock those who later called themselves “patriotic capitalists” (emphasis in 
original).  The Union was caught between an enemy—the South—and a supposed 
friend—“Shylock, clutching his gold and demanding therefor a rate of interest that would 
drain the life blood of the nation more effectually than the bullets of a Southern foe.”   
Bankers were depicted as an equal threat to American liberty.
90
 
Emery‟s use of the word “Shylock” makes it easy to understand how Hofstadter 
saw a substantial strain of anti-Semitism in the Populist movement.  She was hardly 
alone, and her use of the word was not occasional—“Shylock” essentially replaced the 
word “banker” in the rest of her tract.  That said, the emphasis was clearly much more on 
the banking aspect of the slur than on the ethnic character of Shylock.  Hofstadter himself 
wrote that Populist anti-Semitism was “entirely verbal,” while Walter Nugent 
demonstrated that Populists were no more nativist than members of the other parties.
91
   
 Just as Emery depicted a nation plunged into war and at the mercy of greedy 
financiers, she presented a patriotic hero:  Abraham Lincoln.  The President, who “loved 
the people better than Shylock, and justice better than oppression,” decided that Congress 
had the Constitutional authority to make money.  The federal government would print 
treasury notes, otherwise known as greenbacks, and by statute they would be as good as 
gold.  For Emery, this should have been the great innovation of the war.  “With an 
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abundance of money,” she said, “not even the blight of war could check the prosperity of 
the country…Commerce, industry, and education received a new impetus, and flourished 
as never before in the history of the country.”  She considered the greenback to be the 
ideal currency for the egalitarian republic.
92
 
 The bankers‟ setback would prove temporary, according to Emery.  Those who 
controlled the hard currency were about to be left out of the profits of war-making.  
Emery claimed that a conference of bankers from major eastern cities was held in 
Washington, DC, in early 1862.  It was at roughly this same period that Congress passed 
the Legal Tender Act.  This act required that import duties and interest on public debt be 
paid in coin (hard money), devaluing the greenbacks and increasing the market value of 
gold and silver.  Further, because greenbacks could be used to purchase bonds, bankers 
could exchange their precious metals for cheap greenbacks, and then buy government 
bonds.  This guaranteed huge returns to the financiers and left common people to pay the 
price.  Emery believed that from this time on, Congress essentially handed over the reins 
of government to “Shylock.”93   
 In the chapters that followed, Emery outlined case after case in which Congress 
provided special benefits to the financiers.  The National Bank Act of 1863, the 
retirement of millions of greenbacks by the Treasury after the war, the Credit 
Strengthening Act of 1869 (which required that the bonds be repaid in “coin”), and the 
“re-funding” of the debt (postponing final repayment until 1907) all followed.  These acts 
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established a financial system revolving around private bank notes backed by government 
bonds, increasingly scarce government-issued notes, and what to Emery appeared to be a 
menacing and perpetual national debt.
94
   
 It was only in the seventh (of nine chapters) that Emery dealt with the Coinage 
Act of 1873 and the demonetization of silver—the so-called “Crime of „73.”  It was this 
chapter that included the most evocative details, and it was perhaps the one that attracted 
the most public attention.  Throughout most of the pamphlet, Emery had blamed a rather 
non-specific scheme of “Shylock” for each of the conspiracies, and American (especially 
New York) bankers were more likely to take the blame than were foreign financiers.  
This time it was different.  Emery claimed that a story in Banker’s Magazine told of how, 
just as silver was being demonetized in Europe, “$500,000 was raised, and Ernest Seyd 
was sent to this country with this fund, as agent of the foreign bondholders and 
capitalists” to bribe American Congressmen into following suit.  Seyd was a real man, an 
employee of the Bank of England, and he was in Washington to advise Congress.  In a 
statement in the Congressional Globe, Congressman Samuel Hooper said that “Ernest 
Seyd of London…has given great attention to the subject of mint and coinage.  After 
having examined the first draft of this bill (for the demonetization of silver) he made 
various sensible suggestions, which the committee adopted and embodied in the bill” (the 
remarks in parentheses were added by Emery).
95
  The evidence already seemed 
conclusive to Emery, but she did not stop there.   
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Emery offered additional proof that this was but part of a long-established plan by 
the British.  She alleged that, as early as 1862, an agent of the British financiers by the 
name of Hazzard had been disseminating a tract to American bankers which outlined a 
new plan to control global labor.  It was Hazzard‟s job to encourage Americans to join in 
the scheme.  This “Hazzard Circular,” as it came to be called, noted with approval the 
likely destruction of chattel slavery, “for slavery is but the owning of labor, and carries 
with it care for the laborer.”  The European plan, on the other hand, was designed to 
establish “capital control of labor, by controlling wages.  This can be done by controlling 
the money.”  The Circular also tied the cost of the war to this new system of control.  
“The great debt that capitalists will see to it is made out of the war, must be used as a 
measure to control the volume of money,” it said.  “To accomplish this the bonds must be 
used as a banking basis.”   The only threat to this plan was fiat money.  “It will not do to 
allow the greenback, as it is called, to circulate as money any length of time, for we 
cannot control that.”96  And so the currency had come to be limited, controlled by the 
few, and all the rest were now served them.     
It would be impossible to suggest that Seven Financial Conspiracies sparked the 
movement that would become Populism.  It was just one of a number of such tracts, 
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many of which contained at least hints at conspiracy.  As for as Emery‟s best known 
work, one contemporary publication claimed that 400,000 copies of Seven Financial 
Conspiracies had been printed by 1896.
97
  As noted above, the money power theory was 
not new, but by the 1890s there was a powerful demand for publications on the subject.  
Before, large numbers from the old parties had likely developed a familiarity with the 
conspiracy, but it had never become an accepted part of either major party‟s dogma.  But 
in the early 1890s, members of the new political party integrated it into their worldview 
more thoroughly than had any before.   
All three of the major Populist works examined earlier in this chapter contained 
some discussion of the money power conspiracy, and these three texts were not outliers.  
Davis Waite‟s Aspen Union Era regularly advertised sale of copies of the Hazzard 
Circular on the front page, and one writer for the paper was furious when rumors began 
to circulate that Emery‟s tract had been banned from circulation through the postal 
service.  “[I]f it is true,” the writer declared, “it is an act of tyranny that would shame the 
acts of the Russian Czar.”98  Thomas Patterson, the Denver newspaperman and Waite‟s 
chief rival for control of the Colorado Populists, worked to obtain a sworn confession 
from a former confidant of Seyd that was intended to corroborate the conspiracy story.
99
  
The appeal of the conspiracy was also not limited to the West.  The book History of the 
                                                 
97
 Ostler, “Rhetoric of Conspiracy,” 5 n13.   
98
 The advertisement for what they listed as the “Hazard Circular” was in most editions of the weekly paper 
printed from March 3 through May 26, 1892.  Regarding the rumors surrounding Emery‟s work, see 
“Despotism,” Aspen Union Era, Jul. 21, 1892, p. 4.   
99
 Information on Patterson‟s efforts can be found in Gordon Clark, Shylock:  As Banker, Bondholder, 
Corruptionist, Conspirator (Washington, DC:  American Bimetallic League, 1894), 89.   
68 
 
Wheel and Alliance and the Impending Revolution, a publication and recruiting tool of 
the Farmers‟ Alliance of Arkansas, was littered with references to the money power, 
Hazzard Circular, and “Shylock.”100   
While the conspiracy theory was important as a source of unity for the otherwise 
diverse group that came to make up the new party, portions of it also spoke to very real 
elements of the party‟s ideology.  Part of its utility also came from the flexibility with 
which it could be deployed.  It did not necessarily speak only to republican values, nor 
did it best fit “rational” liberal perspectives.  The uses of conspiracy proved to be quite 
varied indeed.   
James Weaver had generally emphasized the natural rights of producers in his 
work, and the money power conspiracy helped him make his points well enough.  
Weaver borrowed rather substantially from such tracts as those of Emery when he wrote 
A Call to Action, and he included a specific reference to the account of Seyd‟s dealings 
with Congress.  But perhaps the most significant idea that he pulled from the theory was 
a belief that monetary contraction was part of a conscious effort to subjugate farmers and 
laborers.  In order to entrench their power in America, the financial elite had decided to 
destroy “the spirit of independence and self-reliance among the people,” which had been 
“increasing in the same ratio with the accumulation of property among the masses.”  
Scarce money was designed to eliminate those small producers and kill the republican 
spirit.
101
  Like Weaver, John Rankin Rogers saw evidence that the conspirators were 
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hoping to break down traditional American society.  He believed the modern conflict was 
one in which “wealth, the power of money, or mammonism… is engaged in the effort 
and attempt to secure power over labor by deprivation.”  It was not merely a clash of 
groups with divergent interests, but a battle for economic and political supremacy.  That 
was, after all, the mission of “one Hazzard, a London banker to teach our „financiers‟ 
how to coin gold from the blood of their countrymen.”102   
 William Peffer, too, wrote of the money power in The Farmer’s Side, even though 
he more typically described the political conflict as one between divergent interests.  He 
did openly state that “since our great war began what is commonly known as the „money 
power‟ has had almost exclusive control of our financial legislation.”   But while he used 
conspiratorial terms, and even claimed that the money power had named all the major 
political candidates in the years since the Civil War, he also described it primarily as a 
pressure group of bankers who leveraged the government for aid when there was 
“stringency in the money market.”  Still, he agreed with most Populists when he declared 
that “money power…impoverishes the people.  It controls the business of the country, the 
markets and the values.”  With that economic power came political might:   “[I]ts 
managers grow continually richer and more arrogant, while the men who perform the 
manual labor and produce the commodities grow weaker socially and politically, and 
poorer and more dependent financially.  This condition of things can not long endure and 
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the people remain free.”  While he minimized the sense that a true plot was afoot, he 
nonetheless informed readers that their liberty was at stake.
103
   
To analyze the utility of the conspiracy theory further, it would be useful to look 
beyond the story of conspiracy itself and view the broad points in Emery‟s work that are 
integral to the theory and demonstrate its wider significance.  First, the conspiracy was 
depicted as part of a sectional and global scheme.  Much of Emery‟s pamphlet had placed 
the blame on New York—or at least northeastern—bankers.  However, she did ultimately 
see the flow of investment capital as a trans-Atlantic phenomenon.  She saw this as an 
attempt by the British to regain their position as colonial overlords, and by the American 
bankers to share in the spoils.  To whatever extent that was a stretch of the basic facts, 
she was not wrong to see New York and London as the centers of financial power that 
held so much influence over the lives of ordinary Americans.   
Other Populists would put an even greater emphasis upon this supposed 
connection between Wall and Lombard streets and, ultimately, the producer‟s connection 
to them both.  They understood that they lived in a raw material-producing region, and 
that the profits from their production were siphoned off by a distant financial and 
industrial elite.  In modern parlance, they developed a primitive “world systems” analysis 
of their situation.  As it is discussed today, the world systems interpretation centers upon 
systems of unequal trade between “core” economic activities—ones in which small 
numbers of sellers offer products with high profit margins—and peripheral ones—in 
which there is competition among sellers and profits margins are low.  Globally, these 
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industries tend to be divided by state, with quasi-monopolistic core industries located in 
strong states and peripheral industries in weaker ones, but these divisions are not 
necessarily based on national boundaries.  Those on the periphery then are often caught 
in a cycle of unequal trade with those who make up the core, resulting in uneven global 
economic development.
104
   
Some academics have previously suggested that the West at this time was such a 
peripheral region, engaged in unequal trade with the eastern and European economic 
core, which offered high-profit products (manufactured goods and financial services) in 
exchange for low-profit ones (foodstuffs, ores, and lumber).  Populists understood their 
unequal position as well, and some have even described their self-perception as a people 
on the colonial periphery.
105
  Peffer expressed his disgust with the way in which “Wealth 
is accumulating in the large cities, more especially those in the East, and those 
accumulations are continually fed by drains flowing away from the country people and 
working forces in the towns.”106  William V. Allen, the Nebraska Populist elected to the 
United States Senate in 1893, expressed the same sort of frustration.  In a brief article for 
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the North American Review, he described how westerners felt it “is the purpose of 
Eastern money loaners and capitalists to drain our industries of their profits by unfriendly 
legislation.”  Contracted currency gave financial interests supremacy over those of 
western producers, while the tariff forced westerners “to purchase their manufactured 
goods from the East, with low-priced products of farm and mine, and pay the freight both 
ways.”  Government and business had engineered a system that would perpetuate 
inequality.
107
   
Obviously, conspiratorial language was not necessary to make farmers and 
laborers aware that they were subject to the whims of global commodity and financial 
markets, but allusion to the money power did suggest the nature of a power relationship 
that more tangible facts could not express.  During the summer of 1893, for example, the 
same Senator Allen warned audiences in Nebraska that “certain parties in Europe and 
America” were attempting to demonetize what remained of the circulating American 
silver just as “the money power of Europe has forced Austria, Hungary, the Argentine, 
and a number of other countries.”  “The truth is that it is the determination of Europe to 
control the finances and industries of this country,” he said.  “England failed during the 
dark days of the revolution and again in 1812, and now seeks to secure control through 
the gold question.”108  One of Weaver‟s supporters in Colorado put it similarly when he 
told all within earshot that “the moneyed power has controlled every national convention 
for sixteen years.”  As a result, “the money changers of Wall street, Threadneedle street, 
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and Lombard street” had “so manipulate[d] the legislation of this country, as actually to 
defraud the producing classes of this state out of 34 per cent of its total products.”109  Use 
of the money power conspiracy did more than demonstrate frustration with uneven 
economic development; it blamed that development upon eastern and European economic 
interests, who had thoroughly undermined American democracy and national 
sovereignty.   
This understanding led some among the Populists to make overt comparisons 
between their situation and that of colonial or semi-colonial states around the world.  As 
one Kansas newspaperman so blatantly put it:  “Lombard street controls Wall street, and 
Wall street the money and produce markets of the United States.  English syndicates buy 
up flouring mills and elevators all along the line at Minneapolis, Chicago, and New York.  
The farmers of this country are as surely under the heel of English tyranny as though we 
were an [sic] British province.”110  By 1894, a Chicago paper even went so far as to 
suggest that a recent issuance of federal bonds was part of a plot by the money power to 
“place a financial agent of our European creditors over the affairs of this government,” 
whose decrees would be enforced, “if necessary, by an appeal to arms of the united 
powers of Europe.”  In this regard, America was “simply following in the same path trod 
by Egypt, Greece, India, Turkey, and Peru.”111   
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The money power conspiracy only added strength to the Populist sense that 
American democracy was in peril, but as mentioned earlier the threat was not believed to 
come exclusively from abroad.  The conspiratorial analysis also added force to the sense 
that plotters intended to use oppressive means to maintain their supremacy, especially by 
coopting the federal government.  In her conclusion, Emery foretold of the demise of 
American democracy through just such means.  She noted with horror the attempt of 
some to add to the power of the American military, which she said was “not to defend 
ourselves against a foreign foe; the enemy is within our gates, sitting in the high places of 
our country.”  Militarism was only designed to secure “the ill-gotten gain of a moneyed 
oligarchy.”112  This distrust of governmental authority was further articulated in another 
of her works, a pamphlet entitled Imperialism in America:  Its Rise and Progress.  In it, 
she elaborated on her belief that the wealthy were about to overthrow democratic 
institutions and make America a monarchy or aristocracy.  Among the many examples 
she employed was an article by the Nevada banker and onetime Republican senator, 
William Sharon, who stated that “We need a stronger Government… The capital of the 
country demands protection; its rights are as sacred as the rights of paupers, who are 
continually prating about the encroachments of capital and against centralization.”113  
Populist concern with federal power took many forms, but all were reinforced by the use 
of conspiracy.  To reiterate, this Populist fear of government should not be seen as a 
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ubiquitous fear of “big brother.”  It was a fear based upon the callous track-records of 
those who held high office in their own era.   
The omnipresence of the money power conspiracy and its appeal is tied to that 
analysis.  Emery and others resorted to conspiratorial rhetoric because they were trying to 
explain how American politicians could support policies that, to them, seemed to directly 
benefit the few at the expense of the many.  While some contemporaries had come to see 
dysfunctional politics as the product of a failed democracy, when Populists adopted 
conspiratorial language they denied that true democracy had allowed these events to 
transpire.
114
  Instead, some great power was at work subverting democracy and disrupting 
the economic and political systems established by the wise founders.  Many individuals 
and the bosses of both old parties had been corrupted, according to the conspiracy; it was 
not about American voters simply making bad choices.  The talk of such massive 
corruption should also be viewed in a sympathetic light when one considers the context.  
In Age of Reform, just before railing against them as irrational and reckless, even Richard 
Hofstadter reminded readers that the Populists had “seen so much bribery and corruption, 
particularly on the part of railroads, that they had before them a convincing model of the 
management of affairs through conspiratorial behavior.”115  The stories seemed plausible, 
and for people who believed that democracy could serve the masses, they were necessary.   
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The money power conspiracy should not be seen as the cornerstone of Populist 
thought or demonstrative of any defects in the Populist mind.  The conspiratorial 
conception of American politics that they embraced was not the sole or even the primary 
tool they used to analyze their situation, but it was far more significant than historians 
have thus far suggested.  If it was not at the center of Populist though, it did at least 
reflect certain elements of their views, including several that are vital for this dissertation.  
First, it both illustrated and reinforced their skepticism of the over-powerful in both 
business and government.  It also demonstrated much about how the Populists thought of 
their region and its place in the world.  In a similar way, it would later play some part in 
shaping their view of colonialism.  All of these elements would reappear during the 
debates over empire at the end of the decade.   
 
Politics, Culture, and Gender 
 As noted above, the Populists had a profound faith in American democracy.  This 
faith was only reinforced by a civic nationalist vision of what America could become.
116
  
For reformers who hoped to overcome the corruption of the previous generation, 
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identification with traditional American ideals held tremendous importance.  Of course, 
Populists employed the language of patriotism and nationalistic pride to legitimize their 
agenda, and they did so at least partially out of necessity.  At least since the outbreak of 
the Civil War, discussions of patriotism and loyalty to a cause had become standard 
political discourse, and the two old parties had already deployed this language to solidify 
their control of identifiable voter groups.  Republicans spoke of the “bloody shirt” and 
loyalty to the Union.  Democrats emphasized white supremacy and non-interference in 
other cultural concerns, appealing especially to southern whites and new immigrants.
117
  
Both of the older parties could then tell their typical constituencies that to deviate from 
their organization was to become a traitor to one‟s identity and to the values they held 
most dear.  They had both developed a certain vision of the nation and of loyalty, and 
anyone who hoped to make headway in this environment would have to challenge those 
definitions directly.   
 Populists understood the difficulties that came with entering the fold in such an 
environment, and they were prepared to redefine patriotism in order to serve the needs of 
reform.  One article in the Topeka Advocate asked how conservative appeals to patriotism 
were supposed to function when the national government refused to serve its citizens.  
“Can you deny a man the common rights of humanity, render him an outcast by laws and 
customs of his country, and can you teach such an [sic] one patriotism?”118  Weaver said 
that, after having taken control of the reins of government, the economic elite now 
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“prates about patriotism and places those who plead for redress, or complain of tyranny 
in the attitude of seditious and disobedient subjects.”119  Perhaps the most effective 
refutations of Republican claims came from those whose loyalty could not be questioned.  
In Kansas during the campaign of 1894, Populists used the speech of an old Union 
veteran in support of the re-election of Confederate veteran William A. Harris to his seat 
in the House of Representatives.  While the Union man admitted that there had been a 
great deal of talk about “patriotism and loyalty” from the Republican side, and some had 
even told audiences to “vote as we shot,” he believed there was more than one kind of 
patriotism.  “[O]ne kind is to our homes, our families and our country.”  The other kind, 
the one really being invoked by Republicans, was patriotic loyalty “for the great 
corporations, trusts, note shavers, combines and men who, when we were fighting to save 
this nation, were sitting behind bank counters scheming how they could rob our country.”  
Harris, he said, was full of the former kind of patriotism, and he had none of the latter.
120
    
 The Populist definitions of patriotism were not only rejections of those of the old 
parties, and there was a special need for them to appeal to a patriotic foundation in order 
to justify their entrance onto the political stage.  The new party did not exist merely to be 
a less offensive alternative to the party in power.  Instead, it planned to be the party that 
was to restore American equality from its perilous position.  They were the party of new 
ideas and simultaneously the party of national rejuvenation.  As one Populist summed up 
the goal of their organization, “It seeks to teach the laborer his rights and impress him 
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with the manhood and patriotism to demand them fully.”121  Populists‟ deployment of 
nationalistic language placed their calls for reform at the same levels as those of Andrew 
Jackson‟s Democrats or Abraham Lincoln‟s Republicans, while it concurrently implied 
the disloyalty of the old parties—those who followed the money power. 
In many Populist addresses, patriotic language went hand in hand with the 
language of manhood.
122
  During the Gilded Age, the type of men who became 
Populists—just like their much-written-of eastern middle-class counterparts—faced 
certain challenges to their manly identities, and their movement sought to address some 
of those challenges.  Yet much of what has been written about the views of men like John 
Hay, Theodore Roosevelt, or others of their ilk does not directly apply to the western 
farmers or laborers.  For certain eastern professionals and members of the “old money” 
elite, the standard Victorian definitions of self-restraint and independence had come to 
seem inappropriate in an era of increasing orderliness dominated by giant monopolies.  
These members of the comfortable classes did not seek to disrupt the political or 
economic basis of society, and so instead sought to adjust or reimagine conceptions of 
manhood.
123
  Precisely the opposite was true for the Populists.  By attacking corporate 
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dominance and the existing two-party systems, Populists were reimagining what society 
could be rather than reconceptualizing their place within it.   
 The traditional version of “manhood” or “manliness” that Populists accepted was 
defined by economic and personal traits.  Self-restraint and integrity were necessary for a 
man‟s personal character, but these and related characteristics were supposed to be 
demonstrated in the commercial realm as well.  Labor organizations and the Farmers‟ 
Alliances had preached sobriety, the Protestant work ethic, and financial responsibility to 
their members in an attempt to both improve their productivity and inoculate themselves 
against the charges of sloth and socialism.  At the same time, they emphasized the 
manhood of members who were financially independent and served the role of 
breadwinner for their families.
124
  This economic role secured their position in the family 
patriarchy and, these organizations claimed, allowed them to think for themselves.  
Because, Populist writers continued to equate economic independence with political 
independence, they also linked manhood and freedom of action in the political field.   
Just as they argued that political and economic freedoms were under threat, 
Populists contended that the principles of patriotism and manhood were being destroyed 
by the greed of others.
125
  A writer for the Coming Crisis told readers that the American 
aristocracy was threatening their political and economic rights, but they had used the 
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mainstream press to blind people to the danger.  Consequently, the author asked readers if 
“patriotism” had been “lulled to sleep?”  “Awake!” the writer commanded.  “Trust no 
man, no men with your liberties.”126  Davis Waite‟s paper suggested that American 
manhood had already been cowed by the “machine system of politics.”  The typical (non-
Populist) man was now a coward who could only “take the lead in cringing servility and 
abject negation to all claims to independent manhood.”  The only solution was political 
education, for “Knowledge begets independence.”127   
 Manhood was frequently described as endangered by the “money power,” but 
simultaneously the exertion of manhood was characterized as the solution.  The state 
chairman of the Colorado People‟s Party, Dr. Alexander Coleman, decried the 
“plundering of all that is sacred, the destruction of manhood and the sale of womanly 
virtue” that had been brought on by political corruption and financial distress.  “In this 
great struggle, gold stands against manhood,” he said, but manhood could fight back.  
The chairman went on to call for self-sacrificing manhood to replace the office-seeking 
of the other parties and rejuvenate American freedom.  “Men who fail in strength and 
cannot keep up with the advancing column must be dropped by the way; strong men who 
have liberty above personal gain and party must be crowded to the front; and the leader of 
today may be an almost forgotten follower of tomorrow.”  Individualism was a cause of 
the great troubles of the age, not a solution.  In this hour, the “individual man is nothing, 
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but the principles of American freedom, human rights and civil liberty…must be 
maintained.”128    
 Other leaders of the new party often equated the abandonment of the old parties or 
the political status quo with manhood.  A prominent member of the Knights of Labor in 
Leadville, Colorado, told his fellow Knights that “we have come to the parting of ways” 
in regard to the Republicans and Democrats.  “We have waited long and waited patiently 
for the two old parties to reconstruct and regenerate themselves.”  To follow them any 
further “would be false to our individuality of manhood.”  Instead, it was time to join a 
new party, “led by true and noble men whose watchword is patriotism and love of the 
people, and whose every effort is scored for the meek and lowly and humble of the 
earth.”129  The Aspen Union Era echoed those remarks.  In 1891, a writer for it stated that 
there was “not one jot of evidence to prove that the government has not already passed 
from the control of the people to, and that they are not the menial slaves of prejudices and 
hatreds and party bosses.”  “You can not prove your manhood” unless you have 
demonstrated “your ability to build up and tear down parties.”  Only then could a man 
claim to have “sloughed off the old sin of plutocracy and all the old ways of political 
sin.”130  To free oneself from the old parties and choose reform was to choose manhood 
and country over ignorant devotion and greed.   
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 By embracing the traditional expectations of Victorian manhood, Populists were 
able to claim a place that might not have been open to them otherwise.  Because of the 
radical economic message that many equated to socialism, they were frequently 
characterized as failures and malcontents.  If they had rejected the principles of 
independence and self-restraint, they could very well have played into the hands of those 
who accused them of being nothing better than anarchists and thieves.  In other cases, 
opponents tried to de-sex or feminize the Populists.  Democrats in North Carolina 
derisively referred to Populist leader (and later Senator) Marian Butler as “Mary Ann 
Butler.”131  In still other circumstances, Populists and third party men generally were 
identified as “she-men” by their enemies.132  The partisan epithets for outliers or potential 
radicals would only have gained greater potency when applied to those who dismissed 
traditional conceptions of manhood.   
 The male Populist appropriation of traditional manhood made perfect sense in 
view of their economic goals.  It was also with these objectives in mind that some of 
them did re-envision the role of women.  Before the new party was even formed, the 
Knights of Labor and the Farmers‟ Alliances had allowed women to become full voting 
members of their organizations, something quite exceptional for the day.  Many of the 
men and women of these reform associations went even further, arguing that women 
deserved a new place in society.  Agricultural reformers believed women needed access 
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to better education and relief from the drudgery that came with “women‟s work” on the 
farm.  The Knights demanded equal pay for equal work, which could have changed 
women‟s economic positions within the traditional patriarchal family.  Notable members 
of the Alliances and the Knights also made statements in support of women‟s suffrage.  
Certainly, many of the men who went on to form the People‟s Party believed that the 
traditional gendered expectations of womanhood were out of date or incompatible with 
reform.
133
   
Yet when the national party was formed in 1892, women‟s suffrage was left off of 
the platform.  While this may have been for largely pragmatic reasons—namely, a fear of 
alienating any potentially sympathetic voters—there were other factors that contributed to 
the new party‟s limited support for women‟s suffrage.  Many of the agrarian reformers 
who imagined a “new” place for women had actually conceptualized only a modification 
of that place.  Those who emphasized the drudgery of life as a farm woman often argued 
that women should be freed from such work in order to devote themselves more fully to a 
properly refined home.  Others who had instead focused upon the moral authority of 
women gave the “fairer sex” a certain supervisory role, but theirs was a necessarily 
limiting kind of argument.  If women were morally superior because of their sheltered 
position in the home or due to the special requirements that came with being wives and 
mothers, they could possess that authority only so long as a majority of women continued 
to play part expected in traditional gender roles.
134
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 Populists did come to support women‟s suffrage under the right circumstances.  
This was demonstrated in Colorado in 1893, when the measure appeared on ballot 
statewide.  Populists promoted it along with state and national women‟s suffrage leaders 
(including Carrie Chapman Catt), but they did so using explicitly economic arguments.  
The vote for women, they said, only added to strength to the votes of farmers and 
laborers.  Even Catt—by no means an economic radical—contended that women would 
vote for free silver and economic equality.  As a result, Colorado became the first state to 
adopt women‟s suffrage as the result of popular referendum.135  Populist men believed 
that the people going through economic struggles by their side—their wives—understood 
the situation as well as they did and could add to their political power.  This should not be 
mistaken for the abandonment of patriarchy, but instead a practical alteration of it.   
The Populist willingness, under the right circumstances, to support women‟s 
suffrage clearly distinguished them from many of their eastern and middle-class 
contemporaries.  Eastern conservatives attacked women who sought a place in politics 
because, as many historians have come to suggest, they necessarily viewed politics as a 
manly battlefield—another field in which they could lay claim to their patriarchal 
identities.
136
  The exclusivity of politics was something worth preserving for its own 
sake.  But for male farmers and laborers, the threat to their manhood that would come 
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from a declining economic position far outweighed any psychological loss that could 
accompany women‟s suffrage.  In some circumstances, they chose to protect their roles 
as breadwinners by enlisting the aid of women.   
 
The term “populist” has, in common usage, almost come to be synonymous with 
“parochial,” but the Populists of the 1890s were neither trapped by old ideas nor by their 
surroundings.  Those who formed the People‟s Party did look well beyond their own 
communities when they formulated a response to the increasing power of economic 
interests.  They feared the (further) development of a centralized, militarized, 
unresponsive government, which they believed would become the ultimate tool of 
concentrated wealth.  They accepted a conspiracy theory that both reflected these fears 
and demonstrated their perspectives on global capitalism and exploitation. These features 
of their worldview fueled their reform efforts over the whole span of their existence as a 
party, but it also came to be more directly tied to foreign affairs as the decade wore on.  
While their views on international trade or imperialism could be described as little more 
than embryonic by 1892, the basic premises that many Populists would use to judge 
American overseas policies were already well formed by that time.   
The ideology and policy proposals of the new party changed the political 
discourse of the 1890s.  Though a diverse group, they had united under the banner of 
reform to launch the most serious challenge to the political and economic systems that 
was to emerge in the late nineteenth century.  It was a movement of self-identified 
outsiders who hoped to construct a system that could empower a greater number of 
Americans and help them find their voice.  Their distrust of those who had held the reins 
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of power made them especially eager to widen access to new economic opportunities, but 
they still had tremendous faith that the egalitarian ideals of the founders could and should 
be realized, no matter the means.  It was that skepticism combined with that vision which 
eventually led them to champion forms of direct democracy.  Their views were not so 
much “statist” as they were based upon a desire for a “bottom-up” form of governance, 
something that was less important to the generation of reformers that would follow.  The 
West of the early 1890s was ready for just such a message.   
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CHAPTER III 
THE LOCAL CONTEXT:  NEBRASKA, COLORADO, AND WASHINGTON, 
1890-1897 
 When the Populists launched their first national campaign on July 4, 1892, they 
took the opportunity to declare their own independence with a powerful statement of 
principles designed to comprehensively repudiate the old parties and the powers that 
controlled them.  Ignatius Donnelly, the reform politician, Minnesota Alliance leader, and 
apocalyptic novelist, was the author, and it was agreed that his words fit the occasion 
perfectly.  “We meet,” it declared, “in the midst of a nation brought to verge of moral, 
political and material ruin.  Corruption dominates the ballot box, the legislatures, the 
congress, and touches even the ermine of the bench.”   Both of the old parties were 
blamed for this state of affairs.  They had struggled with each other “for power and 
plunder, while grievous wrongs have been inflicted upon the suffering people.”  Now 
Democrats and Republicans alike “propose to sacrifice our homes, lives and children on 
the altar of Mammon; to destroy the multitude in order to secure the corruption funds 
form the millionaires.”  The words of the preamble represented a decisive break from the 
old parties, who were as much the focus of attention as any aspect of the economy.
1
      
 Their rejection of the old parties seemed complete, but just four years later the 
People‟s Party nominated William Jennings Bryan, a Democrat, for president.  He was a 
Democrat unlike those who controlled the state parties in much of the West in 1892.  
Like the Populists, he had announced his commitment to the needs of the common people 
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over those of the interests, and he had done so with no less passion than had the Populists 
in their declaration of independence.  Like them, he claimed to speak for those out of 
power and against those who had abused power.  If he was not one of them—and in many 
ways he was not—he shared with them much of their worldview.  He saw many of the 
same problems that they did, and he attributed blame to same groups that they did.  
Populists knew he was not quite one of their own when they nominated him for president, 
but they did consider him to be someone they could work with in 1896 and the years that 
would follow.    
The ideas the Populists brought into common public discourse dominated the 
politics of the West for most of the 1890s.  They were not the originators of most of the 
policies they advocated, and others in the West (and nationally) had favored a number of 
them at various times, but there were always obstacles within the old parties that 
prevented their full engagement with such issues.  The Populists changed the political 
landscape by creating a party that appeared to be a legitimate vehicle for reform.  When 
the party sprang up from the various reform organizations that farmers and laborers had 
assembled to defend their rights, it embraced the kinds of ideas and perspective that were 
missing or suppressed in the other parties of the day.  Its entry into the field changed the 
political landscape of the West, forcing voters away from old allegiances and creating 
fractures in the old parties.  By 1896, the political debate in the West had shifted to 
matters of political economy, and by the time of their national conventions western 
Democratic and Republican delegates alike pushed their parties to take up policies to aid 
the farmers and laborers of their home states.  Though the Populists eventually decided to 
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cooperate (or “fuse”) with the Democrats in that year, it meant something quite different 
than what it had back in 1892.   
 This chapter will discuss the many political transitions that took place in the West 
during these years, with a special emphasis on the period from 1890 to 1897.  These years 
cover the formation of the Populists as an independent political force and the changes 
over the course of the decade that led them to develop an alternative strategy.  While 
historians have typically sided with the opponents of fusion and attributed the decline of 
the movement to that decision, western Populists saw something else quite different.  
They believed that the changes that had taken place by 1896 would allow them to join a 
coalition of like-minded reformers, and in this way their battle against concentrated 
capital would go on.  For the Populists, 1896 was not the “first battle” (as Bryan would 
later dub it) but they believed it was far from the last.
2
   
 
Politics in the West, 1865-1891 
Anglo-Americans and Europeans had been traveling through and occasionally 
settling in the lands west of the Missouri River for some time before 1860, but the total 
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number of white permanent residents remained meager.  The Oregon country had been 
targeted as a place for settlement and missionary work since the 1830s, but because it was 
distant from the rest of the nation and the United States had not established clear title 
over the land until the end of the 1840s the population had remained small.  California 
only came under the control of the United States following the Mexican-American War, 
and while thousands rushed in to the territory in search of gold in 1848 and 1849 the 
population boom did not extend elsewhere.  Colorado had its own gold rush a decade 
later, but the initial flood of migrants dropped off to a trickle quickly as the limits of the 
initial find became known.  Both California and Oregon gained admission as states before 
the secession of South Carolina, but the rest of the West was stuck in the territorial 
phase.
3
   
Some territories did not have long to wait before they were admitted as states.  
Kansas and Nevada were admitted before the end of the Civil War (1861 and 1864 
respectively).  Nebraska was admitted two years after the close of the war (1867).  Yet 
even by 1870, the total white population of the West (excluding Texas) numbered 
roughly 1.5 million, with nearly one third of that number in California alone.  Before 
1860, the growing sectional crisis had been an impediment to the development of the 
region.  While the conflict had ended, the people and government of the United States 
were only setting out on a path toward rapid capitalist expansion into the West.  While, 
by decade‟s end, many things could superficially appear little different than what they 
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had been at its beginning, the first of the key transformations were already either 
complete or well underway.
4
   
The results of the war were absolutely transformative for the whole of the nation 
and for the West in particular.  The Republican Party reigned supreme during the war 
years and controlled the national legislative agenda for some time thereafter.  The 
elimination of southern opposition in Congress and the Republicans‟ own pro-business 
proclivities led to major federal legislation designed to promote the construction of 
railroads (of which the bill to subsidize the transcontinental line was only the most 
noteworthy).  The most notable benefit given to the roads were subsidies in the form of 
massive land grants as a reward for miles of track completed.  Initially, there was no stick 
to accompany the carrot offered by the government; no real attempt was made to create a 
national regulatory agency until the Supreme Court essentially forced the matter on a 
reluctant Congress in the late 1880s.  Additionally, the war—and Republican measures to 
finance and supply the effort—had encouraged an unprecedented concentration of 
domestic capital, and it was eager for new fields of investment.  All of these factors 
combined to contribute to a tremendous boom in the growth of western railroads, and 
settlers soon followed.  In the twenty years from 1870 to 1890, the population of the West 
grew by approximately four hundred percent.
5
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 As the West was rapidly resettled in these two decades, most of the remaining 
territories were fully incorporated into the American system of states.  Colorado was 
admitted to the union in 1876, followed by North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and 
Washington in 1889 and Idaho and Wyoming in 1890.  The integration of these territories 
was more than just political.  In every case, railroad expansion was the necessary 
precursor to rapid population growth.   Most of these settlers came to these states on the 
railroads, bought goods manufactured elsewhere and transported over its lines, and, most 
vitally, expected to make a living by selling or working for those who would sell the 
products of their labor to markets that could only be reached via the roads.
6
    
 The form and timing of this population boom had a tremendous influence on the 
political landscape that would develop in the region.  The West of the post-bellum period 
was thoroughly Republican.  The party of Lincoln had used its position to legitimize their 
dominance in the years during and after, and its candidates had simultaneously cast their 
rivals as the party of secession and rebellion.  Few Republican politicians abstained from 
waving the “bloody shirt” during campaign season, and this practice continued unabated 
all the way through the 1870s and 1880s. Those running for office clung to it so doggedly 
because it worked; the large number of Union veterans that populated states like Kansas, 
Nebraska, and others seem to have concurred in the assertion that they should vote as 
they had shot.  Along the Plains, the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) held posts in 
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almost every sizable community.
7
  Republican dominance was also reinforced by the 
strong role played by federal patronage during the long territorial phase imposed upon so 
many of the western states.  Before the 1890s, western politicians waved the “bloody 
shirt” with such frequency (and success) that they seem to have convinced themselves 
that little else was needed to maintain their grip on power.
8
   
 Of course, the Republicans offered more than just a reminder of the great 
sectional conflict.  They also launched the program of national development that had 
made the western migration possible.  Whether a voter thought of them more as the party 
of Lincoln or as the party of progress is almost irrelevant.  The party‟s support for free 
labor, union, and promotional subsidies for investors came as a package deal.  
Republicans viewed the endorsement of any of the above at the ballot box as a popular 
mandate for them all.
9
   
  Over the course of the 1870s and 1880s, Americans in every section of the 
country began to question the form and function of “progress” as it had been explained 
by leaders in the political mainstream.  It certainly was not progress itself that they 
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questioned, and few disagreed with the consensus that railroads and the connections they 
provided to markets were a positive good.  Instead, farmers and laborers in the West were 
among those that organized in an attempt to exercise greater control over the economy 
and politics.  Mining corporations, banks, and the omnipresent railroads had been 
symbols of western development, but (as discussed in the previous chapter) they were 
also increasingly viewed as predatory and domineering entities that had to be either 
destroyed or made subject to the popular will.  Most of the early efforts were short-lived, 
but they did demonstrate a growing frustration with the status quo, and their approach 
likewise illustrated the perceived inability of the existing political structure to give 
expression to those who felt exploited.   
In Nebraska, it was first Grangers and then Greenbackers that questioned the basis 
of the state‟s progress.  These early protest movements did not achieve any great success 
in Nebraska and both collapsed soon enough, but they nonetheless had some impact.  The 
Nebraska Grange had applied pressure in favor of some railroad regulation, and in 1875 
this culminated in a new state constitution that gave the legislature the power to regulate 
the road and set maximum rates.  The Grange also ran its own tickets against the 
Republicans, but the severe defeat it suffered left it in no position to force the legislature 
to use its new authority.  The political energy of the waning Grangers was then 
transferred to the state Greenback Party, which polled a significant percent of the state‟s 
vote in the late 1870s to early 1880s.
10
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While it was not uncommon for the Grange of other states to be politically active, 
in many others they either achieved a greater degree of legislative success (as in a state 
like Illinois).
11
  The Greenbackers of a number of other states also managed a greater 
degree of success than did those of Nebraska, usually through cooperative arrangements 
with the weaker of the two major parties.
12
  This was not possible in Nebraska.  Not only 
was the Democratic Party widely reviled as the party of rebellion, but the organization 
itself was in no position to call for an activist state.  Though the Democrats of Nebraska 
had never managed any degree of statewide success, the votes they did manage to poll in 
the 1870s and 1880s were based heavily upon those who identified with ethnic immigrant 
communities.  The state party‟s leader, J. Sterling Morton, was a doctrinaire believer in 
laissez faire principles of governance, and he fit that message to the needs of those who 
feared attacks upon their culture.  While the views of the party‟s head and its base 
complemented each other well enough, it was not an organization ready to be turned into 
a vehicle of reform.
13
  
  The third-party movement that would become Nebraska‟s Populist Party did not 
have its roots directly among the Grangers or the Greenbackers.  Instead it was a branch 
of a new organization, the Farmers‟ Alliance, that would spark the most serious challenge 
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to the state‟s political order.  The Alliance united farmers, helped assemble cooperative 
purchasing and marketing programs, and also educated members on the political issues of 
the day.  It advocated some fairly radical reforms, including such unorthodox measures as 
currency inflation, but it initially focused on tangible local adjustments to better allow 
farmers to compete in the market economy.  While in other states the organization 
became a farmers‟ lobby of sorts, in Nebraska there was no party receptive to their pleas.  
Those like Jay Burrows, state secretary of the Alliance, and leading anti-monopoly 
Republicans such as Edward Rosewater had attempted to pressure the legislature to take 
some positive steps in favor of reform in 1889, but it had not budged.  The House had 
deliberated railroad regulation and other reforms only to have the Senate inevitably reject 
them on the advice of conservatives.  The Republican establishment only added to the 
building acrimony by denying re-nomination to those of their candidates who were 
widely viewed as unfriendly to corporate interests.
14
   
In late 1889, growing dissatisfaction within the Alliance led to the introduction of 
a few local independent slates of candidates to oppose the GOP in late.  The hard winter 
that followed made the situation explosive.  What followed was a phase of rapid growth 
for the Alliance in the early months of 1890, clearly a sign that farmers saw an immediate 
need for change.  Sensing the pressure, Republican governor John Thayer begged the 
railroads to make a meaningful reduction on interstate rates in order to aid farmers selling 
crops, but they refused.  Despite initial hesitance, even Burrows and other Alliance 
leaders had come to support the creation of a third party the by summer.  In late July, a 
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joint convention of Alliance delegates and representatives from the Knights of Labor met 
and agreed on a ticket and platform for the coming campaign.  Among their proposals 
were currency inflation (through both paper and silver), laws to hinder the creation of a 
“land monopoly,” and government ownership of the railroad.  The Nebraska Alliance was 
among the first to openly reject the existing two-party system.
15
    
For a party that had been organized just a few months before, the “Independent” 
candidates did remarkably well that November.  Their gubernatorial nominee, Alliance 
president John Powers, was only 1,000 votes behind the winner in an election with over 
200,000 votes cast.  The victor, Democrat James Boyd, was largely aided by the presence 
of a third ticket as well as that year‟s referendum on prohibition that pulled together 
many in the Democratic base.  The legislature held Independent majorities in both 
houses, and they also claimed two of the three United States House seats (a Democrat, 
William Jennings Bryan, won the other).
16
   
In Colorado, Republican dominance was nearly as secure as it had been in 
Nebraska.  From the time of admission until 1892, Republicans occupied the governor‟s 
chair for all but four years.  The two defeats the party had suffered, in 1882 and 1886, 
were more a result of internal factional disputes than of any innovation by their 
opponents or general change in voter sentiment.  As elsewhere, the party focused on the 
maintenance of the state‟s reputation as a safe place for outside investment, and few 
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states received as much of that as Colorado.  The Republicans struggled to maintain the 
allegiance of farmers, mine laborers, mine owners, and the railway interests 
simultaneously, and by the late 1880s the difficulties inherent in such an arrangement 
were becoming apparent.
17
   
Before 1890, most of Colorado‟s history of grassroots political action had its 
source in the labor movement, but by at least the 1880s the Democratic Party had 
successfully coopted or thwarted most moves toward a third party.  Despite the party 
leadership‟s opposition to strikes and ambivalence toward labor organizations, they did 
oppose the overt acts of corporate favoritism the Republicans were known for, most 
notable of which were National Guard interventions in labor disputes.  The party was also 
committed to the elimination of alternatives for the labor vote.  In 1886, for example, 
when the Prohibition Party ran Knights of Labor organizer and self-proclaimed socialist 
Joseph Murray for Congress, Democrats responded by nominating Myron Reed, a well-
known pro-labor Congregational minister, for the same position.  While Reed nearly 
won, it may have been more important for the Democrats that Murray managed only six 
percent of the vote.  Hints of radicalism were present among Colorado‟s laborers, best 
embodied by editor and labor activist Joseph Buchanan, but those with socialist 
proclivities were unable to create a sustained movement in the 1880s.  The Democrats 
were both partially responsible for this fact and the prime beneficiaries of it.  While the 
Democrats of Colorado (like those of Nebraska) still relied more heavily upon Catholic 
and certain immigrant voters than they did upon any other source of support, they had 
                                                 
17
 Leon W. Fuller, “The Populist Regime in Colorado” (Ph.D. diss. University of Wisconsin, 1933), 35-40; 
Wright, Politics of Populism, 52-62.  
100 
 
enough success at casting themselves as the party of labor in Colorado to forestall major 
third-party efforts from that quarter.
18
   
Instead of labor, the force behind third-party politics in Colorado came from those 
engaged in agriculture.  Their grievances were not mitigated by Democratic actions, and 
the Republicans who claimed to represent them also stood for the interests that farmers 
and ranchers had grown to distrust.  Anti-monopoly sentiment had grown perceptibly in 
the state, and in the 1888 contest for the governorship both candidates advocated greater 
control over the railroads.  The campaign was followed by little in the way of action by a 
legislature that came to be known as the “Robber Seventh” and, in the eyes of farmers, it 
appeared that the corporations exercised real control.  Another source of frustration was 
the water companies that had developed substantial power over the practitioners of 
irrigation agriculture in the dry regions of the state.  One management firm that 
controlled some of the water companies, the Colorado Mortgage and Investment 
Company of London—known as the “English Company”—represented the kind of 
distant and impersonal control that many farmers distrusted.  The agrarians did use the 
largest of their organizations in Colorado at the time, the Grange, to call for serious 
reform, but its leaders still rejected independent politics.  It was the Farmers‟ Alliance 
that would be the primary beneficiary of the rising tensions.
19
   
                                                 
18
 Wright, Politics of Populism, 62-74, 79, 108-110; David Brundage, The Making of Western Labor 
Radicalism:  Denver’s Organized Workers, 1878-1905 (Chicago:  University of Illinois Press, 1994), 47-
66, 76-81, 88-91; John P. Enyeart, The Quest for “Just and Pure Law”:  Rocky Mountain Workers and 
American Social Democracy, 1870-1924 (Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press, 2009), 25-28, 41-84 
passsim; Guide to U.S. Elections, 1078.   
19
 Wright, Politics of Populism, 39, 119; Robert W. Larson, Populism in the Mountain West (Albuquerque:  
University of New Mexico Press, 1986), 17-24.   
101 
 
The Colorado branch of the National Farmers‟ Alliance and Industrial Union had 
its beginnings in 1888, but it grew quickly.  Unlike earlier organizations, its lecturers, 
including some veteran organizers from out of state, painted a picture of a system 
dominated by monopolies and concentrated capital.  Dissatisfied farmers were receptive, 
and surely some had a next step in mind.  Unlike the more modest reform messages of 
earlier groups, what the Alliance called for involved a substantial transformation of the 
national economy, and new adherents may very well have appreciated that such changes 
were not to come from the old parties.  Though Colorado‟s state Alliance claimed only 
5,000 members in 1890, some leaders of the organization decided to test the political 
waters.  On July 4, 1890, they met with representatives of the Knights of Labor and 
Grangers, and together they called for a convention to name a new ticket the following 
month.
20
   
  The new party formed in August demanded government ownership of the 
railroads, state ownership and control of the irrigation system, free silver, and the end of 
the national bank system.  Despite its novel platform and public frustration with the 
Republicans—many of their own papers refused to support the ticket—the Colorado 
GOP won easily, with the Democrats taking second.  The Alliance candidates won just 
over six percent of the vote.  While it would be easy to declare that the campaign was a 
waste, in reality the independent ticket attracted ever more attention to the cause of 
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reform.  Just months after the defeat, Alliance membership had jumped from 5,000 to 
15,000.  Two years later, the new party would be a force in state politics.
21
    
As conflicts in states like Nebraska and Colorado led to the creation of third 
parties, similar events were unfolding in Washington Territory.  There, workers first 
organized politically in the mid-1880s, but the object of their frustration was not a 
corporation but a racial minority.  The Knights of Labor initiated a movement to drive the 
Chinese out of the Puget Sound area, but from the very beginning it held a class 
dimension.  The Chinese were believed to be the tools of corporate interests, and this 
view was only reinforced when the “better class” of local residents—including both 
Republicans and Democrats—began to push back against the exclusionary efforts.  
Though the “Liberal League” (the anti-Chinese organization) succeeded in driving the 
Chinese out of Tacoma in November of 1885, when the Seattle chapter attempted to do 
the same in their city the “Law and Order” leaders convinced them to back down and let 
the local business leaders handle the matter.  When the crowd dispersed, the Law and 
Order group instead had the governor, Republican Watson Squire, send in the militia and 
order arrest warrants for forty-three prominent members of the Liberal League.  Months 
later, the Liberal League proceeded with its plans, in no small part due to rumors that the 
Chinese would be used to break a strike in nearby coal mines.  Though they succeeded in 
expelling the Chinese, Law and Order gunmen had fired on several of their number and 
then had soldiers again called in to the city.
22
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The conflicts of Puget Sound intensified the rough sense of class division in the 
territory, and though their task was completed the labor movement was soon channeled 
into a new political organization.  Recent events had convinced many that their interests 
were not the same as those who emphasized economic development over all other 
priorities.  The Liberal League, running under the name “People‟s Party”—not to be 
confused with the later Populists—had its own candidate in the 1886 Seattle mayoral 
election, and in a close contest beat the nominee of the Law and Order set.  Later that 
year, the party organized itself to compete in the territorial contests as well, and it 
advocated public control over corporations (especially railroads), government 
accountability to the people, temperance legislation, and Asian exclusion.  It also 
criticized a national system of currency that was, its members claimed, under the power 
of “capitalistic syndicates.”  While it initially nominated its own candidate for position of 
territorial delegate to Congress, it eventually withdrew to support a pro-labor Democrat.  
The Democrats managed a rare victory, but the People‟s Party declined rapidly thereafter.  
Though it lacked longevity, the movement demonstrated both the growing disaffection 
within the region and labor‟s search for political alternatives.23     
 There would be no more serious third-party activism in the year before 
Washington became a state, but the inability of local politicians to control corporations 
became an undeniable fact.  President Grover Cleveland‟s appointed governor, Eugene 
Semple, openly sympathized with labor but refused to take any specific steps to aid them.  
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In two separate conflicts in 1888 coal mining interests had sparked conflict with labor, 
and the companies responded to labor protests by bringing in large contingents of armed 
men.  The Knights of Labor appealed to Semple for any kind of assistance, but he refused 
to take direct action.  When he tried to have the territorial legislature to pass measures to 
outlaw such practices, the Republican majority ignored him.
24
  In the same year, farmers 
in eastern Washington began to assemble.  Those in the vicinity of Elberton, in Whitman 
County, formed their own branch of the Farmers‟ Alliance in the spring.  They soon 
spread the organization throughout the county—then the fourth most populous in the 
state—and by 1889 into the surrounding counties.  While they did arrange some 
cooperatives, one of their major objectives was the passage of state railroad regulation.  
The challenge was to find a party that could the secure passage of such laws.
25
   
 Washington was admitted as a state in 1889, but it seemed that little had changed 
from its past.  Elisha P. Ferry, a former territorial governor who was known for his 
emphasis upon development at all costs, won the state‟s first gubernatorial election, and 
Republicans nearly swept the legislative elections as well.  Ferry also helped former 
territorial governor Watson Squire to obtain one of the hotly contested United States 
Senate seats.  The Democrats did somewhat better in the 1890 election for United States 
Representative, and the party polled reasonably well in counties dominated by labor in 
the west and wheat farmers in the east of the state.  Still, they were not the Republicans‟ 
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equal in strength, and even their advances among farmers and wage earners disturbed 
certain members of their own party.  Thomas Burke, Daniel Gilman, and other leading 
Democrats founded the Seattle Telegraph in 1890 as a paper to voice the opinions of the 
respectable Democracy.  Those frustrated with the status quo in Washington did not make 
their move toward independent politics in 1890, but the necessary elements were already 
in place.
26
      
  
Growth and Successes, 1891-1892 
 In December of 1890, fresh off their recent electoral victories, members of the 
Farmers Alliance from western states such as Kansas called for a national convention of 
reform associations.  For the westerners, the goal was the creation of a new national 
party.  While many in the southern wing of the largest farmers‟ organization—the 
National Farmers‟ Alliance and Industrial Union (NFAIU)—wanted to delay independent 
political involvement, it was too late to stop the westerners.  The “National Union 
Conference” that was held in Cincinnati in May of 1891 had somewhat contradictory 
results.  Though it did not officially launch the expected new party, it did establish an 
executive committee to negotiate with NFAIU at their next convention in 1892.  There, it 
would gauge the Alliance‟s interest in the endeavor.  However, it was also agreed that, no 
matter the decision of the NFAIU, a convention to name candidates would be called. The 
new organization would be named the People‟s Party.  The hesitant or uncertain 
declarations were intended to demonstrate the western intent to seek cooperation with the 
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South, but all observers recognized that this opened the contest against the two old 
parties.
27
      
 The reform advocates in the West were ready for this move.  As already 
mentioned, independent tickets had run in Nebraska and Colorado in 1890, with varying 
degrees of success.  Washington state‟s farm and labor organizations soon followed suit.  
The events of the opening months of 1891 had already proven a tremendous 
disappointment for them.  Under intense pressure from both the state Alliance and the 
Knights, the legislature had managed to pass a railroad regulation bill and an anti-
Pinkerton law, but Governor Ferry was out of the state for health reasons.  Instead, 
Lieutenant Governor Charles Laughton, a former middle-manager in the railroad 
industry, vetoed both bills.  Both the Knights of Labor and the state Alliance began the 
move toward a third party in the weeks after the close of the session, and the People‟s 
Party of Washington was formally declared in a meeting at Ellensburg in December.
28
   
 The legislature of Nebraska under the control of the Independents showed some 
promise, but it also demonstrated the inexperience of the new members and the naïveté 
with which they approached the process of governing.  More than anything else, their 
inexperience led to disorganization—a problem that would plague all of the early 
Populist legislatures.  For instance, many Independents had accused the Democrats of 
fraud in the election, something they believed had resulted in James Boyd‟s narrow 
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victory in the gubernatorial election.  Yet both the House and the Senate failed to 
challenge the results when they had the opportunity; in fact, the leaders may not have 
known how to do so.  Both houses did pass a sweeping railroad legislation bill, but Boyd 
then vetoed it.  They also struggled to maintain party unity on votes over a range of 
issues.
29
  Despite these difficulties, their accomplishments were not insignificant.  They 
passed a law limiting “all classes of mechanics, servants, and laborers” to an eight-hour 
day, enacted legislation for the protection of the union label, and also approved a secret 
or “Australian” ballot law.  Additionally, they placed a constitutional amendment on the 
next ballot that, if ratified, would replace the members of the ineffective Board of 
Transportation with an elected commission.  Though their accomplishments had been 
limited, they did establish enough of a record to campaign on the next year.
30
      
 Early in 1892, after a last desperate attempt to pull the Democratic Party to their 
cause, southern members of the Alliance were ready for an independent political party.  
When members of the NFAIU and other members of the conference of industrial 
organizations met in St. Louis on February 22, even Alliance president Leonidas Polk 
had made his preference for a third party known.  The convention adopted a platform 
nearly identical to the one the NFAIU had been pushing for several years—inflated 
currency, the sub-treasury plan, and government ownership of transportation and 
communication.  To this was added a preamble which served as a kind of statement of 
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purpose for the whole gathering.  Written by Ignatius Donnelly, it was nearly identical to 
the one that would be read in Omaha less than half a year later, but its adoption was a 
powerful statement of the intentions of those gathered.  It accused both “old political 
parties” of allowing the “dreadful conditions to develop without serious effort to restrain 
or prevent them,” and it asserted that a new “political organization… is necessary to 
redress the grievances of which we complain.”  Just after the convention adjourned, the 
delegates remained in their seats and declared their intent to work with the 
representatives of the Cincinnati convention.  When their representatives met with those 
of the People‟s Party, it was decided to hold the first convention in Omaha in July.31   
 Events leading up to the convention in July only added power to the Populist 
assessment of the old parties.  Of all the states in the West, none was more affected by the 
sea-change than Colorado.  By 1892, Henry M. Teller—the state‟s leading Republican 
and senior United States senator—had come to be considered the champion of free silver 
in Congress.  He had always favored the return of silver coinage to an equal status with 
gold, not only because of its importance to the state‟s mining interests but because of its 
importance to farmers as well.  He had worked with special vigor to obtain such 
legislation since his party‟s major victory in the election of 1888, but on each occasion 
members of his own party stood in the way.  Speaker Reed in the House was only one 
obstacle.  More frequently, the administration of President Benjamin Harrison applied 
pressure on those who nominally favored silver but were willing to trade their support of 
the cause for patronage.  By mid-February of 1892, Teller was actively seeking an 
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alternative candidate for the upcoming national convention in Minneapolis, and he and 
his colleague Senator Edward Wolcott had even dared to use the Democratic Rocky 
Mountain News to voice their disapproval when the Arapahoe County delegates were 
instructed to support Harrison‟s re-nomination.  Then, in March of 1892, with supposed 
silver backers in the majority in both houses of Congress, a last free coinage bill was 
snuffed out in what was now a Democrat-controlled House of Representatives.  Teller 
claimed that both parties were merely posturing for the upcoming campaign.  “[L]ike our 
party,” he declared, “the Democratic party is in the toils of a power it dare not offend, and 
the danger is that these two great political parties in their anxiety to secure the State of 
New York, controlled as it is by a little circle in and about Manhattan Island, will neglect 
and repudiate the interest of the great masses of the country and act exactly alike on this 
silver question.”  Teller had practically made the Populists‟ argument for them.32   
 The Republican and Democratic conventions in June only made the situation 
more difficult for Colorado‟s leading partisans.  Teller had hoped that James G. Blaine 
would lead the Republican ticket, but Harrison‟s supporters won the President‟s re-
nomination on the first ballot.  Teller had managed to place a plank in favor of 
bimetallism on the platform, but it was more sentimental than a policy statement, and just 
days before Teller had even admitted that the candidate mattered far more than the 
platform.  He was disappointed, but Teller remained with the Republicans for the time 
being.  Thomas Patterson, one of Colorado‟s leading Democrats and owner and operator 
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of the Rocky Mountain News, would be unable to do the same.  Just as Teller had in in the 
Senate, Patterson had used his paper to trumpet the cause of free silver leading up to the 
election year.  He led Colorado‟s delegation to the Democratic convention in Chicago, 
but his proposal for a silver plank was cast aside and the Democrats again nominated 
their standard-bearer from 1884 and 1888, Grover Cleveland.  Support for the gold 
standard was a near pre-requisite for Cleveland‟s nomination, as the ex-president had 
made a series of declarations against the silver heresy in the run-up to the convention.  
The free coinage of silver was a “dangerous and reckless experiment,” and he warned 
Democrats not to be tempted by the demands of the disreputable.  His selection meant 
that both old parties had completely rejected the growing calls for change.
33
   
While the Democrats and Republicans showed no interest in the one reform that 
was already known to have wide popularity, the People‟s Party adopted the whole suite 
of reforms advocated by the Alliance, Knights, and other farmer or labor organizations of 
the day.  The platform was broken into three sets of demands which responded to dangers 
in three fundamental sectors of the economy:  money, transportation, and land.  The 
money plank demanded the abolition of the national bank system,  the establishment of 
the “sub-treasury plan of the Alliance, or a better system,” the free coinage of silver, an 
increase in the circulating currency to $50 per capita, a graduated income tax, and a 
federally run postal savings bank.  The transportation section called for government 
ownership of the railroads, and that portion devoted to land condemned speculation and 
demanded the abolition of alien land ownership.  The search for candidates left few 
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viable options of any renown.  The president of the NFAIU, Leonidas Polk, had died in 
June.  Federal judge and known advocate of reform Walter Q. Gresham was the favorite 
of many others, but he had never joined the party, and though he had not quieted the 
rumors at an earlier date he now sent word to the convention that he would not accept the 
nomination.  A few even tossed about the name of James H. Kyle, an Independent who 
had been sent to the Senate by the South Dakota legislature in 1891, but he had no 
particular accomplishments to speak of.  The most logical candidate, and the one who did 
capture the nomination, was the former Greenback presidential candidate James B. 
Weaver.  To join the former Union general, former Confederate general James G. Field 
was selected to round out the ticket.  It was a move designed to show that reform now 
took precedence over the “bloody shirt.”34      
The emergence of a powerful national reform party proved thoroughly disruptive 
to the political balance in the West.  In Colorado, Patterson had walked away from the 
Democratic convention disgusted, but there was a surprise in store when he arrived back 
in Denver.  His partner at the Rocky Mountain News, John Arkins, had used the paper to 
condemn the nomination of Cleveland and instead support Weaver (several days before 
the Populists officially nominated him).  Patterson had been reluctant to bolt the party, 
but when he saw the positive response the move had elicited in Denver he accepted it.  
He was already skeptical that the national Democratic Party would support silver or any 
other substantial reform in the near term, but he was left in an uncertain position.  In spite 
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of his break with the party he still hoped to retain some influence among the local 
Democrats, but many openly denounced his actions.  The Populists were no more 
welcoming.  While he already accepted most of the major elements of the Populist 
program—free silver, substantial railroad reform (possibly including government 
ownership, which he did demand later), and support for organized labor—the leaders of 
the Populists in Colorado believed he was an opportunist who was hoping to capture their 
party for the benefit of the state Democrats.  This concern appeared to be validated when 
he called for a coalition of silver forces in the state.
35
   
When Patterson attempted to persuade the Populist state convention to hold off on 
nominations until it could confer with the Democrats, he was rebuffed.  Instead, the 
convention was dominated by members of the Alliance, former Greenbackers, and others 
with a history of work in reform organizations.  They chose the editor and labor advocate 
Davis H. Waite for governor.  Despite a great deal of hesitancy, Patterson came to 
support Waite‟s candidacy by the time the campaign was under way.  This influence 
would soon tell in the Democratic convention.  The fusion faction held a majority, and 
those who favored a straight ticket were forced to withdraw from the hall.  As the 
fusionists took Waite as their nominee, the bolters drew up a platform that claimed to 
support both free silver and the national Democratic Party.  They nominated former state 
attorney general Joseph H. Maupin for governor and named a slate of Democratic 
electors (which, at the advice of the national party, was later withdrawn).  While 
Colorado‟s Democrats were fractured, the state‟s Republicans attempted to act as though 
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nothing had changed.  They endorsed the actions of Teller and Wolcott, then ignored the 
recent actions of both senators to declare their unqualified support for Harrison.  They 
stressed the national Republicans‟ silver plank—a dangerous choice considering their 
opponents, but they must have viewed the Populists as an insignificant factor in the 
coming contest.
36
    
The entry of the Populists into the field also produced some changes in Nebraska.  
In 1890, the Republicans had dismissed the Independents as cranks, and they warned 
their constituents that a vote for them was in reality a vote for the Democrats.  It had not 
worked, and the Republicans gubernatorial candidate‟s third place finish took some shine 
off the party‟s once perfect record in state contests.  Likely as a consequence of that 
defeat, the anti-monopoly editor of the Omaha Bee, Edward Rosewater, held a great deal 
of influence over the state convention.  He undoubtedly had a say in the nomination of 
Lorenzo Crounse to lead the state ticket.  Crounse was a railroad reform advocate, though 
one who had been out of politics for some time.  He was also the father-in-law of Gilbert 
Hitchcock, the editor of the state‟s largest Democratic paper, the Omaha World-Herald, 
and consequently Hitchcock‟s press was rather ineffective during the campaign.  The 
platform also emphasized reform, specifically railroad regulation and the establishment 
of postal savings banks.  To oppose them, the Populists named Charles Van Wyck, the 
former Republican United States senator who had lost a re-election bid due to his 
perceived anti-railroad views.  The party ran largely on the Omaha platform, but Van 
Wyck and others tried to use the free silver issue to emphasize their difference from the 
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Republicans.   The Democrats, perhaps with an eye to federal patronage if Cleveland 
won, demonstrated their orthodoxy by selecting J. Sterling Morton for governor.  Boyd 
had been rejected for re-nomination because of his veto of the railroad rate law, but 
Morton‟s extreme conservatism did not make the transition appear significant.  The views 
that made Morton popular among easterners of like mind made him very much out of 
place in a state where the debate had shifted to substantial reform.
37
       
 In Washington, the dominant party still showed little sense of alarm over the 
changes that were transforming western politics.  The Republicans nominated John 
McGraw, former King County sheriff and president of the Seattle First National Bank, 
for governor.  They emphasized the state‟s material progress over the preceding four 
years, and to secure its future they promised to push for federal funds to construct the 
Lake Washington canal (which would connect the lake with Seattle‟s port).  The 
Populists endorsed the work of the Omaha convention, crafted a platform that 
emphasized the protection of labor, state regulation of railroad rates, and called for public 
ownership of irrigation canals.  For governor, they selected Cyrus W. Young, a wealthy 
Whitman County farmer.  State Democrats took notice.  They nominated the legislator 
and attorney for Kittias County, Henry J. Snively, who was known for his support for 
labor and railroad reform.  Shortly after their convention, the same conservative 
Democrats who had established the Seattle Telegraph abandoned their ticket to support 
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McGraw.  The promise of development and growth held too much appeal for them to 
ignore.
38
   
The campaigns differed as much one might have expected.  In Colorado, 
Republicans claimed theirs was the only party that could ever effectively remonetize 
silver, and they also suggested that investors would not consider their money safe in a 
state controlled by a radical.  In Nebraska, Crounse and Rosewater emphasized their own 
(if somewhat limited) reform agenda while declaring the monetary policies of Van Wyck 
and the Populists to be unsound.  As if to insure that he would never be mistaken for a 
radical, Morton focused most of his venom on Van Wyck and Populist policies as well.  
Washington Republicans focused on development and the threat to progress posed by the 
Democrats and Populists, while the Democrats‟ gubernatorial nominee struggled to deny 
charges that he had stolen money from orphans earlier in this life.  As usual, western 
Republicans stuck to a vision of progress based on the application of outside capital (both 
federal and private).  The economic future of the West was to be secured through 
investment and subsidies.
39
   
Of course the Populists were not opposed to investment, just as they were not 
opposed to the existence of railroads, canals, the telegraph, industrial mines, or any of the 
other accoutrements of a modern market economy.  However, they did believe that the 
system that existed privileged the rights of mortgage lenders, railroad stockholders, and 
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mine investors over the rights of farmers and laborers—the producers.  Populists 
expressed their distaste for the kind of top-down capitalism favored by conservatives in a 
variety of ways.  In the most widespread and damning condemnation of this system, the 
Populists of 1892 deployed conspiracy theories.   
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the money power conspiracy likely played 
an important part in the move toward third party politics.
40
  It condemned both of the old 
parties as the mere pawns of a financial elite, and the theory made either party‟s 
redemption seem unlikely.  It simultaneously represented an attack on a system that 
allowed distant financiers to draw wealth from the work of others.  While it was used to 
explain the seemingly irrational or heartless actions of those who controlled the American 
government and justify the return of silver to an equal place with gold in the national 
currency, it would have also made the conservative emphasis on the West as a site for 
investment seem inappropriate.   
It should be no surprise that the money power conspiracy would play such a role 
in the Populists‟ first national campaign, but the scope of its use suggests just how 
significant it may have been.  In a series of print debates in January between Rosewater 
and Jay Burrows, former secretary of the Nebraska Alliance and a founder of the state‟s 
third party, Burrows declared that silver had only been removed from its proper place due 
to the plot of the “bondholders.”  When Rosewater suggested that Populists merely 
wanted to “scale their obligations” by using inflationary currency to cut their debt in half, 
Burrows responded that “Every man at all posted on the question knows that the money 
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power of this country and the world performed on two occasions the most gigantic job of 
scaling the world has ever seen—first when it changed the standard of payment of fifteen 
hundred millions of bonds [to “coin”], second when it demonetized silver.”41  The party‟s 
gubernatorial candidate did not discuss the conspiracy in any detail, but he did declare 
that scarce money had been demanded not by “the toilers or the yeomanry,” but instead 
blamed the “Shylocks of Europe.”42   
Washington state‟s leading reformers also used conspiracy theory to justify their 
move to a new party.  Just in time for the campaign season, John Rankin Rogers—then 
just an Alliance organizer and local candidate—wrote a pamphlet titled The Irrepressible 
Conflict, or an American System of Money.  Substantial portions of it were little more 
than a reiteration of the arguments of Sarah Emery, as he too attributed the nation‟s 
policy of financial contraction to a small group of bankers based in England and New 
York.
43
  It is difficult to determine whether Rogers was attempting to spread word of the 
conspiracy to those who were unaware of it or if his goal was to rehash familiar ideas in 
time for the campaign.  Whatever his purpose or impact, the money power rapidly 
entered the lexicon of Washington state Populists.  In public debate in one of Seattle‟s 
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meeting halls in September, the Populist orator accused his opponent of advocating the 
doctrines of Wall Street before he suggested that the conservative spokesman should 
“receive compensation from the „money power.‟”44  Dr. O. G. Chase, a Populist 
candidate for the state House, published a series of articles in western Washington‟s 
small town papers, one of them devoted largely to the story of a senator and former 
Secretary of the Treasury, John Sherman.  Though Chase claimed Sherman had been 
honest when he came into office, “he went down before the money power, and John 
Sherman will be remembered by future generations as a tyrant and tool for Wall street 
[sic.] and England.”45  While the Washington reformers were late to the third-party 
movement, they used the same methods to explain the bankruptcy of the old parties.   
 The money power conspiracy was certainly a substantial part of the Populist 
campaign in Colorado.  Their gubernatorial candidate, Davis Waite, told crowds that 
America must have its own economic policy and not follow in the footsteps of those 
countries already under the control of the Rothschilds.
46
  But Waite was only one of 
many voices.  In May of that year, Thomas Patterson had found a man who claimed to 
have been an associate of Ernest Seyd—the supposed agent of the English money 
power—and then printed his corroborating testimony in the Rocky Mountain News.47  
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Later that summer, when he had made his own political move, he explained the 
impossibility of working within the old parties.  “In seeking an expression through a third 
party organization the people are adopting the only peaceful means of asserting their 
influence in the government, since the old parties have passed into the control of the 
money power.”  As a result of these policies, “A grievously unjust proportion of the 
wealth created by the productive population of the country is extorted from its rightful 
owners and forcibly diverted to the financial centers of the East.”48  He argued that the 
money power that controlled the Democrats and Republicans alike drained the resources 
of the hinterland‟s producers, and only the Populists were free of the corrupting 
influence.   
The results of the election showed tremendous gains for the Populists in much of 
the West, but it also suggested possible limits to their success.  Cleveland triumphed over 
Harrison and Weaver, but the Populist candidate had won the electoral votes of Colorado, 
Idaho, Kansas, and Nevada, as well as one of the votes of both North Dakota and Oregon.  
No other candidate for a new party had managed to win electoral votes since the 
antebellum period, and he received over a million popular votes.  But the single vote he 
won from Oregon was the only one he captured from a state that had been admitted 
before 1860, and the one million popular votes he claimed amounted to less than ten 
percent of the total cast that year.  An examination of regional results showed some 
promise, but it also suggested that a change in strategy would likely be required if 
Populists were to hold more than a handful of offices.  In Washington, for example, 
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where the party had been formed less than one year earlier, their gubernatorial candidate 
had received 26% of the vote.  This could suggest that, given more time, electoral success 
was possible.  Yet in Nebraska the total Populist vote actually declined from what it had 
been two years earlier, and Crounse was narrowly elected over Van Wyck.  The rare 
victories were usually a result of fusion.  Only eleven Populists were elected to the 
United States House of Representatives (all from the West), and a majority of those who 
won had been aided by the Democrats.  Where just two years earlier the Independents 
had struggled to gain more than six percent of the vote, Davis Waite won the 
governorship of Colorado with just under half of the vote cast.  Despite his unwillingness 
to admit that the silver Democrats had played a role, it is difficult to imagine such a rapid 
transition without such support.  Similar results were recorded in Kansas, where Populists 
and Democrats had also fused to elect Populist Lorenzo Lewelling as governor.  Populists 
themselves understood this situation, and it influenced their thinking in the years that 
followed.
49
   
 
Depression Politics, 1893-1895 
 As 1893 dawned, the situation nationally was, from the Populist viewpoint, 
unchanged from what it had been the year before.  Cleveland would soon be replacing 
Harrison but, as Populists were keen to point out, the primary difference between them 
was a few percent on the tariff.  On the same note, the Democrats were due to take over 
the Senate following several victories in state legislative races in the Midwest and West.  
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With the national government in the hands of the two old parties, Populists devoted their 
energies to the reform of state governance in the West.  They were still too weak in 
Washington state to make an impact, and factions in the Republican legislature primarily 
fought each other for right to select a senator—which they eventually failed to do.50  In 
Washington and Colorado, on the other hand, they held a large portion of the legislatures, 
and in Colorado also claimed the executive offices.  Both would be held accountable for 
governments of their states.    
 Populists did not hold a majority of seats in the Nebraska legislature as they had 
in 1891, and in fact Republicans held pluralities in both houses.  No one party held a 
majority, and the Democrats held the balance of power.  Surprisingly, the Populists were 
still able to pass legislation by working with and applying pressure upon Democrats—
some of whom were also interested in industrial reform, while others took note of the 
disposal of Governor Boyd following his veto of the railroad rate law.  The two parties 
were first brought together during a month-long struggle to name a United States senator.  
With the approval of the Democrats, the Populists were able to elect a relative unknown, 
district judge William V. Allen.  He would go on to be one of the leading Populists in the 
Senate over the course of the decade.
51
  Following their cooperation in the Senate 
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election, Populists and Democrats worked together to pass the same piece of railroad 
legislation that the Populists had in 1891, but this time the governor signed it.  It was a 
weighty and complex measure which took up nearly two-hundred pages in the statute 
book, but its specificity was intended to make enforcement easy and prosecution 
straightforward.  It was a substantial triumph for the state‟s reformers, but the law was 
soon challenged by the railroad companies in court, and its enforcement was held up by 
injunctions.  The legislature rounded out the session by adding another pro-labor law to 
those passed the previous term.  This time it was an anti-Pinkerton bill, which would be 
enacted just months after the dramatic battle between strikers and mercenaries at 
Homestead, Pennsylvania.
52
   
 The Colorado Populists had far less luck in their attempts to pass reform 
legislation.  Like the Nebraskans of the same year they did not hold a majority, but they 
could control the state senate if they worked with the Democrats.  They were also 
challenged by the difficulty in creating a united party.  Their greatest difficulty came 
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regarding the fights over railroad legislation.  Substantial regulatory bills were proposed 
in both houses, including a measure that would have set rates and empowered a 
commission to enforce and adjust them as needed.  These bills stalled, at least in part due 
to Republican opposition, but Populist disorganization was as much to blame.  Then, 
legislators commenced to dismantle what railroad regulation already existed for the state.  
Those from the least developed districts believed the law discouraged further investment, 
and so many Populists joined in the effort.  While Waite himself had advocated repeal, he 
expected that it would be accompanied by a proper replacement.  Instead, Republicans, 
Democrats, and Populists together voted to expunge the law.  When Waite rejected the 
bill, the legislature (again with Populist support) overrode his veto.  The impatient 
governor compared the legislators unfavorably to Judas Iscariot, who, following his 
transgression, at least “went out and hanged himself.”  The one substantial achievement 
of the Populists in the legislature involved women‟s suffrage.  Thirty-four (of the thirty-
six who participated) voted to put a suffrage amendment on the 1893 ballot, while only 
twenty of the fifty-three Republicans and Democrats who voted did the same.  If not for 
this, the legislative session would have been universally recognized as a complete 
fiasco.
53
      
 The challenges faced by western Populists were about to become far more intense 
than they could possible imagine.  By the summer of 1893, just months after Cleveland 
took office, the economy was melting down.  The explanations for the collapse are 
complex, but most have connected it to both an increase in gold transfers overseas in the 
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year leading up to the crisis and a stock market crash.  The crash, which began in the first 
days of May, led to further stress on the gold supply and fear that banks could not make 
good on the return of deposits.  The Treasury‟s gold reserve had been greatly affected by 
this withdrawal of specie, and ultimately depositors, bondholders, and investors seriously 
questioned the stability of the whole American system of finance.
54
    
 President Cleveland attributed the calamity to a recent Republican sop to the 
silver heretics:  the Sherman Silver Purchase Act.  Passed in 1890, it required the 
monthly purchase of four million ounces of silver by the federal government at the 
market price and the subsequent issue of silver certificates backed by the white metal.  
But the certificates were imperfect; they could at any time be exchanged at the Treasury 
for gold, and at a moment when gold was rapidly leaving the reserve it served as just one 
more strain upon the system.  Cleveland had railed against silver for months, and he had 
already declared his interest in the repeal of the act.  Eastern business leaders and 
financiers had fed this suspicion of the act, and when the Panic of 1893 struck he wasted 
little time to assign the blame.  On June 30, he sent out the call for Congress to convene 
in August.  The main purpose of the special session was clear to all, but the fight for 
repeal would be one of the most contentious congressional battles of the late nineteenth 
century.
55
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 With full knowledge of Cleveland‟s intent, westerners of all parties aligned to 
stop him.  In Colorado, a large convention of the state‟s silver currency advocates met on 
July 11 to respond.  They adopted a statement drafted by Thomas Patterson that predicted 
ruin for the West and the nation if the act was repealed and the place of silver further 
diminished.  It blamed the current crisis on a system “begotten of the greed of Great 
Britain‟s remorseless money power.”  But what would soon be the most infamous 
statement to be issued at the convention came from Colorado‟s irascible governor.  “The 
war has begun,” he declared, “it is the same war which must always be waged against 
oppression and tyranny to preserve the liberties of man—that eternal warfare of monarch 
and monopoly against the right of the people to self-government.”  The people must fight 
for their own economic independence through the ballot, but “if the money power shall 
attempt to sustain its usurpation by the „strong hand‟, we will meet that issue when it is 
forced upon us, for it is better, infinitely better that the blood should flow to the horses‟ 
bridles than our national liberties should be destroyed.”56    
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 Populists were not the only ones up in arms.  The long-time senator and former 
cabinet member Henry Teller sent his own thoughts to Patterson‟s Rocky Mountain News.  
They appeared under the headline “Traitorous”—a summation of Teller‟s thoughts on the 
repeal of the act.  The gold monometallist position that Cleveland hoped to force on the 
nation would only work for the benefit of the “financiers of England,” he said.  He did 
not describe the fight against repeal as one for the benefit of mining interests or the 
state‟s concerns, but instead explained that “IT IS A FIGHT FOR COMMERCIAL AND 
FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE, FOR PROGRESS, PROSPERITY, FREEDOM AND 
HAPPINESS OF 99-100 OF THE RACE [emphasis in original].”  The whole of his 
comments depicted the debate over silver as so much more than even a struggle over 
currency.  He defined it in terms similar to that of many Populists (if less dramatically 
than Davis Waite), as a struggle between those who held wealth and influence and those 
who merely sought to maintain their financial independence.  “It is not a fight against 
weaklings, it is a fight against organized wealth, against those who control by their 
wealth administrations, the press, and in some case the pulpit, and the unthinking, 
ignorant mass of men who will sell their birthright for a present mess of pottage.”  
According to Teller, the consequences of defeat could not be greater.
57
 
 Populists, especially those in the Senate, joined the chorus of opposition to the 
repeal.  James Kyle of South Dakota denied that the Sherman Act had anything to do 
with the crisis, but said that an economic crisis had already been felt by farmers for years.  
Only now was it gaining attention, when the livelihoods of bankers were at stake.  The 
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newly elected Senator Allen proved his worth early on when he held the floor for fifteen 
consecutive hours, over which time he refuted the conservative claims regarding intrinsic 
value, domestic overproduction, and the favorable balance of trade.
58
      
The Populists did not fight alone.  Representatives and senators from throughout 
the West made similar expressions.  Unsurprisingly, conspiracy talk abounded.  A 
freshman Democratic senator from North Dakota, William Roach, agreed with others that 
“a conspiracy existed, and that it was known that agents of England were here to force 
this Government to issue bonds.”59  California‟s new Democratic senator, Stephen White, 
made similar insinuations regarding the older members of Congress and Ernest Seyd.  
Though the stern rebukes of Senators Hoar and Sherman made him publicly disclaim his 
earlier remark, he then sent a letter to Henry Teller to convince him of the story‟s 
veracity.
60
   
 Of course, not all proponents of the conspiracy theory or of free silver broadly 
were committed to the broadest of reforms.  Senator William M. Stewart of Nevada 
accused Cleveland of “obeying the mandate of the money power and seeking to wrench 
from the people their rights under the constitution.”61  Stewart would go on to operate the 
paper The Silver Knight-Watchman, which he used as a platform for the remonetization 
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of silver.  But Stewart was no radical.  In Nevada, he had left the Republicans and helped 
form the Silver Party, but he had done so to save his own career and to subsume the 
Populist movement that threatened it.  The party created a consensus organization that 
fought for free silver nationally and little else.  Stewart came to work closely with Teller 
and other leaders of the diverse coalition that supported free silver, but he showed little 
interest in other reforms.  He was certainly not the only advocate of silver coinage who 
maintained their fundamental conservatism, but it would be just as faulty to suggest that 
those like him were in the majority.
62
     
   A Republican senator from South Dakota, Richard F. Pettigrew, had only slowly 
become engrossed in the effort to reestablish free silver, but his interest grew as he saw 
prices decline and personal suffering intensify.  As he wrote to a friend, his “sympathy 
goes out to the people who in Dakota are trying to conquer a wilderness and win a home, 
and I believe the people who are living upon our prairies are entitled to consideration in 
preference to the interest of the monied [sic.] classes who, as a rule, are not producers of 
wealth.”  Over twenty-five years later, near the end of his life, Pettigrew published self-
laudatory accounts of his whole career in politics, in which he depicted himself as always 
having been a “man of the people” who fought against vested interests.  In reality, it was 
not until Populists shook the political foundations within his own state and the currency 
debate took center stage nationally that Pettigrew seriously questioned the form of 
American economic development.  He had hoped for the return of silver currency since at 
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least the late 1880s, but in the changing environment of the 1890s the currency question 
took on a new kind of meaning.
63
     
 It was in the midst of the debate over repeal that a new leader emerged.  William 
Jennings Bryan had first entered the House of Representatives in 1891, but in his first 
term he had focused more on that most traditional of Democratic concerns, the tariff.  
Before his second term had even begun, he had studied the money question seriously, but 
it was certain from the beginning which side he would take.  Unlike many of the 
Populists and newly elected Democrats from the West, he devoted little of his speeches to 
discussion of any global conspiracy.  Instead, he won wide respect because he 
demonstrated a proper understanding of what silver represented.
64
   
 In what some considered the finest speech during the whole debate, Bryan 
provided both the material and moral explanation of his position.  For those who 
demanded sound money, he said, there was no such thing.  The value of both gold and 
silver had fluctuated wildly over the course of the last century, both in relation to each 
other and in their relative worth compared to the commodities they purchased.  He noted 
the strange logic of his opponents who said that, in the midst of a crisis many attributed to 
the dwindling supply of money, the government should intentionally exacerbate the 
circumstances by removing silver.  As would be his trademark, Bryan‟s strongest 
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contentions focused on the inherent rights of the people.  Cleveland had told Congress in 
1885 that those who had been elected would be held accountable by the tribunal of 
voters; Bryan told them they must also remember that “these constituencies include not 
bankers, brokers, and boards of trade alone.”  In reply to a congressman from 
Massachusetts, who suggested that “the money loaner was entitled to the advantages 
derived from improved machinery and inventive genius,” Bryan said “he is mistaken.  
The laboring man and the producer are entitled to these benefits.”  American democracy 
was a pointless exercise if government did not express the popular will, and surely “Free 
government can not long survive when the thousands enjoy the wealth of the country and 
the millions share its poverty in common.  Even now you hear among the rich an 
occasionally expressed contempt for popular government.”  Bryan concluded by stating 
that “we have come to the parting of the ways.”    
 
On one side stand the corporate interests of the nation, its money institutions, its 
aggregations of wealth and capital, imperious, arrogant, compassionless.  They 
demand special legislation, favors, privileges, and immunities…. They demand 
that the Democratic party shall become their agent to execute their merciless 
decrees… On the other side stands that unnumbered throng… Work-worn and 
dust-begrimed, they make their sad appeal.  They hear of average wealth 
increased on every side and feel the inequality of its distribution.  They see an 
overproduction of everything desired because of the underproduction of the 
ability to buy.”65 
 
Bryan, like many others of his time, came to view the currency question as an aspect of 
the conflict between producers and predatory wealth, or between common people and 
powerful vested interests.  While monometallists spoke as though the gold standard was 
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neutral or natural, Bryan understood money to be a creation of humankind and that the 
question of its form and function had a real-world impact that would not be ignored.   
 It was for this reason that many Populists came to view him as one of their own.  
The core of Populist ideology did not stem from their views of the railroad or silver or 
any other tangible thing.  Populist thought began with the premise that the industrial 
economy must be made responsive to the popular will and the needs of “the people.”  The 
debate over silver and gold hit upon a specific subset of that premise.  If the current 
economic system created gaps in the distribution of wealth, then that system was unjust 
and must be changed.  Though some westerners thought primarily of the boon to regional 
development that would come with free silver, Bryan and many other western Democrats 
and Republicans recognized a meaning in the issue akin to the Populist understanding of 
it, and by making the cause their own they set in motion the chain of events that would 
lead to Bryan‟s nomination by three parties in the 1896 presidential race.   
 While in a few short years Bryan would lead a movement for reform, in 1893 
Cleveland still held the upper hand.  As was the case in the last Congress a majority had 
declared their support for free silver before the session had begun, but that was before the 
economy had gone into free-fall.  Despite his reputation as a champion of civil service, 
Cleveland was also not above using patronage to get his way.  Less than two weeks after 
Bryan‟s speech, the House passed the repeal bill by the overwhelming vote of 239 to 108.  
Though it was a greater struggle to secure its passage in the Senate, and the President‟s 
supporters had to fend off a free silver amendment in the last days leading up to the vote, 
it was passed 48 to 37 on October 30.  Two-thirds of Republicans supported the bill, 
while the Democrats were split.  Westerners almost unanimously opposed it, and section 
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was a more significant factor than party in settling the results.  Cleveland signed the 
repeal bill into law on November 1.  It was a masterful job of political management by 
Cleveland, but it also hinted at the troubles that were to come and confirmed the 
suspicions of those who claimed the American political system failed to represent the 
voting public.
66
   
  Cleveland had pressured Congress because of what appeared to be an emergency, 
and he suggested that normal business could commence again after the repeal was secure.  
In spite of his optimism, his predictions proved false.  He decided that the dwindling gold 
reserve was another worry, and so, without the consent of Congress, the President 
ordered huge bond sales—equaling over $200 million—between early 1894 and the 
opening months of 1896.
67
  Though the fall in stock prices ceased, economic activity 
remained stunted for the remainder of the year, and in fact it would not return to normal 
levels for the next several years.  The farm and labor organizations that had grown 
rapidly or sprung up from the grassroots in the late 1880s and early 1890s suggested that 
this was already a divisive era, but the situation was only made more complex by the 
second worst economic crisis in American history.   
 The depression unleashed the pent-up discontent of the 1890s.  Labor clashed 
with capital in a way that it had not since the 1870s, and sites in the West were not 
excluded.  In the gold mining districts around Cripple Creek, Colorado, the struggle 
between owners and members of the newly organized (and politically radical) Western 
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Federation of Miners began in late 1893 over labor‟s demand for uniform wages and an 
eight-hour day.  As the confrontation wore on into the spring of 1894, some mine owners 
gave in to the demands while others considered the use of force.  In May, with the 
financial backing of the owners, the El Paso County sheriff had gathered a force of 1,200 
armed men to drive off the strikers.  As the outbreak of violence appeared imminent, 
Davis Waite ordered the strikers to lay down their arms, but he also declared the sheriff‟s 
army to illegal and ordered it to be dispersed.  The Governor acted for the miners in 
negotiations with several owners, and eventually he called in the National Guard to hold 
back and then disarm the deputies.  With this act, the Populists gained substantial support 
among organized labor in the state, but even some of Waite‟s allies depicted the governor 
as unreasonably biased in favor of the miners.
68
    
 Well before the state conventions of 1894, Waite had become quite a 
controversial figure in the state.  His use of the militia in Cripple Creek had been the 
second time they were called out that year; the first time it was to help him remove from 
office members of the appointed Denver Fire and Police Board who fortified city hall 
after he notified them of his intentions.  Bloodshed was averted and the board members 
eventually gave in, but the event made the Populists seem as irrational and dangerous as 
their worst critics had claimed.  Waite had also called a second session of the legislature, 
but it had proven no more effective than the first was.  Worse yet, Waite and members of 
his administration were again made to seem imbalanced when they tossed out wild 
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solutions to the currency problem, such as his plan to send Colorado silver to Mexico in 
order to have it coined and sent back for use as currency within the state.  While he also 
offered some practical proposals to deal with mortgages on homesteads and state 
operation of irrigation canals, moderates in the state were rapidly turning against a 
governor they considered unpredictable. 
69
   
 By the time of the state conventions, the type of fusion that Tom Patterson had 
sought two years earlier was a complete impossibility.  Patterson (now officially a 
Populist) was himself so fed up with Waite that he tried to find an alternative 
gubernatorial candidate, but to no avail.  Some Populists were uncertain about the 
Governor, but his labor support made him impossible to replace.  Patterson and the News 
endorsed the whole of the Populist slate, with the exception of Waite.  The Democratic 
organization had no interest in fusion with Waite at the head of the ticket, a situation that 
suited the Governor as well.  Charles S. Thomas, Patterson‟s former law partner, was 
nominated by the Democrats, but he received little attention during the campaign.  
Republicans selected an obscure judge, A. W. McIntire, for the governorship, and 
devoted their campaign to the divisive Waite administration.  Some among them went so 
far as to suggest that Waite‟s irrational behavior was responsible for the depressed local 
economy, not the national crisis and policies of the federal administration.  “Waiteism” 
was the issue of the day.
70
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 In Nebraska, the most substantial development was the first attempt at statewide 
fusion between the Populists and Democrats.  The chain of events which contributed to 
the union may have been initiated by a Republican.  Frustrated by his party‟s support of 
the reportedly corrupt (and possible member of the nativist American Protective 
Association) Thomas J. Majors for governor, Edward Rosewater of the Omaha Bee left 
the convention and temporarily abandoned the GOP.  The editor let it be known that he 
would support a Populist judge, Silas A. Holcomb, and the Populist gave him the 
nomination on the first ballot when they met just days later.  When the Democrat‟s turn 
to nominate came, Bryan was the first to add Holcomb to the list of candidates, and he 
was quickly accepted by the delegates.  It was the perfect year for Bryan to pull off the 
fusion arrangement that he had been contemplating.  He had already managed to place 
younger silver Democrats into the key positions of the party for just such a move, and 
then the Republicans did him the favor of nominating a candidate who offended both the 
reformers Bryan sought out and the party‟s ethnic voters who had long been suspicious of 
the Populists.
71
    
 Washington state had four year terms for executive officers, and so instead of 
centering on a gubernatorial election the campaign there focused on legislative races and 
the two House seats, which were both elected at large.  Still, the depression and the 
policies of the two old parties on the national stage provided an opening for the state‟s 
Populists.  Though the main contests were for legislative seats, these representatives 
would have to elect the senator that the 1893 legislature had failed to select.  In the 1894 
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contests Populists put a greater emphasis on silver than they had in the past, but the state 
convention in North Yakima attempted to strike a balance between it and other planks, 
such as that for direct legislation.  It also rejected growing talk of fusion, which may have 
appealed to new converts from Seattle‟s Western Central Labor Union.  The nominations 
for the congressional seats went to W. P. C. Adams, an American Railway Union 
organizer (in the midst of that summer‟s ARU strike) and J. C. Van Patten, a teacher and 
Presbyterian minister.  The anti-fusion statements by the Populists were probably 
necessary that year, for the state‟s Democrats talked of little else.  For years they had 
been the minority party in the territory and state, and now Cleveland had destroyed the 
reputation of Democrats throughout the West.  As noted, the Democratic courtship of the 
Populists was unreciprocated, with the exception of a few local and legislative tickets.  In 
hopes of downplaying Populist advocacy of silver, state Republicans also fought amongst 
themselves over the silver question in their convention.  Spokane lawyer and 
businessman George C. Turner eventually forced the gathering to accept a free silver 
plank, but much of the remainder of the platform was little more than a denunciation of 
Cleveland.
72
   
 For all of the suggestions by historians that Populism was a movement born of 
economic decline and crisis (and thus was doomed by the return of “good times”), the 
outcome of the election of 1894 suggests otherwise.
73
  Electoral results proved to be 
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determined more by tactical factors than the general state of the economy.  In Colorado, 
where the economy was in utter ruin, Populists were branded with the image of Waite 
while Democrats were burdened by the presidency of Cleveland.  The Populists did 
garner a substantial vote from organized labor in the state, but they were defeated 
throughout its agricultural counties.  Republicans won the election for governor and a 
majority in the state legislature.  In Nebraska, where Populists and Democrats had fused, 
Republicans linked all of them with the increasingly unpopular president.  The fusion 
candidate for governor, Silas Holcomb, did manage a narrow victory over his opponent, 
but the rest of the ticket fared poorly and the legislature was again in Republican hands.  
Washington state Populists, on the other hand, had never held power and made no 
statewide agreements with the other parties. As a consequence, the new party was 
defeated but actually made substantial gains throughout the state.  Populists received over 
one-third of the vote, and now ranked ahead of Democrats in strength in the state.
74
     
 The state governments put in place following the election of 1894 looked and 
acted very much like those that had existed before the 1890s.  In Nebraska, the 
Republican legislature passed (over Holcomb‟s veto) a subsidy for the manufacture of 
beet sugar, something the Populists had repealed in 1891, and added a law restricting the 
coloring of oleomargarine—hardly a thoroughgoing response to the severe depression.75  
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Colorado followed suit in its legislature.  One of the few laws it managed to pass was one 
designed to increase the punishment for “train wrecking,” which now became a felony 
punishable by sentences ranging from ten years to life.
76
  In Washington, most of the 
legislative session was also dominated by conservatives.  A railroad regulation law was 
voted down, and a pointless resolution in favor of silver was passed.  But one notable 
piece of reform legislation did slip through.  John Rankin Rogers, a Populist member of 
the state House, authored a bill that would redistribute educational funds to districts based 
on the number of students in the district, essentially apportioning the money based on 
need rather than the wealth of the community.  The bill was opposed by representatives 
from the wealthier urban counties, but publicity for the bill forced Republicans with rural 
constituencies to support it.
77
     
 Republicans in the West showed hesitance to adopt any serious reform measure, 
and they had defended that action (or inaction) by suggesting that regulation or state 
interference would drive away capital.  That does not mean that western Republicans had 
not observed the shifts that had taken place in regional politics, but to advocate local 
reform over development was counter to the doctrines they had carried with them from 
the beginning, and it was certainly opposed by the interests they represented.  However, 
that did not preclude advocacy of at least one change.  By 1894-95, nearly all western 
Republicans gave at least token support to silver, and one‟s availability for high office 
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was directly related to one‟s advocacy of the cause.  John Thurston, a prominent 
Nebraska Republican and railroad lawyer, had proclaimed the Republicans to be the true 
silver party during his campaign tour of the state in 1894.  He was rewarded months later 
when the legislature elected him to the state‟s vacant U.S. Senate seat.78  In Colorado, 
Populists and Democrats called attention to the flaws of one of their sitting senators.  
They flatly accused Edward Wolcott of being a known gambler and philanderer and, 
worst of all, a corporation lawyer who had shown too much preference for his friends in 
business.  It was for those reasons that the Rocky Mountain News sardonically described 
him as the “best representative member” of his party.  Despite the criticism, Wolcott was 
chosen by the Republican majority on the first ballot, and they did so with the sole 
justification that he had always been a staunch advocate of free silver.
79
  Washington‟s 
bi-annual fight for the senatorship was not determined by the free silver debate, but those 
who were known advocates of the gold standard were considered all but hopeless.  The 
man selected, Congressman John L. Wilson, evaded questions on the subject and may 
have encouraged the circulation of rumors that he favored free coinage.
80
  Western 
Republicans did not yet appreciate the danger in the creation of a silver consensus.   
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The “Battle of Standards,”1896-1897 
 The events of 1896 have frequently been described as leading to the end of the 
Populist reform movement.  This has especially been the case for historians who 
attributed the death of Populism to fusion.  They suggest that Populists—particularly new 
converts and those who had only a partial understanding of the party‟s doctrines—were 
wooed by Bryan‟s dramatic oratory and they fell under his spell, only to be destroyed.  
But fusion was not new, nor were the fusionists somehow less “Populist” than those who 
opposed fusion.  By creating a party that could legitimately champion silver at the 
national level, they had changed the political landscape and forced others to incorporate it 
as well.  Though they embraced a wide spectrum of reforms, money had been central to 
the agenda of the movement from the moment the farm and labor organizations had taken 
the first steps toward independence.  Now, it appeared a majority of voters could be on 
their side.  For the great majority of western Populists, 1896 was a year of opportunity, 
not a year of cataclysm.
81
     
 The growing sentiment in the West in favor of free silver had become strong 
enough in 1896 that, well before the party convention, Senator Teller and others began to 
insinuate that the Republican Party‟s refusal to accept the issue that year would lead to 
their withdrawal from the organization.  They would soon be forced to make good on that 
promise.  The eastern wing of the party generally hoped to fight the campaign on terms 
                                                 
81
 For several of those who have attributed the collapse of the movement to fusion, see footnote 2 above.  
On the importance of the monetary issue to Populism, see Postel, Populist Vision, 150-153; Bruce Palmer, 
“Man over Money”:  The Southern Populist Critique of American Capitalism (University of North 
Carolina Press, 1980), 81-82; Robert W. Larson, Populism in the Mountain West (Albuquerque:  University 
of New Mexico Press, 1986), 147-159 ; Bensel, Political Economy, 134-138; Robert F. Durden, The 
Climax of Populism:  The Election of 1896 (Lexington, KY:  University of Kentucky Press, 1965), 7.   
141 
 
similar to what it had over the last decade, which meant economic policy would center 
upon the tariff.  The man that was almost universally favored to receive the nomination, 
Governor William McKinley of Ohio, had made his career straddling the monetary issue 
while advocating (and authoring) a strong protective tariff.  However, the recent 
developments had made the currency issue impossible to ignore.  By the time of the 
convention, McKinley and the head of his campaign, Mark Hanna, had decided some 
statement in favor of gold was necessary.
82
   
 The basic presumptions of many—or for most western Republicans, their worst 
fears—were soon realized at the Republican‟s St. Louis convention.  The needed majority 
of delegates were already committed to McKinley, and the single ballot required on the 
final day of the convention was a mere formality.  Earlier that day, a more genuine drama 
was played out on the convention stage.  The monetary plank called for “sound money,” 
and denounced “free coinage of silver, except by international agreement.”  It was as 
close to an unequivocal statement as anyone in the party cared to offer, and Teller could 
not stand for it.  He offered the minority report as a substitute and begged the delegates to 
accept it or, “I must, as an honest man, sever my connection” with the party he had 
helped found in the West.  As he stood, tears streaming down his face, his request was 
rejected by the overwhelming majority.  As the westerners walked out of the convention 
they were hooted and heckled, with Hanna openly leading the worst of it.  In expectation 
of such a bolt, Populist leaders were on hand to consult with Teller and the others.  The 
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two groups quickly decided to cooperate in their arrangements for the remainder of the 
campaign.
83
     
 Notwithstanding the departure of the silver men, the gathering in St. Louis would 
be the most orderly of the three significant conventions of 1896.  That of the Democrats, 
with the uncertainty that preceded it, conflicts that defined it, and the energy that 
followed it, is usually the one to receive the most attention.  Bryan‟s status as the dark 
horse of the convention has only added to mystique of the event.  But as the best recent 
scholars have emphasized, Bryan‟s selection was no accident and the adoption of a free 
silver platform was as much an inevitability as McKinley‟s nomination had been.  The 
overwhelming majority of delegates from the West and South supported silver, as did 
substantial numbers from the Midwestern states.  While the representatives of New York 
had been allowed to dictate the candidate in years past, their control had already been 
broken.
84
     
 The field of candidates that Bryan did beat out was substantial, but most were 
flawed.  The Colorado delegation and the Populist leaders who came to Chicago favored 
the nomination of Teller, but Teller‟s support among actual members of the convention 
was minimal.  Former Congressman Richard Bland of Missouri was one of the favorites, 
but he was considered to be a rather old and uninspiring figure, and those outside of the 
Democratic Party viewed him as conservative on nearly every other issue.  Horace Boies 
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of Iowa was another thought to be a serious contender, but his reputation did not stretch 
very far beyond the borders of Iowa.  Likely candidates also followed tradition and 
abstained from participation in the convention, but Bryan was under no such obligation.  
Amidst the disorderliness associated with the western and southern takeover of the party, 
Bryan saw his opportunity.   
The Nebraskan took the last place in a debate over the platform, and it was his 
task to provide the final response to the arguments of the gold standard delegates.  While 
he denied that he held any sectional animosity, he rebutted the statements of the gold men 
who asked the delegates to consider the impact silver would have upon business.  These 
same men had already “disturbed our business interests by your course,” and the 
“business man” who worked for wages or farmed had an equal right to profit from their 
own labor as any financier or industrialist had.  The financial policies of the East had 
placed their own region‟s benefit over that of all others.  To the man who said he feared 
the coming of a Robespierre, he declared that “What we need is an Andrew Jackson, to 
stand, as Jackson stood, against the encroachments of organized wealth.”  He then railed 
against “their policies,” attributing the previous year‟s Supreme Court ruling against the 
income tax to men of their class and region.  He attacked the national banking system and 
stated that it was time that “the banks ought to go out of the governing business.”  He 
then tore apart the Republican plank that suggested “bimetallism is good, but that we 
cannot have it until other nations help us.”  By the time he laid an imaginary crown of 
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thorns upon his head, Bryan had explained why the nation must strike out on its own to 
establish circumstances under which farmers and laborers could prosper.
85
     
 While the speech brought a thunderous response out of the convention in Chicago 
and allowed Bryan to secure the Democratic nomination, it also made him the logical 
candidate of the Populist Party.  Populist leaders had already been in communication with 
top Democrats, and they had let it be known that even silver advocates with a 
conservative streak would be rejected.  Bryan‟s selection obviated any fear of that.  He 
did not support government ownership of the railroads or the establishment of the 
subtreasury system, but he did believe that any prosperity was illusory if those in the 
lowest rungs of society could not profit from their labor.  As much as any Populist, he 
believed in popular control of the economy, and for the Populists that was good enough.     
 From the beginning of the campaign, James Weaver, North Carolina senator 
Marion Butler, and other heads of the organization had agreed to a late convention with 
the intention of working with the disaffected members of the other parties.  While some 
contemplated the possibility that neither party would accept free silver, and thus any 
fusion with the bolters could occur on Populist terms, the real possibility of a silver 
Democratic nominee must have occurred to some among them.
86
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 In the Populist convention, the West and South divided on the best option to 
take.
87
  Westerners wanted Bryan and held no reservations about how they accepted him.  
Southerners, on the other hand, were hesitant to fuse with the Democrats unconditionally.  
In this regard, it is difficult to define many of the key participants as representative of the 
“middle of the road”—as anti-fusionists had come to be known.  Even before the 
convention, Populist leaders had conferred with Senator James K. Jones of Arkansas, 
Bryan‟s campaign manager, about the availability of the vice-presidential selection.  
Bryan already had a running mate, the wealthy shipbuilder from Maine Arthur Sewall, 
and neither Bryan nor Jones would have him withdraw.  The fact that Sewall was not 
popular with any group Bryan sought was apparently insignificant.  Eventually, pressure 
from the southern wing of the party led to Bryan‟s nomination and a separate vice-
presidential nomination, done regardless of the Nebraskan‟s approval.  The anti-fusion 
ex-congressman from Georgia, Tom Watson, was selected as his running mate.
88
   
 The push for a separate ticket was especially vital to those in the South who 
believed that fusion with the Democrats was suicidal.  While a clear majority at the 
Populist convention demanded Bryan‟s presidential nomination, southerners believed that 
a separate ticket would allow them to act on their own and maintain their party‟s 
independence.  Those like Butler, Weaver, Allen, and Patterson did not believe that their 
support of Bryan had to destroy the movement.  Instead, they argued that if the 
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Democrats were to be treated as allies, the Populists must continue as a separate entity to 
“keep them honest.”  Furthermore, they believed the party‟s rejection of Bryan would be 
deadlier to the movement than fusion was.
89
   
It was a strange solution for what would be a unique campaign.  Bryan was left 
with two “vices”—as Republicans liked to joke—and eventually held the nominations of 
the Democratic, Populist, Silver Republican, and National Silver parties.  Despite the 
support from so many quarters, he was soon abandoned by many members of his own 
party.  Democrats who remained committed to the gold standard (especially in the East 
and Midwest) formed the National Democratic Party and nominated the aging John M. 
Palmer for president.  Their goal was not victory, but to deprive Bryan of triumph.  They 
claimed to control several hundred thousand votes right up to the time of the election, but 
if this were so then most of their voters must have supported McKinley in the end.
90
  
 In the western states Bryan‟s nomination was quite popular, and fusion 
arrangements were made in most to capitalize upon the situation.  Bryan and western 
Populist leaders both favored this move, Bryan tried to use his newfound influence in the 
West and South to encourage mutually beneficial arrangements.  In Nebraska, Democrats 
and Populists agreed to a division of offices, and Holcomb was re-nominated for 
governor.  Despite their anti-fusion sentiment before 1896, Washington‟s Populists 
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reluctantly came to accept a division of offices as well.  John Rankin Rogers was selected 
as the gubernatorial candidate, while the two U.S. House seats were divided among the 
Democrats and Silver Republicans.
91
   
The situation was more complicated in Colorado, and the Mountain West 
generally.  There, nearly the whole of the Republican Party abandoned McKinley to 
support free silver and Bryan.  Neither Bryan nor silver, then, proved as useful there as 
they had elsewhere to create a fusion ticket.  Though Teller and Patterson advocated 
unity, and it was agreed that the Silver Republicans, Democrats, and Populists alike 
would support the same presidential electors, it proved impossible to divide up offices 
satisfactorily among three parties, each of which would have considered themselves the 
dominant partner in the arrangement. In the final arrangements, the Democrats and 
Republicans fused in the state election, nominating former Democratic governor Alva 
Adams for the same office.  Patterson‟s Populists were left to partner with the weak 
Silver Party, while Waite led his anti-fusion Populists to their own convention.  The 
“fusion” Populists nominated Morton Bailey, while Waite was chosen by his own 
backers to run for governor yet again.
92
    
The Republican campaigners in the West were in a difficult position.  Many had 
declared the necessity of free silver in the years leading up to 1896, but outside of the 
mining states few dared to bolt the party when it renounced the policy.  In Washington, a 
large share of those in the Spokane region did so but they were joined by few others 
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statewide, while only a smattering of local officials did so in Nebraska.  Certain editors 
decided to follow McKinley‟s line and reject free silver and inflated currency.  They 
issued statements that silver would destroy wages, drive off international investment, and 
bring a return to the worst of depression conditions.  Businessmen of all sorts would want 
nothing to do with the “fifty-cent dollars” Bryan and the Populists called for.  Some 
admitted free silver was designed to aid farmers, but declared that it amounted to class 
legislation and the repudiation of debt—something they characterized as “dishonorable.”  
Others suggested that those who favored silver were really in the employ of mine owners 
who hoped to boost the value of their product.  In this way, they painted Bryan other 
proponents of silver coinage as the servants of a rather unsympathetic economic interest 
group.  While many of these remarks could be found on editorial pages, even more 
frequently the anti-silver statements came in the campaign supplements prepared by the 
national Republican campaign.
93
   
But in the West, some Republicans chose to cling to the only silver options their 
platform allowed.  Some claimed that the problem with free silver was in the ratio of 
sixteen to one; others said the problem stemmed from the free coinage element, which 
would allow anyone to have their silver coined at the mint without limit.
94
  But the most 
common statements focused on the fig leaf of international bimetallism.  Most 
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considerate people would have thought such an agreement impossible, as it had been 
bandied about for over twenty years with no real signs of change on the horizon.  One 
paper, the Colorado Springs Gazette, actually made that very point in one article, but 
supported Senator Edward Wolcott as he campaigned through the state preaching the 
necessity of an international agreement.
95
  Senator John L. Wilson of Washington, who as 
a candidate for office had refused to even state his views of the subject, said that “I am 
and always have been a bimetallist,” but he had also held “serious doubts as to the ability 
of the United States to maintain the free coinage of silver without the cooperation of at 
least two other great European commercial nations.”96  Silver proved to be a difficult 
issue to let go.   
 The western Republicans‟ unwillingness to embrace the gold standard was a 
product of the political climate in the West.  They understood as well as their opponents 
the appeal of reform, and if not for silver they could offer little to farmers and miners of 
their region.  The Democrats, Populists, and breakaway Republicans, however, did not 
allow the claims of McKinley‟s supporters to stand.  Teller noted that, after the platform 
was unveiled, international bimetallism was “promptly repudiated by the great 
Republican leaders and Republican newspapers.”97  Others noted that no eastern paper 
(regardless of affiliation) had taken the international bimetallism plank seriously, and 
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McKinley said so little on the subject that there was no reason to believe he wanted it.
98
  
With no real alternatives, the straight Republicans of the West were doomed to defeat.   
For westerners, the results of the election were remarkable on all counts.  Reform 
coalitions that included the Populists swept all major offices in Nebraska and 
Washington, as well as Idaho, Kansas, Montana, and South Dakota, and they also won 
sixteen of those states‟ United States House seats.  In Colorado, the Populist-backed 
congressmen John Calhoun Bell (Populist) and John Shafroth (Silver Republican) also 
won easily, but one of the few victories achieved without Populist aid came in the 
Colorado gubernatorial election.  There, Democrat Alva Adams defeated the Populist 
candidate by over fifteen thousand votes, but only managed that by fusing with the larger 
half of the state‟s Republican Party.  That the Populists—who had been forced to ally 
with the weak National Silver Party in the contest—still managed to gain nearly forty 
percent of the total was telling.  As soon as the Republican-Democratic coalition broke 
down, as it inevitably would, Colorado‟s labor vote would emerge as the largest voting 
bloc in the state.  Even if reform was stalled there, the general outlook in the West was 
promising.
99
   
Yet the overarching goal they had set out to accomplish was just beyond their 
reach.  Bryan‟s whirlwind campaign through the Midwest and East is legendary, but 
ultimately he could not overcome both the wealth arrayed against him and certain 
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geographic obstacles.  That he did not tour the West after the campaign commenced is a 
telling fact; he knew he did not need to.  Just as he would have expected, Bryan won 
every western state in which there was still a substantial Populist presence.  Of the states 
that entered the Union after 1860, he lost only North Dakota.  To these he added the 
states of the solid South.  Outside of those regions, he had no victories.  From Iowa to the 
Atlantic Ocean, among the heavily-populated agricultural and industrial states of the 
Midwest and Northeast, Republicans were the victors.  The strength of the old parties and 
their old ideas had gone largely unchallenged there, and though Bryan drew large 
audiences he not could totally reshape the political balance of these states in a mere 
matter of weeks.
100
   
Still, the defeat of Bryan in 1896 would not be the final word on reform.  He 
certainly indicated it was not when he titled his account of the campaign The First Battle.  
Bryan (somewhat arrogantly) viewed the fight for silver in 1896 as the opening 
engagement in a struggle against centralized wealth.  He donated the proceeds of the 
book to his allies, including leaders of the Populists, in order that they might use the 
funds to strengthen their organizations.  He did not believe that his defeat in 1896, or the 
fusion arrangement that had brought him so close to victory, would somehow lead to the 
collapse of the allied movements.
101
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In this regard, his views were shared by many in the West.  The Populists did not 
believe that their party was on the verge of collapse in 1896.  Shortly after defeat, even a 
southern Populist like Marion Butler could predict that in four years‟ time the Populists 
would form the core around which the forces of reform would coalesce.  In fact, over the 
next two years western Populists would frequently express their belief that either the 
Democrats would collapse and a new party would be formed or that the reformers would 
voluntarily join the Populists.  Their predictions were based on a few assumptions.  First, 
they knew the objective of the gold Democrats of 1896 was not to form a new permanent 
party, but instead the separate gold ticket was designed to allow partisans to maintain 
their loyalty without voting for Bryan.  When these powerful leaders returned to the 
Democratic Party, Populists believed that Bryan and those like him would be forced to 
either compromise on reform or abandon the organization.  Populists also remembered 
the strife created by fusion, and a new party would streamline reform without the 
necessity of awkward multi-party arrangements.  Like Bryan, the western Populists 
believed that the fight was not yet over.
102
    
Bryan‟s hopes and the hopes of other serious proponents of reform in the West 
rested on the continuation of successful fusion coalitions.  Though southern Populists 
struggled to maintain their independence in the wake of the contest, the movement in the 
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West could continue unabated.
103
  Disgruntled former leaders of the party‟s western 
branch did blame their personal defeats upon fusion, but westerners had overwhelming 
favored the coalition in 1896 and showed little evidence that they intended to desert the 
cause.  Many of the Populist parties of the western states had sprung up as independent 
organizations based upon local reform movements.  The national organization had always 
acted more like a collection of state parties rather than a single group, but that is 
essentially what they had always been. Local victory could allow them to maintain their 
place.  As long as they could build on their accomplishments, there was no reason that 
western Populists could not keep up the fight for a number of years.    
When the new legislative sessions opened in 1897, pressure was on to follow 
through on promises.  This was especially true in Nebraska and Washington, where 
Populists held the governorships and were the strongest parties in the legislatures.  In 
Colorado—where Populists held only about one-third of the legislative seats, a Democrat 
elected without their aid held the governorship, and the laborers they represented had not 
yet formed an effective lobby—the prospects for reform were bleak.104   
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In Washington, the session began with a divisive fight over the senatorship.  
Apparently fusionists were not immune to this biennial tradition.  Populists had hoped to 
elect one of their own, but remained divided on the candidate.  Governor Rogers acted as 
though neutral, but there is evidence he had an alternative in mind.  The absence of any 
leader with the power or influence necessary to make a bargain left the less partisan 
Populists to join with Silver Republicans and Democrats.  In late January they agreed to 
elect George C. Turner, a Silver Republican from Spokane with a solid reform record.  
He was a former justice of the territorial Supreme Court and one who had not been afraid 
to rule against railroads.  In summer of 1894, during the ARU strike, he publicly 
advocated government ownership of the railroads and control of all “natural monopolies.”  
If not a true Populist, his selection was certainly not an unreasonable one.  Added to that 
was his position as the leader of the Silver Republicans, and what appeared to be a 
growing association between Turner and Rogers could solidify a reform party in 
Washington for years to come.
105
   
The bickering and disputes that had characterized all first-term Populist 
legislatures plagued that of Washington in 1897, but they did actually manage a solid 
record in spite of themselves.  The loudest complaints came from mid-roaders who were 
frustrated with Rogers due to his willingness to award offices to Democrats and Silver 
Republicans.  This group then alienated the governor and the rest of the fusion coalition 
by promising to support the creation of a railroad commission, then backing out after 
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their own legislation had been passed.  The defeat of the commission was perceived to be 
a disaster, as this had been a primary reform demanded by agrarians for most of the 
decade.  Because of his own animosity towards what he considered an unreasonable 
minority, Rogers ignored the flood of recommendations for a special legislative 
session.
106
  Through all of the infighting, the legislature did still manage some significant 
accomplishments.  They passed a workers‟ lien law, authorized a system for mine and 
factory inspections, put restrictions upon wage garnishment, and established a state 
bureau of labor.  They also passed a railroad rate law, but the reductions were modest and 
without a railroad commission this law could be limited through judicial injunctions.  
Still, when compared with the paltry record of past legislatures, the 1897 session had 
accomplished much.
107
    
Though all parties were far more familiar with the politics of fusion than they 
were in other states, the twenty-fifth session of the Nebraska legislature also struggled 
with a signature piece of legislation, namely a bill to outlaw the free passes that railroads 
offered to politicians.  Despite this failure, a working coalition of Populists and 
Democrats did manage to pass new stockyards regulations, abolish the bounty for the 
manufacture of beet sugar, and pass a municipal referendum law.  To these they added 
three laws—with rather stiff penalties—designed to outlaw trusts and combinations in 
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restraint of trade.  A local company found to be a trust would forfeit its charter of 
incorporation; a business chartered out of state could find itself completely banned from 
operations within the borders of Nebraska.  If the session of 1897 was not quite a 
culmination of Populist expectations, it did represent the dramatic transformation that had 
taken place in the politics of the state from the time of the party‟s foundation.108 
 
During the 1890s, the struggle for reform had been a difficult one, but grassroots 
organizations and a new political party created a substantial movement for change that 
had altered the political landscape of the region.  What was once a bastion of 
conservative values and unchecked industrial expansion had been transformed by those 
who desired to make the new economy responsive to the demands of the people.  The 
movement they created had stumbled at times, and even at this moment its long-term 
future appeared uncertain.  But despite all previous challenges, it had continued on.   
In early 1897, there were only subtle hints that something new was on the 
horizon.  In the Nebraska legislature, a Populist in the state House named Addison 
Sheldon introduced a resolution in praise of the people of Cuba, who were “now 
struggling to free themselves from 400 years of Spanish misrule, oppression, and 
cruelty.”  It also stated that all hoped that “the day may soon dawn when Cuba shall be 
free and European domination and intrigue shall be banished from American soil.”  To 
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that end, the resolution asked the President and Congress to take action on Cuba‟s behalf.  
It was adopted with little debate.
109
       
Such discussions were taking place throughout legislatures nationwide, just as 
they were with increasing frequency in the halls of Congress, in the nation‟s media, and 
undoubtedly among ordinary citizens as well.
110
  It was impossible for people like 
Sheldon to know at the time that the world they lived in and the country they hoped to 
transform would soon look very different.   
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CHAPTER IV 
THE MONEY POWER AND THE WAR OF 1898 
By the beginning of 1898, Spain‟s war to maintain its control over Cuba had been 
raging for three years.  The president‟s cautious dealings with Spain had left many 
exasperated.  Western Populists, Democrats, and Silver Republicans were some of the 
most vocal advocates of Cuban independence, but these enemies of the administration 
thought they understood the source of McKinley‟s hesitance.  Frank Cannon of Utah, part 
of the close cohort of Silver Republicans in the U.S. Senate, outlined the western 
reformers‟ view of administration policy:    
If there be any policy on the part of the United States, it is one of affiliation with 
this movement, by which Spain shall be enabled to saddle upon Cuba the vast 
mass of debt incurred in the vain endeavor to conquer that island…. Mr. 
President, I charge now that the purpose of the Administration in delaying action 
is in consonance with, if not in direct copartnership [sic] with the will of the 
Spanish bondholders, who are determined that before Cuba shall be allowed her 
freedom in the world, and before there shall be recognition of her independence 
by Spain, there shall be security upon that blood-stained island for the major part 
of the debt which has been incurred by Spain.
1
 
 
As the debate raged on over the recognition of Cuba, the possibility of intervention, or 
later, over how war would be waged, those opposed to the administration became 
increasingly certain that greater forces were at work.     
 Western reformers made their presence felt in the Fifty-fifth Congress.  Their 
numbers were not inconsequential:  fourteen total in the Senate and twenty-five in the 
House.
2
  In the Senate, no one party held the majority and thus the power of such a 
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coalition could be magnified.
3
  While the cooperative effort among them was certainly 
new and fragile, administration policies began to drive many of these westerners closer 
together, as they came to see the president support positions too blatantly favorable to 
money lenders and large corporations at the expense of the producing classes.   The 
second session most notably began with a proposal by Lyman Gage, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, to “commit the country more thoroughly to the gold standard,” reigniting the 
smoldering embers of 1896.
4
  Suspicion of the administration only grew as the session 
went on, soon encompassing McKinley‟s foreign policy as well.  It would be inaccurate 
to suggest that western frustration spilled over into their interpretations of foreign affairs; 
Populists especially had always believed that the forces behind international finance held 
sway throughout the world.  By 1898, however, increasing numbers of westerners came 
to argue that a handful of economic elites were the driving force behind American foreign 
policy.   
 
Prelude to the War Debates 
Before Congress became entangled in conflicts over international affairs, the 
administration stirred controversy with its proposals for economic reform.  McKinley 
came to power in the midst of one of the worst economic disasters in American history, 
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one that had emboldened his opponents to call for a substantive transformation of the 
national monetary and banking systems.  His inaugural address, though touching on 
monetary policy, demonstrated little tolerance for the inflationary policies desired by the 
Populists, Democrats, and many who had recently bolted his own party.  The closest he 
came was a reference to “international bimetallism,” the fig leaf that had been attached to 
his party‟s platform and a measure that no serious person believed stood a chance of 
success.  Instead, he spoke of the “embarrassment” caused by the “several forms of paper 
money,” then stated a desire to withdraw certain notes from circulation.5    
McKinley hoped that his sober message of modest reorganization would play 
some part in restoring financial confidence, but his proposal could only have been seen 
with alarm by many in the West.  The president‟s selection of a prominent Chicago 
banker, Lyman Gage, as his Secretary of the Treasury had immediately stirred 
controversy.  He was already a figure of no small infamy to westerners.  Well-known 
enough in his own right, he was also depicted as one of the more intransigent students of 
the bimetallist instructor in the playful work of fiction by William Harvey, Coin’s 
Financial School—a semi-conspiratorial pamphlet that gained wide circulation in its brief 
run before the election of 1896.
6
  Gage added to his reputation shortly after his selection 
when he let his intentions be known.  The most notable portions of his plan involved the 
retirement of the greenbacks and treasury notes as well as increasingly flexible rules 
pertaining to the amount of backing national banks were required to hold for their bank 
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notes.  Newspapers reported the story widely, and reaction in the western states was 
strongly negative.  Even the staunchly Republican Omaha Bee called Gage‟s plan to 
remove many of the federally issued notes from circulation “unpopular and 
disappointing,” and likely to cause a contraction of the currency.7   
 The short session after McKinley‟s inauguration provided no time for such 
proposals, but in the middle of December 1897, Gage presented his plan to members of 
the House Committee on Banking and Currency.  His vision of the national financial 
system was just what Populists and silverites had dreaded.  Despite the criticism heaped 
on his plans earlier in the year, the bill he brought with him to the House seemed even 
more extreme.  When he outlined his objectives to the committee, Gage opened by stating 
that he intended to “commit the country more thoroughly to the gold standard…and thus 
strengthen the credit of the United States both home and abroad.”   Next, he called for a 
reduction of the Treasury‟s “demand liabilities, in which are included greenbacks, 
Treasury notes, and the incidental obligation to maintain on a parity, through 
interchangeability with gold…the present large volume of silver certificates and silver 
dollars.”  In total, the bill authorized the resumption of $200,000,000 worth of currency, 
to be paid for in gold obtained through a massive sale of bonds.  In his justification of this 
most controversial provision, Gage admitted that to “take in $200,000,000 of the present 
demand obligations of the Government by bonds…would  be, I think, in the general 
opinion of most men in the United States, a contraction of the currency at this time so 
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violent that nobody could endure it.”  Gage believed national bank notes could be made 
to take their place. 
8
 
 At nearly the same time, a self-appointed “monetary commission”—the acting 
representatives of a number of chambers of commerce, boards of trade, and other 
commercial interests—declared their support for similar measures.  In fact, Gage and the 
commission had been in communication for quite some time, and any similarity was 
much more than coincidental.  The commission‟s report, however, also demanded that all 
repayment of government bonds be in gold and that the Secretary of the Treasury should 
have the power to issue bonds in return for gold at his own discretion.  Despite the 
attempt to make these “reform” proposals appear as the culmination of a grassroots effort, 
there was little initial support for Gage‟s proposals in Congress.  Some congressmen who 
saw the bills languishing in committee took it upon themselves to make proposals of their 
own and reenergize the debates, but it still appeared that little could get through the 
thoroughly divided Fifty-fifth Congress.
9
   
Again, the reaction from the West was overwhelmingly negative.  While orthodox 
Republicans looked forward to the entrenchment of hard money, even some among them 
feared the consequences of these plans.  Weighing the merits of Gage‟s bill, a writer for 
the Omaha Bee argued that it would “strengthen the treasury in relation to demand 
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liabilities,” but “in regard to contracting the circulation it is by no means certain that this 
would be avoided.”10   Of course Populists and silverites were vehemently opposed to the 
plan, which in their eyes would entrench the gold standard, supplement the power of the 
national banks—institutions they already listed among their chief enemies—and increase 
the government debt for the benefit of moneylenders.  Suggesting the great issue of 1896 
would again determine the contest in 1900, the editor of the Yakima Herald reminded 
readers of the consequences of such legislation:  “the single gold standard means 
contraction of the currency, increase of our interest bearing debt, and yet greater 
reduction in the price of the products of your labor…. Hold patriotism above party and 
choose as becomes a free born American citizen.”11   
Opposition in Congress was just as fierce.  William Allen, Nebraska‟s Populist 
Senator, was certain that—if given the power to do so—the national banks would ruin the 
economy for their own gain.  He was sure “they would be guided solely by the 
consideration whether they would make money by contraction or expansion, and thus the 
power would be placed in their hands to contract the volume of money and thereby throw 
millions out of employment, shrink the value of property to a point where they might buy 
it for one-half, or less.”  All of this, he was sure, would usher in the last days of 
representative government.  “We can not shut our eyes,” he said, “to the fact that the 
money power dominates every branch of the Government, while the people are deceived 
into believing that this is a popular government, in which they have a full share. It is a 
                                                 
10
 “Mr. Gage‟s Currency Bill,” Omaha Daily Bee, Dec. 17, 1897, p. 4.    
11
 “The Issue Now Clear,” Yakima Herald, Feb. 10, 1898, p. 2.   
164 
 
government by the few and for the few.”  If the president had his way, and private banks 
were allowed to control the economy, “it would be but a comparatively short time until 
the masses would be practically deprived of their right to vote or to participate in the 
Government in any form, and we would pass from the semblance of a Republic into a 
complete aristocracy.”  Rule by the people was under threat.12   
Though nearly every portion of the proposed monetary reform was offensive to 
western reformers, they put their greatest focus on the issue of bonds.   Bonds were, after 
all, the lynchpin of Gage‟s plan.  No government issued currency could be retired without 
bonds to maintain the federal gold reserve.  Gage had also identified the repayment of 
bonded debt in gold as one of the primary methods that would further commit the nation 
to the gold standard.  The Secretary pointed out that bonds were currently payable in 
“coin”, but an explicit commitment to repay in gold would “strengthen the United States 
both at home and abroad.”13  Fearing that the Treasury would adopt that policy regardless 
of legislation, Senator Teller proposed a resolution declaring that any federal bonds were 
potentially payable in silver, at the option of the government.  Western reformers in 
Congress came out in force to defend Teller‟s resolution and attack the system called for 
by the administration.
14
   
                                                 
12
 Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., Jan. 7, 1898, p. 418-423.   
13
 Statement of Hon. Lyman J. Gage, 6.   
14
 Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., Jan. 5 1898, p. 311.  Nebraska‟s entire Populist House 
delegation entered their criticism of the administration‟s bond proposal, along with defenses of greenback 
currency, into the Appendix of the Congressional Record.  See Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 2nd 
Sess., App. 48-50, 127-128, 130-131, and 131-135.  James H. Lewis of Washington also introduced a 
concurrent resolution against “the retirement of greenbacks and issuance instead of gold-bearing bonds.”  
See Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., Feb. 5, 1898, p. 1486.  
165 
 
When he took to the floor of the Senate in support of his own measure, Teller 
accosted the Republicans for claiming to support international bimetallism during the 
campaign of 1896 and them immediately abandoning it.  True, he admitted, a commission 
had been sent to Europe to negotiate with the other major financial states, but he was 
certain that those who really controlled the executive would not allow it to be successful.  
“We knew that the power which created this Administration would not let it back out if it 
wanted to; we knew that the power which created it would control it; and we knew it 
would control it for the gold standard.”  The same forces, he argued, were also now in 
command of American foreign policy.  “[T]he money power is the great power that has 
been felt all over the world…. It is the power that allows the wickedest war that was ever 
carried on against men to be carried on in sight of our shores, because it is feared that to 
do otherwise would disturb commerce and trade.”  Because of the influence of the greedy 
few, “the maintenance of a steady market for stocks and bonds render it impossible for 
the American people to assert their manhood.”15 
Teller voiced a belief that was rapidly gaining favor in among some in Congress:  
that the president was under the spell of the money power.  While the administration‟s 
monetary reforms sputtered and died, those who had already distrusted McKinley made 
up their minds.  Another Silver Republican, Senator Richard Pettigrew of South Dakota, 
told a close friend that “McKinley has absolutely gone over to the gamblers of Wall 
Street.”  He had even come to despise him more than the previous chief executive.  
“Cleveland had something of a brutal tenacity and corrupt independence about him that 
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stamped him as an individual,” he said, “but this jellyfish of a fellow has none of these 
qualities, which marks him as possessed of no element of manhood.”16  The commander-
in-chief was seen as little more than a tool for the powerful.  Westerners believed he was 
in no position to stand up for the oppressed, in his own country or any other.   
 
Cuba 
 When he assumed the presidency, McKinley inherited the unresolved Cuban 
conflict.  The Cuban issue had been troubling American leaders since the inception of the 
conflict in late 1894.  While first Cleveland and then McKinley took their turns working 
quietly through diplomatic channels, Senators and Congressmen expressed their 
frustration with what they perceived to be inaction.  This began in late 1895 and early 
1896, at the middle point of Grover Cleveland‟s second term and the beginning of the 
Fifty-fourth Congress.  These opening discussions revealed differences of opinion, not 
just regarding involvement itself but also the form and purpose of engagement.  While 
many of the resolutions that were proposed—including several within days of the 
session‟s start—were designed to push Cleveland into taking a stand or make an 
admission of weakness, they are also revealing.  A brief examination of two speeches in 
support of these resolutions hints at the divergent groups that took an interest in Cuba.  
One of the first resolutions was proposed by William Allen, who justified involvement by 
appealing to the American belief in freedom.  Henry Cabot Lodge (a Massachusetts 
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Republican) joined in several weeks later, but his contribution to the debate carried with 
it a very different message.    
The Populist senator from Nebraska did not use his resolution to call for armed 
intervention in Cuba; no one in Congress yet expressed that kind of bellicosity.  Instead, 
Allen argued that American foreign policy should be informed by the principles of 
democracy.  He believed that it was “the true policy and the true doctrine of our country 
that wherever a people show themselves desirous of establishing a republican form of 
government upon any territory adjacent to us they should receive our encouragement and 
support.”  He did not totally forswear a desire for expansion in the Caribbean, the islands 
of which he predicted would soon “have established a republican form of government, or 
they will have become integral parts of this country.”  Yet he also stated that the country 
must not “be possessed of greed for territory, or the glories of conquest.”  He believed 
any expansion should be based on the desires of the people of the islands, not simply the 
result of American might.  As for Cuba, that island was not part of his estimation of 
American needs.  His resolution called for swift recognition of “the revolutionists of 
Cuba, who are now honestly struggling to secure their independence of the Spanish 
Government, as composing an independent nation and possessing the rights thereof 
according to the law of nations.”  Recognition would grant the Cubans certain rights, 
such as the right to purchase arms from a neutral power.  For those who said American 
had no interest in their affairs, he admitted that “It may be said that they are not of our 
race or tongue,” but added that “these things should be matters of indifference to us. It 
ought to be sufficient for us to know that they belong to a race of people who are striving 
for liberty. They have a desire to abandon the galling yoke of the King and establish a 
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form of government that will be a blessing to them and their posterity through the ages to 
come, and we should give them such assistance as may be within our power.”   For Allen, 
American foreign policy should mix national interest with the promotion of human 
liberty.
17
   
The marked differences between Allen‟s speech and that which Lodge would 
deliver in February, 1896, were quite substantial.  For the senator from Massachusetts, 
America could not be just a dispassionate observer of events in Cuba.   While he 
understood that the Cuban fight for freedom had gained American sympathies, he also 
reminded listeners that “in the condition of that island and in its future are involved large 
and most serious interests of the United States.”  Referring to the recent investments in 
Cuban sugar production, he noted that “Our immediate pecuniary interests in the island 
are very great,” but the plantations and refineries had been destroyed or threatened.  
Furthermore, a “Free Cuba would mean a great market to the United States.”  Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, were strategic concerns.  “The great island lies there across the 
Gulf of Mexico. She commands the Gulf… She lies right athwart the line which leads to 
the Nicaragua Canal. Cuba in our hands or in friendly hands, in the hands of its own 
people, attached to us by ties of interest and gratitude, is a bulwark to the commerce, to 
the safety, and to the peace of the United States.”18 
 The rest of Lodge‟s speech lauded the efforts of the Cuban revolutionaries and—
with even greater force—condemned Spanish brutality.  While a portion of this attack 
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was leveled at Spanish actions in Cuba, Lodge actually devoted far more of his speech to 
the long history of confrontation between Spain and various representatives of 
enlightened Protestant rationalism.  In no insubstantial way, Lodge characterized the 
difference between Spain and the United States as a clash of civilizations.  “If that for 
which the Spanish Empire has stood since the days of Charles V is right,” he said, “then 
everything for which the United States stands and has always stood is wrong. If the 
principles that we stand for are right, then the principles of which Spain has been the 
great exponent in history are utterly wrong.”  Digging deeper into the history of conflict, 
he added that “The great English-speaking people who settled here and who largely 
outnumber all others are the descendants of the men who stood with Drake and with 
Hawkins, of that small band of English Protestant seamen who curbed the power of Spain 
in the days of her greatest authority.”  “[S]uch are the races which have done most to 
settle and build up the United States” as a bulwark of liberty “against the power and 
bigotry of Spain.”  Though like Allen he did not call for war, it would have seemed the 
logical result of the legacy of conflict that he highlighted.   
 The Nebraska Populist and Massachusetts Republican were technically on the 
same side of the issue; both wanted greater action on the part of Cleveland, and neither 
saw strict neutrality as acceptable.  Both also did believe it was time for America to 
develop a more assertive foreign policy.  But beyond such a broad-brush depiction, there 
remained substantive differences in the two perspectives.  Allen‟s emphasis was on an 
American foreign policy that encouraged the spread of democratic values.  Lodge 
stressed the nation‟s economic and strategic concerns.  Allen noted the supposed cultural 
and racial differences between (presumably white) Americans and the Cuban 
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revolutionaries, yet he looked past that and encouraged camaraderie based on the shared 
value of freedom.  Lodge focused on the Spanish and what he saw as a history of cruelty 
and differences that made them natural enemies of America.  For the Populist, America 
was an example for the rest of the world to emulate.  For the Republican, American 
greatness was tied to its ability to defend its interests and project power.   
 As they voiced the call to action, both Allen and Lodge were only echoing 
growing public sentiment.  Shortly after the outbreak of war in Cuba, the major media 
outlets began covering the conflict in Cuba with an unusual ardor, and public speakers 
and reformers of all stripes soon joined the fray as well.
19
  While typical accounts have 
covered the Pulitzer-Hearst rivalry in New York, newspaper coverage was just as 
thorough in the West as it was anywhere else in America.  Just months after the 
beginning of the revolution in early 1895, even the papers of small western towns began 
to cover the drama in the Caribbean.  The newspapers of the state of Colorado can be 
used to provide a ready example.  The Daily Camera of Boulder first mentioned the 
Cuban revolution in late February of 1895—just two days after the beginning of 
hostilities on the island.
20
  Dailies such as Leadville‟s Herald Democrat and Evening 
Chronicle both began by February 27, and smaller weeklies like the Castle Rock Journal 
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and Silver Cliff Rustler provided their first coverage by March 6.
21
  No one in the West 
was so provincial that they could have avoided the story for long, even more so in the 
coming months as the plot became all the more dramatic and tragic.   
 Even from a very early point, the coverage of the conflict in Cuba thoroughly 
depicted Spanish savagery.  In late 1895, under the headline “The Cruel Spaniard,” the 
Herald Democrat of Leadville, Colorado, reported that one Spanish captain had ordered 
his company to massacre 100 wounded insurgents.  The author added bloody details, 
informing readers that “He refused to allow them to be shot, but made his soldiers chop 
up the victims with swords.”22  A similar story in a Nebraska paper, the Petersburg Index, 
reported the Spanish soldiers boasting “that they had sent eighteen rebel sympathizers to 
meet their fate and showing their bloody arms as proof of their butchery.”23   
Just one year into the conflict, the American press found a new personification of 
Spanish brutality in the form of the newly assigned military governor of Cuba, General 
Valeriano Weyler.
24
  His name was soon attached to every story of atrocities.   In its 
headlines, the Aspen Daily Times followed the mode of the day by giving the general the 
sobriquet “Weyler the Butcher” for his massacre of captured rebels.25  This charge was 
repeated in a Nebraska weekly, the Madison Chronicle, under the title “It Is Weyler‟s 
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Way of Discharging Prisoners.”26  By late 1897, bloody outrages of any kind were so 
easily attributable to Weyler that, when the New York World published an article 
claiming that he was responsible for over 400,000 Cuban deaths (out of an population of 
1.5 million), the Spokane Daily Chronicle found it creditable enough to reprint it.
27
    
The Spanish, and Weyler in particular, were especially accused of attacking 
women.  One account in a Colorado paper claimed that a girl of fifteen was publicly 
stripped by an officer and paraded in front of soldiers “at the point of a bayonet.”28  The 
Madison Chronicle used the alliterative headline “Weyler Wars with Women” to 
disparage the abusive Spanish, who were accused of imprisoning Cuban mothers “with 
their babies in their arms” before sending them to a “house of ill repute, for degraded 
women.”29  One Washington state publication added that “Weyler says that women are 
harder to subdue than men, and that if he had his way would kill them all first and try 
them afterward.”30  These stories exhibited the increasingly common view of the 
“barbarous” Spaniards and, as has been suggested elsewhere, served as further 
justification for intervention.
31
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Not all called for action, but even those local papers that described the war in 
Cuba as none of America‟s concern shared the sense of disgust with Spain‟s handling of 
the conflict.  As just one example, during the first several years of the war the 
conservative Omaha Daily Bee did not publish editorials supportive of any form of 
American involvement.  Yet the same pages of that very paper contained several 
condemnations of Weyler‟s campaign in no uncertain terms.  “It would be a wise thing on 
the part of the Spanish government to recall Weyler,” one wrote.  “The world knows that 
he was selected to replace Campos [the previous military governor] because of his 
possession of qualities that were expected to inspire terror among the insurgents.  It was 
not his superior military ability that caused him to be preferred, but his capacity for 
prosecuting a savage and brutal warfare.”32  In another piece, a writer attacked “Weyler‟s 
cruelty and brutality,” and claimed that this inhumanity was causing a universal “feeling 
of resentment toward a civilized government which permits such a state of affairs.”33  
Though there was no demand for recognition or intervention, the editor soon found it too 
difficult to urge restraint.   
 Of course, the press has often been given a prominent role in histories of the war.  
Most frequently, the American response to events in Cuba has been classed by academics 
into one of three categories:  as a xenophobic reaction against Catholic, monarchical 
Spain; as parochial excitement whipped to a frenzy by the yellow press; or as an 
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opportunity taken in order to exert national power.
34
  The media, even when not depicted 
as the culprit, has been seen as representative of all of those themes.  Yet it should also be 
kept in mind that real atrocities were happening in Cuba, and there was nearly as much 
truth in the accounts as exaggeration.  One recent historian has pointed out that Spain‟s 
reconcentrado policy was responsible for the death of at least 100,000 people, and he 
considers estimates of 150,000 or more—one-tenth the island‟s population—to be closest 
to the full truth.
35
        
One reason historians have likely desired to explain the outpouring of sympathy 
for the Cubans pertains to the partisan nature of the reaction.  These expressions had 
appeared on a small scale before the contest of 1896, but they accelerated rapidly 
following the election of McKinley.  This was just as apparent in the local as the national 
media, and a cleavage appeared that divided many along the same lines they had assumed 
during the “battle of standards.”  A turn in the war itself may have had something to do 
with the growing intensity of media commentary.  It was only in 1896 that the policy of 
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“reconcentration” had begun at all, and it intensified in 1897.36  Still, both presidents 
received blame.  Cleveland had taken a measured approach to Cuba and McKinley 
adopted a similar method when he assumed the presidency, but increasingly in the 
popular view this now amounted to inaction and callous disregard for the plight of a 
suffering people.  As they sought to explain the apparent indifference of the two 
administrations, western reformers came to attribute this timidity to vested economic 
interests.   
 The most moderate of the Bryanites found fault with those they felt put commerce 
above all else and simply accused their rivals of possessing improper priorities.  The 
Aspen Daily Times, for example, censured the president for refusing to do more to protect 
Americans whom the Spanish had imprisoned in Cuba.  It attributed dithering tendencies 
of the McKinley administration to “conservative business interests which have dominated 
bygone administrations” which had “developed an incredible degree of cowardice in the 
department of state.”37  Editors of the Omaha-World Herald, an ideologically temperate 
Democratic paper run by a close Bryan ally, acted in much the same way.  By May of 
1897, they began excoriating the Republicans for ignoring the plank of their party‟s 1896 
platform, which had vowed more forceful action in favor of the Cubans.  “Instead of 
keeping its promises the republican party is prolonging the „cruelty and oppression‟ of 
the Spanish government, and its leaders are denouncing as „jingoes‟ the men who would 
do for Cuba what France did for the colonies.”  This shift toward caution was brought 
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about by “cowardly leaders who are brave in the face of trembling and cowering 
humanity and terror stricken in the face of Wall Street influence.”38  In a later piece, the 
editor attacked a conservative paper for supporting Secretary Gage‟s assessment that talk 
of war “would quickly drain the treasury of its gold” and, worse yet, it could even 
embolden the supporters of the free coinage of silver.  The World-Herald writer noted 
that this was an example of “commercialism once more demanding that it be favored at 
the expense of justice and humanity.”  It was callous to support the “oppression of 
patriots striving for liberty in order to maintain the gold reserve.”39  While the attribution 
of inaction to greed was harsh enough, the comments of moderates paled in comparison 
to the statements of their more radical colleagues.   
Some bellicose reformers began pointing to the war in Cuba at a very early date, 
and they sometimes depicted the rebellion there as a conflict with the same great power 
that they faced in America.  William Hope Harvey laid out the global reach of predatory 
finance in one speech he delivered in 1895.  The man popularly known as “Coin” Harvey 
opened his speech by telling the audience that a growing awareness of the immoral 
structure of finance was about to transform the country and the world.  “Hope, comfort, 
and relief are coming.  Manhood in this country is again going to be revived.  We are 
going to force this country by the shere [sic] influence of intelligence to cease its worship 
of property and money as of greater value than humanity.”  This movement was not only 
national, but global.  “To-day liberty is appealing to us from all over the world.  Cuba is 
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to-day striking for liberty against the oppressor, Spain…. It is to liberate those people, it 
is to end their oppression that comes with your money power, that the liberty-loving 
people of Cuba are to-day striking for liberty.”  He also believed that the United States 
should have already recognized the Cuban revolutionaries, and by refusing to do so, “The 
president of the United States, the willing implement of the money power and tyranny 
and oppression, has given every assistance to Spain.”   According to Harvey‟s 
characterization of the money power, “The tail of that serpent rests in Egypt and India, its 
body in Europe, and its head is raised in this country.”   Essentially, that form of 
colonialism was a product of the financial and political power wielded by an elite clique 
and, just as vitally, the United States was in much the same position as other parts of the 
global periphery.   Near his conclusion, he declared that “We need a second declaration 
of independence in the United States.”40  In their attempt to liberate themselves from the 
political and economic domination of Europe, the Cubans were only doing what America 
should have already done. 
Few others developed such an elaborate picture of how the revolution in Cuba 
represented the fight against economic domination, but others did see presidential 
indifference as evidence of the influence of the money power.  The editor of Washington 
state‟s Aberdeen Herald used it to remind readers of the executive‟s real priorities:   
Patriots at our very doors may be massacred in cold blood, Liberty and Freedom 
may plead in vain for recognition, the shrieks of murdered women and children 
may not move the hearts of the powers at Washington, but all this is being stored 
up in the memory of the American people who are not wedded to the worship of 
Mammon and will be brought forth and used in crushing rebuke to those who are, 
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now in the great hour of need, unmoved by the slaughter in the fair island of 
Cuba, so say nothing of the want and misery in their own land.   
 
Could Americans still recognize right, or “will the next four years more firmly fix their 
fetters and subjugate them to the money power?”41  In a later article, the same editor 
lambasted McKinley for his supposed compassion while he apparently did nothing.  “His 
intentions towards Cuba and its gallant patriots are hidden in doubt and obscurity,” he 
wrote.  “Mr. McKinley is in full sympathy with the Cubans, acknowledges the atrocities 
committed in the name of war, also the injustice of Spain towards American citizens, 
depicts the whole thing in a chapter of horrors, and then meekly bows to the money 
power and says „hands off.‟”42   
The employment of the money power conspiracy to explain American inaction 
was not limited to Washington state.  Colorado newspapers abounded with editorials to 
that effect throughout 1896 and 1897.  The Aspen Tribune claimed that “Public sentiment 
in this country is in favor of recognizing Cuba as an independent republic.  This 
sentiment is strongly represented in congress, but the administration is representing the 
money power, which isn‟t patriotic, and the money power always wins.”43  A few months 
later, the Ouray Herald reminded readers of the broken promises of the Republican 
president.  “The great party platforms declared for Cuba.  Bloody deeds indescribable in 
horrid cruelty have been of daily, hourly occurance [sic] for two years.  McKinley knows 
it; the money power knows it.  The former may be in sympathy with the wishes of the 
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masses but his Cuban policy thus far allies him with the money power which opposes 
intervention and consequent, perhaps, trouble with Spain.”44  Worse yet, suggested the 
Silverton Standard, the tendency of that power to strangle American manhood had 
forestalled any national action.  “The sympathy of American manhood is with her [Cuba] 
in her struggle, but the hand of that arch enemy of liberty, goldocracy is upon the throat 
of American manhood, and it is powerless to act.”  The author ended by stating that “The 
Cuban patriots will pass through fire and blood to freedom from Spanish tyranny long 
before the boasted free American will shake off the degraded manacles doubly riveted 
upon his limbs by the trusts, combines and aggregated capital of his country.”45  The 
Cubans were men worthy of support because of their struggle for independence, and just 
as much they served as an example that struggling American men should emulate.   
 This talk of the money power‟s influence on American action spread in ways that 
may have been unexpected.  The general American public was not alone in its growing 
frustration with their presidents.  The Cuban Junta, operating out of New York, helped 
spread the message of the revolutionaries throughout the United States, but its members 
may well have been responding to the American media in late 1897, when the American 
secretary of the Junta issued a letter to McKinley and made the contents available to the 
press.  The Junta‟s message presented a series of statements that explained how the 
United States had thus far acted to thwart the revolution just off the coast of Florida.  
Among other things, they claimed that “Without the indirect aid given by this 
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government to Spain,” especially through such means as the American Coast Guard‟s 
anti-filibustering patrols, “the patriots would be further advanced in their struggle.”  More 
damningly, the Junta declared that “A majority of the people of this country desire to see 
a free and independent Cuban republic.  An opposing factor of great force is the money 
power.”  The secretary elaborated, stating “that a majority of our people believe that the 
assistance of our Government till now has been given to Spain and withheld from the 
republic on account of the influence that emanates from great financial interests.”46  
When they adopted the language used by those reform advocates who were uniting 
behind the cause of Cuban freedom, the Junta subsequently reinforced the economic 
analysis that these reformers were keen to embrace.   
 By the opening of the second session of the Fifty-fifth Congress, western 
reformers had become more committed than ever to recognize the Cuban republic.  Both 
before and following the destruction of the Maine, nearly all the references to Cuba in 
Congress expressed horror at the suffering taking place on that island.  Allen told those in 
the Senate “that since the opening of hostilities between the Republic of Cuba and the 
Spanish forces in that island 300,000 pacificos have died by starvation and disease 
generated and directly traceable to the lack of sufficient food and sanitary conditions.”  
He had been informed that “it was the custom of the Spanish Government to herd 
hundreds of families together in sheds and exposed positions, without any sanitary 
conditions whatever, starving them until disease as a result of their starvation 
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intervenes.”47  While there was undoubtedly quite a lot of truth in his statements, it is 
useful to note the extent to which the speeches of congressional leaders imitated the 
newspaper headlines of the day.  This tendency knew no party.  A Republican Senator 
from Illinois, William Mason, declared in February that “500,000 persons have died in 
Cuba” in just the last year.  When a colleague informed him that such a number 
amounted to one-third the population of Cuba, Mason stood by it, but did meekly admit 
that he gleaned the entire story from a newspaper.
48
   
One of the primary goals of several of the agitators in Congress was to gain 
recognition for Cuban belligerency, and thus allow the people of the island to fight for 
their freedoms with the protections offered by international law.  Many noted that Spain 
was able to purchase war materiel in the United States, but for the Cubans to openly do so 
was a violation of law.  This legal matter caused the Cubans much trouble, and the cost of 
smuggling and from the loss of impounded contraband had nearly bankrupted the cash-
starved rebels.  “Every rifle which a Cuban soldier carries has cost the Cuban patriots 
$200 before it is put in the field,” claimed Frank Cannon.  “A declaration of belligerency 
at any time since the war began would have brought it to a speedy conclusion, and would 
now absolutely terminate the attempt of Spain to hold possession of Cuba.”49  Curtis 
Castle was equally frustrated.  “Instead of saying to brutal, pagan Spain, „This butchery 
of innocents shall cease; this selling of maidens to satiate Spanish lust is the act of 
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devils”... instead of taking a noble, manly stand for truth and virtue, and justice, we have 
fawned at the feet of this medieval devil.”  Rather than aiding the rebels, “We have kept 
our fast cruisers and men-of-war on guard from Marblehead to Key West to seize any 
chance cargo of arms purchased by the pittances contributed by Cuban exiles.”50  Senator 
William Stewart of Nevada argued that “No one questions but that Cuba would have 
acquired her freedom if she could have had the same privileges in our ports to purchase 
supplies that Spain had.”51  Granting belligerency rights to the Cubans would have been 
the most minimal form of recognition, but some were sure that even this limited 
assistance would prove enough to turn the tide of battle.   
  From the very beginning of the session Allen had wanted to push for more, but 
the president was hesitant to follow up on earlier Republican promises.  In his message to 
Congress in December of 1897, McKinley stated that “I regard the recognition of the 
belligerency of the Cuban insurgents as now unwise and therefore inadmissible.”  In 
response, the Populist senator called this “a great disappointment to members of the 
Republican party throughout the United States,” reminding all present of the assertive 
proclamations made in their platform of 1896.  Allen said he personally “would not be 
content or satisfied with a simple acknowledgment of the belligerent rights of the people 
of that island, but I would demand absolute and unconditional political liberty and a 
recognition of the government they themselves have formed and to whose sovereignty 
they owe allegiance.”  Allen was certain of the justice of the Cuban struggle, and he 
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needed to explain why the administration would not act.  As he stated in a speech in early 
December: 
[U]nfortunately for the advancement and elevation of the human race and for the 
glory of our country, we have entered an era of cold and merciless commercialism 
that freezes the blood of patriotism in its veins and that is willing to sacrifice 
human rights, the honor of women, and the lives of children, if need be, that the 
course of business may not be checked…If I should be asked what I mean by this 
expression, I would answer without hesitation that the owners of Spanish bonds in 
this country…and the carrying trade and the commercial interests of the world … 
have joined to prevent Cuban recognition, and their influence is sufficiently 
powerful in official circles to prevent anything further being done in the interest 
of those unfortunate people.
52
  
 
He was now sure that profit seekers had stayed the President‟s hand.  Other westerners 
would come to adopt similar language.   
 Allen‟s talk of Spanish bonds would not have surprised western or southern 
advocates of reform.
53
  Even conservative newspapers like the Omaha Bee had been 
reporting on the financial standing of special Spanish bonds that were backed by 
revenues from Cuba since shortly after the war began on the island.
54
  A report by the 
New York Times in early 1898 confirmed the importance of these bonds to Spain, and 
further predicted that the war in Cuba would end as long as Spain could guarantee 
repayment—perhaps with American backing.55  It should be pointed out here that when 
Allen attacked those who he believed were protecting the value of these Cuban bonds, he 
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avoided any overtly conspiratorial language.  Yet when one considers the extent to which 
bonds played a central role in the conspiratorial writing of Sarah Emery—let alone in 
Gordon Clark‟s Shylock:  As Banker, Bondholder, Corruptionist, Conspirator—he may 
not have needed to.
56
  When he suggested that those indifferent to the freedom of Cuba 
were doing so at the behest of bondholders, many Populists, Democrats, and Silver 
Republicans knew that they faced their old enemies on yet another front.     
Following Allen‟s lead, two Populists in the House attacked the president‟s 
policy, but this time they put a clearer emphasis on a single enemy.  Congressman Jerry 
Simpson of Kansas connected the hesitancy of the current administration with that of its 
predecessor and, ultimately, to the financiers.  Why, he asked, had Cleveland been so 
unwilling to acknowledge Cuban belligerency?  Answering his own query, he stated 
“Simply because Mr. Cleveland and his Administration and his Cabinet were the 
agents… of the bond-holding interests of the country, and the $400,000,000 of bonds that 
Spain has issued to carry on the Cuban war were the one great factor… It is my opinion 
then, and is now, that the Republican party will follow the same line of action.”57  Curtis 
Castle of California went so far as to describe the administration as little more than a 
puppet government:   “Rothschild and his American agents, Belmont, Morgan, & Co., 
hold $200,000,000 in Spanish bonds.... Rothschild controls Morgan, Morgan controls 
Hanna, and Hanna controls McKinley, the Supreme Court, the Senate, and the House of 
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Representatives.  Hanna is America and America is Hanna.”58  Simpson and Castle honed 
in on just one element mentioned in Allen‟s speech:  the Spanish bonds, sold to facilitate 
the war in Cuba and backed by revenues collected by Spain from that island.  It was 
claimed that Cuban independence would void the bonds, potentially ruining some 
investors. 
59
  
The story picked up momentum in the following months.  Frank Cannon made his 
speech on the subject in early February, the day after he proposed a resolution granting 
belligerency to Cuba (with a rider attached that likely would have led to recognized 
independence).  At the same time, publications sympathetic to the allies of William 
Jennings Bryan ran articles on the subject with increasing frequency.
60
  While 
conservatives did not accept the conspiratorial narrative, even some among them 
questioned the basis of the administration‟s hesitancy.  One of the most ardent supporters 
of the administration, Senator John Thurston of Nebraska—the man who had chaired the 
1896 Republican Party convention—admitted that he too was sure that “against the 
intervention of the United States in this holy cause there is but one voice of dissent; that 
voice is the voice of the money changers.”61    
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A few took the bond conspiracy rumor to an even greater extreme.  James 
Hamilton Lewis, Washington‟s flamboyant Democratic congressman, decried the “flock 
of these vultures wheeling around the head of the President.”  He had heard that a 
collection of powerful bankers had applied pressure on McKinley, seeking to take 
advantage of “the weakness of an emergency and now demand that the honorable 
President of the United States shall sell the liberties of the Island of Cuba to them for 
$200,000,000 and allow these men a mortgage upon the tax facilities of Cuba.”  If he 
refused, according to Lewis, they would call back their loans from the government and 
cripple it before it could act against Spain.
62
   
The rumor that bondholders might purchase Cuba maintained some strength right 
up to America‟s entry into the war.  Senator George Turner of Washington quoted a 
telegram he received from a number of officials in his home state:  “Our people urge 
recognition [of the] Cuban Republic. No recognition, no intervention. Stand by 
Democratic resolutions against bondholders' intervention.”   Allen was likewise 
suspicious of the involvement of bankers and bondholders.  In the last days before the 
outbreak of war, Allen again proposed a resolution to recognize the independent 
government of Cuba.  “I have myself not the slightest doubt that the Island of Cuba is to 
pass into the hands of a syndicate of financial cormorants, financial buzzards, financial 
vultures, unless the United States takes prompt steps to check that conspiracy.”63   
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Allen did not invent such a story out of nothing.  Rumors that Cuba‟s freedom 
was to be purchased by an independent syndicate had circulated throughout 1897 and into 
1898, and evidence suggests that several bankers did propose such a plan.
64
  As far as 
Cuba was concerned, the speculation surrounding the island‟s fate was intense over the 
three years of conflict, and in no way was this limited to Populists.  For example, in June 
of 1897 the Omaha Bee reported that the sugar trust was considering the purchase of 
Cuba, financed through a $100,000,000 bond scheme to be backed by the American 
government.
65
  In 1896, the conservative New York Democrat Bourke Cockran 
recommended that Cubans purchase their own freedom from Spain, again with the United 
States backing their bonds.
66
  Seemingly wild schemes abounded, and so looking back it 
is difficult to separate the totally irrational from the simply inaccurate.    
Following the destruction of the battleship Maine on the night of February 15, the 
restless voices in Congress only grew louder.  Most suggested that the destruction was 
the work of a Spanish mine, but nearly all concluded that Spain was at fault regardless.  
Washington‟s Silver Republican senator, George Turner, declared that it did not matter 
“whether the hand that exploded the mine was that of a duly accredited and authorized 
agent of the Government of Spain or whether it was that of a maddened and lawless 
fanatic…. The hand that intended to explode that mine in some well- understood 
contingency was the hand of Spain, and it is immaterial whose was the hand that sent the 
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electric spark on its fateful mission of death and destruction.”67  Westerners continued to 
voice fears that McKinley would not act, and there was fear that even justice for the dead 
would be overlooked to keep business interests satisfied.  In the House, James Hamilton 
Lewis stated that it was not only “appropriate but most onerous upon us that we do 
something to instill a patriotism into the youth of this country,” after hearing that a young 
banker had sent “a letter to the President of the United States… calling upon him for an 
answer as to „why should the mere loss of 250 lives be of consequence enough for him to 
unsettle all the stable values of this country by irritating Spain to conflict.‟”68  The fallen 
dead of the Maine had to be avenged, commercialism be damned.   
By the time the navy‟s official Maine inquiry report was released in late March, 
the patience of Republicans had reached its end as well.  The findings of the report 
suggested that, indeed, the cause of the disaster had been an external mine, though it 
blamed no parties specifically.  Western Republicans joined the rapidly growing number 
of their fellow partisans in expressing their rage.  Senator George Perkins of California 
was positive that “The Maine was blown up from the outside…. The fact is established 
beyond the possibility of a doubt by the position of the bow and that of the iron from the 
bottom where the mine first took effect.”  The only issue left, then, was the identification 
of those responsible.  “Surely,” he said, this was “not by the act of friends.  Neither by 
accident.”  Spain needed to be held to account.  While he did also mention Spain‟s 
“officially organized plan for the starvation of more than a million people, and of this 
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number it saw 600,000 die according to the programme,” these facts had apparently been 
irrelevant to him not long before.
69
   
Wyoming‟s Senator Clarence Clark also cast aside his earlier restraint.  He called 
for immediate action, ostensibly for the “men, women, and children” who were “dying of 
starvation in Cuba, the victims of a warfare the most cruel, inhuman, and barbarous of 
modern times.”  Perhaps more vital to his change of heart was “the evidence 
accumulated, under careful and honest investigation, that the loss of our sailors was due 
to the direct criminal action of Spain.”  Such an act of treachery “can not be settled by 
diplomatic correspondence nor treated by any tribunal of arbitration.”   The only remedy 
was “justice, swift, sure, and complete.”70  The calls for war became a juggernaut, and 
finally they did lead the president to respond.   
On April 11, President McKinley finally delivered a message to Congress asking 
for permission to intervene in Cuba.  While it had been widely anticipated, the content of 
the speech only made McKinley‟s opponents more convinced that a plot was afoot.  
McKinley did not ask for a declaration of war against Spain, but called for intervention as 
an impartial neutral.  As it was stated in his message, merely ending the bloodshed 
appeared to be the goal.  Little was said about Cuban liberty, and the President clearly 
explained that he was opposed to any form of recognition of the rebel government 
already in place or even the semblance of an alliance with them.  For those who had long 
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demanded a free Cuba, the call to action by the commander-in-chief was a complete 
disappointment.
71
   
The reaction was immediate.  The reading of McKinley‟s message in the Senate 
chamber had no more than ended when William Stewart of Nevada and Marion Butler of 
North Carolina (the South‟s lone Populist senator) responded.  Stewart declared that 
intervention without recognition of Cuban independence “looks like a war of conquest. It 
would be difficult to find a precedent for such intervention outside of the conquest of 
Egypt or the dividing up of China among the great powers of Europe”—cases of overt 
imperialism.  The international community would never support such an action.  Stewart 
also suggested that there were further ramifications associated with the apparent conquest 
of Cuba.  “What will you do with the island when you take it?  There is some talk about 
responsibility.  As I read international law, the responsibility upon us would be very great 
if we should take the island.”  Butler more clearly outlined Stewart‟s interpretation:  “If 
we intervene in Cuba and take possession of the island, we can not liberate it from the 
lien which the bondholders have upon it…. Our interference will not be paramount to the 
mortgage under international law”—essentially the conquest of Cuba would not 
invalidate Spain‟s bonds—“but the right to liberty and independence, for which the 
Cubans have fought, is paramount to a mortgage made to obtain money to subdue them.”  
An independent Cuba could not be expected to pay the debts of those who sought to 
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destroy it, but the acquisition of the island by the United States would make America 
liable to pay Spain‟s debt.72   
A similar message was delivered by one of their colleagues in the House.  The 
next day, Nebraska Populist William Greene explained all of the many complications 
associated with the executive‟s aloof policy:  “I say that if we simply intervene we admit 
that Spain is a friendly power.  We say there is no government in Cuba that we can 
recognize except the Spanish Government.”  Added to this was Spain‟s recent 
announcement (unheeded by the McKinley administration) that it was willing to 
participate in an armistice, potentially negating any need to pacify the colonial 
occupation force.  “[W]hat is there left for us to do if what I have said should occur, 
except to turn our guns upon the Cuban patriots and compel them to lay down their 
arms!”  And what was to happen after American troops had pacified the island, he asked?  
A Democrat from Michigan replied, “Give it a carpet-bag government under quasi-
military rule.”  “I fear that will be the result,” responded Greene.  Greene was also fearful 
of the influence of financiers in the international community.  “[T]here are held by the 
people of foreign governments large sums of bonds issued by the Spanish Government 
and predicated largely upon the revenues which Spain derives from Cuba.”  If it was 
decided to make Cuba independent, while simultaneously “admitting Spain to be a 
friendly power,” the international community would be up in arms.  “Do you not know 
that France, Germany, and England would step to the front and say to this country, „You 
can not steal the territory of a friendly power unless you make the obligations good‟?”  
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Critics of the administration agreed that, without prior recognition of the independent 
government of Cuba, U.S. intervention would only transfer Spain‟s debt to America.73   
The assumptions of Stewart, Butler, and Greene fit the conventional reading of 
international law at that moment.  Historian H. Wayne Morgan has demonstrated that 
Spain‟s Cuban debt was a major concern of its regime, and its attempts to saddle the 
United States with a portion of it actually held up negotiations after the war.
74
  Even 
common media reports after the ceasefire described the attempts of Spain and France 
(whose citizens owned a large share of the bonds) to recoup their losses, even by 
suggesting that the United States had an obligation to pay as the new sovereign power in 
Cuba.
75
  Whether or not they had correctly judged the goal of McKinley and his allies, 
these critics of the president were not actually misreading the international situation at the 
time.   
 While the aforementioned opponents of McKinley argued that the president‟s 
policy was mistaken and that Cuba had to be recognized, they did not suggest that it all 
was due to the scheming of conspirators; instead, they used it as just another form of 
justification for immediate recognition.  Allen, and soon Butler with him, went further.  
Allen wanted it to be stated on the record that the course laid out by the president would 
mean “that we will be called upon hereafter to pay the Spanish-Cuban debt.”   He also 
accused some of his fellow Congressmen of playing a part when he suggested “that that 
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is the fixed and settled policy in some quarters in this city.”76  However, Butler was 
certain that the Cubans would yet be forced to pay for their freedom.  “The great 
Republic of the United States,” he said, “has turned its back on the brave band of patriots 
in Cuba…who have already won their liberty.  Our Army and Navy is to be used to force 
them to surrender to a gold and monopoly syndicate...We are to force them to submit to 
an industrial slavery worse than Spanish rule.”77 
 While they questioned the methods the president had proposed, it must be 
emphasized that western Populists, Democrats, and their allies had consistently been 
among the strongest advocates of an independent Cuba.  Yet, as noted at the opening of 
this dissertation, historians have struggled to explain why they did so.  One of the few 
focused works of scholarship that sought to explain their actions through close 
examination instead concluded that their anti-imperialism was based upon the bond 
conspiracy itself.  Historian Paul Holbo argued that Populists and their allies supported 
independence for Cuba rather than annexation as a means to strike at European 
bondholders.  In his view, the Populists (led by Allen in his telling of events) had taken 
the Cuban issue seriously from a relatively early point, shifting their domestic frustrations 
to troubles overseas by 1898.  By that time, they had convinced the Bryanite Democrats 
and Silver Republicans of the seriousness of the money power threat.  Together, they 
collectively attacked the administration for its idle stance on Cuba, and their irrational 
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embrace of the conspiracy eventually forced them to reject the acquisition of Cuba and 
thus void the bonds.
78
    
Holbo‟s reading of the situation ignored the fact that the bond conspiracy rumors 
were new in 1898 but the Populist calls for free Cuba were not.  The evidence 
demonstrates that, when they focused on the bond conspiracy, westerners only used it to 
explain the puzzling actions of a president whose known primary objective was the 
maintenance of friendly relations with domestic capitalists.  Westerners did not argue that 
Cuba should be free in order to devastate certain bondholders, but rather they tried to 
understand why anyone would be opposed to Cuban independence.  For someone like 
Allen, the independence of Cuba was of supreme importance in its own right.  Even in a 
speech in which he acknowledged that the press called him the “the jingo of jingoes,” 
Allen emphasized that “From the time the war broke out between Spain and Cuba I have 
been the steadfast and uncompromising advocate of independence.”   “We have no greed 
for Spanish territory,” he continued, “nor for Spanish gold…. We do not want Cuba.  We 
do not even desire to be her guardian.  But we are determined she shall be free.”79  His 
analysis incorporated his views on the political power of a capitalist elite, though he 
simply stated his belief that this group was a hindrance to a policy that he considered 
humanitarian.  Just as tellingly, Allen‟s speech in 1895 had nothing to do with the holders 
of Spanish debt, but even at that early date he was no less vigorous in his support of 
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Cuban freedom.  His actions in 1898 did not suggest that recognition of Cuban 
independence should be used as a tool to strike at any class.  
 Five days after the president had issued his controversial call for intervention, 
Henry Teller offered his famous amendment.  It stated clearly that “the people of the 
Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent,” and included a 
disavowal of self-interest by “disclaiming any disposition or intention to exercise 
jurisdiction or control over said island except for the pacification thereof.”  It also 
demanded that Spain withdraw its military units from the island or face expulsion at the 
hands of the American armed forces.  The amendment significantly changed the 
complexion of the resolution for intervention.  By specifically pointing to Spain as the 
aggressor, renouncing territorial aggrandizement, and calling for an independent Cuba, it 
quickly alleviated the fears of those who distrusted the president‟s motives.  Teller‟s 
amendment was quickly added, and both houses passed the joint resolution on April 19.  
McKinley signed it the next day.  On April 23, Spain replied with a declaration of war, 
and the Congress responded in kind two days later.  The United States was at war, but the 
battles in Congress only intensified.
80
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The War Revenue Bill 
 When America went to war in 1898, many had hoped that a sense of patriotism 
would smooth over the conflicts that had divided the nation politically.
81
  Despite these 
desires, conservatives and reform advocates continued to battle with each other 
throughout the war.  Such contests were inevitable, as both sides believed that the war 
could be a vehicle for their policy objectives.  Their greatest fights took place over the 
course of the first six weeks of war, over what would come to be called the War Revenue 
Bill.   
 On April 25, the bill was proposed by Congressman Nelson Dingley, a 
Republican friend of the administration, best known for his authorship of the most recent 
tariff regulations.  Dingley stated that, after several years of deficits, revenues (largely 
coming from the tariff) were just at the point in which they would match expenditures.  
While only $365,000,000 had been spent in 1897, he said, war expenses had raised costs 
to a rate that would equal an additional $300,000,000 per year. To make up for the 
additional expenses, his new bill provided for two forms of supplemental revenue.  The 
first involved an additional $100,000,000 of internal taxes, primarily upon the 
consumption of popular items like beer.  The second, and most controversial part, would 
have empowered the Secretary of the Treasury to sell up to $500,000,000 of “3 per cent 
coin bonds, to be disposed of as a popular loan.”  The bonds were to be sold in post 
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offices in multiples of twenty-five dollars, with the stated intent that they would be 
accessible to the public.
82
   
 The Populists and silverites in Congress could not believe what they were 
hearing.  They had no more than defeated the earlier bond measure when another one was 
thrust upon them.  The system of taxation the bill would create was nearly as 
preposterous.  As they came out in opposition to the War Revenue plan, however, their 
arguments were often divided into attacks that focused upon the “money power” for the 
bond portion (and its implications for currency) and those that derided Republican 
subservience to the “plutocracy” based on the tax system they devised.   
 First and foremost, western Populists and their allies said the bond measure was 
completely unnecessary for a war that they knew from the beginning would be of short 
duration.   Representative John Kelley, a South Dakota Populist, declared that “even if 
Spain were a second-class power instead of what she is, there would still be no excuse for 
this fabulous bond measure.”83  Senators Allen and Teller likewise criticized the size of 
the bill, and suggested that the administration had an immediate need for the money.  
When allies of the administration “tell us that the war would cost about three hundred 
millions annually extra,” Allen said, “and legislating on the supposition that the war is to 
last a year, we have to raise only $300,000,000 in addition to the ordinary revenues of the 
Government, unless the deficit of sixty-odd millions under the Dingley tariff act is to be 
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covered up by the bill.”84  Teller had a similar suspicion.  "Mr. President, I am 
particularly interested in this revenue scheme…because I know it is not to be a temporary 
scheme...It can be demonstrated that the present system of collecting money under the 
Dingley bill, so called, and the existing internal revenue taxes will not produce enough 
money to run the Government in time of peace.”85  The administration had been spending 
more than the tariff was bringing in, they claimed, and this was to cover up its shortfall.   
 Beyond criticism of the sheer size of the bill, most who attacked the bond portion 
called it a sham that was to be pushed through in time of war for the profit of the few.  
Kelley said that his colleagues were now "rudely awakened to a realization of the fact 
that the spirit of patriotism which is aroused throughout the country has been taken 
advantage of…while the minds of the people are distracted by the clamor of war, to 
satisfy the maw of the money changers.”86  Lewis of Washington also warned against 
being “buoyed off upon an imaginary patriotism to wrong the people by deluding them 
and robbing them.”  War, he said, “has ever been the pat time for the pilferers of public 
confidence and the plunderers of the public Treasury to do their destructive work.”87  
Later, Lewis would claim that the bill itself had been drawn up at the instruction of Wall 
Street‟s bankers. 88   
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 Though Populists had called for intervention in Cuba, they were distraught by 
what they perceived as McKinley‟s abuse of wartime sentiment.  William Allen assailed 
those who took advantage of the "patriotic wave [that] is sweeping over the country.”  
Behind this scheme was “the infamous money power of the United States and Europe,” 
which was “endeavoring to foist upon the people a perpetual national debt.”  “There is 
not one of that power,” he continued, “who would not see this Government sunk to the 
bottom of the ocean if he could make a fortune by it. There is not an impulse of 
patriotism, not a feeling of affection for the Government among them. The Government 
is to them simply a carcass upon which they are to feed and fatten."
89
  A few of the most 
radical Populists believed that the money power might have already been in complete 
control.  William Stark of Nebraska told the House of “a belief that there may be a 
sinister motive in the proposition to issue so large an amount of interest-bearing 
obligations at this time; that when negotiated the war may suddenly be brought to a close 
and the remainder of the bond issue utilized to retire the present legal-tender notes...”  
While he remained skeptical that any party “can properly be charged with such a 
scheme,” he was also distrustful of his colleagues:  “the emissaries of Shylock can always 
be depended upon to do his will.”90  Jerry Simpson had also heard rumors that the “big 
banking interests are advised that just as soon as the United States has, by force of arms 
administered the crushing blow that Spanish honor demands…the great financiers of 
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Europe will take that country by the throat and choke her into pleading for peace.”91  
Though many Populists had been the strongest advocates of Cuban independence, the 
war was serving the purposes of the money power.    
A number of westerners incorporated portions of the classic conspiratorial 
narratives into their counterattacks against the administration.  In most of the apocryphal 
histories of finance popular in that era—most notably in Seven Financial Conspiracies—
the Civil War was the pivotal moment in which the money power had used a national 
crisis to its advantage.
92
  It is not surprising then that some Populists and others came to 
believe that they were living through a similar moment.  Jerry Simpson, for example, was 
certain that the bill demonstrated the intent “to carry out a programme mapped out some 
time ago in the interest of the money lords of this and other countries to take advantage of 
the people, appealing to their patriotism to authorize for war purposes an issue of bonds 
the authority for which has been sought in vain in times of peace."  The great purpose 
behind it all, he said, was to bolster the national banks.  Aside from the profit they gained 
from interest, bonds were required as security on the notes that the bank issued.  “Bonds 
are to national banks the blood of life,” he said.  If Gage were to initiate his (presumed) 
plan to privatize the issuance of money, he first required these bonds.
93
  In his 
explanation, Representative Charles Barlow (Populist, California) largely agreed that the 
“policy of the present Administration is to retire the whole noninterest-bearing debt 
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[greenbacks] and replace it with an interest-bearing debt.”  But for Barlow, this was a 
continuation of a phenomenon that had haunted the country for over thirty years.  “This 
bond craze of to-day is a legacy of the civil war,” he said.  “[W]hile the brave men on 
both sides were sacrificing themselves in a struggle of principle, which resulted in the 
liberation of 4,000,000 slaves, these shylocks and coupon clippers were completing their 
nefarious plans."
94
  After the war, the money power had maintained its position with the 
aid of those in government.   
 The Civil War provided a powerful example for those who desired monetary 
reform.  It was the period when they believed the force of the money power had made its 
greatest impact, but it was also a time of creative experimentation in national finance.  In 
Populist narratives, one of the most important developments was the introduction of 
greenback currency.  As the nation again went to war, many believed the same kind of 
creativity, and maybe some of the same solutions, could work again.   One after another, 
they made speeches defending the greenback and cursing those who had always tried to 
destroy it.   
When they traced the history of the greenback, a number of Populists in the 
House remembered that the currency had served the Union‟s purposes once before, but 
had been an imperfect creation because of certain schemers.  John Kelley gave one of the 
more complete descriptions of the Populist view of the matter.  He said that the 
“greenbacks were and are the best money this or any other country has ever known.  
They saved the nation when no other money would or could save it.”  But he still 
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remembered how the “Wall Street ravagers” had forced the government to include “a 
damning exception clause.”  The greenbacks could be used to pay public debt, but they 
could not be used to pay import duties.  The circulation of both “hard money”—notes 
backed by gold and silver—and “soft money”—greenbacks, backed only by the word of 
the government—worked in combination with the exception clause and resulted in the 
depreciation of the greenbacks.  After the war ended, according to Kelley, “the command 
of the Wall street vultures” had made its best effort to “destroy the greenbacks.”  Kelley 
believed he was witnessing just the most recent attempt by financiers to destroy the 
federal currency.
95
 
 Kelley‟s description represented a typical Populist analysis.  His fellow South 
Dakotan Freeman Knowles and Nebraskan William Greene were Populists who held 
similar views regarding the utility of the greenbacks.  Knowles claimed that, during the 
Civil War, “there never was an hour during the darkest days of that rebellion but what 
those notes were worth their face in gold.”  Like Kelley, he believed that “after the war 
was all over and the danger past, then it was that the money devils began to cry 
„dishonest money‟ and „rag baby‟…. And from that day to this it has been bonds, bonds, 
bonds.”  Greene also blamed “men outside of Congress,” who “have taken advantage of 
conditions of war to secure legislation in their interests…This was notably so when we 
issued the greenback currency in 1862, and crippled it at the suggestion of money 
lenders"—another reference to the exception clause so bemoaned by Sarah Emery.96  
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Both men developed counter-proposals to the bond plan; Greene called for $150,000,000 
in Treasury notes while Knowles demanded $250,000,000.  Further, both men explained 
their understanding of the basis of money.  “[M]oney is the creation of the law,” said 
Knowles.  “The idea that one kind of money should be redeemed in another kind of 
money was simply a trick invented by the money changers to make the people believe 
that one special commodity which the money changers controlled was the only legal 
money.”  Greene likewise told the House that “there is not now, never was, and never 
will be any other kind of money among civilized men but „fiat money,‟ money made by 
decree of law.” Knowles and Greene were just two of the many Populists who advocated 
fiatist policies as alternatives to the bond measure.
97
 
 This is not to say that Populists abandoned the free silver issue.  They were, after 
all, living in an era in which paper and specie currency circulated side-by-side with one 
another.  However, rather than arguing for the parity of two metals (as they had in 1896), 
they suggested that silver, gold, and paper served the same purpose.  John Calhoun Bell 
of Colorado stated that he wanted the silver seigniorage to be coined.
98
  Yet, like the 
other Populists, he did not do so because of any belief in the inherent value of the metal.  
“The Supreme Court of the United States says gold is not money; it says silver is not 
money; it says paper is not money, but that a legal decree of a legislative body makes the 
money of the realm.”  Issuing money, he said, was the only responsible thing to do in this 
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time of war.  “You have got to use essentially a national currency.  War is a great, new 
business and requires a new supply of money that will circulate and not be hoarded.”99 
 Their Senate counterparts were eager to coin the seigniorage as well.  During one 
of his attacks on the bond measure, Senator Allen called for the silver seigniorage to be 
coined.  When some of his colleagues claimed that silver had depreciated, he shot back 
with the claim that “silver has not depreciated in the slightest degree…. Simply by 
cutting the cord that existed between silver and gold and casting all the money work upon 
gold alone, gold has risen and silver has stood still.”  Primarily, though, Allen expressed 
his lack of tolerance for “that class of pseudo financiers who argue that the value of 
money resides in the commercial value of the material employed. We can displace every 
dollar of silver and gold in the United States and replace them with full legal-tender paper 
money, and if we limit that volume, every paper dollar will be equivalent in value to a 
dollar in gold.”100  Even the relatively conservative Silver Republican Henry Teller had a 
degree of willingness to listen to the fiatist proposals of his friends.  He did flatly say that 
“I have not been one of those who have been in favor, as a general rule, of issuing paper 
money,” but added that “I know that the authority of the United States exists to issue 
paper money.”  When he spoke to those who claimed that silver was unacceptable as 
money, he was able to describe the seigniorage as an alternative to both fiat money and 
bonds.  “No matter what may be the theory of Senators as to the issue of paper money,” 
said Teller, “they can not defend this proposition here or elsewhere by saying that with 
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$42,000,000 of silver in the Treasury, which will make as good money as gold, we are to 
keep it locked up there and then borrow an equal amount and pay interest upon it.”101 
 The Senate did succeed in adding an amendment to coin the silver seigniorage, 
but neither Allen, Teller, nor any of the other reform senators could take credit for it.  
Instead, that honor went to Senator Edward Wolcott.  The junior senator from Colorado 
had already been rewarded for his loyalty to the McKinley administration with the top 
position on the fruitless international bi-metallic commission that was sent to Europe in 
1897.  With a few more feathers in his cap, perhaps the state legislature would forget that 
he had chosen his party over the silver cause in 1896.  While his was one of the few 
amendments of the bill that westerners supported, for those opposed to the administration 
it could hardly have felt like a victory.
102
   
While western reformers relentlessly attacked the War Revenue Bill for its bond 
measure, they were nearly as offended by the components covering taxation.  The basis 
of these fights was the widely divergent worldview held by conservative Republicans and 
those who opposed them.  Republicans claimed that broad-based taxation was the only 
fair system, while Populists, Democrats, and Silver Republicans retorted that such 
regressive forms of taxation did not reflect growing disparities in wealth.  Some of these 
debates pertained to seemingly trivial matters, but they effectively demonstrated the sense 
of class division.  One such conflict focused on something as mundane as a tax levied on 
beer consumption.  Congressmen Castle and Maguire, joined by Senator White (all of 
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California), objected to the provision that taxed something all identified as “the drink of 
the poor.”  Castle further noted that champagne, an item “used only by the rich,” was 
specifically exempted from taxation.  The amount of expected income from the provision 
on beer—$33,000,000—was one-third of the total amount to be collected through 
taxation.  To those already suspicious of administration intent, it was further evidence 
that the entirety of the bill was designed to protect the class that least needed 
assistance.
103
   
Western reformers were most angered by the system of taxation applied in the 
bill—a levy on consumption—which they said would inevitably take more from the poor 
than from the rich.  The bill was designed to impose a consumption tax on a number of 
popular items (as in the case of beer), but it contained no personal income or corporate 
tax provisions.  Western reformers asked their partisan rivals how this could be possible.  
Congressmen Newlands of Nevada asked if the “accumulated wealth of the country” was 
to be excused of its wartime obligations.  Senator White of California concurred.  "Ought 
the wealth of this country to bear any of the ills of this war?... If not, what excuse is there 
for the bill as it came from the House, and what excuse is there for those who are seeking 
to exempt the rich?"
104
  Some explanation was necessary to justify these unequal taxes.   
Western colleagues provided an obvious answer.  They argued the imbalance in taxation 
was no simple oversight, nor did it emanate from some misguided sense of equity.  
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According to Congressman Knowles, the Republicans who drafted the bill “felt so 
grateful to [the] great trusts, monopolies, banking institutions, and millionaires for past 
favors that they have exempted them from all share in the burdens of the war."
105
  
Knowles placed blame upon a handful of members of one party, who he suggested were 
trying to protect their most important supporters.   
James Hamilton Lewis, a Democratic representative from Washington, was 
blunter in his statements.  Acknowledging that “it would be ordinarily the purpose of a 
humane man and a generous government to compel all those who could best afford, with 
the least loss, the sustaining and bearing of such a conflict,” he asked “Then why not do 
so?”  In response to his own question, he proclaimed that “the answer is, because those 
who are the wealthiest through the favors and privileges of the Government have likewise 
become the objects of its exemption.”  He blamed the favoritism of the government for 
the creation of the economic elite.  This class then grew so powerful that they “had 
wielded their influence to such ends and such purposes as to have distorted the 
Constitution, misled the highest tribunals of the Republic, and obtained for themselves 
immunity from a just contribution to the Government from which they had derived both 
their comfort and their riches."
106
   
Lewis was drawing attention to a Supreme Court ruling from 1895, in which the 
justices ruled that a federal tax on personal income was unconstitutional.  This ruling 
overturned a number of precedents, some of which dated back to the early years of the 
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republic.  Another, and perhaps the most notable, was an 1881 decision by that same 
Court that supported the Civil War era federal income tax laws.   Coming in the same 
year as its rulings against Eugene Debs for his part in the Pullman strike and against the 
federal government in one of the few anti-trust cases prosecuted in the 1890s (United 
States v. E.C. Knight), it seemed to many that the Court had been corrupted by powerful 
interests.
107
  This frustration was unleashed over the course of the debate.   
Western reformers of all stripes attacked the Court and any who argued that the 
government had such limited authority over wealth or property.  More than the rest, it 
was the Populists who argued that there were few limits upon the federal power to 
marshal resources.  Congressman Simpson mocked Republicans who had claimed “The 
wealth of this country is something sacred.”  "Why, sir,” he said,  
do you know that when war exists in this country, the Government can take a man 
from his home, his fireside, his family, and put him in the front rank of the Army 
and have him shot for the benefit of his country?  Yet the wealth of the country is 
so sacred that even in time of war we can not invoke an income tax to touch the 
wealth of the wealthy classes, even to pay the funeral expense of the man who has 
been shot for the good of his country.  
 
Congressman Castle made a nearly identical comparison.  He decried the new “age of 
commercialism,” saying greed had “dethroned man and enthroned property.”  A man 
“can be taken from the bosom of his family and be shot to death on the field of 
battle….but when it is proposed to lay the heavy hand of Government on property we are 
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told that the property of the wealthy classes can not be touched.”  No individual‟s wealth 
could be withheld from the government, they argued, especially in time of war.
108
   
 Western Republicans avoided the debate over the revenue bill, with two notable 
exceptions.  The first of these involved Senator Edward Wolcott.  In the midst of a 
discussion by several Republican senators over details of a provision to tax inheritances, 
William Allen interjected his concerns regarding “the inequities, if I may so express it,” 
in any proposal that would “tax the estate of a dead man and permits the estate of a live 
man to escape.”  Senator Wolcott responded “that the experience of the last twenty-five 
years of this country has demonstrated without a doubt that live men with large properties 
can always evade the tax gatherer so far as their personal estate is concerned. The Senator 
knows, and I know, of men worth a million dollars of personal property who pay 
practically no taxes whatever.”  And so, he argued that, “If we could reach the living man 
we would do so, but we can not,” so the government should not even bother.  Wolcott, 
who the year before had led McKinley‟s futile international bimetallic commission, 
apparently did not appreciate the irony when he declared that the impossible should not 
even be attempted.
109
   
 The only other moment in which a western Republican participated came during 
debate of a proposed corporate tax, and once again he only acted to oppose the proposal 
of another westerner.  Democrats in the Senate were working to add a tax on the nation‟s 
largest businesses, but they struggled to develop a satisfactory amendment due to 
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squabbles over its particulars.  Following the rejection of yet another, Stephen White 
offered an alternative.  Rather than a tax on all corporations, White proposed a modest 
levy—amounting to one-quarter of one percent of gross revenues—“upon the business of 
oil refining and sugar refining, so that the Standard Oil and the sugar trusts will be able to 
pay taxes under the bill.”  As the two most identifiable monopolies in America, the tax 
was targeted at businesses he believed few were willing to defend.
110
   
 John Wilson, Washington‟s regular Republican senator, denied that the trusts 
could really be made to pay.  While he agreed with “the honorable Senator from 
California [Mr. WHITE] that this tax, if imposed, would be a tax upon those who can 
afford to pay it,” he argued it would provide them an excuse to exponentially raise the 
price consumers would have to pay.  Though he claimed he would have liked to support 
the amendment, portions of Wilson‟s speech also suggested an appreciation of the 
monopolies.  He reminded White that “when he was a boy the consumer of oil paid 50 
cents a gallon for it, and to-day it is only 8 cents at retail, and less than 4 1/2 cents at 
wholesale.”  Wilson did acknowledge the near complete control of the market held by 
these companies, but he did not consider that to be so regrettable.
111
   
 White did not care for such reasoning.  He ridiculed his Republican opponents, 
who claimed the federal government was too feeble to deal with the great corporations.  
“[W]e are told,” he said, “„Well, it would be a good thing if we could make these great 
institutions pay something, but we can not; they will lay it upon some one else, and 
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therefore while we feel these are the most oppressive monopolies in the world, and while 
we would like to get at them, we can not get at them, and we refuse to levy a tax upon 
them.‟”  He also contrasted Wilson‟s sudden sympathy for consumers with the other 
measures contained in the bill.  The “onerousness of taxation” had already been placed 
directly upon consumers.  “We have not shed any tears for the consumer when we have 
been levying taxes upon tobacco and beer.”  White‟s amendment was one of the few 
proposed by the opposition to pass in the Senate, doing so by a vote of 33-26 and with no 
western reformers in opposition.
112
   
The class dimensions of the portions of the bill pertaining to taxation were so 
flagrant that the opponents attempted to counter them any way they could, often with 
symbolic proposals that held little chance of passing.  In the days leading up to the final 
vote, these propositions only increased in number.  In just one example, Senator Allen 
proposed a 1% tax on all yachts.  It was rejected without discussion.
113
   
On the same day, Senator Richard Pettigrew offered a far more ambitious plan.    
The first component of his amendment would have defined the word “trust” as any 
“combination… association or corporation whose effect is to restrict the quantity of 
production or increase the price of any article,” or as “any conspiracy in restraint of 
trade.”  All organizations found to be trusts would then be subject to a tax of five percent 
on the total value of their manufactures.  His purpose was “not so much to obtain revenue 
as to destroy trusts.  Trusts have grown up covering almost every article of manufacture 
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in this country...with the object of plundering the consumer.”    While some were arguing 
that White‟s amendment would already make the sugar trust pay “about one hundredth of 
1 per cent per pound upon sugar, we give them a discriminating duty of more than one-
tenth of a cent upon all refined sugar.”  He pointed out Republican George Hoar of 
Massachusetts as just one of the many who defended the trusts by arguing that “this 
amendment punishes the innocent purchaser of all the sugar or any other article 
manufactured by a trust in this country.”  Pettigrew knew his measure sounded extreme, 
but he believed the war was already being used for the benefit of the few.  The choice, he 
said, was between “the continuance of plutocracy or absolute socialism.  I am in favor of 
neither, but I am in favor of socialism before I am in favor of plutocracy.”  While nearly 
all western reformers in the Senate voted for his proposal, it went down to defeat.  
Pettigrew‟s effort was a last-ditch attempt to make the conduct of the war fit their agenda.  
The victory of the administration party was nearly complete.
114
 
After a long fight in both houses of Congress, the conference committee reported 
back the final version of the War Revenue Bill in early June.  In its finished form, the bill 
was still much like it had been when originally proposed.  The vicious debate had only 
forced the most cosmetic changes.
115
  The House vote was held on June 9, and the results 
were as partisan as the debates had been.  Not one western reformer voted for the 
measure, and not one western Republican voted against it.  The measure passed 154 to 
107, with eighty-seven counted as absent.  Only two of those absent were westerners:  
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James Maguire (a California Democrat) and Jesse Strode (a Nebraska Republican).  The 
vote played out in much the same way in the Senate the next day.  Western Republicans 
provided unanimous support for the bill and were joined by only two of the least 
dependable reformers:  the Silver Republican Lee Mantle of Montana, who would soon 
return to the orthodox branch of his party; and James Kyle of South Dakota, a former 
Populist who had been drummed out of his state party after consummating a corrupt 
bargain with state Republicans to secure he re-election in 1897.  The bill won by a forty-
three to twenty-two margin, with twenty-four senators absent or abstaining.  With 
McKinley‟s signature, the War Revenue Bill became law on June 13, 1898.116   
 
The success of the bill highlights the diminishing fortunes of the western 
reformers once the war had commenced.  They may have ultimately succeeded in 
applying pressure on the administration and their conservative rivals when it came to 
Cuban independence.  Their attacks on all who stood by as the Cuban people were 
brutalized likely helped spur on action by those who would otherwise have chosen to 
remain indifferent. However, once the war began, they proved unable to rein in the forces 
they had unleashed.  The president they despised was now a commander-in-chief.  The 
bonds they saw as evil had been transformed into a war funding bill that too many others 
refused to oppose.  Their inability to substantially change the War Revenue Bill signaled 
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the utter failure of the western Populists and their allies to use the war to simultaneously 
liberate Cuba and reform America.  Quite to the contrary, it became a war paid for with 
bonds and consumption taxes, with little administration fervor for ideals such as political 
freedom or economic justice.  McKinley had called for intervention in order to return 
stability to the region, not to aid revolutionaries.  American interests were his primary 
concern, and this would soon show itself in other fields.  The war for humanity that the 
Populists had hoped for was about to become a war for empire.   
  
215 
 
CHAPTER V 
HAWAIIAN ANNEXATION AND THE BEGINNING OF THE DEBATE 
OVER EMPIRE 
On May 4, 1898, Congressman Francis G. Newlands, the only member of 
Nevada‟s Silver Party in the House, submitted a joint resolution designated H. Res. 259, 
“to provide for the annexing of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States.”1  The 
resolution was immediately forwarded to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.  
While it did not create much of an immediate stir, it did catch the eye of the McKinley 
administration.  They would use their influence in the committee to push Republican 
support for the measure.
2
  That it had been sponsored by one of the western reformers 
likely added to its appeal.   
Newlands was hardly a logical ally of the administration.  His devotion to free 
silver was as strong as that of any member in Congress, and he had earlier referred to the 
Republican War Revenue Bill as a scheme to satisfy the “rapacity” of the national banks.3  
At the same time, he was a man of no small ambition.  He may have been attempting to 
make a name for himself in order to challenge Senator William Stewart‟s control of 
Nevada state politics.
4
  Even more likely, he may simply have believed the time was right 
to take the islands.   
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The reintroduction of Hawaiian annexation, in the midst of the war with Spain, 
took a politically charged topic and made it explosive.  With the chance to take action on 
an issue they believed had been delayed since the second election of Grover Cleveland in 
1892, Republicans almost universally supported it.  Western reformers, on the other hand, 
divided over the measure.  Considering the diverse individuals who had been pulled into 
the free silver cause, it is hardly surprising.  A few who had been in Congress earlier in 
the decade had supported Hawaiian annexation then, and still others—like the widely 
admired Henry Teller—had a truly expansive vision of what America could become.   
Though some western reformers did fall victim to the siren calls of manifest 
destiny, an equal number did not.  Throughout the summer of 1898 they fought their 
conservative enemies and, not infrequently, their closer friends.  They sided with some 
eastern anti-expansionists, some of whom they had described as their arch rivals.  As 
much as any of their eastern colleagues, they demonstrated their commitment to 
government based upon consent of the governed and their opposition to colonial systems 
of rule.  Just as vitally, they demonstrated how Populist ideology could be applied to 
combat imperialism.    
 
The Hawaiian Issue Before the McKinley Presidency 
By the first years of the nineteenth century, Hawaii was becoming a frequent 
stopping point for European and American sailing vessels.  At an early point in the 
century it became the hub of America‟s Pacific whaling fleet, and some Hawaiians joined 
the crews of ships as they searched for their quarry in the ocean before heading back 
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again to New England.  These contacts with America led to the first Christian mission 
sent from the United States to Hawaii in 1819.
5
   
The missionaries were arriving at a time when the Hawaiian kingdom was already 
in disorder.  When the islands became a regular stop for Pacific sojourners, they likewise 
became a receptacle for every disease those ships brought with them.  The results of these 
epidemic diseases were devastating to the people of Hawaii, both demographically and 
culturally.  The people became skeptical of traditions that had been unable to cope with 
the new maladies, and even some leaders became more willing to listen to outsiders who 
offered new solutions.   
A further complicating factor was the growing threat of European interventions 
that could destroy native sovereignty on the islands.  By the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century, European powers were demonstrating bellicose attitudes toward the 
peoples of the Pacific islands.  France and Britain each contemplated conquest of the 
islands.  Their dealings with foreigners had convinced Hawaiian leaders that, if they were 
to maintain their power, they needed to take steps demonstrating their “civilization” to 
the rest of the world.  They adopted legal codes that were more comprehensible to foreign 
observers.  Traditional systems of land tenure were replaced by fee simple titles—a 
policy which later enabled the missionaries and their descendants to develop into a 
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powerful planter class.  Finally, to take their place in the community of nations, they 
initiated diplomatic contact with some of the world‟s great powers.   
America‟s official relationship with Hawaii began in the 1840s as a direct result 
of this last policy, when King Kamehameha III sent a diplomatic mission abroad to gain 
recognition for his government.  Daniel Webster, Secretary of State at the time, quickly 
recognized the important place Hawaii would hold for the future of American 
commercial pursuits in the Pacific.  President John Tyler agreed, giving his name to what 
would be called by some the Tyler doctrine.  Hawaii, they believed, must be within the 
American sphere of influence.  The independence of the local monarchs would be 
supported, and other powers would be discouraged from attempting to claim sovereignty 
over the islands.  All of this was done without a full recognition of Hawaii‟s 
independence.   
The sovereignty of Hawaii‟s rulers faced a number of challenges in the years that 
followed the American Civil War.  The increasingly dominant white sugar planters 
sought a stable supply of cheap labor—primarily Chinese and Japanese workers—to 
replace the “disappearing” Hawaiians.  The demand for labor quickly made the native 
Hawaiians a minority in their own homeland.  Planters also sought to obtain the benefits 
of access to the American market.  At times United States tariff policy granted Hawaiian 
sugar special privileges, and during those times the planters reaped enormous profits.  
Without the benefit of that status, as was the case with the tariff authored by 
Representative William McKinley in 1890, Hawaiian planters struggled.
6
  Planters knew 
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that the most likely guarantee of special access to the American market would be 
annexation to the United States.   
In 1893, with the assistance of the American representative to the Hawaiian court, 
John L. Stevens, and marines from an American warship, white planters led a revolt that 
overthrew the last Hawaiian monarch, Queen Lili‟uokalani.   The new government of 
Hawaii immediately sought recognition and, shortly thereafter, annexation to the United 
States.  The Harrison administration, in its last days in office, gladly accepted the 
opportunity and attempted to push a treaty of annexation through the Senate before the 
close of the lame duck session.  Harrison and Secretary of State John W. Foster 
underestimated the opposition they faced, which only hardened when President-elect 
Grover Cleveland announced his disapproval for the hastiness with which such a matter 
was handled.  The treaty did not pass and, when Harrison‟s term expired, President 
Cleveland withdrew the treaty altogether and sent his own representative, former 
Congressman James Blount, to investigate the incident.   
After several months of investigation, Blount claimed that Stevens had acted with 
the conspirators and had used the landing of American troops to support their revolution.  
He contended that the revolution would not have succeeded without their intervention, 
and a letter from Lili‟uokalini to Grover Cleveland also stated that she would never have 
stepped down in the face of rebel opposition alone.  Blount withdrew the protectorate 
status that Stevens had proclaimed for the islands shortly after the revolution, and in his 
report he stated his support for the restoration of the Queen.  Later interviews with 
                                                                                                 
Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1963), 120.   
  
220 
 
Lili‟uokalini conducted by another Cleveland representative may have only complicated 
the matter.  When asked how she would deal with the revolutionaries if she were 
restored, she replied that they would be beheaded and their property confiscated.  
Whether or not such a response was well within her rights, it was hardly a response that 
Americans would enthusiastically endorse.
7
     
President Cleveland held off until December of 1893 before he made any public 
statements on the Hawaiian matter.  In his annual message to Congress in early 
December and an additional memorandum sent two weeks later, he essentially 
relinquished authority over the Hawaiian issue.  He condemned Stevens‟s actions, he 
denounced the Harrison administration‟s attempt to hurriedly force a treaty of annexation 
through the Senate, and he generally stated that Queen Lili‟uokalini had been wronged.  
However, Cleveland was also unwilling to use force to remove the provisional 
government established by the revolutionaries.  And with that, he told the national 
legislature that he now entrusted the question to the “extended powers and wide 
discretion of the Congress.”8   
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Congress had not waited for Cleveland‟s permission to begin the debate.  For 
more than a year, from February of 1893 until May of 1894, members of Congress 
debated the proper course for America to take.  Several members of the 55
th
 Congress 
were prominent in these debates, including several who would rethink their positions 
later.  Republicans were especially vocal, and they primarily characterized Cleveland‟s 
withdrawal of the treaty as a partisan act.  Some even believed he would resubmit the 
treaty as it was, thus taking the glory for himself.  Others demonstrated a sort of jingoistic 
arrogance in their attacks on the president.  Two of the worst of these, perhaps oddly, 
were Senators George Hoar and Henry Teller.  Hoar took so much pleasure in attacking 
the Cleveland administration on this point that he felt the need to include it in his draft of 
the 1894 Massachusetts Republican platform, which listed the following planks:  
“Americanism everywhere.  The flag never lowered or dishonored…. No barbarous 
Queen beheading men in Hawaii.”9   Teller‟s “spread eagle” Americanism was no less 
than Hoar‟s.  In one speech he declared:  “I am in favor of the annexation of those 
islands.  I am in favor of the annexation of Cuba; I am in favor of the annexation of that 
great country lying to the north of us.”10  He envisioned an era when nearly the whole of 
the western hemisphere would be in American hands.  There was no limit to the territory 
that he believed could become a part of the American union.   
Two western opponents of annexation also voiced their opinions during the 
debate:  Senators Richard Pettigrew of South Dakota and Stephen White of California.  
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Pettigrew at the time was still a straight Republican, but one who was increasingly 
showing frustration with his party.  Fitting the style he would later be known for, he 
criticized government policy towards Hawaii as the design of the big businesses, 
especially the sugar trust.
11
  Pettigrew hinted at the worldview that many western anti-
annexationists would hold by the summer of 1898, but most westerners in Congress were 
not yet willing to apply their critique of the domestic situation to foreign affairs.  At that 
point, many were not leery of expansion at all, and those that were tended to use the same 
arguments that conservative opponents of expansion did.   
Democrat Stephen White of California was one of this sort.  White devoted most 
of his longest speech on the subject to the impropriety of Minister Steven‟s action, but he 
also laid out several basic principles of American governance that would be violated with 
the annexation of Hawaii.  The foremost of these doctrines was “consent of the 
governed,” the basis of the system established by the founding fathers.  This was one of 
the central points that nearly all anti-expansionists turned to, and he certainly was not the 
first to use it.  The vast majority of Hawaiian people had not asked for annexation, he 
said, and no annexationist was eager to hear their opinions.  White cited Blount‟s report 
to the administration, which claimed that any referendum on annexation that included all 
the peoples of the islands “would be defeated by a vote of at least two to one.  If the votes 
of persons claiming allegiance to foreign countries were excluded it would be defeated by 
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more than five to one.”12  The values of democracy should not be violated for the sake of 
expedience.   
Though Cleveland handed the issue over to Congress, there were no real avenues 
open for annexationists to pursue.  The President had shown his preference for a return of 
the native monarchy in Hawaii, and any attempt to claim Hawaii through a joint 
resolution would surely have met with a veto once it reached his desk.  The powers of 
treaty making and negotiation with foreign states also rested solely with the executive, 
and so the debates in Congress at the end of 1893 and into the spring of 1894 were little 
more than bluster.  Congressional debate on the matter largely subsided when Senator 
David Turpie of Indiana submitted a resolution declaring that the domestic politics of the 
islands were wholly the concern of the people already living there, but simultaneously 
declaring that any interference by an outside power would be regarded as “unfriendly” by 
the United States.  The resolution was put to an immediate vote and passed easily.  The 
debate died down for a time—without ever completely disappearing—but the ideas 
articulated by both sides would reappear, in 1898 and after.
13
   
 
The Terms of the Debate 
 Both expansionists and the more conservative of their opponents had developed 
the basic elements of their arguments in the first phase of the Hawaiian debate—and in 
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some cases much earlier.
14
  Obviously, a significant share of anti-expansionist statements 
were devoted to denying that any truth lay in the claims of their rivals, but expansionists 
rather fluidly adapted their own arguments to changing circumstances.  In fact, a great 
many annexationist arguments focused on the immediate necessity of action and the 
practical advantages that they believed would follow.  Anti-annexationists instead tended 
to emphasize their values, usually values that were common to traditional American 
views of their nation and its citizens.   
 Two of the foremost advocates of Hawaiian annexation during the 1890s were 
Senators Henry Cabot Lodge, a Republican from Massachusetts, and John Tyler Morgan, 
an Alabama Democrat.  Both were remarkably quiet during the debates over annexation 
in 1898, but they had advocated the cause of annexation for years beforehand.  They did 
not change their minds in 1898, but instead worked quietly (more or less) to attain their 
goal.  An examination of their statements from earlier years can effectively draw out the 
expansionist argument.   
 Though it was first discussed seriously during a time of peace, Hawaiian 
annexation was always described as a measure necessary for defense.  In an exercise that 
would be frequently repeated, expansionists pointed to a map of the world and noted the 
archipelago‟s location at the center of the northern Pacific.  A naval base in Hawaii, they 
said, could threaten or protect all the trade routes across the Pacific.  “The main thing,” 
said Lodge, “is that those islands lie there in the heart of the Pacific, the controlling point 
in the commerce of that great ocean.”  “All the great routes from San Francisco and from 
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Vancouver, all the great routes to the East, to and from the [hypothetical] Nicaraguan 
Canal, pass those islands,” he added.15  Morgan‟s assessment was of a similar sort, going 
so far as to suggest that “it would be folly for our citizens of this country to build the 
Nicaragua Canal, or for our Government to sanction the scheme” if some other power 
held the islands.  
16
 
 Expansionists often demanded immediate action, and they did so by claiming that, 
if the United States did not act, others would not wait.  In the early 1890s, when 
expansionists spoke of a threat to Hawaiian independence, they usually meant Great 
Britain.  Morgan emphasized that British ownership of Hawaii—combined with their 
bases in the Caribbean—would give them virtual control of any isthmian canal.  Lodge 
likewise considered the British the greatest threat to American domination of the islands, 
giving one speech in which he pointed to calls from Dominion countries for the 
acquisition of Hawaii.
17
  But the Senator from Massachusetts did not focus all of his 
attention on the British threat.  He was just as willing to point to Japan.   
 Japan was, by the 1890s, recognized as a rising power in the Pacific.  In their 
1894-95 war with China, they won a series of victories that demonstrated their 
increasingly dominant position in East Asia.
18
  Lodge openly fretted about their growing 
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navy, especially their recent order for two huge battleships from Britain—said at a time 
when many members of the Senate still had passages of Alfred Thayer Mahan‟s Influence 
of Sea Power floating in their heads.
19
  A Japanese conquest of Hawaii would have made 
that nation‟s strategic advantages in the Pacific impregnable, the expansionists said.  
Hawaii must be taken before then.   
The most publicized opponent of expansion during the 1890s was probably Carl 
Schurz, a German-American known widely as a former Republican politician, a 
prominent mugwump, and an editorialist.  While certainly no intellectual slouch, his 
greatest value to the opposition stemmed from the ease with which he could make 
complex arguments approachable and comprehendible.  In 1893, in the midst of the first 
serious debates over Hawaiian annexation, Schurz penned an article titled simply 
“Manifest Destiny,” in which he laid out a number of arguments against expansion.  
While not wholly unique, it was certainly a widely read piece, and many speeches made 
in Congress by anti-expansionists appear to have been based at least partially on it.   
First and foremost, Schurz was opposed to the introduction of people that he 
considered unfit for incorporation into the American corpus.  “It is a matter of universal 
experience,” he said, “that democratic institutions have never on a large scale prospered 
in tropical latitudes.”  In his view, the Constitution demanded that all lands claimed by 
the United States must eventually become states, and the inhabitants of these regions 
must be granted American citizenship.  He attributed this to a lack of work ethic in 
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tropical regions, which the climate encouraged and no degree of management could 
overcome.  While he framed his argument largely around the unsuitability of regions for 
incorporation rather than of races, he did not totally dismiss any racial component.  
Certain races were more suited to different environments, he argued.  So it was that 
peoples of mixed Indian and Spanish descent remained “far more apt to flourish” in the 
American tropics “than people of the Germanic stock.”20   
If such people were incorporated into the American body politic, his forecast was 
grim.   “As our fellow-citizens they will not only govern themselves in their own 
States…but they will, through their Senators and Representatives in Congress, and 
through their votes in Presidential elections, and through their influence upon our 
political parties, help in governing the whole Republic, in governing us.”  Schurz, the 
president of the National Civil Service Reform League, already believed that the 
American government was suffering from unacceptable levels of corruption and 
inefficiency.
21
  Even worse results could be expected if people incapable of self-
government were left to determine the course of elections.  Still, he insisted that the 
Constitution required that anyone who resided under the flag would have citizenship, and 
that they must have a say in how they were governed.   
Finally, he attacked the claim by some that Hawaii would prove a useful base to 
defend American shipping and the Pacific Coast.  Hawaii was over 2,000 miles from the 
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West Coast, he observed.  Not only would it add little to the defense of western ports, the 
archipelago could only be defended with “very strong military and naval establishments 
there, and a fighting fleet as large and efficient as that of the enemy.”  He thought this a 
foolish investment, especially because he thought no country on earth could launch a 
meaningful attack against the American mainland.  “Seeing the impossibility, under 
existing conditions, of striking against us a quick blow that would have any decisive 
consequences…all those powers will be naturally disposed to go to the extreme of 
honorable concession in order to avoid hostilities with the United States.”  The advantage 
of concentrated power would be lost if the military was dispersed among islands dotting a 
wide ocean.  Surely, America‟s position was stronger without colonies than it would be 
with them.   
Obviously, neither side actually “won” or “lost” the debate over Hawaiian 
annexation based on the strength of their arguments alone.  Yet by comparing the two, 
the sharply differing perspectives of each side become clearer.  Expansionists were 
concerned about power and America‟s place in the world.  Their opponents feared the 
corruption of American values or, worse yet, the destruction of the American political 
and racial order.  The clash of these priorities came to the forefront again during the early 
months of William McKinley‟s presidency.   
 
New Beginnings 
By the time McKinley was inaugurated, the situation was much as it had been in 
1893.  Hawaii remained independent, but the greater share of those in power continued to 
seek incorporation as the best avenue to financial security.  While the Republican Party 
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platform in 1896 had called for the annexation of Hawaii, the new president initially tried 
to keep silent on his own view of the situation, telling representatives of the Hawaiian 
government in late 1896 that “I have my ideas about Hawaii,” but he considered “that it 
is best at the present time not to make known what my policy is.”  It is, however, likely 
that he had wanted annexation from the beginning.  An incident soon provided McKinley 
with an opportunity to act.  When the Hawaiian government began turning away Japanese 
immigrants, Japan responded by sending a warship to the islands.  McKinley claimed that 
the rising tensions between Hawaii and Japan demanded a change in the status quo.  In 
June, he sent a message to the Senate informing them that the question of annexation had 
always just been “merely a question of time,” and that time had finally arrived. 22  
Though no action could be taken during the short opening session of the 55
th
 Congress, a 
new fight over it was certain when the second session began in December 1897.   
Several westerners played a significant role in the fight against Hawaiian 
annexation.  Senators White and Pettigrew, who had fought against the treaty during the 
Harrison administration, became leaders of the opposition to the new treaty.  In early 
February 1898, White introduced a simple resolution calling for Hawaiian self-rule, very 
similar to the one Senator Turpie had introduced in 1894.  While he claimed to believe 
that it would pass with little opposition, when the debate over annexation became more 
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serious he dropped this course altogether.  It seemed annexationists were more 
determined than they had been in the past.23   
At the same time, Senator Pettigrew worked—almost uncharacteristically—
quietly behind the scenes.  He wrote a letter to the Japanese minister in Washington, 
suggesting that it would be useful “for the Japanese Government to propose to join the 
United States in guaranteeing the independence of Hawaii.”  Such an action would surely 
“prevent the passage of this bill or resolution for the annexation of Hawaii, there is no 
question about it.”24  The senator from South Dakota also maintained ties to an ex-
colleague—former Silver Republican Senator Fred T. Dubois of Idaho—who remained 
active in his opposition to the acquisition of Hawaii.  Pettigrew had two of Dubois‟s 
speeches printed and, perhaps more vitally, sought to use the ex-senator‟s influence with 
other Silver Republicans.   
Pettigrew also made contact with Hawaiians who were working to maintain 
independence.  Writing to Joseph Carter, a close personal friend of Queen Lili‟uokalani 
who was working with her to restore the monarchy, he asked for financial aid to support 
Dubois in Washington.  “He has a great deal of influence with Senator Cannon [of Utah] 
and Senator Mantle [of Montana],” he said, “but he is poor and unable to come to 
Washington without assistance.”25  Carter may have also provided a link to other 
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opposition groups from Hawaii.  Pettigrew was one of two senators to welcome 
representatives of native Hawaiian anti-annexation organizations, and he even invited 
them to the opening ceremonies of the session in early December, 1897.  These groups 
brought with them petitions designed to show native preference for an independent 
Hawaii.  One, with over 17,000 signatures, was given to George F. Hoar, who the 
Hawaiians believed was now opposed to annexation.  Another, which asked for the 
restoration of the monarchy, was given to Pettigrew.
26
   
Despite the administration‟s efforts, opposition to the treaty persisted throughout 
early 1898.  Members of Congress were soon too distracted by Spain and Cuba to deal 
with the treaty, but McKinley would not have long to wait.  With Commodore Dewey‟s 
victory in the harbor of Manila at the beginning of May, Hawaiian annexation came to 
the forefront again.  Hawaii, claimed the expansionists, was the most logical stopover 
point for voyages from the West Coast to Asia.  Dewey would need to be resupplied if he 
was to hold the bay.  Even more importantly, volunteers from the western states were 
already being sent to California in preparation for an expedition to the Philippines.  The 
troopships would require a place to stop and resupply.  To vote against Hawaiian 
annexation would jeopardize the American war effort.
27
  Furthermore, they claimed that 
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in a rapidly changing and dangerous world Hawaii was the key to any defense of the 
Pacific Coast and a future isthmian canal.  In the calculations of others, Hawaii would be 
necessary if the Philippines were to be held in the long term.   
 
Western Opposition 
As debate on Newland‟s resolution opened up, anti-annexationists from all 
regions rebutted the arguments of their expansionist rivals.  Western reformers raised a 
number of the same issues and concerns as their colleagues from the South and 
Northeast, with certain particular portions appearing almost identically in the speeches of 
all.   They were just as eager to refute the validity of imperialist claims, and their 
statements regarding race and citizenship were largely based on the same assumptions as 
their counterparts from other regions.  This superficial similarity can explain why 
previous historians have overlooked the western opposition to expansion and 
imperialism.  However, when western reformers discussed the ultimate implications of 
empire, or they connected domestic structures of power to this renewed push for territory, 
their language demonstrated an interpretation rooted in Populism‟s republican ideology.  
They spoke of traditional fears of centralized authority, militarization, and ultimately the 
diminished economic opportunities that would bring about the end of free government.  
The exploitation of distant colonies could break the back of American democracy.  
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The speeches of western anti-annexationists all hinted at a belief that Hawaiian 
annexation could be just a first act that set the stage for wider expansion.  In mid-June of 
1898, Congressman John Shafroth attacked New York Democrat William Sulzer for 
saying that America “should not only annex Hawaii but should extend its power and 
dominion across the Pacific and forever hold possession of the Philippine Islands.”  In 
fact, Shafroth claimed, “four-fifths of those Representatives who believe in the 
annexation of Hawaii” also called for the acquisition of the Philippines.  Senator White 
claimed that “If we consummate this scheme, it will be urged that we must have the 
Philippines because Hawaii is not of great value unless in connection with other 
possessions,” and the result would be a flood of “Polynesians, Malays, Chinese, Negritas, 
and semi-orang-outangs [who] will demand our care.”  The debate over Hawaii in the 
summer of 1898 must be considered in that context.  These western critics were not 
merely attacking Hawaiian annexation, also the annexations that they feared would come 
with it.
28
 
Opponents of Hawaiian annexation took turns ridiculing and dismantling these 
arguments.  Most commonly, they pointed out that Pearl Harbor had already been ceded 
to the United States via treaty, and the rest of the islands added little of military value.
29
  
Richard Pettigrew went further, and after thoroughly researching the matter he pointed 
                                                 
28
 Nearly all westerners who made speeches in opposition to Hawaiian annexation included references to 
the other colonies their rivals proposed to take next.  For Shafroth and White‟s comments, see:  
Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., Jun. 14, 1898, App. 633-637, and Jul. 6, 1898, App. 603-
619, respectively.   
29
 Among those that pointed to American possession of Pearl Habor were Senators William V. Allen, 
Stephen White, and William Roach (a North Dakota Democrat), and John Shafroth in the House.  See 
Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess.; for Allen, Jul. 6, 1898, p. 6702-6707; for White:  Jul. 6, 
1898, App. 603-619; For Roach, Jun. 27, 1898, p. 6357- 6363; for Shafroth, Jun. 14, 1898, App. 633-637.   
  
234 
 
out that an alternative base was available and that it was already in American hands.  
“The harbor of Kiska [in Alaska] is a noble bay, perfectly protected from all winds…  
The entrance is wide enough to enable a sailing vessel to beat in or out at any time. There 
are no hidden dangers, and the depth of water is sufficient for any vessel.”  Others had 
dismissed Alaska‟s harbors as too icy or too far afield.  Pettigrew threw these aside as 
well, using sources that his foes could not reject.  Senator George Perkins, the 
conservative Republican closely tied to the Southern Pacific Railroad, had informed him 
that “that there never has been ice known in the harbor but once, and his ships have gone 
there for the last quarter of a century.”  Additionally, information he received directly 
from the Department of the Navy demonstrated the limitations of Hawaii as a coaling 
station.  In a letter he received in January, he said, the respondent from the Navy 
explained that the new battleship Massachusetts, “steaming at the most economical rate, 
can sail 4,797 miles. She can just get from Honolulu, by the shortest route, to Manila if 
nothing happens.”  But, he continued, “[T]his distance that she can travel is from the 
official trial.  She can not do it in practice. Everybody knows that the official trial is in 
excess of what these ships can accomplish at sea… She would be 3 miles short with 
every favorable circumstance, with no adverse winds or storms.”  By comparison, the 
Aleutians were only 3,700 miles from Manila.
30
 
Other western anti-imperialists discredited claims that Hawaii was vital to 
American security.  Senator William Roach delivered one of the most stinging speeches, 
sarcastically admitting,  
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for argument's sake, that in case we were in trouble with any European power that 
country would send its ships to Asia and then across the Pacific Ocean in order to 
attack our western coast. I will even admit that Hawaii is so large and so strong 
that such European power could not possibly send its ships around Hawaii, but 
must inevitably have them stopped as soon as they struck our coaling station in 
Pearl Harbor. I will admit, Mr. President, all of these things, notwithstanding the 
historical fact that Gibraltar is as strong a fortification as Honolulu, and not much 
farther distant from the United States coast; and yet we have never had trouble by 
reason of England's owning Gibraltar.
31
 
 
Roach could not envision how an island thousands of miles from American shores could 
be essential for national security.   
His colleagues continued on in the same vein as Roach, though with less sardonic 
wit.  Senator William Allen noted that “a child capable of locating the Hawaiian Islands 
on the maps would be convinced at a glance” that the island had no defensive value. 
“They have no significance whatever and not the slightest value for defensive purposes. 
They will only add to the burden of our country in defending its coast, as I shall show 
further along.”32  Stephen White, a Californian, also questioned how a defensive 
perimeter so far from the mainland could be of any use against a real-world foe.  San 
Francisco and San Diego were already fortified, and there were few powers that were 
even capable of attacking them.  For those who claimed Britain was a threat, he pointed 
to British fortifications in British Columbia as a greater danger than any that could come 
from Hawaii.  “There she is right in sight of the smoke of our civilization. She is not 
compelled to go 2,100 miles from anywhere and be dependent upon a precarious supply 
of coal and provisions.”  For those who claimed Japan was the primary threat, White 
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stated that Japan had only made friendly overtures to the United States.  Japan was not 
even a threat to Hawaiian independence.  “If her actions toward Hawaii excite doubt, 
negotiation—friendly, manly negotiation—will solve all.”  His use of the term “manly” 
demonstrated that, amidst all of the excitement of war, frank discussion could still be 
used to assert the nation‟s prerogative.  Besides, only Japan and Britain had been 
mentioned by expansionists as threats to the West Coast, and he dismissed either as likely 
enemies in the foreseeable future.
33
   
While critics were sure that Hawaiian annexation would do little for national 
defense, they also suggested that distant colonies were a point of strategic weakness.  
White asked simply “If our coast is not well protected now, will we make its protection 
easier by obtaining an addition that also must be fortified?”34  Congressman John 
Shafroth of Colorado pointed to recent examples from the war with Spain:  “We have 
attacked Spain at her weakest points, namely, in her outlying possessions. If we acquire 
colonies, the first attack upon us will be through them.”   As extensive as America 
already was, he said, it was an integrated state that provided no easy avenues for attack.  
“There is no way of holding a slice of territory cut from a nation located such as ours. 
Sooner or later it would be retaken. When nations find that nothing can be gained by war 
with such a country the idea of conquest vanishes even if they covet our possessions. We 
should not exchange concentration for diffusion.”35  His fellow Coloradan agreed.  “If 
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you pile up mountains of coal during times of peace from the territory of some of the 
friendly powers,” said John Calhoun Bell, “that will simply make the island a more 
inviting object of attack should we become involved in a foreign war.”  If Hawaii were 
annexed, attacks would come “at this vulnerable point, in mid ocean, some six or seven 
days‟ sail from our nearest home port.”  The only possible defense would be from a 
greatly enlarged navy, hardly a solution Bell would endorse.
36
   
Anti-annexationists in Congress also attacked the resolution because of the threat 
they believed it posed to constitutional restraints on power.  Allen argued that only a 
treaty could be used to annex territory, pointing out that a joint resolution had no more 
power than any other regular law passed by Congress—and like all other laws, it was 
only applicable within the sovereign bounds of the United States itself.  He went further, 
emphasizing the strict-constructionist viewpoint that many Populists were committed to.  
“The Constitution of the United States is a grant of power that does not exist outside of 
its expressed provisions and necessary implication…  [P]owers not expressly granted or 
not necessarily implied or proper for the execution of granted powers do not exist and can 
not be constitutionally employed.”37  Senator White agreed that the Newlands Resolution 
went beyond the constitutionally granted powers, claiming that “there is no precedent for 
such legislation.”  While expansionists reminded him of the example of Texas, he denied 
that there was a parallel.  Texas was admitted as a state, but few of his contemporaries 
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even spoke of a day in the distant future when Hawaii would become a full member of 
the Union.  The result, he was sure, would be something akin to colonialism.
38
   
Beyond their attempts to compare the addition of Hawaiian to expansion in earlier 
times, annexationists claimed rather broadly that expansion was part of America‟s fate.  
Again, opponents of annexation united to refute this suggestion.  Richard Pettigrew 
attacked the conceptual basis of manifest destiny, calling it “the murderer of men.  It has 
committed more crimes, done more to oppress and wrong the inhabitants of the world 
than any other attribute to which mankind has fallen heir.”  It was, he said, “simply the 
cry of the strong in justification of their plunder of the weak."
39
   
Like Pettigrew, Congressman Bell believed manifest destiny ultimately meant the 
conquest of the weak by the strong.  Perhaps “the time has come when manifest destiny 
shall automatically decree that this exemplary Government shall shed its gabardine of 
justice, impartiality, and equality, and shall join the Old World in gormandizing its 
national greed by absorbing all the smaller governments that come within its reach.”   Bell 
further castigated any who claimed that the little “republic” could provide legitimate 
consent for annexation.  He noted that the Hawaiian senate practically controlled the 
affairs of the islands, but that high property qualifications prevented the vast majority 
from voting for those officers.  The land losses of indigenous Hawaiians ensured that few 
of them could vote, while white planters maintained a monopoly on political power.  
“The best of evidence has been secured by a personal canvass of the natives and of the 
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non-American population, and it has been found that at least 90 per cent of the population 
are praying for an independent government.”  Bell argued that this was not, as one 
expansionist congressman had suggested, “the bold assertion of American manhood,” but 
was instead a wrongful usurpation of authority.  Like other anti-expansionists, he denied 
that dishonorable actions displayed anything manly.
 40
     
 Legality was also tied to the central issue that nearly all anti-annexationists (and 
later, anti-imperialists) focused on:  consent of the governed.  Senator Allen struck just 
such a chord when, during a heated debate, he asked a colleague “suppose Congress 
should declare that it was a necessity to annex England and the President should approve 
it, would that annex England to the United States?”  Certainly, he said, Congress had no 
legal authority to do that without some kind of popular referendum, and even Parliament 
lacked the authority to approve such a proposal.  His opposite number declared yes, in 
fact, Congress did have such authority, as long as their government approved it.   Allen 
asked how it could be possible to “bind the people of England, though the Parliament 
lacked authority to consent?”  If this was legal, “[t]hen we can annex the world.”41   
Anti-annexationists were most upset that, in every facet, expansion and 
colonialism would violate the basic principles of republican government.  They were sure 
that Hawaii would not be made a state, largely due to the racial makeup of the islands.  
Congressman John Shafroth reminded members that the people of Hawaii “belong to an 
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entirely different civilization, to an entirely different race. They know nothing of 
republican institutions.” 42  Race was tied to democracy, and in this view most members 
of the opposition agreed with expansionists.   
Hawaii, they were confident, would never have the right population to suit it for 
full partnership in the American political system.  This assumption was based on both the 
racial demographics of the islands and commonly held beliefs that tied together mental 
acuity, health, and the environment.   Underlying it all was a confidence that whites—
living in lands to which they were well suited—had attained the highest level of 
civilization.  In his speech in mid-June, Congressman Bell integrated both the racial and 
environmental elements into his argument against expansion.  At one point in his speech 
he broke down the population of Hawaii into racial categories:  “There are 40,000 
Hawaiians and mixed bloods, and probably 8,000 of these are over the age of 21 years; 
24,000 Japanese, mostly all males, and probably 16,000 of them above the age of 21 
years; 15,000 Chinese; 8,000 Portuguese,” and so on.  His focus on demographics was 
just part of his greater argument about politics—namely, that the islands were, due to 
their population, unfit for incorporation into the American political body.  American 
freedom was based upon equal right to the ballot box.  “If we annex Hawaii, we must 
treat all of the citizens thereof as political equals and give them the privilege of the ballot, 
or must make another radical change in the policy of our Government.”  Just over 3,000 
of the population had been identified as “Americans” in the last census of Hawaii, and 
this tiny fraction of the population would have no control if democracy followed the flag.   
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It was not just that whites would be outnumbered.  In Bell‟s view, American 
civilization could not survive in the tropics, and products of that environment were unfit 
for citizenship in a democracy.  “[T]here is not a case in history where this civilization 
has thrived under a tropical sun.”  In Africa, he said, the “torrid sun has never allowed the 
front brain to develop.”  These rules were immutable, he explained.  “Take the extreme 
north; the government that has always controlled best is force.  Take the temperate 
climate…and they tell us that reason is the controlling force there; but take the case of 
those within 30 degrees of the equator, and nothing else has ever governed them so well 
as superstition.”  Bell could not envision democracy existing in a place so different from 
the United States. 
43
  
Others chimed in with similar comments.  Senator Allen asked “what will this 
country do with 15,000,000 people such as are to be found in the Hawaiian Islands, in the 
Philippines, in Puerto Rico, and in Cuba, every one of them of an alien race; none of 
them used to the forms and solemnities of self-government; turbulent, vicious, savage?”44  
Likewise, Senator Roach said it was a “notorious fact that out of the 90,000 inhabitants of 
the Hawaiian Islands there is not to exceed 5 per cent of them capable of taking any part 
in government.  A government of that kind of people and by that kind of people would be 
irrepressible conflict, while a government for that kind of people would of necessity have 
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to be a very strong one.”45  Certainly, the anti-annexationists said, these were not people 
who could be incorporated into the American body politic.   
The opponents of Hawaiian annexation feared the incorporation of distant lands 
and their peoples, but they had no desire for less democratic alternatives either.  
Regardless of region or political affiliation, all of the anti-annexationists—as well as the 
anti-imperialists that would follow them—believed it was impossible to reconcile a 
colonial system of rule with the American political tradition.  Those like John Shafroth 
asked, “[A]re we going to violate the very principle for which our fathers fought the 
Revolutionary war? Are we now going to deny the principle that „taxation without 
representation is tyranny?‟”  Shafroth also mentioned the “monster petition against 
annexation, signed by more than a majority of the Hawaiians” presented by Pettigrew 
earlier in the session.  Bell, Pettigrew, and Roach also denied that Hawaiians had 
consented to annexation.  Roach went on to point out that Texas had been required to 
hold a referendum when it was annexed.  If that was the example used by expansionists, 
that model should be followed again.
 46
    
William Allen went farther, demanding that Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto 
Rico should be granted freedom on the same basis as Cuba.  “On all those islands that dot 
the sea I would erect and sustain an independent republican form of government,” he 
said, “giving them moral aid and support, as we have other islands in the past, and I 
would demonstrate to the world in time that all the Western Hemisphere was dedicated in 
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different sections and in different republics to the cause of a government by the people 
and for the people.”47  Allen was every bit the American exceptionalist that his opponents 
were, but he thought that American influence should remain persuasive rather than 
coercive.  
Usually, anti-annexationists also claimed that undemocratic systems under the 
American flag were a threat to democracy at home.  However, it was on this point that 
the arguments of conservative opponents of expansion seemed to fall flat.  They suddenly 
claimed that this one change would endanger the entire system upon which American 
freedom was based, while few among them questioned the economic or political 
structures of power that had taken hold domestically.  For Populists and their allies, on 
the other hand, government by the people was already under threat.  The growth of huge 
economic empires at home and an apparent alliance between political and corporate 
America had convinced many of them to leave the two-party system earlier in the 1890s.  
These western opponents of annexation most clearly differentiated themselves from their 
eastern counterparts when they discussed the far-reaching consequences they saw as the 
likely results of a colonial policy.   
For all anti-expansionists, the proposed “new possessions” were a threat to the 
American racial, political, and industrial order.  But because westerners viewed the 
existing governmental and economic systems as hugely flawed, they were particularly 
sensitive to the ways in which an unequal colonial system would accentuate those flaws.  
An examination of several of the more complete speeches, delivered by Senators Richard 
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Pettigrew and William Allen and Congressman John Calhoun Bell, provides clear 
examples of the Populist view of annexation.   
Though still nominally a Silver Republican, Richard Pettigrew had informed his 
associates in South Dakota that he was already a Populist in every practical sense.
 48
  
Pettigrew may have also been one of the least racist members of the Senate.  In one of his 
speeches he gave an unfavorable comparison of aggressive Americans with their 
counterparts across the Pacific, the Japanese, who he called the “the most civilized people 
upon the globe,” who were now “adopting everything that is good and rejecting 
everything that is bad in modern civilization.”49  He was upset that native Hawaiians 
were not consulted regarding the possible annexation of their homeland, and in defense of 
their intelligence he even pointed out that “The natives of Hawaii can read and write the 
English language. A greater percentage of the people can read and write than in nearly a 
majority of the American States.”50  Still, he could not believe that the islands‟ Asian 
majority could become proper republican citizens.  Worse yet, he considered them a 
threat to the livelihoods of present citizens.  Pettigrew believed that the founders had 
envisioned a government supported by independent property owners, but he contended 
that Asian labor posed a danger to the American yeoman.  He considered “the Asiatic 
races” to be “people with a low vitality and great tenacity of life, human machines who 
could subsist upon the least of food and perform the most of work.”51  They would 
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destroy the freedom of the white laborer who was the backbone of American democracy; 
he left it unsaid that only whites were capable of the requisite independence to maintain 
such a government.   
Even without the competition of Asian labor, Pettigrew also thought it unlikely 
that whites would ever permanently inhabit the tropics, as he believed “our race does not 
live in that climate; it can not.”52  Hawaii and its people were not suitable for 
incorporation, but to acquire lands that could never become states was a violation of the 
vision of the founders.  “[I]f we adopt a policy of acquiring tropical countries, where 
republics can not live, and where free, self-governing people have never lived since the 
world had a history, we overturn the theory upon which this Government is established 
and we do violence to our Constitution.”53 
Because Pettigrew believed that “No one for one moment pretends that we intend 
to admit the Asiatic people of Hawaii or of the Philippines into full citizenship under the 
Government of this country,” the consequence would be colonial rule and government by 
decree.  He claimed that it was the intent of the founders themselves “that no area should 
be brought within the bounds of the Republic which did not and could not sustain a race 
equipped in all essentials for the maintenance of free civilization,” but that rule was to be 
violated with the proposed additions.  For Pettigrew, the only safeguard of freedom had 
been the “government of limited powers,” established by the Tenth Amendment.   
                                                 
52
 Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., Jun. 23, 1898, p. 6258-6268.   
53
 The following paragraphs covering Pettigrew‟s speech are based on Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 
2nd Sess., Jun. 22, 1898, p. 6229-6232. 
  
246 
 
Pettigrew was sure that colonialism would destroy that barrier as well.  Already 
the accumulation of power in America had become too great.  “Centralization has gone 
on so rapidly since the war of the rebellion,” he said, “that already our people are looking 
to the Government of the United States as the source of all power through which all relief 
must come.”  Growing inequality was the consequence:  “the wealth of the United States, 
which was once fairly distributed, has been accumulated in the hands of a few; so that, 
according to the last census, 250,000 men own $44,000,000,000, or over three-fourths of 
the wealth of this country, while 52 per cent of our population practically have no 
property at all and do not own their homes.”  By using their leverage to control the votes 
of those in the most desperate of circumstances, this tiny elite had “usurped the functions 
of government and established a plutocracy.”   
Imperialism had been the scheme of all plutocracies, he argued.  While he 
believed that such policies were, in part, directly for the commercial benefit of the elites, 
he also saw how they could use imperialism as a diversion and a justification for 
militarization.  “[W]henever all power and all property have been gathered into the hands 
of the few and discontent appears among the masses, it has been the policy to acquire 
foreign possessions, to enlarge the army and the navy, to employ discontent and distract 
its attention.”  Colonies would be a white elephant, and their needs would be used as a 
rhetorical support for an even greater extension of central government power.    
Senator Allen had a similarly negative view of the threat posed by annexation, but 
he focused on different perils that would come with it.  In a speech on July 4, he put his 
greatest emphasis on the threat posed by immigration.  Speaking of Hawaii, the 
Philippines, and all other lands the most aggressive expansionists now dreamed of 
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acquiring, he said he could not “incorporate in our population, as citizens of the United 
States, 15,000,000 people belonging to alien races, the most of them ignorant, brutal, 
hostile, and savage,” who would “reduce the standard of our home civilization to that of a 
low and brutal Asiatic population.”  He would not have them as citizens, but he did not 
believe anything else was possible under the constitution.  “Once annex those islands to 
the United States and there is no power in Congress by legislation to prohibit the Malay 
of the Philippine Islands from coming to South Dakota or Nebraska or New York; and, 
sir, they will come by the million,” he said.  Once here, they would compete with:   
the farmers and laborers of your State and of my State. They will come to reduce 
the standard of civilization in all the occupations in this country among our 
legitimate population. The Japanese cooly [sic] and his son will become farmers 
in your State and in Nebraska, and they will lower the prices of farm products 
there… So, sir, the Japanese cooly's [sic] wife and daughter will become 
competitors with the wife and daughter of the American citizen.  
 
Allen framed the threat as a direct attack upon American manhood and the role of men as 
providers and protectors of their families.  But that economic threat would prove 
destructive to the entire American way of life.  “[O]ur society can not carry the load; 
civilization will stagger under it,” he said.  The struggle to maintain American freedom 
would be lost, and he forecast that “out of it all will grow a landed peasantry with a few 
thousand landlords, who will own millions of acres of our country.”  Ultimately, the 
demise of free labor in America portended the failure of democracy.  The nation “will 
pass from a Republic, which was framed by the founders, into an oligarchy, if not into 
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absolute monarchy itself.”  Allen contended that this deadly competition with Asian labor 
was inevitable if America should acquire the Pacific archipelagoes.
54
 
In another speech, made just two days later, Allen shifted his focus to two of the 
other major concerns held by western reformers.  First, he pointed out that the addition of 
new territories would require a military buildup in order to defend the islands—both from 
external threats and the need “to keep the natives in subjection.”  “[W]e must add to the 
taxes of our people from $350,000,000 to $500,000,000 a year,” he said, essentially 
doubling the federal budget. “Our Navy must be increased; our standing Army must be 
increased to at least 200,000 soldiers, and all the burdens of taxation are to rest upon the 
people of this country, for we can expect nothing from the Hawaiian Islands or the other 
islands that we shall annex.”  The taxes to pay for this would have to be wrung from 
American farmers and laborers, as “We can not impose an income tax because that rests 
upon the rich, and the Supreme Court has declared that the rich shall not be taxed.”  Allen 
was no lover of the professional military in its own right, but the costs associated with 
this kind of expansion would be ruinous.
55
   
Worse yet, Allen was sure the yearly expenses associated with such a military 
would certainly exceed revenues in many years.  The addition of overseas colonies was 
“one step, and an important step, in the interest of the perpetuation of a national debt. I 
have no doubt in my own mind that every man who has the money and desires to own 
Government bonds and draw interest from the people in the form of taxation is in favor of 
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this scheme of annexation.”  The national debt had begun to increase again in recent 
years, and parasitic financiers had done nothing to discourage it, he was sure.  With these 
new expenses, soon the government would be called upon by “these interest-eating 
patriots calling for the issuance of bonds, the borrowing of money.”  Then, with colonial 
debt dragging down the government, control “will pass from the masses of the people, 
from the debtor class to the creditor class, and the Republic, if it exists, will exist in name 
only. It has almost reached that point now. Every one of these men is in favor of 
annexation.”  While he limited his overtly conspiratorial language, he did claim that 
financiers and bondholders would make representative government irrelevant.   
Allen believed that the cost of militarism would drain the resources of common 
people.  Congressman John Calhoun Bell, on the other hand, saw even more direct links 
between the military establishment and the economic elite.  He ridiculed the arguments 
made by those “high in the Army and Navy ranks” that the acquisition of Hawaii would 
extend the American defensive perimeter.  For Bell, the military sought expansion simply 
for its own aggrandizement.  These leaders knew the military would need to be expanded 
in order to defend the islands and control its population, and rule by the bayonet in these 
possessions would only encourage further growth of “the dominating spirit of militarism” 
among the citizenry.  “The soldier is ever endeavoring to build up and enlarge the Army 
and Navy, and to obtain opportunities to display his skill in warfare,” so it was no 
surprise that military chieftains claimed that Hawaii was vital.  Worse yet, if present 
conditions were any sign of things to come then he expected the military to become more 
closely tied to a select elite.  “Every year we draw nearer and nearer to the caste system 
of the Old World.  No man can look over the military appointments recently made 
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because of the social, political, or financial standing of young men… without being 
convinced that an invidious distinction was made against the efficient trained soldier 
from the ordinary ranks of society.”  He even claimed, perhaps facetiously, that many 
now believed “that applicants for office in the Army or Navy must now present their 
pedigrees, strains of blood, or social standing rather than their qualifications.”  Militarism 
was to be a tool used to establish an American aristocracy.
 56
   
For those at the bottom of American society, the annexation of Hawaii would only 
lead to greater deprivations.  Unlike expansion during earlier times that had provided land 
and resources for the use of all Americans, now Bell believed only a “few wealthy 
Americans and European whites will own all the valuable possessions of these islands.”  
Just like Pettigrew and Allen, Bell was confident that, rather than hiring white Americans 
(who were, according to Bell, unfit for the climate), these great property holders “will 
inevitably employ the natives or the poorly paid labor of like climates, and will produce 
untold quantities of the necessaries of life, and will pour them into our channels of trade 
in competition with out laboring classes.”  Saying annexation brought with it “the return 
of slavery to this country,” Bell stated that “this menial labor will certainly be completely 
controlled and used by their more fortunate brethren there and here.”  The support he saw 
in Congress for expansion of this sort provided every indication to Bell that “the United 
States will unfold itself in the early morning of the twentieth century into the greatest 
military and naval power and into the most regal and resplendent aristocracy that the 
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world ever beheld.”  While in earlier times expansion had been a guarantor of freedom 
for Americans, annexation in the era of unrestrained capitalism would certainly destroy it.   
The examples above by Pettigrew, Allen, and Bell demonstrate how a worldview 
based largely on Populist ideology could be translated into a foreign policy position.  
While much of their content differed, certain themes appeared in all of them, and these 
same themes were also commonly discussed by other western opponents of annexation.   
All three demonstrated a fear that expansion was a threat to American producers.  
Each also explicitly tied this threat to competition with Asian labor.  They agreed that 
workers from the Pacific would depress the American standard of living, and either that 
they would be exploited in place or they would immigrate to the mainland to deprive 
Americans of employment.  This view of Asian labor as malleable and unfree was hardly 
new, and it had especially predominated in much of the West.
57
  Certainly, many of their 
colleagues agreed with their assessment.  Senator White of California reminded all that 
his state had faced such a problem before, but that they had quickly learned that “there 
could be no intelligence or competent American citizenship in an element struggling for 
10 cents per day.”58  Congressman Shafroth pointed out that the West‟s fledgling sugar 
beet industry could not compete with sugar “raised by contract Chinese and Japanese 
labor that is paid $3 a month and board, or 30 cents a day without board.”  “In the 
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Philippine Islands,” he warned, “the labor conditions are still worse.”  On this point, he 
said such labor leaders as Samuel Gompers were in agreement with his own views, and 
surely a majority of workers would be opposed to the addition of such people.
59
  
It is useful as well to note that Pettigrew and Allen pointed to more than just a 
fear of lower wages.  When they spoke of the economic damage that could result, they 
frequently couched it in terms of the destruction of a proper republican citizenry.  Though 
whiteness was a prerequisite for citizenship in their eyes, this was hardly exceptional.  
Nearly all, on both sides of the argument, accepted this as established fact.  Populists 
differed from their contemporaries in the way they continued to define republican 
citizenship in traditional terms and believed that the economic basis of that citizenship 
was under threat.  Populists viewed small property holders and (and often breadwinning 
laborers as well) as the core component of representative government, but 
industrialization and combinations were squeezing the independent yeoman and laborer 
in ways they could not combat.  Asian workers would prove to be the tools of 
industrialists and landlords, and their ability to produce the same goods for less 
compensation would drive out the last of the economically self-sufficient producers.  As 
wealth and property ownership were concentrated in the hands of fewer individuals, 
Populists feared that American men would lose the independence of thought and action 
that had been the foundation of mass participation since the early republic.   
These speeches also demonstrated the extent of Populist fear of such 
concentrations of wealth.  Allen spoke of an oligarchy, Bell of aristocracy, and Pettigrew, 
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using a word that had become a staple of his lexicon, of plutocracy.  They all suggested 
that the acquisition of colonies would work for the benefit of a capitalist elite, who would 
soon become entrenched both economically and politically.  However, Populists and their 
allies did not simply argue that the trusts would profit from annexation but instead 
claimed they had come to actively seek it and now pushed it among their allies in 
Congress.  Foremost among their targets was the sugar trust.  Pettigrew claimed that “the 
chief champions of the sugar trust in this body array themselves” on the side of 
annexation.
60
  Allen agreed, and, brushing aside claims that the trust was actually 
opposed to annexation, he asserted that “Every Senator and Representative in Congress 
who has heretofore been considered as occupying anything like close or friendly relations 
with the sugar trust…is found arrayed in solid phalanx in favor of annexation.”  But 
Allen was not done, for “other influences [are] behind this question.”  Tobacco interests 
were no less keen on acquiring Hawaii than the sugar trust.  “If the tobacco of these 
islands can escape taxation, as it will by annexation, it will be a saving of at least fifteen 
or twenty million dollars annually to the tobacco trust. Their influence is arrayed in favor 
of annexation.”  Additionally, he suspected that “Every organization or every institution 
that is making armor plate is in favor of annexation; every company or individual 
engaged in the construction of naval vessels is in favor of annexation; all those engaged 
in furnishing supplies to the Army and Navy, and making tremendous profits out of it, are 
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in favor of annexation.”  And all, he was sure, were using their influence in Washington 
at that very moment.
61
   
The contribution of another western reform congressman should not be ignored, 
even though his speech was never even read aloud in the halls of Congress.  
Representative Charles Hartman, a Silver Republican from Montana, was not given the 
opportunity to address the House on the subject of Hawaiian annexation, probably due to 
time constraints.  Instead, Hartman had his prepared comments inserted into the 
Appendix of the Congressional Record.  In his remarks, Hartman said that the wealthy 
and powerful supporters of McKinley were finally coming to appreciate “the rapidly 
growing sentiment adverse to the financial policies of the Administration and to its close 
friendship to trusts and monopolies.”   Their aim now was to “turn the attention of the 
people into another direction.  By this new policy of imperialism which is proposed to be 
adopted, public investigation of questions of domestic concern may be supplanted by 
proposals for extending the national domain.”  Better yet, “Should such extension result 
in complications with foreign nations,” these conflicts would provide even greater 
distractions and novel opportunities for profit.  It was a similar mode of thinking that had 
allowed the passage of the War Revenue bill, he said.  These interests had waited until 
the patriotic sentiment of the nation had blinded the public to the dangers of such 
propositions.  “The proposed annexation of Hawaii…is but another part of the same 
plan.”  The expenses associated with gaining and defending colonies and competing with 
the other great powers would compel the government “to use its credit further and to 
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issue still more bonds to sustain the foundation of the great bank-issuing system to be 
created and to add power to the present strong grasp of the money power of the world 
upon the industries of our people.”62 
Hartman‟s message contained a stronger conspiratorial tone than any other one 
presented in opposition to Hawaiian annexation.  He claimed that a grand plot was afoot, 
emanating from the great capitalists and sanctioned by the McKinley administration and 
its friends in Congress.  Hartman was not the only one to call the acquisition of colonies 
an intentional distraction.
63
  He was also not the only one to suggest that the debts 
associated with colonialism would benefit parasitic financiers.  Hartman‟s real innovation 
was his directness.  His remarks lacked subtlety or innuendo, and for that reason his 
message was clear when he invoked the name of the money power.   
It is perhaps strange that Hartman‟s speech was one of the very few to mention 
the money power by name.  Western reformers of all stripes had freely brought up the 
conspiracy at other times during the session.  The early portions of the debate over 
Hawaii actually overlapped with the last discussions of the War Revenue bill, and no 
small number had been willing to attribute the most onerous measures of that bill to the 
money power.  Despite their hints that powerful interests were pushing certain 
congressmen for annexation, western opponents of expansion were less willing to 
characterize all of their opponents as sinister tools of the ever-grasping financial powers.   
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One explanation may have to do with their increasing awareness that imperialism 
was not merely in the interests of financiers.  Manufacturers, mining and land 
speculators, shipping magnates—a far more diverse lot—could find value in overseas 
expansion.  The battle of 1896 had been waged almost solely against banking interests 
and monetary speculators.  By 1898, on the other hand, “aristocracy” and “plutocracy” 
were increasingly becoming the Populist watchwords.  
Another possible explanation relates to divisions among the western reformers 
themselves.  While many of their most important leaders in Congress opposed 
annexation, there were notable exceptions.  Henry Teller and William Stewart—a regular 
promoter of the money power conspiracy himself—were among those who suddenly 
supported the administration‟s initiative.  Stewart was beginning his shift back into the 
Republican Party, a more fitting place for the mine operator and friend of big business.  
By comparison, Teller‟s political journey would continue its convoluted path for the 
remainder of the debate over expansion.   
 
Western Annexationists 
Western annexationists were more politically diverse than their opponents.  
Nearly all regular Republicans from western states supported the annexation of Hawaii, 
and they were joined by a smattering of Populists, Democrats, and Silver Republicans.  
Despite the evidence to the contrary presented by the anti-expansionists, most western 
annexationists cited wartime necessity as their primary motivation.  Many also pointed to 
the strategic and economic value that the island could bring.  But while several 
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Republicans suggested that this was only a beginning, western reformers more frequently 
stated that Hawaii represented their limit.   
House Republicans demonstrated little hesitancy on the matter.  John Barham of 
California saw only opportunity.  The islands, he said, were quite valuable in and of 
themselves.  The United States already had a greater trade with them then it did with 
most other nations.  Barham was also sure that the islands could not maintain their 
independence.  Those who opposed annexation preferred “quietly sitting by [to] see 
England, Japan, Germany, or some other nation take the islands and their trade and 
military advantages.”    Furthermore, “The islands are of great importance from a military 
point of view. The strategic importance of Hawaii has been demonstrated by facts 
developed during the pending war with Spain.”  He brushed aside the claims that the 
islands were unnecessary, saying that he preferred the arguments presented by military 
men.  Just as one went to a doctor for medical problems, “So it seems to me, in military 
and naval affairs, that we should be largely guided by the opinions of men learned and 
trained upon these subjects.”  To refuse annexation would threaten all that had been won, 
and thus “sacrifice the unparalleled achievement of our arms upon the seas, so heroically 
won by Admiral Dewey and his men at Manila, and endanger him, his men, and our 
soldiers who so recently left the port of San Francisco to aid in holding the fruits of that 
victory.”64   
Barham followed the typical expansionist script in his speech, but his speech 
remained focused on the value of Hawaii itself.   Another California, Samuel Hilborn, 
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believed that annexation was about much more.  Dewey‟s victory had changed the world, 
and America‟s place in it.   Before then, “We took no heed of the contentions of nations 
striving for territorial aggrandizement.  We were content to build up and develop this 
continent.”  Now, he said, “The world looks upon us now as a martial nation, ready to 
participate in the struggles which change the map of the world.”  The spot on the map 
that most concerned Hilborn on this day was an archipelago just off the coast of Asia.  
Americans were heading to the Philippines already, and many would certainly meet their 
ends there.  “Miles of headstones will mark the burial place of soldiers from every State 
of the American Union….No foreign flag will ever wave over an American burial ground 
where rest America's brave defenders. To whom shall we surrender these islands?”  
Before the American flag had even been hauled up in Manila, he denied the right of 
anyone to take it down.  Hawaii was needed as a stepping stone to “reach our more 
distant possessions in the Orient.”65   
Barham and Hilborn were quite typical of Congressional Republicans during the 
debate.  Barham spoke of an immediate need due to the war.  Hilborn spoke of new 
responsibilities that Americans understood only as a consequence of the war.  Anti-
expansionist fears of colonialism and militarism were brushed aside.  Barham obviously 
believed that the military leadership should be followed, not instructed.  Hilborn said a 
larger military establishment was “already necessary.”  As America took its place in the 
world, “we have been irresistibly swept into a position where we must become a warlike 
nation.”  Barham mocked those who claimed that a new foreign policy would change 
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immigration, especially those who claimed “the Chinese will literally overrun the 
country.”  Chinese exclusion, he reminded his audience, was expressly maintained in the 
resolution of annexation.  As for the Japanese, “All the Japanese in the world can now 
come into the United States without the lightest obstruction.”  Hilborn, too, said that 
America‟s racial problems would remain unchanged.  Neither even made reference to 
spreading democracy, or the concept of consent of the governed. 66 
Few reformers in the House shared their unwavering confidence.  Those that 
favored expansion believed in limits, and for many Hawaii itself represented that limit.  
The author of the controversial resolution, Congressman Newlands, gave a lengthy 
speech on annexation in which he laid out many of the same arguments that certain 
Republicans had.  He spoke of the need to secure access to and from an isthmian canal, 
just as Senators Lodge and Morgan had throughout the 1890s.  The islands also had 
strategic utility, for either offensive or defensive operations.  However, he argued that 
possession of them would be such a deterrent to American enemies that annexation 
would “minimize the necessity of militarism.”  He also wished that the issue would not 
be “considered in the public mind in connection with the Philippine question.”  Hawaii 
had a small population, but in the case of the Philippines, the “acquisition of such a 
population may entirely break down and destroy our industrial system.”  Annexing those 
islands would only complicate American systems of “individual liberty, individual 
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representation, and industrial and commercial laws.”  True colonialism was to be avoided 
at all costs.
67
 
In the Senate, Republicans from all regions spoke rather sparingly, frequently 
leaving Democrats, Populists, and Silver Republicans to fight amongst themselves.  In 
these fights, Nevada‟s William Stewart and the venerable Henry Teller were two of the 
chief antagonists of the anti-expansionists.  The West‟s two elder statesmen specialized 
in tearing down the Constitutional arguments made against annexation.   
Stewart did not lay out any ideological basis for his support of expansion.  His 
longest speech essentially declared that the United States Congress could do as it wished, 
annexing or ruling lands without constitutional restrictions.  When Allen pressed him, 
sure that he must believe in some limits to the power of Congress, Stewart assured him 
that they were few.  “There is no lack of power to pass an act,” he said, and very little 
that could not be done through one.  Congress could even “pass an act tomorrow 
extending our boundaries 300 miles down into Mexico, our courts would have to follow 
it.”  In such a case, even Mexico‟s consent would be legally superfluous.  “The only 
remedy Mexico would have would be war.”  And once land was annexed, Congress could 
dispose of it as it chose.  The question of ultimate statehood rested with the “sound 
discretion of Congress.  It may take a century or two….The decision holds that Congress 
                                                 
67
 Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., June 13, 1898, p. 5828-5831.  Congressman Marion De 
Vries, a California Democrat, demonstrated a similar perspective in his entry in the Appendix to the 
Congressional Record.  See Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., Jun. 14, 1898, App. 655-666.   
  
261 
 
must also exercise a sound discretion when it will cease to treat it as a colony or 
Territory.  That is a question we may not live to see disposed of.”68   
While Stewart‟s precise motivation for supporting expansion remains unclear, 
Henry Teller‟s views are less murky.  Teller was, in no uncertain terms, a fervent 
expansionist.  His desire to add new land to the American republic had in no way 
diminished, and his statements in 1898 were little different than those he had made in 
1894.  Most of his speeches focused on historical examples of expansion—and 
opposition to expansion—from the earliest days of the republic.  He especially liked to 
speak of Thomas Jefferson‟s experience, and he seemed to be speaking to his anti-
annexationist friends when he did so.  He liked telling the story of Jefferson‟s doubts 
concerning the constitutionality of annexing the Louisiana country.  Though troubled by 
right up to the last, “he solved that doubt, Mr. President, in favor of bringing it in.”  
Teller considered it Jefferson‟s greatest contribution as president, an act which ensured 
American greatness.
69
   
The senator from Colorado did not speak only of the past.  Teller was sure that 
America‟s future lay in the Pacific.  America‟s population would only grow, he said, and 
trade would be necessary for continued prosperity.  Trade with Asia would become “the 
great trade of the world and a great boon to this great population when it shall be 
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overflowing and filling the land with just such people as we have to-day, only, I trust, a 
little better.”  Hawaii was a part of that link across the Pacific.   
But Teller‟s ambition did not stop there.  Some had said that to take land in a war 
that was fought for humanity‟s sake would seem ignoble.  But Teller believed the nation 
had entered this war “in the interests of freedom,” and nothing “you will do anything to 
debase them.  I do not believe that will be possible, though we may take in Cuba, Puerto 
Rico, the Hawaiian Islands, and the Philippine Island.”  He was confident that it would 
never become sordid because he was sure they would be governed, “not only [in] the 
interest of the American people, but every one of the people whom we invite or bring 
under the influence of our flag.” 
Teller‟s reference to an “invitation” to join America hinted at a principle that he 
had emphasized in his 1894 speech in favor of Hawaiian annexation.  While back then he 
had even said that he was “in favor of the annexation of the great country lying north of 
us,” there was a condition.  “"If the Canadians will never choose to come to us we shall 
never get them,” he had said.  The United States should “so manage affairs that they can 
see ultimately that it is their interest to become a part of the United States,” and then 
Canada would voluntarily join the Union.
70
  Canada was his example, but he made it 
clear in 1894 that the principle was the same for any country.  Perhaps Teller forgot about 
his earlier remarks, because by 1898 he no longer spoke of consent.  Yet he still believed 
that America would rule these lands with justice, and that soon they would be shown the 
benefits of connection to the United States.  If it was indeed a memory lapse, it was one 
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that would last into 1899.  But even if it took him longer than many of his friends, Teller 
too would eventually remember his devotion to liberty.     
The joint resolution for annexation came up for a vote in the House of 
Representatives on June 15.  It passed by a vote of 209 to 91, six members counted as 
“present,” and an additional forty-nine not voting.  Among the supporters of the 
resolution were twenty-two westerners, ten of whom were Republicans and the rest 
reformers.  No Republicans from the western states voted in opposition to annexation, 
while six Populists, Democrats and Silver Republicans did.  It is interesting that no 
Republicans were absent, while six Populists were.  Others spoke up for them, claiming 
that several of them would have voted for the resolution had they been there.  Yet it 
would seem no mistake that they were absent.
71
   
The Senate vote was scheduled for July 6, but the day before the conclusion 
Senator Hoar announced his reversal on the subject.  He noted the points made by 
opponents of annexation—that military enlargement would become necessary, that the 
country would be swept into competition with the great powers, or that expansion would 
continue because of it—and then claimed that it was all “needless alarm.”  Hawaii was 
small, it would be added as a wartime measure, and while he had no desire for colonial 
adventure, there was nothing of the sort to worry about in the case of Hawaii.
 72
   
Pettigrew was furious.  He and Hoar were the two men seen by the Hawaiian 
delegates who sought to maintain the independence of their homeland, and now Hoar 
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chose to maintain party loyalty over their interests.  “The Senator from Massachusetts 
says that this is wrong,” declared Pettigrew in the minutes before the vote, “that it is a 
sin; that it is wicked; but the islands are so little that if we will forgive him for taking that 
country, he will sin no more; he will be virtuous and resist a like crime if it involves a 
larger acquisition of territory.”  He scolded Hoar for forgetting that “the first step in 
wrongdoing is the dangerous step.  If we set the ex- ample, regardless of honor, of 
acquiring title to a territory from puppets that we have set up, what will we not do?”  
Hoar‟s earlier talk of moral action rang hollow in the South Dakotan‟s ears now.73   
The vote in the Senate was much the same as it had been in the House.  There, the 
aggregate vote was 42 to 21, with a remarkable twenty-six members not voting.  Ten 
western Republicans were joined by two Silver Republicans (Teller and Cannon of Utah) 
and one former Populist (Kyle of South Dakota, who Pettigrew believed was trading 
votes for patronage).  Five western members—Allen, Pettigrew, Roach, White, and the 
Silver Party man from Nevada, John Jones—all voted against the measure.  Seven more 
westerners did not vote at all.  Only one of these—John Thurston of Nebraska—was a 
Republican.  Thurston was likely also the only one of their number who was there that 
day to state his opinion on the subject.  He declared that he was against annexation, but 
he was paired with a member who was likely to vote for it but not present, and so he sat 
out the voting.  Again, six western reformers absented themselves for vote.
74
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It is almost certain that these non-voting members sensed the importance of the 
issue to their allies, men they intended to work with again.  It was just as likely that they 
did not want to be on record voting against a measure that some believed to be quite 
popular.  These members sensed the powerful emotions stirred up by expansion and the 
war, but there must have been ambivalence.  The remarks of Newlands, author of the 
resolution, had demonstrated this ambivalence.  Pettigrew, Allen, and other reformers felt 
no hesitance in their opposition.  They acted with a sense of moral certitude, and they 
believed they were defending the foundations of independence in republican America.  
By fleshing out the anti-expansionist elements that already existed within the Populist 
analysis, they set the stage for their fight against empire.   
 
 Whether or not they were prepared for their next contest in the halls of Congress, 
another moment of decision was approaching.  The reformers had fought the 
administration all spring and into the summer, but they had helped make McKinley‟s a 
wartime presidency.  In their defeats, they had challenged the policies and initiatives of 
the President, and conservatives wanted them held to account for it.  Late summer 
marked the beginning of a another campaign season, and the winner would hold the 
upper hand in the next series of debates.   
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CHAPTER VI 
PATRIOTISM AND THE ELECTION OF 1898   
 Western reformers had begun the year 1898 with high hopes.  They successfully 
stifled the administration‟s new banking act and instead demanded a financial system that 
was directly accountable to the people.  They were confident that, at least in their home 
states, popular support was on their side.  Just as they had in 1896, many of them 
believed they would campaign in the fall on a platform that demanded economic justice.  
But then the war—which they had helped bring about—complicated the situation.  The 
war was fought on the terms chosen by the commander-in-chief, and the reformers were 
unable to stop the War Revenue Bill or the annexation of Hawaii.  Could their old agenda 
still take precedence over the new issues?   
 For politicians in the western states these were especially difficult times, and no 
western reformer knew more of these challenges than Richard Pettigrew.  Aside from 
being one of the fiercest opponents of the “vested interests” in the nation‟s capital, the 
South Dakota senator was also the most well-connected politician in his state.   In 
early 1898, as Congress was debating Gage‟s monetary restructuring and the discussion 
of Cuba intensified, Pettigrew was simultaneously working to cement another fusion 
coalition in South Dakota for the 1898 campaign.  He tried (and failed) to keep South 
Dakota Alliance founder Henry Loucks from bolting the Populists.
1
  While he informed 
his friends he was now a Populist, he told them that he was not “going to make any 
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particular fuss about it, or get into the newspapers.”2  He believed the Silver Republican 
organization he had helped form would soon be dead, but in the short term he thought it 
could be used “as a half-way station” for those not yet ready to move directly into the 
Populist Party.
3
  He also demanded that members of all parties be given places on the 
ticket and hoped to create a proper partnership that would permanently bind the parties 
together.  The goal was to eventually bring all—including Democrats—into the Populist 
ranks or, failing that, to form a new party for all reform forces.
4
   
 Pettigrew believed that the key to success lay in holding firm to the message of 
economic justice and grass-roots democracy.  As he explained to one confidante, the 
object was to “rally the people who protest against government by injunction, 
government by trusts, government by the banks—in fact, against the domination of 
plutocracy.”5  In early April, before the war, he told one of his associates that the coming 
campaign must focus on national issues: free silver, government control of the currency, 
and opposition to the trusts.  The McKinley administration made sure that these issues 
remained alive, and Pettigrew was sure that the president‟s subservience to the 
economically powerful would be at the heart of the fall campaign.
6
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 The senator‟s tone began to change just two months later.  While he had initially 
believed that the war would be over so quickly that it would not affect the elections in the 
fall, he sensed a growing possibility that it could interfere.
7
  On June 20, he wrote 
Governor Andrew Lee and told him it was now necessary to “make State issues 
prominent” in the coming fusion campaign, especially by emphasizing the initiative and 
referendum.  While he hoped his Populist colleagues in the House would win their 
elections, “I am a thousand times more anxious for your election.”  Pettigrew told Lee 
rather bluntly that all future success required continued control of state offices.
8
  No 
longer was the election to be a referendum on McKinley.      
 Never did Pettigrew state why it was necessary to change course, but it seems 
apparent that he wanted to avoid any discussion of the war and its consequences.  A week 
later he wrote Lee again and provided a brief glimpse of his thoughts.  “The Anglo-Saxon 
has an inherent greed for land,” he said, and the desire “to reach out and conquer the 
world is bred in his blood and bone.”  Americans did not realize, however, that conquest 
did not provide the benefits it had in past generations.  Imperialism would allow the 
“plutocracy” to be “thoroughly enthroned in this country.”  If that should happen, “of 
course we will follow in the wake of all Republics, and in fact all nations of the past and 
a speedy decay of patriotism and free institutions will set in.”9  Yet he sensed that most 
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Americans were not ready to reject the temptations of imperialism.  The excitement of 
war had captured the public mind, and it was too soon to begin that fight on the campaign 
trail.  That same excitement had transformed what Pettigrew thought was going to be an 
easy contest in the fall into a totally uncertain quantity.    
 The difficulties that Pettigrew faced were the same as those that challenged the 
other reform coalitions throughout the West.  In places like Nebraska, Colorado, and 
Washington, they struggled to show a unified front as they entered what was, due to 
circumstances beyond their control, already guaranteed to be a confusing campaign.  
Their message, one that emphasized the regeneration of American economic opportunity 
and political freedom, had an uncertain place in this changing environment.  Worse yet, 
the civic nationalism that the reform parties had channeled for support was in danger of 
being replaced by the kind of militaristic patriotism advocated by their conservative 
opponents.  All told, the events of that year caused a dramatic shift in the political 
discourse that had characterized the debates of the 1890s.    
 
Politics and Patriotism in 1898 
Over the course of 1898, “patriotism” and its myriad definitions became a 
substantive topic of discussion.   One of the most notable contributions to this discussion 
was Carl Schurz‟s article, titled plainly enough “About Patriotism,” in which he 
questioned whether the aggressive jingoism that many displayed was really behavior 
fitting of the citizens of a republic.  “Indeed,” he wrote, “it is difficult to imagine a 
wantonness of spirit more reckless, more wicked, more repugnant to true patriotism, than 
the use of whatever influence one may possess to bring on war, with all its horrors and 
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miseries, so long as the possibility of preserving an honorable peace has not utterly 
vanished.”  He despised the talk of war for its own sake, and he tried to shift definitions 
of patriotism away from those tied to martial traditions.  Love of one‟s country should be 
a concept reserved for higher purposes than that.
10
   
Schurz was not the only one who believed that patriotism had deeper meanings, 
even if many of those who agreed with him on that point had differed with him in April 
of 1898.  Populists and their allies had attempted all year long to appropriate the concept 
of patriotism to bolster the cause of reform.  By the summer, that objective was slipping 
away from them.  When war came, militarized valor and unquestioned loyalty again 
became the synonyms of patriotism, and opponents of the commander-in-chief found 
themselves having to defend their right to object.   
Early in the year, this language was deployed to unify the coalition of parties that 
had come together in 1896.  In February, representatives of the Populists, Democrats, and 
Silver Republicans in Congress issued separate statements to their members, calling for 
united opposition to the Republican Party and the financiers who backed them.  All three 
invoked patriotism as the motive which would animate the people in their support of 
reform.  Most emphatic of all were the Populists, who proclaimed that “Patriotism and 
manhood are not dead,” for the American people were awakening to the threats to their 
freedom.  “The spirit of ‟76 is abroad in the land and the friends of liberty everywhere are 
awaiting the patriotic call to fight a common battle against a common foe.  Let this be 
done, and we can crush every traitor as did the men of the American revolution.”  The 
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Populists also flayed the foreign “gold syndicate”—clearly just the money power 
sanitized for broader consumption.  Any man who opposed them was little more than a 
“tory,” they said.11   
One of the biggest congressional battles at the beginning of the year had been 
over Secretary Gage‟s proposal to restructure the nation‟s financial system, a move that 
involved the selling of a great many government bonds and the replacement of 
greenbacks with national bank currency.  The response from westerners had been 
overwhelmingly negative, and again they frequently claimed that their opposition was the 
patriotic position.  When the writer for the Yakima Herald asked Republicans to “Hold 
patriotism above party and choose as becomes a free born American citizen,” they were 
certainly not alone.
12
  William Allen had said much the same in Congress.  “We should 
not imperil the interests of present and future generations by farming out this right [to 
print money] to associations,” he said.  “I hold that man to be an enemy of his country, 
whether consciously or not I do not pretend to say, who would turn over the power to 
make and issue money to private institutions.”  While he would not “decry a man because 
he deals in money if he is honest and patriotic,” but generally “the rule is that such men 
know no nation, no patriotism, and but few have knowledge of any God save the gold 
they horde and worship.”  Handing over this power to such individuals would be more 
than just dangerous, but nearly disloyal.
13
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Patriotism—along with “manhood”—was utilized by the western reformers as 
they called for intervention in Cuba.  Yet in this context, when love for country ran afoul 
of the wishes of the money power, critics of the administration claimed that greed was 
triumphant.  As a writer for the Denver Times put it, “Justice may be outraged, our 
president may be traduced and villified [sic], our national honor may be impugned,” but 
the country remained bound “to the interests of the Spanish bondholders.”14  When fifty 
of the leading residents of Colorado Springs (who self-identified as “patriotic citizens”) 
called for peace in the wake of the destruction of the Maine, local newspapers attacked 
them mercilessly.  One sarcastically stated that, while their patriotism was not “the sort 
that enabled this country, in 1776, to declare its independence and establish a free and 
independent republic… they are still patriots; they are patriotic to the vast interests of 
wealth at home and abroad.”15  Populists and Democrats were not so much equating 
patriotism with violent action as they were defining it to be unfettered by greed.  
When war did come, the position of the administration‟s opponents became much 
more complicated.  To fight McKinley now was to question the decisions of a war-time 
commander-in-chief.  Conservatives sensed the opportunities this presented and leapt at 
them, and the first such opportunity arose with western opposition to the War Revenue 
Bill.  Eastern congressmen and newspapers attacked those attempting to stop the bill, 
suggesting that they had ignored all of the calls for wartime unity.   
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Western reformers proved remarkably sensitive to these slights, and they began to 
include defenses of their patriotism in nearly every speech they made.  Henry Teller 
lashed out after seeing newspapers in which “Senators who do not believe in a bonded 
debt [were] characterized the other day as the „assistant Spaniards.‟”  Certainly, the once 
quiet friends of the administration did not have a monopoly on patriotism, he said.
16
  A 
Populist congressman from Kansas, Nelson McCormick, likewise claimed that while all 
“Populists, Silver Republicans, Democrats, and Republicans are willing and ready to 
assist our President in this war with Spain,” he also feared Republicans would  “charge 
disloyalty because we exercise our judgment as well as our rights as Representatives.”17  
His fellow Kansan, Jerry Simpson, claimed to be entering “the discussion of this bill with 
a great deal of fear and trembling, for there is still ringing in my ears the accusation of the 
chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means to the effect that all those who may not 
on this occasion support this bill without any opposition will be guilty of demagogy, 
pettifoggery, or a lack of patriotism.”18   
Other westerners counterattacked, claiming that patriotism was being used as a 
shield to pass outrageous measures, such as huge bond sales and new regressive taxes.  
John Kelley said that he had been “rudely awakened to a realization of the fact that the 
spirit of patriotism which is aroused throughout the country has been taken advantage of, 
and an attempt is being made, while the minds of the people are distracted by the clamor 
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of war, to satisfy the maw of the money changers.”19  James Hamilton Lewis warned 
against being “buoyed off upon an imaginary patriotism to wrong the people by deluding 
them and robbing them,” and he reminded his audience that “war has ever been the pat 
time for the pilferers of public confidence and the plunderers of the public Treasury to do 
their destructive work.”20   
Western newspapers printed similarly skeptical analyses of the War Revenue bill.  
The editor of the Yakima Herald wrote that “The republican party thinks it has at last 
found an opportunity to silence all opposition to their policies.”  Indeed, the Republicans 
had “issued their ultimatum that to criticise [sic] republicanism is treason, and that the 
definition of the word patriotism shall for three years, or during the war, be changed from 
that given by Webster to read:  „Love of the republican party; devotion to the welfare of 
the republican party; the passion which inspires one to serve the republican party.‟”  
Those who refused to accept such a definition were “traitors and copperheads.”21  Others 
leveled charges that the interests which were protected by Republicans were not doing 
their part.  The oil trust and the sugar trust—the monopolies that were subject to special 
taxation—were certain to use the courts to “evade this tax, same as the income tax was 
evaded a few years ago.”  The common people showed “their patriotism by 
uncomplaining compliance” with the new taxes laid upon consumer goods, but “with the 
powerful corporations generally there is no patriotism at all.”22   
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Some continued to fight for definitions of patriotism tied to independence and 
character rather than simply strict loyalty to a party or political figure.  One writer 
declared that any “senators who surrender their principles, betray their constituents and 
abjectly surrender to the money sharks should be branded with the scorn and contempt of 
every patriotic citizen.”23  Another stated that “Patriotism does not consist of falling in 
with every nefarious financial or taxing scheme that is put forward by designing 
politicians under the guise of patriotism.  The truest patriot is the one who forgets self in 
his desire to stand up for the common good.”24  As part of the national discourse, their 
attempts to define patriotism as something separate from unquestioned loyalty may have 
been unsuccessful.  Now they were set to face the fierce opposition in their own states.   
Republican congressmen and papers from the western states were slow to attach 
additional partisan meaning to the term “patriotism,” and it demonstrates how the 
appropriation of nationalist sentiment was influenced by regional political trends.  
Western Republicans suffered major setbacks in the election of 1896 when they went to 
the polls as the standard-bearers of gold money and the national banking system 
generally.  Their newspapers had clung to the forlorn hope of international bimetallism as 
long as they could.  When Secretary Gage proposed strengthening the gold standard and 
national banks at the beginning of the Fifty-fifth Congress, both groups had either 
remained silent or cautioned against such a move.  They still considered themselves as 
                                                 
23
 Denver Rocky Mountain News, May 9, 1898, p. 5.   
24
 Omaha World-Herald, May 5, 1898, p. 4.   
  
276 
 
the representatives of the party, but they felt could not win with that party‟s economic 
platform.  The War Revenue Bill looked no more promising.   
Western Republicans in Congress had supported the revenue measure without 
exception, but they had barely spoken a word in its favor.  Their friends in the newspaper 
business were also surprisingly quiet on the issue.  They certainly wanted to join the 
partisan chorus, but they were left wondering how to go about it.  The Omaha Daily Bee, 
for instance, dropped hints that the administration‟s opponents were disloyal, but refused 
to say why they should be classified as such.  One two-sentence piece sardonically noted 
that Spain had an advantage, because in that country “obstructionist” politicos “have no 
newspaper organs through which they can make attacks on the government and 
incidentally help the enemy.”25  A similarly brief and non-specific piece criticized the 
“popocratic yellow kids” who are “constantly snarling” at the heels of the president when 
they should have been praising him.  Even what he should have been praised for, the 
author did not say.
26
  This was relatively mild stuff for the frequently unrestrained writers 
for the Bee, but they had few alternatives available at that time.  They, like many other 
western Republican journals, had nothing positive to say about the War Revenue Bill.  In 
a series of articles, they attacked the bond issue as totally unnecessary and undesirable.  
Though it was to be a “popular loan,” bankers and financiers were certain to end up with 
the majority of them.  They denied that anyone “assails the patriotism of the bankers” 
(apparently the author was not reading anything coming out of the nation‟s capital), but 
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added that the interests of financiers were opposed to those of nearly all other classes.  
Put simply, they were in no position to make support of the bill a litmus test for 
patriotism.  Theirs was not the only publication in such a position.  The response of 
Republican papers ranged from damning with faint praise to modest condemnation of the 
bill, but their coverage of it overall was substantially less than that provided by 
Democratic or Populist publications.  Western Republicans remained fearful of the 
economic issues that had brought about their decline throughout the region.
27
    
Congress soon moved from the debate over finance to the first wartime 
discussions of expansion, and new opportunities arose.  While not yet ready to fight over 
bonds and taxes, western conservatives soon grabbed onto the Hawaiian annexation fight 
as a tool to be used against their enemies.  Many claimed that the addition of the island 
was somehow necessary to aid and honor the nation‟s brave combatants.  California 
Congressman John Barham said that Hawaii could serve as an adequate base only after it 
was annexed.  Those who opposed such a measure wanted to “sacrifice the unparalleled 
achievement of our arms upon the seas, so heroically won by Admiral Dewey and his 
men at Manila,” and in the meantime “endanger him, his men, and our soldiers who so 
recently left the port of San Francisco to aid in holding the fruits of that victory.”28  As 
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noted in the previous chapter, another Californian, Samuel Hilborn, tied Hawaiian 
annexation to the acquisition of the Philippines.  Because American blood would be shed 
to raise the flag in that distant Spanish colony, it was inappropriate for it to be every 
lowered again.  According to Hilborn, to abandon any of these Pacific islands dishonor 
America‟s war dead.29   
Western reformers denied that their policies were disloyal or unpatriotic, and they 
accused their adversaries of taking advantage of the war craze.  Senator White attempted 
to remind those who said that the flag must never be lowered that “we revere and honor 
[it] because it is not only the flag of our country, but because we believe that the 
Government which it represents is based and acts upon principles of honor, upon maxims 
and policies which will stand the scrutiny of ages and remain untarnished and 
unquestioned when the strongest of us shall be summoned hence, when tyranny shall be 
driven from the earth.”30  Pettigrew refuted the claim that only unquestioned loyalty was 
acceptable in wartime, and argued that the attempts to make America a more militarized 
society should “alarm patriotic citizens and lead to an anxious inquiry as to whither we 
are drifting.”31  The war had not changed the reformers‟ definitions of patriotic behavior.   
Yet it is impossible to suggest that they were impervious to the conservatives‟ 
attacks.  In fact, anti-expansionists had continued to support their own definition of 
patriotism as a defense against the claims that they were disloyal.  William Allen sensed 
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that this intimidation was having its desired effect, for late in the session he said it was a 
true shame that “more moral backbone can not be found in Congress to stop this hasty 
legislation [the annexation resolution].”32  Several of his colleagues all but admitted that 
they were cowed by the pressure.  James H. Lewis of Washington was late to take sides, 
but in his remarks in the Congressional Record‟s appendix he stated  that he was 
compelled to act contrary his own desires.  “Whatever my personal sentiments may have 
been previous to the Spanish American war,” he now had to ignore his “personal fears” in 
order to support expansion.  “My state, her citizens, my constituents, have in various 
ways expressed their desires, wishes, and preferences upon the issue.”33  Freeman 
Knowles of South Dakota openly admitted that he felt compelled to support Hawaiian 
annexation—despite his previous opposition to it—because of the war.  Surely, he 
succumbed as much to annexationist attacks as he did to any of their arguments.
34
   
The western press demonstrated these trends clearly.  In some places, especially 
the Pacific Coast states, nearly all the media supported the acquisition of Hawaii.  That 
fact offered no special protection for those who did oppose it.  The editor of the 
Oregonian, one of the Pacific Northwest‟s most prominent conservative papers, 
demonstrated his impatience with the opponents of the measure.  “The privilege of 
unlimited talk in the senate is one of the abuses flagrant in that body.  The country will 
not forever endure it.  Meantime, while this obstructive talk is going on, there is no way 
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to supply our sailors and soldiers…”  Despite little evidence to support the claim, they 
declared that opponents of the president were jeopardizing American lives.
35
  But some in 
the fusion press accepted similar visions of wartime patriotism, further weakening the 
position of the opposition.  The editor of the Yakima Herald called the acquisition of 
Hawaii a “war measure” that was “of more importance than a fleet of battleships.”  The 
same paper even reprinted an article from an eastern paper titled “Stand by the 
President,” which equated opposition to annexation with the defiance of the orders of the 
commander-in-chief.
36
  With little thought for its greater political meaning, the Herald 
portrayed some of its allies as traitors.  Certainly, the war brought with it certain 
challenges for anyone who dissented.   
 
The War and Politics in the States 
The war necessarily had an impact on state politics and the discussion of issues at 
the local level.  Western people and their state governments ended up playing a 
significant role in what would come to be a global event.  Dewey‟s victory guaranteed 
that the military campaigns would not be confined to the Caribbean but would extend into 
the Pacific as well.  All of a sudden, geography, expediency, and politics would come 
together to put the people of the western states in a complicated position.    
In April of 1898, the regular army of the United States was in no way prepared to 
take on any foreign power.  Instead, National Guard units from the states would be called 
                                                 
35
 Morning Oregonian (Portland, OR), June 24, 1898, p. 4.   
36
 Both can be found in Yakima Herald (WA), June 16, 1898, p. 4.  “Stand by the President” was taken 
from the Cincinnati Enquirer (no date).   
  
281 
 
upon to carry the load.  While some men had belonged to these militia units for years, 
they were not exactly ready to be part of a well-drilled military machine.  Additionally, 
though some of these nationalized volunteer units had existed in some form before the 
war, a number were hastily raised to fulfill federal requests.  Even many of the older units 
went through rather dramatic transitions, as unfit officers were replaced (frequently with 
men from the regular army) and unhealthy men dismissed.  The politics of a unit‟s home 
state continued to matter as well.  Governors were given considerable discretion in the 
commissioning of officers, and among some of the newly formed units the troops 
themselves selected their officers in elections which often resembled peacetime contests.  
This latter method helps explain how William Jennings Bryan—a man with neither 
experience nor inclination—could find himself in command of the Third Nebraska 
Volunteers.
37
  Most of the regiments called into federal service, such as Bryan‟s Third 
Nebraska, would never leave the United States.  His was recruited after McKinley made a 
second call for volunteers, and so was not mustered in until July.  Shortly after it joined 
the federal service, his regiment was sent to wallow in the miasmatic swamp that was 
Camp Cuba Libre, just north of Jacksonville, Florida.  There it would remain until well 
after the end of combat operations.
38
   
Yet the fate of a great many units from the western states would prove different.  
The first battle of the war proved that this would be a conflict that played out nearly as 
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much in the Pacific as in the Atlantic.  To follow up Dewey‟s victory, McKinley ordered 
a force to be prepared for the purpose of capturing Manila.  Despite the protests of the top 
officer of this new command (General Wesley Merritt), the force assigned to the task was 
made up primarily of volunteer units that came from nearly every state of the trans-
Missouri West.  Before Dewey even requested army support, preparations were 
underway to organize an army in San Francisco, to be shipped off from there to the 
Philippines.  Hawaii, despite its position as an independent “neutral,” served as the 
primary stopover along the trans-Pacific journey.  Volunteers from the West would get a 
first-hand look at the lands that would cause a major political debate for the next several 
years.
39
   
 The composition of volunteers from the western states was also noteworthy.  
Because of their prominence as local leaders, and also because so many of them had 
come to advocate intervention on behalf of Cuba, a great many Populist, Democrat, and 
Silver Republican public figures felt the need to participate in the war.  Still, as 
opponents of the administration, this did put many of them in awkward positions.  Shortly 
after the war broke out, Bryan sent a letter to President McKinley tendering his services.  
When news of this broke, letters from his friends poured in warning him of the dangers.   
As William Allen put it, “You minimize you[r] position in the political world and place 
yourself in the grasp of Hanna and McKinley whom I do not doubt would be glad to 
expose you to every conceivable danger, get you out of the country if possible, and have 
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superior officers involve you in difficulty and possibly disgrace.”  Kansas Congressman 
Jeremiah Botkin was also keen to remind him that “the war in which we are engaged with 
a certain jew and his cohorts is a much more important war than that we are fighting with 
Spain.”  Bryan was the only man that Democrats, Populists, and Silver Republicans 
would unite behind, the Kansan said, and as a servant of the people the Commoner had 
“no right to hazard yourself personally or politically at this most important and critical 
time.”40  Prominent Silver Republican Charles Towne nearly followed in Bryan‟s 
footsteps.  “You must be crazy, and if you were near enough I would call a commission 
of lunacy and send you to the asylum at once,” wrote Richard Pettigrew to his close 
friend and political ally.  “What do you think the Goldbugs would do with you if they got 
you down in Cuba?  They would see that you made no more silver speeches, or troubled 
further the political waters of plutocracy.”41     
 While Towne followed Pettigrew‟s advice rather than Bryan‟s example, others 
close to the reform leaders did enthusiastically enlist for the fight to free Cuba.  A friend 
of Pettigrew named Jonas Lien, a recent college graduate who had left his studies to 
campaign for Bryan in 1896, joined the First South Dakota Volunteers when the war 
began.  He remained in contact with the anti-imperialist senator throughout his service.
42
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Arthur C. Johnson, nephew of Colorado Populist leader and newspaperman Thomas 
Patterson, joined the First Colorado and acted as an embedded reporter for his uncle‟s 
paper over the months that followed.
43
  John Rankin Rogers‟s private secretary, John 
Ballaine, was also a prominent Silver Republican and the adjutant general of the state‟s 
National Guard.  He resigned his post in order to take a lieutenancy in the First 
Washington Volunteers.
44
  Frank Eager, editor of Nebraska‟s most important Populist 
publication, the Independent, had been in the state‟s National Guard for years and 
became a captain in the First Nebraska.
45
  Their regiments, along with the Twentieth 
Kansas, First North Dakota, First Idaho, First California, First Montana, First Wyoming, 
and a scattering of other volunteer units made up the bulk of the Eighth Corps, the force 
assigned to capture Manila.
46
   
 It would be weeks before the regiments that made up the Eighth Corps were ready 
to be mustered in, let alone ready for their trans-oceanic voyage.  In the meantime, the 
question of expansion was already gaining attention in the West, especially in the press.  
The Hawaiian annexation debate had played a part in this discussion but, after May 1, the 
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Philippines took center stage.  Still, it is difficult to identify public opinion on the subject.  
Most Americans had spent little time considering the implications of expansion, and in 
early May of 1898, the opinions they voiced demonstrated a kind of haphazard or 
imprudent thought.  Put simply, people did not know what to think of a place that was so 
distant, and they were even more uncertain about the islands‟ inhabitants.   
 In the aftermath of the Battle of Manila Bay, Several newspapers attempted to 
investigate popular opinion.  On May 6, the Denver Post asked forty-five local lawyers, 
politicians, and businessmen, primarily Democrats, to comment on what they believed to 
be America‟s proper future relationship to the Philippines.  The results were, to say the 
least, mixed.  Sixteen of the respondents said that the United States should take control of 
the islands on a permanents basis, three were unsure, and the rest were opposed to long-
term occupation.  That said, those who had no interest in permanent acquisition were 
thoroughly divided on what to do with the islands.  Fifteen of them actually said that 
either the Philippines should be captured and sold to the highest bidder or held to 
pressure Spain into the payment of an indemnity.  Others favored a short-term 
protectorate.  Only eight laid out an unequivocally anti-imperialist position.  Just as 
interesting, though, were the justifications used to support these various positions.  The 
sixteen expansionists said nothing about “duty” or “obligation” to the Filipinos, but 
instead focused on the need for trade in Asia or bases for a robust American Pacific fleet.  
“The islands might be used as a commercial point and assist us in opening up our 
commerce more extensively in the Eastern hemisphere,” said one.  Additionally, they 
tended to speak as though the conquest of the islands was already an accomplished fact.  
The thought of giving the islands back to Spain “is ridiculous when we consider that we 
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already have the islands,” said a former member of the legislature.  Certainly, most of the 
remarks were made with an extremely limited knowledge of the situation in the islands.
47
   
 In this confused moment in May, those involved in local politics were left 
grasping for the right position.  The national debate over Hawaiian annexation had been 
fairly quiet to that point, and certainly the issue of imperialism did not have the same 
partisan history that characterized the tariff or revenue fights.  Local newspapermen were 
left to their own devices, and they attempted as best they could to develop a coherent 
response to the rising question of the day.   
One result of this scramble was a short-term incoherence, as some papers changed 
their position by the day.  For example, the Oregonian of Portland, one of the most 
important Republican newspapers in the Pacific Northwest, vacillated wildly in its 
opinions over a surprisingly short time.  On May 9, the paper informed its readers that, 
though the United States may need to control the islands for a time, any long-term 
possession “would be in every way to be regretted.”  Though the author admitted the 
people there were incapable of self-government, and a coaling station might be of use, 
“The best thing that could happen to us concerning the Philippines is that we release them 
to Spain upon payment of a war indemnity.”  Three days later, at least some of these 
reservations were set aside.  A new column was printed that largely supported the 
conclusion that a base was needed in the Philippines, and it also emphasized that it was 
America‟s time to control the “avenues of commerce” to Asia.  By May 14, with this new 
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commercial focus in mind, the paper fixed heavily upon the masses of wealth that flowed 
out of the islands and now suggested that “An infusion of American blood and the 
introduction of the liberal principles of American law” was needed to improve the 
islands.  Then, “In the course of 50 or 100 years the 8,000,000 or 10,000,000 simple-
minded inhabitants of the Philippines may become fitted for the responsibilities of 
American citizenship.”  In less than a week, the Philippines had been transformed from 
an undesirable land into a future state.
48
   
Partisan though the press was, editors frequently did not fall into line with what 
would eventually become the party positions until quite late—and even more frequently, 
they did not at all until after 1898.  Of course, for the first several months after the naval 
battle, the president himself did not have a definitive opinion on what to do.
49
  This 
allowed some newspapers that generally followed the president to develop anti-
imperialist positions.  The Omaha Bee was one of them, and it frequently contained 
remarks suggesting that the addition of the Philippines would be more of a burden than a 
blessing.
50
  Still, just as many Republicans in Congress did, Republican editors typically 
supported aggressive, imperialist policies.  The Seattle Post-Intelligencer, for example, 
                                                 
48
 “What of the Philippines?” Morning Oregonian (Portland), May 9, 1898, p. 4; “Out of the Rut,” Morning 
Oregonian (Portland), May 12, 1898, p. 4; “Our Permanent Advantage,” Morning Oregonian (Portland), 
May 14, 1898, p. 4.   
49
 H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America (Syracuse, NY:  Syracuse University Press, 
1963), 387-389, 402-411; Lewis Gould, The Presidency of William McKinley (Lawrence:  University Press 
of Kansas, 1980), 113-119, 131-135.   
50
 For two of the most important fusion papers, see “Lest We Forget,” Independent, May 5, 1898, p. 4; 
“Cost of Killing,” Independent, May 26, 1898, p. 4; “Empire can Wait,” Omaha World-Herald, June 12, 
1898, p. 4.  For the Bee, see “Occupation of Philippines,” Omaha Daily Bee, May 4, 1898, p. 4; 
“Threatening Conditions in Europe,” Omaha Daily Bee, May 12, 1898, p. 4; “World Power a Costly 
Luxury,” Omaha Daily Bee, May 18, 1898, p. 4.   
  
288 
 
proclaimed that George Washington‟s call for isolation was totally unsuited to the present 
moment.  The writer went on to suggest that even Washington himself would have 
believed that to be true, so that now the acquisition of the Philippines—“or even of Cuba 
for that matter”—was no longer “incompatible with the general principles advocated by 
the Father of this Country.”51   
While most western Republican editors suspected that McKinley had foreign 
ambitions and came to support expansion rather quickly, among the Democratic and 
Populist newspapers of the West the sorting out took a while longer.  Most seriously for 
those who wanted to maintain party order, a great many of their papers initially expressed 
interest in expansion—and among them were many of those with the widest circulations.  
A majority of the smaller publications of Colorado declared in favor of taking the 
Philippines in the opening weeks of the war.  Most suggested that the Philippines made 
America a player in Asian politics and trade, and so was too valuable to give up.  “Our 
existence as a commercial power in Asia depends upon our retention of the Philippines,” 
claimed the editor of the Durango Wage Earner.
52
  Another paper told readers that the 
islands would become a naval base “that has long been needed by this country, and one 
which would be looked upon with envy by all the nations of the world.”53  These smaller 
publications were joined by Thomas Patterson‟s Rocky Mountain News, which expressed 
rather aggressive views throughout 1898 and into 1899.  “The sentiment for a new 
                                                 
51
 “George Washinton‟s Advice,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 5, 1898, p. 4.   
52
 “We May Need Them,” Durango Wage Earner, June 9, 1898, p. 2.   
53
 “The Philippine Islands,” Aspen Daily Times, July 16, 1898, p. 3.   
  
289 
 
international life by the United States is fast taking root in the American mind,” one of its 
writers contended.  The tradition of isolation was now obsolete.  “If to advance American 
commerce into countries from which armed alliances would bar or expel it, we should 
make alliances, and we should choose our allies and acquire them upon terms safe and 
lasting.”54  They claimed that trade with Asia required an American presence.   
A similar situation arose in Washington, where some of the largest fusion papers 
initially favored imperialism.  The editor of the Seattle Times was sure that trade which 
“has been confined to the Atlantic Ocean between Europe and America will shift to the 
Pacific between America and the Orient.”  Acquisition of the Philippines was to be the 
cornerstone of American power in the Pacific, and Seattle was to be the primary 
beneficiary.  “If ever there was a time when the finger of destiny pointed unerringly and 
persistently at a mark, now is the time, and Seattle is that mark.”55  Spokane‟s 
Spokesman-Review was initially more ambivalent.  A piece published on May 9 
suggested that “every consideration of prudence and interest would keep us out of the 
Philippines.”56  A mere ten days later, however, the editor hinted that holding the 
archipelago and gaining the trade of Asia “may solve the perplexing problem of 
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providing work for the unemployed, and markets for the surplus goods of American 
factories.”57   
That so many newspapers in the far west—regardless of political allegiance—
supported expansion into the Pacific should not be a surprise,.  Newspapers were 
necessarily commercial and promotional enterprises, and western newspapers had a 
tendency to act the part of the booster and predict a future of fame and wealth for the 
town or city or state they resided in.
58
  This was only accentuated by the political 
discourse of the West in the 1890s.  While the actual greenback theorists and the more 
prominent minds in the Populist Party had denied that overproduction was the source of 
American economic difficulties, they had still precipitated the shift of political discourse 
from recent history and cultural issues to one based upon economics.  Now, when 
advocates of expansion promised that the nation‟s attention would be fixed on the Pacific 
and trade with Asia, the boosterism of many western editors overcame any hesitance they 
may have held.
59
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Yet there is also a great deal of evidence that these voices did not represent the 
majority of Bryan‟s followers.  Though some of the largest Populist and Democratic 
publications of the West initially supported expansion in 1898, that should not be 
misunderstood as representative of the party.  Weeks after the excitement of the war‟s 
first battle, the editor of Nebraska‟s leading Populist paper, the Independent, sent fifty 
letters to friendly members of the legislature and editors of the “reform newspapers” of 
the state.  The purpose of the questionnaire was to test sentiments regarding the state 
party‟s platform for the coming campaign, but the second questions asked respondents to 
explain how the party convention should respond to “consequences growing out of” the 
war.  While the other responses that the editor received showed little uniformity or single 
interest that could unite them, the greatest agreement came in response to the war 
question.  Thirty-one of the fifty unequivocally stated their opposition to new acquisitions 
or conquests; only three argued that the conventions should support expansion.  As one 
newspaperman put it, “All populists should be too enlightened to doubt for a moment 
their duty to oppose land-grabbing, militarism, or any other appurtenance of royalty.”  
Certainly not all were so “enlightened,” but clearly a great many were.60   
Nebraska‟s largest Populist and Democratic papers were also more uniformly 
opposed to imperialism than those of the other two states.   Just days after the Battle of 
Manila Bay, the Independent reminded readers that “we are fighting for peace and peace 
alone,” not for military glory or conquests.61  Just weeks later, the same paper warned 
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that “There is a danger in the time, in the glory of foreign conquest, in the opening up of 
colonial empire, in the measured tramp of men away from walks of production to the 
tented camp of idleness and destruction.”  Debt, death, and a growing desire for war and 
conquest were the consequences of the glorification of battle, and all were inimical to 
American ideals.
62
  The Omaha World Herald also refuted the arguments of those who 
claimed that a colonial policy was the only way for the United States to bestow the 
blessings of liberty on others.  “It will suffice to plant in those places free institutions 
similar to those of the United States…. To enter upon a colonial policy now would be to 
overturn the basic principle  of our government, that „governments derive their just 
powers from the consent of the governed.‟”63 
In Washington state, opposition to expansion required many newspapers to go 
through a transition.  Most local papers, including the Yakima Herald, had come out in 
support of Hawaiian annexation.  Hawaii had a friendly government, and the country 
“peaceably offered” to join the United States, the paper had claimed.  On the other hand, 
the Philippines and the other Spanish islands had been ruled by an oppressive 
government, and they sought the right to control their own affairs.  “Their right to govern 
themselves is as sacred as was that of the thirteen American colonies in 1776.”64  Another 
Washington paper, the Aberdeen Herald, attacked the administration for taking lands but 
doing nothing for the Cubans.  While the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and the Cuban port of 
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Santiago had been attacked, “the poor, starving reconcentrado [sic] have seemingly been 
forgotten.”   America had turned to conquest, so that “those who bought and paid for the 
administration at the last election may have new fields for exploitation.”65  As had their 
counterparts in Congress, these local newspapers attacked colonial and imperial policies 
based on both humanitarian and economic grounds.   
In a similar fashion, several of the smaller publications of Colorado laid out their 
own critique of imperialism.  A writer for the Rocky Mountain Sun claimed that “Eastern 
capital in large quantities is being withheld from investment awaiting new and more 
profitable channels which the results of the war will open.”  Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, 
and the Philippines were the “present splendid possibilities.”  Because of imperialism, 
“the great and undeveloped west [must] suffer for lack of capital to develop her matchless 
resources.”66  Another local journalist critiqued the American record of dealing with 
conquered peoples.  “Think of the shining success we have had in dealing with the three 
hundred thousand Indians in the native tribes of America, who had undisputed possession 
of this country until discovered by Columbus, and then let us ask ourselves if we are 
justified in repeating the experiment with fifty times that number of people.”67  The 
humanitarian purpose of the war would then be lost.      
The debate had barely even begun when the soldiers of the western volunteer 
regiments were on their way to the Philippines.  The first western regiments had departed 
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for Manila in the last days of May.  A second contingent left San Francisco on June 15, 
and a third followed near the end of the month.  Ten thousand American soldiers were on 
their way to the Philippines, where they took up a position alongside the insurgent army 
that was already besieging the colony‟s capital city.68   
A day before the second wave of these troops were at sea—and just weeks before 
his regiment would be mustered in—William Jennings Bryan took the opportunity to 
address the subject of imperialism.  More than a month had passed since the Battle of 
Manila Bay, and interest in the Philippine question had grown rapidly.  In Bryan‟s eyes 
the subject had become too important of a topic to ignore, but he knew that it would be 
improper to speak out after he became an officer in the American army.  He opened his 
speech by declaring that “Nebraska is ready to do her part in time of war,” but that did 
not “indicate that the state is inhabited by a contentious or warlike people.”  Instead, it 
merely demonstrated that “they do not shrink from any consequences which may follow 
the performance of a national duty.”  Their duty was to protect the United States in a time 
of war and liberate Cuba, and there had never been a more honorable justification to 
serve, he said.  But he believed there was no justice, and certainly no “duty,” in the 
acquisition of far-off islands.  That would transform the humanitarian struggle into a war 
of conquest, and “we shall meet the charge of having added hypocrisy with greed.”  
Dewey‟s victory had a purpose, and the defeat of Spain in the Pacific was a legitimate 
goal, but it should not be claimed that one triumph in battle must determine the course of 
American policy.  “Our guns destroyed a Spanish fleet, but can they destroy the self-
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evident truth, that governments derive their just powers, not from superior force, but from 
the consent of the governed.”  Those who “clothe land-covetousness in the attractive garb 
of „national destiny‟” would gain no support in Nebraska, he said.69       
 At nearly the same time that Bryan was speaking, organizers in Boston led the 
first explicitly anti-imperialist meeting.  Bryan had no contact with its organizers at this 
time—as both probably preferred—but the basic sentiment was the same.  The old 
mugwump Gamaliel Bradford led the gathering and, like Bryan, he and the speakers who 
followed condemned the wild dreams of empire that they feared had gained a new 
foothold in the American psyche.  While support for conquest had developed almost 
impulsively, opponents were preparing to make Americans consider the consequences for 
both their own nation and a nation that was fighting for existence.
70
   
 The war with Spain would last only two months more.  On August 12, a peace 
protocol that suspended fighting was signed by the United and Spain, with a formal peace 
treaty to be negotiated thereafter in Paris.  On the other side of the world, Americans in 
the Philippines were totally unaware that the war had ended.  The telegraph cable 
connecting Manila to the outside world had been cut at the beginning of the conflict, and 
information was slow to arrive.  In the meantime, the American commanders in the 
archipelago, General Wesley Merritt and (recently promoted) Admiral Dewey, had 
negotiated with their Spanish counterpart for a peaceful surrender of Manila.  A sham 
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battle was arranged, for the purpose of preserving Spanish honor and guaranteeing sole 
American possession of the city.  When the “attack” began on August 13, it was apparent 
that not everyone was informed regarding the arrangements.  Some casualties were 
suffered, and the Americans did not rush to occupy the Spanish positions quickly enough 
to prevent their former allies from entering the suburbs of Manila.  Worse still was what 
followed.  American officers were rather lamely forced to explain to Emilio Aguinaldo—
leader of the Filipino revolutionaries—that their sole occupation of the city was merely to 
preserve public order, hinting that this was something Filipinos could not manage for 
themselves.  Aguinaldo and his army did not disperse, but continued to hold their position 
surrounding Manila.  The public debate over imperialism was no longer academic.
71
   
 
The Campaign of 1898 
 While the war was still the primary object of public attention by the summer of 
1898, by July at least some conversation had turned to the upcoming state political 
conventions and the elections that would follow.  It was the first major election to come 
after the upheaval of 1896, and it proved pivotal for the western states.  In the eyes of 
Bryan and his allies, it was supposed to be the election that Democrats, Populists, and 
Silver Republicans used to perfect the fusion coalition, something that would greatly ease 
their favored candidate‟s road to the presidency in 1900.  Every House seat was at stake, 
along with the Senatorial positions held by William Allen, Stephen White, William 
Roach, and several other prominent westerners.  Additionally, the large number of state 
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positions at stake—vital to the continued existence of each state party—made this contest 
crucial for determining the political future of the entire region.   
Both sides looked forward to the next campaign, and the contours of that contest 
shaped their plans for 1898.   Populists and Democrats in the West hoped to continue 
their crusade for economic justice, and they intended to change little from the previous 
election.  Some Republicans hoped to co-opt the message of their opponents by taking up 
reform of their own, but soon reality forced them back into the uncomfortable positions 
they had held two years earlier.  Of course the war would have an impact, but early in the 
campaign its significance remained unclear.  Questions surrounding expansion were 
present throughout the campaign, but even where the acquisition of Hawaii had been 
popular the expansion issue was not yet the exclusive property of one side or the other.  It 
was not until the last month of the campaign that the decisive issue became clear, and it 
marks the election of 1898 as unique from both the campaign that preceded it and the one 
that would follow.   
In order to best explain the forces at work, the campaign will be examined at the 
state level.  In each of the three states, local factors and developments made the 
campaigns there unique, and what follows will seek to describe these differences as much 
as it will attempt to identify their similarities.  The contests of 1898 could be described as 
transitional.  Populists and their allies hoped to focus on the issues of political economy 
they had brought to the forefront earlier in decade, but the campaign soon veered off into 
the new issues produced by the war.  Throughout the West, the result was a series of 
distinctive campaigns that were not fought upon any fixed set of issues, but that 
collectively had a decisive impact on the regional and national political landscape.     
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Certainly, western reformers had not expended the full extent of their energies in 
1896.  In both Washington and Nebraska, where Populists held the governorships and 
many of the legislative seats, they had compiled solid records in the sessions of 1897.  
Washington‟s Democrats and Populists had also succeeded in placing women‟s suffrage 
and single tax amendments on the ballot for that November.
72
  In Colorado, Democrats, 
conservative Republicans, and the breakaway Silver Republicans made up most of the 
legislature, and reform subsequently stalled.  However, new organizational efforts on the 
part of Colorado‟s laborers soon shifted the balance in favor of change.  Unions such as 
the Western Federation of Miners (formed in 1893) were greatly influenced by the 
Populists, and by 1896 several them came together to establish the Colorado State 
Federation of Labor.  At its 1897 convention, a majority of delegates came out in favor of 
political advocacy, and by 1898 its leaders had agreed that they must unite their members 
for political purposes.  Secretary of the State Federation David C. Coates was a Populist, 
but he also developed a program to vet the perspectives of local candidates so affiliates of 
the organization could then endorse an appropriate slate.  By this means, they intended to 
secure a legislature to pass an eight-hour law for miners.
73
    
Conservatives soon provided further justification for continuation of the reform 
coalition.  In late 1897 and early 1898, Gage‟s monetary reform proposals had caused 
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frustration even among the editors of western Republican newspapers.  Wolcott‟s 
international commission had already proven a colossal failure, in no small part as the 
result of Gage‟s public statements since assuming office.74  Any thought that western 
Republicans could hide behind the fig leaf of international bimetallism was erased 
thereafter.  Only adding power to the arguments of reformers, in March of 1898 the 
Supreme Court made its ruling in the case of Smyth v. Ames, which threw out the state of 
Nebraska‟s maximum railroad rates and threatened similar laws enacted in other states 
(such as Washington‟s recently passed rate regulations).  Its passage in 1893 had 
represented the greatest victory achieved by the Nebraska Populists, but now the court 
ruled that the rates did not offer a fair return to the railroads and represented confiscation 
without due process of law—a violation of the corporate person‟s Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.
75
   
 This last attack on one of the few gains made by the Populists appeared that it 
would only further bolster the resolve of western economic reformers.  Just the week 
before, Allen had lambasted those who called for federal regulation.  “We have Interstate 
Commerce Commissioners.  We are paying them large salaries…. Pray, what are they 
doing for the country and for the shipper?  Absolutely nothing.”  The battle between 
regulators and regulated had already been fought, and the winner was clear.  “They do 
not make an order that is obeyed by a railroad company unless the railroad company sees 
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fit to obey it.  They are as powerless and impotent as a babe in its cradle to control these 
corporations, which run riot over the people and over the commissioners.”76  But now the 
only other means of reining in the power of the railway lines was practically nullified.  
Any rate that a conservative court deemed unfair could be thrown out.  Nebraska‟s state 
Populist organ, the Independent, lashed out at the court in the weeks that followed.  
While the editor stated that this was the opinion that had been expected for at least the 
last nine months, they were primarily upset that the “power of injunction” and “the 
evident bias of the supreme court towards corporate interests” now made it “practically 
impossible to enforce any regulation of the railway rates except such as the roads 
themselves will agree to.”77  In several articles, the paper emphasized the court‟s 
application of the Fourteenth Amendment and its identification of the railway corporation 
as a person.  When the ICC issued a report in early April which admitted that court 
rulings had crippled it as well, the Independent simply ran the headline “Regulation a 
Failure.”78  Populists had a more thorough solution.   
Before the coming of the war with Spain, Populists and other members of the 
reform coalition continued to hammer home the need for change.  Whatever the future of 
their party, they still offered alternatives that no one else did, and they promised a kind of 
economic equality that many Americans still dreamed of.  Populism, they contended, was 
every bit as necessary now as it had been at the beginning of the decade.   
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 While the Populists and their allies demanded substantive reform, Republicans 
had not remained static.  Western newspapers of all stripes had long been critical of 
corporations deemed to be monopolistic, and those like the Omaha Daily Bee developed 
a lengthy record of doing so.  Others provided occasional hints that they believed the 
party could be made a vehicle for reform.  For example, when the newly elected 
Republican governor of Michigan, Hazen Pingree, began to lash out against trusts in 
public addresses, a number of western Republican editors responded enthusiastically.
79
  
Fewer of the region‟s prominent politicians followed suit, but a few tested the waters.  In 
a February speech to the Baltimore Union League, Senator John Thurston told easterners 
about the situation in his part of the country.  There, he said, the “allied force of free 
silver, socialism, lawlessness, and anarchy” had continued to proselytize with great 
success, all in an attempt to “array every man without a dollar against every man with a 
dollar.”  There was only one way to put an end to the threats to national development 
posed by the extremists from the West.  It was time for the Republican Party to “stand 
eternally against all unlawful combination and unjust exaction of aggregated capital and 
corporate power; it must smite with the mailed hand of law every combination formed to 
artificially decrease the wages of labor or increase the prices of necessities of life.”  
Certainly this would seem to be strange talk from a railroad lawyer and arch-
conservative, but he felt there was no choice.  He believed that he must either take up the 
call for reform or the more radical reformers of the West would replace men like him.  In 
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early 1898, he predicted that another campaign based upon support of the economic 
status quo would lead to disaster.
80
   
Thurston‟s prediction proved wrong on nearly all fronts.  While western 
Republicans were hesitant to emphasize their conservatism, they did not yet embrace 
reform in any substantial way.  As the party in power at the national level, to call for 
reform at this moment would not only provide support for any partisan critiques, but it 
would seem to be an admission that the political, industrial, and financial systems were in 
need of substantial readjustment.  Thurston believed that his party could not survive if it 
did not accept change, but as it turned out Republicans would not have to change just yet.  
Though public frustrations had in no way abated, the war soon provided a distraction.  
Eventually, conservatives would also see that it provided opportunity.   
The campaign officially launched in August.  The Populists, Democrats, and 
Silver Republicans of Nebraska met at their separate conventions in Lincoln on from 
August 2-4.  As usual, there was plenty of squabbling that accompanied the cooperation, 
but the great struggle over fusion in Nebraska was not fought over ideas so much as it 
was over candidates.  Some Democrats believed they deserved the governorship, while 
the Populists stood firm behind William A. Poynter, who was an early Alliance leader, 
senate majority leader for the 1891 legislature, and, most unfortunately in this case, a 
teetotaler.  Democrats hesitated at the thought of accepting a prohibitionist, and night 
nearly passed into morning before they accepted the Populist candidate—and even then, 
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only after a reassurance from Poynter himself that he did not mix his personal beliefs 
with his politics. 
81
 
The platforms of each party remained separate, but were largely focused on the 
same issues.  Despite the near unanimity present in the responses to the Independent‟s 
inquiries, none of the parties approved an anti-imperialist plank on their platform.  
Instead of a declaration of policy regarding the Spanish islands, the Populist platform 
admitted that the “policy pursued by the United States respecting foreign nations and 
peoples of the islands of the sea is one of great moment and far reaching in its 
consequences,” but ultimately stated that the wise course for this government was to 
“postpone consideration until the conclusion of the war, to be taken up for mature 
deliberation by the people when no public excitement exists.” All parties included planks 
that praised the bravery of those fighting the war, attacked the bond issue used to finance 
it, and expressed their disgust at attempts to bolster the gold standard or destroy silver 
and paper currency.  The Populists added another demand for government ownership of 
the railroads and pointed directly at the Smyth v. Ames decision as proof of that necessity.  
All of the fusion parties agreed on one thing, however:  economic reform would remain at 
the center of their campaign.  It was, after all, what had brought them together to begin 
with.
82
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The fusion forces of Washington did not convene until a month later, meeting as 
they had in 1896 at the town of Ellensburg.  The three parties of Washington had less to 
fight over than most other western fusionists did in 1898 because of their state‟s four year 
gubernatorial terms.  James Hamilton Lewis and William C. Jones, the first non-
Republicans to win congressional seats since statehood had been achieved, were also due 
to be re-nominated.  That meant the squabble over positions was largely confined to two 
candidacies for the state supreme court.  While the Populists and Democrats eventually 
decided to split the judgeships, another skirmish erupted over the single platform that all 
of the involved parties had pledged to support.  The platform that was eventually agreed 
to included planks that demanded free coinage of silver and federal control over the 
issuance of currency, opposed any further sale of interest bearing bonds, praised the 
present governor and legislature for the first balanced budget in state history, and called 
for direct legislation.  The general platform contained nothing controversial, but the 
Populist convention also passed a separate platform of its own.  This platform differed 
from the other in that it pledged Populist support for a women‟s suffrage amendment that 
was to appear on the ballot, but it also contained several statements related to the recent 
war.  While it applauded the “patriotism, bravery and heroism manifested by the 
American soldiers and sailors, from the commander-in-chief to the rank and file,” it also 
condemned the actions of the administration before and during the war.   Intervention had 
been delayed and thousands of Cubans died as a consequence, and when war did come 
the president and cabinet had turned “the unavoidable hardships of war” into “horrors” 
through their incompetence.  Near its conclusion, the platform stated that “While we do 
not favor an aggressive policy of territorial expansion,” they were unalterably opposed to 
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“the surrender to Spain of any of the territory that has been acquired…and we do not 
favor the surrender to Spain‟s domination of the people of any Spanish colonies who co-
operated with our forces against our enemy in the late war.”83   
Colorado‟s conventions were underway simultaneous to their Washington state 
counterparts.  The organization of a fusion coalition in Colorado fared better than it had 
in 1896, but the situation had become much more complicated.  The state Silver 
Republicans divided into three parties:  those who favored fusion with the Populists and 
Democrats (usually described as followers of Teller); those who wanted to return to the 
regular party but could not abandon silver (Wolcott‟s followers); and those led by mine 
owner Simon Guggenheim and state Silver Republican Party chairman Richard Broad 
who claimed to be independent of both.  Wolcott‟s faction could have just returned 
directly to the Republican fold, but they believed that the only route to victory in 
Colorado was by claiming the mantle of free silver.  When the conventions came, the 
Colorado Springs opera house where the Teller faction planned to meet was stormed by 
some of Wolcott‟s followers in the early morning hours, and one of them was shot and 
killed in the process.  Despite the loss of life, Wolcott‟s backers did manage to take the 
building, and Teller‟s supporters moved off to another site.84   
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Teller, Thomas Patterson‟s Populists, and the Democrats then proceeded to 
cement their alliance.  The Democrat Charles S. Thomas—a Southerner by birth with a 
mixed record on questions surrounding organized labor—was given the nod for the 
governorship, but only after a fierce protest from the Populist camp.  All other state 
offices and the two House seats were split among the Populists and Silver Republicans.  
Each convention also developed its own platform.  The most prominent feature in all 
pertained to the money question:  all three called for the free coinage of silver, and the 
Populists proclaimed that it was again “the paramount question of the present campaign.”  
The Populists alone called for direct legislation, while the Democrats condemned 
Wolcott‟s amendment to the War Revenue Bill as a sham and lambasted the issuance of 
bonds.  Of course, all went on to praise the heroism of the state and nation‟s soldiers, but 
the Democrats and Populists differed substantially on the consequences of the war.  The 
Democrats claimed that the soldiers‟ efforts had added to the “glory and power of the 
nation, and to the limits of our domain,” and now believed that these new possessions 
represented the nation‟s “enlarged duties and responsibilities” which required the 
construction of “the best navy in the world.”  The Populists, on the other hand, said the 
islands should not be given back to Spain, but said that the flag should wave over them 
only “until such time as a majority of the people of these respective countries shall 
express a desire to establish a government of their own.”85 
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The greatest commonality among the combined reform parties of the three states 
was their desire to continue the economic fight above all else.  Imperialism was not yet a 
clear issue, and certainly not a unifying one.  In Nebraska, even though Allen condemned 
“land-grabbing” in the biggest speech of the fusion conventions, there would have 
seemed little need to make the campaign one of anti-imperialism.
86
  Their greatest 
opponents, such as Edward Rosewater of the Omaha Bee and Senator John Thurston, also 
opposed expansionist policies.
87
  While at least one Republican congressional candidate 
tried to challenge an incumbent Populist by supporting imperialism, the issue did not 
become an integral part of the Republican statewide campaign.
88
  If Nebraska‟s fusionists 
took a stand against imperialism it could have potentially alienated some voters but 
would almost certainly have provided little political benefit.  In the case of Washington, 
the situation was more ambiguous.  The state‟s Silver Republican senator, George 
Turner, had absented himself from voting during the Hawaiian annexation vote, and 
Congressman James Hamilton Lewis had put his own serious reservations on record 
before he did vote for the Newlands Resolution.  On the other hand, the state press 
seemed to favor the acquisition of Spain‟s colonies, and Governor Rogers directly stated 
his own preference for holding all lands taken.
89
  Though the Populists made a brief 
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statement regarding retention of captured islands, none of Washington‟s party leaders 
thought expansion—either for or against—was an issue for the campaign.  In Colorado, 
the newspapers supported acquisition of the islands, and so did the Democrats in their 
platform.  Despite that, Charles S. Thomas—the candidate the Democrats had forced on 
their allies—was the one of the most solidly anti-imperialist politicians in the state.90  
Certainly, none of the fusion parties were ready to put issues of foreign policy ahead of 
reform.   
Despite the extent to which it was de-emphasized in their official party 
proclamations, it is curious that so many Colorado and Washington fusionists supported 
expansion even though it was becoming clear that national leaders such as William 
Jennings Bryan and prominent members of Congress were opposed.  Their motivation 
likely had to do with a hesitance to reject traditional American enthusiasm for territorial 
acquisition combined with a great deal of political pragmatism.  It appears that a great 
many of these Democratic and Populist expansionists feared the consequences that 
accompanied the alternative position.  John Rankin Rogers declared that “Past American 
history shows us clearly that neither public men nor political parties can successfully 
oppose the advance of our country in territorial extent or national authority.”91  Denver 
lawyer and state Democratic Party insider T. J. O‟Donnell also feared “We will lose the 
congressional elections unless we take an advanced stand in order to obtain our full share 
                                                 
90
 “Denver Democrats on the So-Called Policy of Imperialism,” Denver Post, July 7, 1898, p. 3; “The 
Imperial Idea in Colorado,” Greely Tribune, July 14, 1898, p. 4.   
91
 John Rankin Rogers to W. R. Hearst, June 20, 1898, Governor John Rankin Rogers Papers; Riddle, Old 
Radicalism, 250.   
  
309 
 
of the benefits of the patriotic impulses now aroused in our people.”  Bell and Shafroth, 
who had opposed Hawaiian annexation, “did not represent 5 per cent of the people of 
Colorado” he said.92  In both states, the situation was quite different from that of 
Nebraska.  In Washington, the near unanimity of expansionist sentiment voiced by 
Republican papers suggested that the backers of McKinley could seek to make it a 
campaign issue.  In Colorado, Davis Waite led mid-road Populist opposition to the 
leadership of Thomas Patterson, and at an early date the ex-governor had proclaimed his 
own preference for an aggressive policy overseas.
93
  By supporting expansion, Democrats 
and Populists could neutralize it as a political controversy and refocus the campaign on 
domestic political economy.  Or so they thought.   
In fact, the war had stirred up too much sentiment and had created too many 
issues of its own for any of the reform parties to ignore.  In some instances, Republicans 
were trumpeting the military victories won over the summer as the triumphs of 
Republican governance.  The reformers were forced to respond by pointing out that all 
had joined the war effort, regardless of party, all the while reminding audiences that the 
administration had practically been pushed into the war against its will.  In this way, they 
were attempting to deny that the war was a campaign issue at all.  At the same time, they 
frequently criticized the administration—especially Secretary of War Alger—for its inept 
management of army‟s supplies and the disorder and disease that infested the military 
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camps.  Nearly all papers reported the struggles of the War Department over the summer 
and fall, but as it came to overlap with the campaign season it was increasingly seen as 
partisan.  In Washington state, Congressman Lewis and Senator Turner made 
administration incompetence part of their political campaign.  Lewis, who had accepted a 
position as a military inspector (with rank of colonel) late in war, was especially harsh in 
his criticism of profiteering and negligence.  This aggressive attempt to turn a popular 
war into a scandalous campaign issue would bring with it as many difficulties as it had 
advantages.
94
  
The War Revenue Bill also had a part to play in the campaign.  It had struck too 
close to their core concerns for the fusion forces to ignore it.  Again and again, Populists, 
Democrats, and Silver Republicans on the campaign trail waylaid the “issue of bonds for 
the sole benefit of the financial syndicates.”  Of course, by emphasizing the bill and the 
bonds that came with it, reform candidates and editors could easily segue into the 
continued need for drastic changes in the financial system.  The Independent informed 
readers that the $300,000,000 of bonds issued before the close of the war required 
taxpayers to pay back the principal plus “$20,000,000 a year in interest to get the money 
back into the channels of trade again.”  On many of the reform party platforms, 
references to the war bonds had been followed by declarations against national banks and 
for direct federal control of all currency in circulation.  But while criticism of the war 
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bonds and proposals for public control of money dovetailed nicely, the reformers were 
yet again putting the conduct of the war front and center.
95
   
In fact, the reformers came to fear that the campaign was being redirected away 
from economic issues to the war, and some made efforts to steer it back to the course that 
was followed in 1896.  “Republican managers in this state are trying desperately hard in 
this campaign, so far as national issues are concerned, to ignore the currency question and 
make an issue of the war with Spain,” wrote one such editor.96  Another pointed out that 
when the reformers had attempted to remonetize silver, they had once been called 
“„cranks,‟ „anarchists‟ and „repudiationists,‟” until those old epithets had lost their power.  
Now, Republicans were using “promises of military glory,” and talk of the opportunity to 
“join English Tories in schemes of oppressing and robbing the helpless of the earth” to 
distract attention away from domestic reform.
97
  As much as campaigners like Senator 
Turner attempted to paint it as another contest of “money against manhood, and gold 
against the teachings of Almighty God,” both sides either allowed or encouraged the war 
issue to affect the campaign.
98
   
Whatever the difficulties faced by the fusionists, western Republicans had at least 
as great a challenge at hand.  Because nearly all of these state parties—including those of 
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Nebraska, Colorado, and Washington—had flirted with free silver at some point in the 
1890s, they had been in a weak position to assail the Bryan campaign in 1896.  The other 
hallmark of Republican campaigns in the 1890s was the claim that prosperity was only 
possible under their guidance, and a vote for any radical party would demonstrate the 
region or state‟s unsuitability for investment.  Two years after their defeat all agreed that 
economic circumstances had improved throughout the West, but that hardly validated 
their previous assertion.   
Each state party had to adapt to this changed environment or their struggles would 
continue.  In Colorado, change failed to happen.  Wolcott—who still remained as 
publicly committed to bimetallism as ever—was the leader of the McKinley Republicans.  
As if to put even greater emphasis on his centrality to the party, Wolcott‟s brother was 
nominated for governor by the regular Republicans and Guggenheim‟s independent 
Silver Republican ticket was eventually forced out of the race.  Almost no Republican 
newspapers in the state admitted that the party accepted the single gold standard, and 
several chose to continue on as if the 1896 election had never happened.  The Wolcott 
group‟s haphazard campaign gained nearly no newspaper support, and only lured the 
Denver Times away from the Teller camp by the middle of October.  With few issues to 
differentiate between the two sides it was necessarily a campaign that focused on 
personalities as much as anything, but for that reason the Republicans were also doomed 
to failure.
99
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In Washington and Nebraska, the state organizations were led by those closer to 
the national mainstream of the party, many of whom seemed better prepared to run a 
winning campaign.  But even in these states, some Republicans struggled to accept the 
new message.  Elmer Burkett, a candidate for Nebraska‟s first district House seat, gained 
notoriety among his opponents for first suggesting he supported international 
bimetallism, then later refusing to discuss the “money question” with any clarity on the 
campaign trail.
100
   
  Of course, there was always “prosperity.”  Improved economic conditions have 
frequently been used to explain the rapid decline of Populism in the West, but that may 
largely be the result of claims of the victors after the fact.
101
  While all parties admitted 
that times were better in 1898 than they had been two years earlier, they were all apt to 
fight over the credit for it.  While Republicans were much more willing to boast about 
national prosperity and the value of “100 cent dollars” in October than they had been 
even in April, they tended to identify economic growth as an adjunct to their party—with 
no essential explanation of its source.
102
  Washington‟s Senator John L. Wilson simply 
                                                                                                 
Honest Campaign,” Colorado Springs Gazette, October 24, 1898, p. 4.  See also James Wright, Politics of 
Populism, 216-217.   
100
 “Like Days of Ninety-Six,” Omaha World-Herald, October 4, 1898, p. 5; “Burkett Continues to 
Dodge,” Omaha World-Herald, October 19, 1898, p. 4; “Where Mr. Burkett Stands,” Omaha World-
Herald, October 23, 1898, p. 7; “Jump, Mr. Burkett, Jump!” Omaha World-Herald, October 29, 1898, p. 4.   
101
 The historians of Washington state have been particularly wedded to the idea that “prosperity” destroyed 
Populism.  See Riddle, Old Radicalism, 231-232; Robert E. Ficken, Washington State:  The Inaugural 
Decade, 1889-1899 (Pullman, WA:  Washington State University Press, 2007), 215-230; Putnam, 
Progressive-Era Seattle, 25.  For others, see John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt:  A History of the 
Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party, 2nd ed. (1931; Lincoln:  University of Nebraska Press, 1959), 
388-389; Robert F. Durden, The Climax of Populism:  The Election of 1896 (Lexington, KY:  University of 
Kentucky Press, 1965), 163.   
102
 For one very good example of this, see the Republican campaign speeches presented in “Rousing 
 
  
314 
 
told audiences that, throughout the “history of the republican party,” good times “always 
attended it when in power.”  In a similar vein, one of the state‟s Republican House 
candidates Wesley L. Jones noted that his opponent said that any economic improvement 
was an “accident,” not a result of Republican policies.  “I tell you,” he exclaimed to his 
audience, “I am going to stand by the party that is struck by this sort of accident.”103  The 
talk was much the same among Nebraska Republicans.  “No man of candor and honesty 
will deny that the United States is very much more prosperous now than it was two years 
ago,” claimed a writer for the Omaha Daily Bee.  “It is not necessary to discuss the 
causes of this fortunate condition.  It is sufficient to know that it exists and inquire as to 
what is essential to its continuance.”  Republican control of Congress was the predictable 
answer supplied.
104
  Of course, the exact state of the economy may not have been of 
importance.  One candidate on the state ticket attempted to perform some verbal sleight 
of hand to aid the party‟s chances.  While he claimed that prosperity had returned, he 
simultaneously informed his audience that “Capital has no confidence in populist rule and 
so long as that party remains the dominant one in this state so long will capital be slow to 
invest in Nebraska.”105  The speaker made no attempt to reconcile the two statements.   
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 Something else was needed to bring a Republican victory.  The war proved to be a 
powerful issue of its own, and soon the victorious commander-in-chief joined the 
campaign.  In early October, President McKinley embarked on a speaking tour of the 
Midwest that culminated in his arrival at the Trans-Mississippi Exposition in Omaha on 
October 12.  While ostensibly not a campaign tour, McKinley knew he could make voters 
see the connection between a triumphant war president and local Republican candidates.  
His speeches have been characterized as broadly imperialist, and according to his 
biographers he received warm welcomes throughout his tour—especially at the points in 
which he made reference to America‟s new “duty” across the Pacific.  Yet the President 
was not outlining his vision in any great detail.  In signature McKinley style, his tone was 
inoffensive and his references to policy would have generally remained opaque for casual 
listeners.  At the Omaha exposition, where local reports claimed 100,000 people had 
timed their visit to coincide with that of the president, his speech may have appealed to 
patriotic elements, but hardly defined any policy regarding occupied territories.  In his 
Omaha address, he pointed out that “Hitherto, in peace and in war, with additions to our 
territory and slight changes in our laws, we have steadily enforced the spirit of the 
constitution… We have avoided the temptations of conquest in the spirit of gain.”  While 
he also pointed out that “new and grave problems” faced the nation, he did not suggest it 
was the time to ignore the anti-imperial precedent.  Indeed, he later reaffirmed their 
sentiments by stating that “We must avoid the temptation of undue aggression, and aim to 
secure only such results as will promote our own and the general good.”  Though his 
discussion of duty demonstrated his preference for a more robust foreign policy, he never 
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clarified whether that meant a tiny coaling station or an expansive island group of 
between 7-10,000,000 inhabitants.
106
   
 The most important portions of the president‟s remarks did not pertain so directly 
to foreign affairs as they did domestic politics.  After praising the achievements of the 
soldiers who fought the war, he asked the audience “Who will dim the splendor of their 
achievements?... Who will intrude detraction at this time to belittle the manly spirit of the 
American youth and impair the usefulness of the American army?”  Worse still, “Who 
will embarrass the government by sowing seeds of disaffection among the brave men 
who stand ready to serve and die, if need be, for their country?  Who will darken the 
counsels of the republic at this hour, requiring the united wisdom of all?”  All at once, he 
united the objectives of his administration with the service of the soldiers, and in so doing 
made it seem craven to criticize either.  Then, he claimed that America was still in a 
challenging moment and unity was needed instead of partisanship.  This last component 
had already become a significant element in the speeches he had delivered on his tour.  
Just the day before, he had told the residents of Boone, Iowa, that “This is a solemn hour 
demanding the highest wisdom and the best statesmanship of every section of our 
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country.”  He concluded by asking them to “remember at this critical hour in the nation‟s 
history we must not be divided.  The triumphs of war are yet to be written in the articles 
of peace.”107  As the campaign was coming to a conclusion, the emergency of war was 
not yet over.      
 McKinley told audiences that there was still a crisis, and partisanship (or at least 
the kind that emanated from his rivals) was inappropriate.  Again he was nonspecific, 
refusing to identify which emergency in particular concerned him.  At that moment, there 
were two situations the press had identified as “crises” which may have been on 
McKinley‟s mind.  One pertained to the commitment of the Filipino revolutionaries 
under Emilio Aguinaldo to an independent Philippines, a major story in the news for 
much of the summer.  The other, which received much more press attention at the time, 
was based upon a rumor that the negotiations with Spain could break down at any time 
and war could resume.  The great fear was that this time Spain would not be acting alone.  
It was claimed that the European powers—led by either Russia or Germany—were 
considering intervention on behalf of Spain.  Some said this was based directly on 
jealousy over the American claims to the Philippines, while others emphasized a fear that 
the introduction of Americans to the region might upset the fragile East Asian balance of 
power.
108
  Rumors of European intervention had preceded the war and never really 
ceased.
109
  In July, Populist editor and captain in the First Nebraska Volunteers Frank 
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Eager wrote a letter to his brother from an encampment just outside Manila in which he 
said that the rumors of a European intervention were spreading fast.
110
  From September 
through the end of the political campaign these rumors reached a new peak.  Spanish 
negotiators were one potential source of these reports, and some in the press even 
acknowledged as much.
111
  It is difficult to state for certain how believable these stories 
appeared to the American public, though suspicion of European intrigue was as old as the 
republic and obviously still significant by the 1890s.  There was also just enough recent 
history to make the stories hold a degree of plausibility.  A mere three years earlier, the 
unlikely coalition of Germany, Russia, and France had intervened at the conclusion of the 
Sino-Japanese War to prevent Japan from taking possession of certain Chinese territories.  
It was feared that the incorporation of these possessions into the Japanese domain would 
tip the regional balance of power too strongly in Japan‟s favor.112  To many, it may have 
appeared that a similar scenario could play out again, but the administration should have 
known better.  Spain had been attempting to gain allies at every point, from the months 
before war right up to the negotiations.  McKinley‟s lieutenants had kept in contact with 
the diplomats of the great powers throughout the process, and even as negotiations were 
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underway they received confirmation that no interventions were contemplated.
113
  But 
that did not mean that the rumors could not play a part in the campaign.   
 Republican campaigners soon painted the situation as a national emergency, and 
one that could only be prevented by following the lead of McKinley.  Especially in the 
Nebraska campaign, Republicans emphasized the dangers of the moment.  The Columbus 
Journal, for example, advertised that all patriotic Americans should vote for the local 
legislative candidate because he believed in the protective tariff and, even more 
importantly, “he has been an earnest supporter and is in sympathy on all points with the 
administration, especially in the late Spanish war, and will, if elected, act in hearty co-
operation with the President in the peace negotiations now pending.  That the present is a 
critical period in our history, all thoughtful Americans admit, and realize the necessity of 
electing a congress in full sympathy with the administration.”  To abandon the president 
now was unpatriotic, because “The statesmen of Europe are eagerly awaiting political 
events in this country.”114  In the same vein, the editor of the McCook Tribune told 
readers it was their duty to “Endorse the administration” by voting for Republicans for 
their respective seats in the state legislature.  “They are all worthy and able men and 
believe that President McKinley should be upheld in the present crisis.”115  Still another 
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paper went even farther, and claimed that the Populists and Democrats were acting on 
behalf of Spanish interests.  They were working to “embarrass the National 
administration as much as possible in the settlement of the questions growing out of the 
war, so that some or all of the advantages gained by this country in the war with Spain 
will have to be thrown away.”   Aiding them were “Speakers from the east” who had 
been sent into the state, and whose “utterances would indicate that they are in the direct 
employ of Spain.”  Traitors were trying to halt their own nation‟s progress for the sake of 
another, the author claimed.  The nation and its president must be defended.  “Patriotism 
demands this course without regard to previous political opinions.”116    
 The suggestion that Populists and Democrats wanted to throw away “all of the 
advantages gained by this country in the war” hinted at the expansionist subtext that was 
present throughout the campaign.  Rarely did any of the Nebraska editors directly express 
opinions regarding the American situation in the Caribbean or Pacific.  Instead local 
Republican papers reprinted stories from the national media that discussed the inability of 
the Cubans, Puerto Ricans, or Filipinos to manage their own affairs and which then 
described how American troops were keeping the peace.  Then, on their political and 
opinion pages they wrote that patriotism required support for the president‟s policies.  As 
one of these editors put it, if you were “a good patriotic American citizen, you indorse the 
policy of the president with reference to the Cuban, Porto Rico, and Philippine 
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questions,” without ever explaining what that meant.  This patriotic duty required voters 
to put Republicans in Congress.
117
  But it should not be assumed that all Republicans 
equated patriotism with expansion.  Throughout the campaign, Edward Rosewater‟s 
Omaha Daily Bee continued to oppose what it regarded as imperialism.  Just as the rest of 
the state‟s conservative media did, the Bee declared that “patriotism should rise above 
partisanship.” “The main issue before the people at this time is whether the national 
administration under William McKinley shall be endorsed and upheld and the policy 
under which this country is enjoying exceptional prosperity shall be continued”118   
 In Washington state, the newspapers and campaigners used much the same 
material to support an identical conclusion:  to vote against a Republican would weaken 
the president at a critical juncture.  It “could be in interpreted in no other way and would 
have no other meaning than as a vote of national censure upon William McKinley.”  This 
issue was “First and foremost above all other issues,” they claimed.119  But in 
Washington, it was rarely viewed or described as an issue unto its own.  While loyalty to 
the president was a patriotic duty, it was also a prerequisite to territorial expansion.  
Consistently, the state‟s newspapers expressed the desire that the state‟s voters would 
“favor upholding the hands of the noble administration at Washington in arranging the 
terms of peace to the permanent advantage of America, instead of neutralizing the grand 
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victories of the magnificent war.”120  While some fusionists tried to claim that all parties 
in Washington supported the acquisition of Spain‟s islands, the records of their 
congressmen called that into question.
121
   
Local Republicans were not done tying patriotic sentiment to the actions of their 
party.  They criticized their rivals for their untoward attacks upon the War Department—
and indirectly, upon McKinley—denying that a Democrat or Populist could do so and 
still possess any patriotic feeling of their own.  Nowhere was this more true than in 
Washington state, where Turner and Lewis had continued to accost Secretary Alger for 
incompetence throughout the campaign.  When Lewis attacked those managing the war 
as “tasseled society sapheads,” the Tacoma Daily Ledger declared that these “are words 
intended to be expressive of the fusionist estimate of the brave men who scaled the 
heights of El Caney and others, many of whom now rest in their graves of heroes at 
Santiago.”122  Turner was said to have criticized “without mercy the course of 
President McKinley during the late war, accusing him of weakness, cowardice and 
collusion with money kings [emphasis in original].”123  Speaking before a large 
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Republican crowd, Senator Wilson responded by labeling Turner‟s language “unpatriotic 
and treasonable.”124   
The method was much the same in Nebraska, though Republican terminology 
there was more directly borrowed from the era of the “bloody shirt.”  Just weeks after the 
close of the state conventions, Republican gubernatorial candidate Monroe Hayward 
ended one of his biggest speeches by reading a campaign bill from 1864 that called for 
the “Brave men who hate the rebellion of Abraham Lincoln and are determined to destroy 
it” to join the Democrats.  Hayward proclaimed that such language was “gotten out for 
the same purpose that the opposition are getting out their slanders today.”125  This type of 
rhetoric was only amplified when it was discovered that the Populist state Commissioner 
of Public Lands had been a “copperhead” member of the Indiana legislature during the 
Civil War.  Newspapers of a certain stripe soon used it as further evidence of fusionist 
disloyalty.
126
  This was the kind of language that had dominated Nebraska politics in the 
years before the Populist uprising, but it was reincorporated into the political lexicon as if 
nothing had changed.
127
  While Senator Thurston declared “patriotism” to be the true 
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issue during his late campaign swing through the West, other Republicans had already 
made that point clear enough to voters.
128
    
Western reformers thought they could defuse the contentions of their opponents 
and demonstrate their own loyalty by emphasizing their military service.  James 
Hamilton Lewis made it clear that he had seen abuses when he had served in the 
inspector general‟s office.  Yet opponents claimed that he had never formally been 
accepted to the position, and as evidence they claimed that if he had made such 
slanderous comments while in uniform he would have been court martialed.  Though 
Lewis eventually provided proof from the War Department that he had been in uniform, 
Republican papers continued to accuse him of being a fake colonel right up to election 
day.
129
  In Nebraska, the supporters of Senator Allen likewise reminded voters of his 
military service.  A front-page article in the Independent recounted Allen‟s brave service 
during Civil War, as told by the Iowa veterans with whom he had served.  The headline 
of the article, “W. V. Allen as Private,” even accentuated his appeal as a common soldier.  
While it made no reference to Allen‟s recent attacks on the administration, the timing 
made it clear that Allen‟s loyalty was beyond question.130  Yet such defenses inherently 
accepted their opponent‟s emphasis upon service to country.  Allen had endured personal 
hardship and risks at least as great as that faced by most American soldiers during the 
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War of 1898, but he had remained the dutiful soldier.  When Lewis tacitly accepted that 
only those in the military could critique the civilian-led War Department, he 
acknowledged that only those under the employ of the administration could criticize it.  
At a moment when patriotic sentiment was at fever pitch, western reformers did not seek 
to challenge the growing tide of militaristic nationalism.   
 The results of the 1898 contest were far more decisive than most historians have 
realized.   Looking at the national perspective, analysts have pointed out that Democrats 
gained several seats in the House but remained in the minority while the Republicans 
picked up a few seats in the Senate.  For what some feared would be an off-year decline, 
it has been called a minor victory for the McKinley administration.
131
  But if examined 
from a regional perspective, it was a disaster for the western reformers.  In Washington, 
Republicans captured the state legislature, killing any chance of further reform.  
Additionally, William C. Jones and James Hamilton Lewis were turned out of Congress, 
as their 13,000 vote majorities from 1896 were turned into defeats by over 2,000 votes.  
Similar results were recorded along the Pacific Coast.  Of the six Populist and 
Democratic House members from those states, only Marion De Vries  of California won 
reelection.  In Nebraska, there was some reason for celebration.  Poynter won the 
governorship by less than 3,000 votes and the fusionists held all of the Congressional 
districts they already controlled.  Yet they too had lost the legislature, and Senator Allen 
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had no chance of winning over the state Republicans. 
132
 Throughout the West, the 
defeats piled up.  Governor Andrew Lee of South Dakota barely managed to be reelected 
but was left to face a hostile legislature, and Kelley and Knowles were not returned to 
Congress.  Even in Kansas, that classic bastion of Populism, fusion forces were swept out 
of the state offices and lost five of their six House seats.
133
   
 Only in the mountain states did similar political groups have a measure of 
success, but in those states issues surrounding the war had largely been pushed aside 
during the campaign.  Two years earlier, the regular Republicans parties there had all but 
ceased to exist, and the locally significant Silver Republican organizations were torn.  
Despite that, fusion had been arranged in Colorado and as a result Thomas was elected 
governor, Bell and Shafroth were sent back to Congress, and a more reform-minded 
group took charge of the legislature—a sweep unmatched even in the other mining states.  
Populist infighting in Idaho led to a successful Democratic and Silver Republican fusion 
ticket that excluded them altogether.  In Montana, too, the fragile silver alliance broke 
down, as William A. Clark of the Anaconda mine pushed the state‟s Democrats to 
nominate a straight party ticket.  The Silver Republican Charles Hartman was deemed too 
“populistic” to receive nomination, and the Populists and Silver Republicans who 
attempted a separate fusion ticket went down to defeat and the hands of the Democrats.  
Even in Nevada, single-party politics prevailed as the Silver Party remained dominant at 
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all levels, but the victory just briefly masked emerging divisions that loyalty to a metal 
alone could not smooth over.  Fights over the spoils threatened to tear apart the remaining 
reform coalitions in the states most opposed to administration policy.
134
 
 Elsewhere, as they tried to explain the results of the contests, many on both sides 
contended that the war had played a significant part.  In a letter to Jonas Lien in Manila, 
Richard Pettigrew attributed defeats in South Dakota to the difficulties that came with 
local fusion arrangements, the “unlimited supply of money” held by their opponents, and 
added in conclusion that, “the war sentiment is strong, and that had a good deal to do 
with our defeat.”135  In Washington, the Republican state committee chairman attributed 
the stunning reversal to two issues.  He first pointed to his opponent‟s support for the 
single tax (which had more to do with Republican branding of the amendment than fusion 
espousal of the doctrine).  The second factor related to the ongoing negotiations with 
Spain, and realization by voters that “the administration needed the undivided support of 
all parties.”  The attacks of Lewis and Turner upon the conduct of the war only 
highlighted the President‟s call for unity.136  Almost remarkably, their opponents agreed.  
One commentator declared that Lewis overshadowed the accomplishments of fusionists 
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in the state and national government by his “reprehensible attack on the war 
administration of President McKinley,” and the editor of the Seattle Daily Times agreed 
wholeheartedly with the assessment.
137
    
 In Nebraska, there was greater difficulty to explain the mixed results.  Despite the 
election of Poynter, state Republicans believed the election marked a dramatic shift.  In 
1896, Holcomb was elected by a majority of over 20,000.  Poynter‟s victory was by less 
than 3,000.  While the total number of voters who participated was substantially lower, 
the Republican candidate had run less than 2,000 votes behind the party‟s showing in 
1896.  The losses were nearly all on the fusionist side.  Their interpretation of the 
election‟s implications went much farther.  According to the Bee, “The election of a 
republican house of representatives was a blow, perhaps a decisive blow, to free silver.”  
They declared with no small amount of satisfaction that Republican victories in the West 
had killed silver as an issue.  “There has been a wonderful change in sentiment in 
Nebraska,” crowed another paper, “and Bryanism is doomed.”138   
   Despite their limited victory, Nebraska Populists appeared to suffer the loss of 
Senator Allen, and some drew connections between this defeat and what they saw as the 
coming contest for the soul of America.  Jay Burrows, an Alliance organizer and one of 
the founders of the state party, wrote a letter to the Independent on these very subjects.  
He described the loss of Allen—“the greatest United States senator the state ever had”—
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as an incalculable disaster for the people because of the “new situations that confront the 
nation.”  The territory that America was likely to take from Spain amounted to a sizable 
overseas empire, and citizens must decide what role the nation would play in the 
Philippines.  Colonial occupation would mean “our complication in European politics” 
and the militarism that came with such associations.  A more inclusive form of expansion 
“must necessarily and unavoidably place the ten or fifteen millions of this half civilized 
Asiatic population upon absolute equality with our own people,” and essentially destroy 
American labor.  The third option, he said, was to tell the Filipinos “establish a free 
constitutional government for your own people… and you shall have our moral support, 
our advice, and our armed assistance if you need it.”  According to Burrows, the ultimate 
decision would determine the fate of not only the Filipinos but the Americans themselves.  
Americans must choose between the course of “rapacity and greed and thirst for 
dominion” or “national honesty, integrity and devotion to a God-given mission.”  While 
Nebraska‟s Populists and Democrats had avoided discussion of imperialism during the 
campaign, their fear of its consequences remained.  For Burrows and other Populists 
imperialism remained a serious question, no matter the logic of the campaign.  If it was 
not confronted soon, they feared its legacy could haunt the nation for generations to 
come.
139
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While the election of 1898 was far too confused an affair to create the clear 
divisions and evoke the moral senses that the contest of 1896 had, the rhetoric adopted in 
the campaign was in many ways a precursor to the discourse that followed over the next 
two years.  Finally, western conservatives could change the terms of a debate that they 
had been losing for most of the decade.  This was the greatest change from the last 
presidential race, and the one that promised to give conservative Republicans the kind of 
national mandate they had lacked.  Though the discussion of “realignment” has rightfully 
passed from the lexicon of most current historians, it is undeniable that Republicans won 
dominant victories in much of the Midwest and Northeast.  The South remained solidly 
Democratic, and that seemed unlikely to change anytime soon.  In 1896 and immediately 
thereafter, the West was the largest political battlefield left, and suddenly it too was 
shifting into the Republican camp.
140
   
As a consequence of the many defeats suffered by Populists and their allies in 
1898, McKinley would have a solid majority of regular Republicans in both houses of the 
Fifty-sixth Congress.  It was this Congress that determined the form of control that the 
United States would exercise over its “new possessions.”  While he preferred to push it 
through as quickly as possible, McKinley always knew that if the lame-duck Senate of 
the Fifty-fifth Congress did not ratify the peace treaty with Spain—which was still in 
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being negotiated—the next one would.  His campaign ploy had worked as well as anyone 
could have expected, and now he merely had to collect the rewards.   
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CHAPTER VII 
IMPERIALISM COMES TO THE FOREFRONT 
“There is mourning in Nebraska to-day,” said Senator William Allen on February 
6, 1899.  “[T]here will be weeping at the hearthstone of many a Nebraska home to-night.”  
The first reports of fighting around Manila had arrived.  The initial rumors claimed that 
the army led by Emilio Aguinaldo had attacked American positions, most of which were 
held by volunteer regiments from the western states.  Allen said that he had been 
informed that ten of the first twenty dead were from the Nebraska regiment.  “I can not 
condemn too severely the assault, the treacherous assault, made on our troops,” he 
continued.  He went on to call the individuals responsible for the attack “savages as 
bloodthirsty and incapable of being reconciled as the Ogallala Sioux.”  Despite the anger 
he felt towards those he believed had attacked his friends and neighbors, he told the 
audience that “this ought to be a warning to us.”  At the close of his speech, he told all 
there that he looked forward to “the day when the Filipinos and the inhabitants of Porto 
Rico and Cuba may rise to a true conception of the duties and obligations of citizenship; 
when they too, with the encouragement of this great and powerful Republic, shall take 
their station among the civilized republics and peoples of the earth.”1 
The outbreak of the conflict had put Allen in a difficult position.  He favored 
ratification of the peace treaty that would end the war with Spain.  However, he had 
rejected the notion that the United States had inherited some obligation to conquer and 
hold people without their consent.  Now he acceded to the use of force to put down what 
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he believed was a wanton attack upon those who had helped break the chains of Spanish 
oppression.  But he still had serious doubts about the administration‟s policy.  Overseas 
conquests, colonialism, and militarism were, in Allen‟s mind, totally without precedent in 
American history and unacceptable behavior for a republic.  The last lines of his speech 
defined his view of the correct form of relations between the United States and the rest of 
the world:  America should be an example for others to emulate.   
By early 1899, the battle lines that divided imperialists and their opponents were 
still incredibly convoluted.  There were Republicans who had misgivings about the 
acquisition of some overseas territories, especially the Philippines.  At the same time, two 
former Republicans—Henry Teller and William Stewart—unreservedly supported the 
acquisition of all the lands American forces then occupied.  There were also Populists 
such as Allen, who distrusted McKinley but wanted to put an official end to the war with 
Spain before determining the fate of the islands.  And of course there were many others 
who declared that the treaty must be stopped in order to safeguard liberty and the 
Constitution.   
Despite the diversity of positions, harder ideological lines were appearing.  
Increasingly, Populists and Democrats demonstrated their firm opposition to imperialism.  
While western reformers had divided over Hawaiian annexation, nearly all opposed the 
permanent occupation of the Philippines.  Some had considered Hawaii to be necessary 
for the war effort, while others simply saw it as too small to meaningfully alter American 
ideals or institutions.  Such could not be said of the Philippines.  To control and defend a 
distant archipelago containing between 7-10,000,000 inhabitants would require a larger 
army and navy, a greater administrative bureaucracy, and—most ominously—a 
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willingness to disregard republican principles.
2
  All of this, the western critics were sure, 
was to be done for the benefit of financiers and industrialists.  The whole push of their 
crusade had been one designed to put the interests of humanity before business.  In 1899, 
as they tried to prevent territorial acquisition, their struggle expanded into a new field.    
 
Interregnum  
Following the election of 1898, much remained undetermined.  The president‟s 
campaign tour had provided little insight into his foreign policy ambitions, and the final 
negotiated form of the treaty was not signed and made public until December 10.  While 
the treaty did fulfill the main purpose of the war—Cuba was recognized as under 
American tutelage, pending the organization of a new government—it also included 
provisions for the acquisition of Puerto Rico and the Philippines.  The latter was to be 
exchanged for the sum of $20 million.
3
  The treaty was much as the anti-imperialists had 
feared, but even it did not provide a substantially clearer outline of America‟s policy.  
While it differentiated between Cuba and the other islands, it did not state whether 
American intended to control Puerto Rico and the Philippines as colonies in perpetuity, as 
territories to be admitted for statehood in the future, or as short-term protectorates that 
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would soon become independent countries.  McKinley chose not to clarify his plans, only 
adding to the controversy.   
The closest that the President provided to a statement of policy was a document 
directed at the Filipinos and American military on the islands, not Congress or the 
American public.  It declared that Dewey‟s victory “practically effected the conquest of 
the Philippine Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein.”  As a result of 
America‟s military victories, “the future control, disposition, and government of the 
Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States.”  McKinley framed the military 
occupation as a kindly paternal act, suggesting that this was necessary only “for the 
security of the persons and property of the people of the islands and for the confirmation 
of all their private rights and relations,” and that the Americans came “not as invaders or 
conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments, 
and in their personal and religious rights.”  Much of his message invoked the kind of 
“hearts and minds” language similar to what would be used in the coming century.  
Commanders were to guarantee the “full measure of individual rights and liberties which 
is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United 
States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right 
for arbitrary rule.”  Yet every suggestion of benign intent was followed by a warning.  
For those who did not submit to the newly established authority, he vowed to bring them 
“within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be.”  He added in his 
closing that, to that end, “the strong arm of authority” must be maintained, in order to 
“repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of 
good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag 
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of the United States.”   He saw no irony in declaring the need for brute force under such a 
“free flag.”4   
Others did see through the doubletalk, and foremost among them were the 
Filipinos themselves.  McKinley issued his proclamation in mid-December of 1898, and 
shortly thereafter General Elwell Otis, new head of the American army in Manila and 
titular military governor of the Philippines, provided a sanitized version of it to Emilio 
Aguinaldo.  Otis apparently held the belief—quite incorrect, in fact—that the Filipino 
commander had no means of obtaining the original.  The form Otis provided de-
emphasized the American claim to sovereignty but still claimed that America was there 
for the benefit of the inhabitants, suggesting little likelihood of an American withdrawal.  
Aguinaldo would not have been satisfied with the content of the sanitized version, but the 
Filipino general was furious when he learned that McKinley claimed that the right of 
conquest entitled the United States to absolute control over the whole of the Philippines.  
The army under his command maintained its position surrounding Manila, but took no 
action that would provoke a response.  No matter his course, the likelihood of a peaceful 
conclusion grew increasingly slim.
5
 
As tensions were building in the archipelago, other opponents of empire were 
taking action in the United States.  By November of 1898, those who had organized the 
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anti-imperialist meeting at Boston‟s Faneuil Hall had succeeded in attracting large 
numbers of prominent northeasterners (and a few others) to help them form a new 
organization.  The Anti-Imperialist League was officially formed on November 19, with 
former Massachusetts governor and Secretary of the Treasury George S. Boutwell 
selected as the first president.  That a regular Republican was chosen by the heavily 
mugwump organizing committee was no accident, but was instead designed to 
demonstrate their non-partisan approach to the issue.  The first of many honorary vice 
presidencies given out went to men such as businessman, economist, and gold-advocate 
Edward Atkinson, former president Grover Cleveland, steel tycoon Andrew Carnegie, 
leading mugwump and editor Carl Schurz, and former senator—and most recently, 
McKinley‟s Secretary of State—John Sherman.  Though they were joined by labor leader 
Samuel Gompers, for the most part the views of these men ran the (rather short) 
ideological gamut from classical liberal to conservative.
6
   
 Of course, there were plenty of others who saw the menace of imperialism as a 
serious problem.  Richard Pettigrew was thoroughly opposed to the acquisition of the 
Philippines, just as he had opposed Hawaiian annexation in 1893 and the summer of 
1898.  In late 1898, he was in contact with a number of soldiers of the First South Dakota 
in the Philippines in an attempt to gain a thorough and unfiltered assessment of the 
situation there.  The most important of these correspondents was Jonas Lien, a twenty-
five-year-old reform speaker and editor who was now a lieutenant in South Dakota‟s 
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regiment in Manila.  It was Lien who informed him in October that “the much heralded 
battle of Manila [the capture of the city by the Americans in August] was a farce—cut 
and dried and prearranged.”  Lien also told the senator that if the Americans attempted to 
claim the islands for themselves, Aguinaldo and his army would fight.  Worse still, “If 
they determine to fight it will be a prolonged struggle, ending either in the withdrawal in 
disgust of the United States forces or in the extermination of the native population.”  The 
best solution was for “you gentlemen who occupy seats in Congress” to “devise some 
scheme to get rid of it.”7   
 Pettigrew was hoping to do just that.  He responded to Lien by stating his views 
on the subject, namely that militarism and “the conquest and government of unwilling 
people” were un-American doctrines that must be defeated.  In a remarkable statement of 
his commitment to the cause, he even declared to his friend in Manila that “If we try to 
occupy the Philippines I hope the native inhabitants will fight us, and then I hope they 
will whip our army, for I believe all governments derive their just powers from the 
consent of the governed, and we have no right to forcibly occupy that country.”  They 
possessed every right to control their own affairs, and they should be allowed to “set up a 
government of their own and run it in their own way, without interference on our part in 
any particular.”8   
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 Pettigrew believed the best way to halt American ambitions in the Philippines was 
by defeating the Treaty of Paris.  He was joined in this view by many members of the 
League and senators such as the Democrat Arthur Pue Gorman and the Republican 
George Frisbie Hoar.  The required two-thirds majority for the ratification of a treaty was 
a high hurdle, and even a relatively small number could prevent its passage in the Fifty-
fifth Congress.  Those who fought against the treaty did so because they attributed much 
of the popular expansionist sentiment to the emotional nationalism sparked by the war.  
With the passage of time, passions would calm and popular sentiment would again favor 
more traditional American policies, they argued.
9
    
The opponents of ratification have often been depicted as the only real hope for 
American anti-imperialism, yet the possibility of “success” by this route was, at best, a 
highly questionable proposition.  First, if McKinley was committed to ratifying the treaty 
as it was, there was nothing they could have done to stop it.  The President could always 
call a special session of the newly elected Fifty-sixth Congress just a matter of days after 
the sitting Congress adjourned, and it was due to be more solidly pro-administration than 
its predecessor.
10
  While a number of anti-imperialists believed that the American public 
had become temporarily irrational and that the basic logic of their policy would become 
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clearer in the matter of a few months, it is surprising that historians have largely accepted 
their claim well after the fact.  Popular opinion regarding the Philippines was due to 
become more emotionally charged, not less so.   
One anti-imperialist outside of the Senate has been given considerable attention 
for his controversial role in ratification debate.  In mid-December, William Jennings 
Bryan requested and received an honorable discharge from the army.  While he had 
contended that all of the regiments that had volunteered for the war should be mustered 
out, his Second Nebraska Volunteer regiment was, like so many others, bound for 
garrison duty in the islands now under American control.  Freed from the obligation to 
follow the commander-in-chief, he could continue the anti-imperialist campaign he had 
begun in June.
11
   
Bryan disagreed with those anti-imperialists who favored rejection of the treaty, 
contending instead that America could deal with the situation more directly through 
legislation than by diplomacy.  Peace with the Filipinos could be established just by 
declaring that America‟s aim was to help them set up independent government.  Even 
such a simple declaration of policy would be hollow until Spanish sovereignty was 
erased.
12
   
                                                 
11
 William Jennings Bryan to Adjutant General, 10 December 1898, and Adjutant General to William 
Jennings Bryan, 12 December 1898, William Jennings Bryan Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C. (hereafter, WJB Papers), Box 22; Paolo E. Colletta, William Jennings Bryan:  
Political Evangelist, 1860-1908 (Lincoln:  University of Nebraska Press, 1964), 232; Louis W. Koenig, 
Bryan:  A Political Biography of William Jennings Bryan (New York:  G. P. Putnam‟s Sons, 1971), 287-
288.   
12
 For a description of Bryan‟s views, see “Bryan Says Ratify Treaty,” Evening Star (Washington, D.C.), 
January 9, 1899, p. 5; Paolo E. Coletta, “Bryan, McKinley, and the Treaty of Paris,” Pacific Historical 
Review 26, no. 2 (1957):  131-146; Colletta, William Jennings Bryan, 233-237; Koenig, Bryan, 290-294.   
  
341 
 
Both contemporaries and historians have described Bryan‟s position as 
complicated, contradictory, and incongruous with his stated goal.  But those who left 
behind the most widely referenced accounts—men such as George F. Hoar and Andrew 
Carnegie—were men who were opposed to the Commoner on nearly every other issue.13  
Of course, these were individuals who had no reason to see any high motive in Bryan‟s 
actions, and both of the aforementioned individuals went on to claim that the Nebraskan 
was only seeking political advantage.  In his autobiography, Hoar claimed that 
Democratic senators informed him that their party “could not hope to win a victory on the 
financial questions at stake after they had been beaten on them in a time of adversity; and 
that they must have this issue for the coming campaign.”  Bryan was the leading force 
that encouraged this line of thinking in Hoar‟s telling of the story, and he claimed the 
Commoner encouraged seventeen of his “followers” to vote for the treaty.14    
To suggest that politics played no part in Bryan‟s thinking would be inaccurate, 
but to alternatively say that the war had been conducted and portrayed in a non-partisan 
manner up to that point would be equally erroneous.  Additionally, he told Carnegie 
himself that his desire was to downplay imperialism as a political issue if at all possible.  
Shortly after the two began correspondence in December of 1898, and in direct response 
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to the steel magnate‟s suggestion that anti-imperialism could make Bryan a strong 
candidate in next presidential contest, Bryan informed him that he did not see it primarily 
as a political conflict.  Not only was he not yet a candidate for any office, but it was his 
hope “to see the question disposed of before 1900, so that the fight for silver and against 
trusts and bank notes may be continued.”15   
Whether or not Bryan did believe the issue of imperialism could be taken care of 
before the election of 1900, there is reasonable evidence that he did suspect that rejection 
of the treaty would have dire consequences for those who opposed it.  His letters to 
Carnegie reveal that he feared a backlash against the anti-imperialist movement that 
would halt their efforts permanently.  “Sentiment is turning our way,” he said, so “why 
risk the annihilation of our forces by rejecting the treaty?”  In any event, “To reject it 
would throw the subject back into the hands of the administration,” which obviously 
could not be trusted on the matter.  At the same time, those who stopped the treaty 
“would be held responsible for anything that might happen” in the interim.  A much 
briefer letter sent to Carnegie just two days before had expressed a similar view of the 
situation:  “Your plan is dangerous,” wrote Bryan, “my plan is safe.”16     
The historians who have all-too-frequently accepted the criticisms leveled by 
Hoar, Carnegie, and other conservatives have completely ignored the context of the 
moment.
17
  As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the President himself had 
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campaigned in 1898 by telling audiences that the nation was in a “crisis,” and that they 
needed to put “patriotism” above all else until the war was officially concluded.  This 
rhetoric continued on after the campaign as well, only compounded by rising tensions in 
the Philippines.
18
  By January, Republican newspapers were occasionally running stories 
that declared Aguinaldo and his representatives in Washington were “getting 
encouragement from the anti-expansionists in Congress.”19  Another claimed that, “By 
delaying ratification of the peace treaty senators hope to see trouble in the Philippines.”20  
Even some Democratic papers ran stories which included suggestions that delayed 
passage of the treaty provided inspiration not only to “Aguinaldo and his followers, but to 
foreign nations to encourage opposition to the United States.”21  An appreciation for this 
context necessitates a reappraisal of Bryan‟s position.  Bryan‟s actions and private 
statements suggest he considered the risk to be plausible.   
It should also be kept in mind that the stakes for Bryan and for those who opposed 
the treaty were quite different.  Bryan‟s western allies had just taken a severe beating in 
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the recent elections by virtue of Republican entreaties to put patriotism above politics.  
Those most critical of his decision were a Republican senator who would not likely face 
such repercussions, a Republican businessman who was beyond caring about his own 
popularity, and mugwumps who had either never held office or who had not come close 
to positions of power since shortly after the end of Reconstruction.  What Bryan had 
done, in reality, was provide those who loathed him a convenient excuse when they chose 
to abandon him later.   
Historians have been no kinder to Bryan, and in their search for further 
incriminating evidence they have turned to one of his allies:  Richard Pettigrew.  Over 
twenty years after the fact, the former South Dakota senator wrote a semi-
autobiographical account of his years in and around the national centers of power, and he 
included in it an indictment of the Commoner based upon his response to the treaty.  
Pettigrew claimed that when Bryan came to Washington to lobby in favor of the treaty, 
he told the senator that the islands could be granted independence shortly after the treaty 
was ratified, and if the administration “should undertake to conquer the islands and annex 
them to the United States, such a course would and ought to drive the Republican party 
from power.”  Pettigrew—and the historians who have accepted his claims since—stated 
that Bryan had “made the ratification of the Spanish Treaty an act of political 
expediency.”  By doing so he tarnished the cause of anti-imperialism, they claim.22   
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It makes little sense to discredit Bryan based on the record left by Pettigrew.  
What Bryan did was recognize that the whole process was political, and that the threat of 
retaliation by the electorate is one of the few motivators that exist in the American 
political system.  Additionally, other portions of Pettigrew‟s account have been called 
into question, while his arraignment of none other than George Frisbie Hoar himself has 
somehow been ignored.
23
  Hoar, he claimed, tried to convince him to vote for the treaty 
and then fight for Philippine independence afterward.  He concluded by suggesting that 
the senator from Massachusetts only registered his protest by voting against the treaty 
when it was certain that enough votes had been mustered to ratify it.
24
   
Regardless of the validity of Pettigrew‟s account, anti-imperialism manifested 
itself in many forms during the last political battles of the Fifty-fifth Congress.  While 
western reformers in Congress remained divided over the methods to employ, by this 
point there was nearly complete agreement that the new overseas policies advocated by 
expansionists posed real threats to freedom at home and abroad.  After stinging defeats in 
the elections of 1898 this was the last chance many of them had to put their opposition to 
empire on record in the national legislature, and many decided to make the most of it.  
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The Opening of the Debate and Imperialist Arguments 
Before the President sent his proclamation of “benevolent assimilation” to the 
Philippines, and even before the Treaty of Paris was signed, opposition to annexation was 
forming in Congress.  Senator George Vest, a Missouri Democrat, introduced a resolution 
stating that “under the Constitution of the United States no power is given to the Federal 
Government to acquire territory to be held and governed permanently as colonies.”  
While it went on to clarify that small quantities of land could be acquired as coaling 
stations, it specifically defined colonialism as a European institution and not one suited 
for the great republic.
25
  His resolution was only the first of many designed to force the 
administration and its allies in Congress to declare their intentions toward the Philippines, 
and these (not the treaty vote) became the clearest point of contention between supporters 
and opponents of the McKinley administration.   
Republicans were forced into a tentative position, largely by the silence of the 
administration, and Populists and Democrats sensed the opportunity this presented. The 
most well-known Senate resolutions on policy, and the ones that were most seriously 
debated, were those by Vest, presented at the opening of the session, one by Augustus 
Bacon of Georgia, first offered as debate began in earnest on January 11, and one by 
Senator Samuel McEnery of Louisiana, proposed just before the final vote on 
ratification.
26
  Despite the prominence of the proposals by southerners, Western senators 
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were no less active.  Between January 11 and February 11, William Allen alone offered 
three different resolutions that were designed to put either the Senate or both houses of 
Congress on record in opposition to colonialism.  The last of these was framed merely as 
a reaffirmation of the principles of the Declaration of Independence, but in reality it was a 
thinly veiled criticism of those who believed that Puerto Rico or the Philippines (or, 
according to many Republicans, even Cuba) needed to be ruled by Americans.
27
  Allen 
claimed to be surprised at the opposition that arose due to the resolution‟s statement that 
the doctrine of the Declaration “is not, in its application, to be confined to the people of 
the United States, but is universal and extends to all peoples, wherever found, having a 
distinct and well-organized society and territory of their own.”28  He was not the only 
westerner who used resolutions in an attempt to force some statement of policy out of 
McKinley‟s backers, but all proved ineffective.29    
Western reformers had no lack of opportunity to voice their opposition to 
imperialism.  The Senate devoted much time to debating the pending treaty and, even 
more commonly, the resolutions designed to set American policy regarding the “new 
possessions.”  House members would normally have had less opportunity to state their 
opinion, and they had no chance to vote on or even debate the merits of the treaty.  But in 
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this case, the administration handed them a gift.  Secretary of War Russell Alger, 
Adjutant General Henry Corbin, and their ally in the House, Representative John A. T. 
Hull of Iowa, fashioned a bill designed to expand the regular army from roughly 25,000 
men to 100,000 on a permanent basis, ostensibly to police the colonies.  In fact, there was 
still more resistance to an enlarged American army than the administration supposed, and 
it soon became clear that the bill had little chance of passing.  Some feared that 
conservatives wanted an expanded army to put down internal disturbances, but for 
western reformers in the House neither its use at home nor in the colonies would have 
been acceptable.  As they attacked the Hull bill, anti-imperialist Congressman used the 
opportunity to reflect on the problems that accompanied expansion.
30
   
The President‟s western supporters were somewhat slow to organize a response, 
perhaps because of lingering ambivalence regarding imperialism and its consequences.  
In one case, Senator George C. Perkins of California asked his state legislature to instruct 
him how to vote on the Treaty of Paris.  In his request, he clearly indicated that he 
considered the dangers associated with the annexation of the Philippines to be great, 
suggesting that he preferred to vote against the treaty.  Perkins was a former governor of 
the state and a man one historian claimed was known “notoriously as a servant of the 
railroad” and big business generally, but in the last lines of his letter he awkwardly 
referred to himself as a mere “representative of the people of California” and 
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acknowledged it was his duty to “obey.”  In this circumstance, he thought it wiser to 
abdicate the responsibility that went with being senator rather than support a risky policy 
of his own volition.
31
   
Eventually western supporters of the administration did organize a response, but 
when it came to policy statements they largely followed the lead of their eastern 
counterparts.  Most commonly, they declared that it was the wrong moment to state their 
intentions towards the “new possessions.”  Many were likely trying to follow the 
President‟s lead, but the chief executive proved too nimble for even his allies to pin down 
on the subject.  And so they were left to argue that no one should yet declare America‟s 
policy.  Senator Thomas Carter of Montana simply questioned the utility of an early 
declaration of policy.  “It must be conceded by those who seek to determine the 
momentous questions presented by the resolutions, not questions of constitutionality, but 
questions of policy, that our information is of the most meager character.” Greater 
knowledge would allow the Congress and President to better chart the nation‟s course.  
As for now, “Even the number of islands in the archipelago seems to be a matter of 
controversy and doubt. The number of dialects or languages spoken by the people is 
merely conjectural, so far as our information at present extends.”32  Representative 
Thomas Tongue of Oregon argued along very similar lines that “We know too little of 
existing conditions, the capacities or will of the people, to determine upon a plan of 
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future government for the people of the islands.”  Worse yet, “the people of the 
Philippine Islands know less of us; less of our institutions than we do of theirs.”  
Questions surrounding the future of the Philippines “will be better solved next year than 
now; better in two years than in one; better in three years than in two.”33  Such a 
timeframe was much to the liking of Senator William Stewart.  Nevada‟s grey-bearded 
senator thought any declaration was “entirely premature.”  “Six months or a year or two 
or three years hence will develop the facts, and the American Government will be better 
able to deal with it when they have a full knowledge of the facts than they are now, with 
the limited knowledge they have.”34  Of course, this was tantamount to handing the 
subject over to the President‟s care, but it allowed expansionists to claim that their 
solution was the cautious, responsible one.   
The expansionist refusal to define the terms of expansion—such as whether it was 
to be temporary or perpetual, or whether the peoples were to be considered citizens or 
subjects—only led to greater criticism by their opponents.  Jerry Simpson mocked a 
Pennsylvania Republican for what he branded a “new kind of statesmanship.”  “He did 
not tell us and he did not know what course the President is going to pursue with 
reference to expansion or the annexation of the Philippine Islands,” said Simpson, “but he 
finally said that he was willing at all times, in season and out of season, to stand by 
whatever his party wanted him to stand by.”  The Kansan imagined a circumstance in 
which a member of Congress could have no thoughts of their own on a matter “until he 
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read his paper and found what the President stood for.”35  The laughter his comments 
invoked could not mask the seriousness of the issue.   
Imperialists were able to argue that the issue could be put off for a future date 
because America had always been a country of freedom and justice, and so there was no 
reason to believe it would behave differently now.  Colorado Senator Edward Wolcott 
was sure that America would not “put our hands upon that people [the Filipinos] except 
to bless them.  American institutions mean liberty and not despotism, and our dealings 
with those islanders, be they brief or be they for all time, can only serve to lift them up 
nearer into the light of civilization and of Christianity.”   The free government and a free 
press would guarantee their safety, he said, and American treatment of them would be 
always be “honorable and fair and just.”36  Congressman Tongue assured the House that 
“it is safe to trust the representatives of the American people to establish a government in 
the Philippine Islands, not only much better than the people have ever known, but one 
that will give the fullest share of personal liberty and political privileges that the people 
are capable of receiving consistent with their own welfare.”   For Tongue, this was 
guaranteed because Anglo-Saxons were a just race.  For those who claimed the United 
States would act as Spain had, he asked how anyone could “compare America to Spain, 
Americans to Spaniards?  The difference between these two races was demonstrated by 
Dewey at Manila... Why not rather point us to our own race, to the example of our own 
history?”  Along with America‟s own history of expansion was “the success of English 
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colonial government,” which proved affirmatively, he said, that Anglo-Americans were 
morally (and racially) fit to rule.
37
   
The imperialists then took their arguments further as they emphasized an 
American obligation to “protect” and govern those who they believed could not yet 
govern themselves.  Teller did not believe that “we should shrink from our duty because 
there may be difficulties attending it.”  The country went to war to free Cuba from 
tyranny, he said, and “when eight or ten millions more of men under like circumstances 
fall under our control, we can not avoid our duty by saying. „We went to war to help 
Cuba. We will help nobody else.‟ That is cowardly. We can not do it.”  In his view, the 
Philippines needed to be freed from Spain and protected from outside enemies.
38
  His 
fellow Coloradan, Wolcott, agreed, but he laid out the other possibilities in grimmer 
detail.  “The course of events, unexpected and necessarily unforeseen, leave us at the 
conclusion of this war charged with a duty toward 9,000,000 people in far-off, distant 
seas,” he said.  “We found them cruelly oppressed by Spain.  No man with bowels of 
compassion would want to turn them back to that country.”  To abandon them now would 
be to leave the diverse people of the islands open to “internecine strife, perhaps extending 
over a generation, with its accompaniment of bloodshed and murder and rapine.”  Surely 
it was clear that “the people there are as yet apparently unfitted for self-government.”  
The only alternative to that, he suggested, was to take them under the American wing or 
leave them vulnerable to “the land-hunger and the greed of the countries of Europe that 
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are now seeking to colonize land the wide world over,” several of whom may fight for 
the islands and “plunge the world in[to] war.”39  Teller and Wolcott‟s description of 
obligation to an oppressed people and the international tumult that could be caused by 
uncertainty in Asia essentially replicated the concerns that McKinley‟s biographers have 
considered the most vital to the president‟s decision making.40   
While the talk of America‟s benign mission was not totally new by late 1898 and 
early 1899, it had been less apparent in earlier manifestations of expansionist sentiment.  
The language imperialists now adopted bore a closer resemblance to that used to justify 
intervention on behalf of Cuba than it did to even that applied to Hawaiian annexation 
just months earlier.  While certainly this was an appeal to a widely-held faith in 
America‟s exceptional role in the world, that such a shift occurred at all may be telling.  
Its use in this case suggests—as many scholars have explained—that the rhetoric of 
civilizing mission and paternalistic tutelage relied upon a common vision of America as a 
powerful force for good.  The nation‟s inherent “morality” then provided justification for 
intervention and colonialism.
41
 
Of course, the language of benevolence and protection was mixed with other less 
compassionate talk.  While nearly all did try to claim that the acquisition of new territory 
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would benefit the inhabitants, several imperialists added that profit and strategic 
advantage were real objects.  William Stewart was rather exceptional because he was one 
of the very few imperialist senators to overtly reject the supposition that the United States 
had any special responsibility toward the Filipinos.  “When and where did the idea 
originate that it was the duty of the United States to go into the Philippine Islands to 
establish a government for those people and to prepare them for self-government?” he 
asked.  While his query was in response to an anti-imperialist resolution, it had been ad 
rather moderate one which suggested that there could be a moral objective behind 
American colonialism.  Stewart rejected such concepts outright.  “If it is our duty to give 
the people of the Philippine Islands good government, to educate them, and to establish a 
government suitable for them, is it not our duty to do so to every country in the world 
where they do not have a government suitable to our ideas?”  Instead, he reminded 
listeners that “There are many people who think they are valuable acquisitions.”  He 
believed that possessions in the tropics could provide goods that could not be produced in 
the United States, and thus reduce the flow of hard currency overseas.  The senior senator 
from Nevada was also certain that America could capture a larger share of the trade of 
Asia.  “[T]here is in the Orient an import trade which in round numbers amounts to a 
billion dollars a year. We have only 5 per cent of the trade of Asia and Oceania. If we had 
these islands, and were engaged in the trade there, we would have a nucleus for trade and 
have a chance to compete with England.”  He was confident the Philippines would 
facilitate trade for the United States just as Hong Kong did for Britain.
42
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Tongue was even more emphatic about the need to develop trade with Asia.  The 
future of industrial America required it.  “The productions of the United States are 
increasing year by year with tremendous rapidity and are assuming unheard-of 
proportions,” he said.  But, he asked, “when the people of the West have attained full 
growth, developed all their resources, extended and expanded their industries, what is to 
become of our surplus productions?”   Europe—especially Britain—and their colonies 
had provided the largest markets for American exports up to the present, but that demand 
would soon be outstripped by the supply of American goods.  “The only remaining field 
is in Asiatic countries.”  Anti-imperialists agreed with much of this argument, but refused 
to believe that colonialism would create trade.  To one such “gentleman from Indiana” 
who had recently declared that “commerce is the child of peace,” Tongue responded 
curtly, “Not in the Orient.”  “We can preserve and increase our trade and commerce in 
the Orient if we are prepared to defend them…. With a chain of naval stations in Hawaii, 
the Ladrones, and the Philippine Islands, the Pacific Ocean will become an American 
lake, and will bear American commerce, not only now, but in the future.”   The 
Congressman from Oregon went on to tell the House that the opportunity had presented 
itself but may not be there at a later time.  America needed to secure its place while it 
could.
43
   
Tongue‟s talk of opportunity and American self-interest fit well with his belief 
that those who were to be governed need not have any say in how they were governed.  
He pointed out that “The pilgrim fathers did not wait upon Plymouth Rock for the 
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„consent of the governed‟ before taking possession of this continent. The framers of the 
Declaration of Independence organized a government in the Northwest Territory without 
consulting a single inhabitant.”  In fact, consent had only occasionally been tied to the 
right to govern, he said.  Certainly it was still true in his own time.  “Mississippi and 
other States are disfranchising large numbers, if not a majority, of their male citizens 
without their consent.”  Almost shockingly, he even described the Civil War as proof that 
the government often ruled without consent:  “Within the memory of this generation, we 
expended billions of treasures and sacrificed hundreds of thousands of valuable lives to 
force upon the people of a part of this country a government to which they did not 
consent.”  While he half-heartedly did mention it as an ideal that all governments should 
aspire to, he essentially described “consent of the governed” as a fiction.44   
Other westerners described the ways in which democracy had been limited during 
the history of American expansion.  Henry Teller, far more of an idealist than Tongue, 
admitted that consent had never mattered in previous instances.  “We have never put that 
limitation upon it [expansion] in legislative affairs,” he said.  In the case of the territories 
seized from Mexico, “if we had elected so to do, we might have held them by conquest, 
for we had wrested them by force from Mexico,” though the United States included in the 
treaty provisions for the eventual inclusion of the land as states.  Even now, portions had 
been excluded from full admission.  He reminded his colleagues that, “in the case of the 
Territories of New Mexico and Arizona,” the United States had ruled territories without 
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consent for fifty years.
45
  These same remarks were echoed by Nevada‟s William Stewart 
later in the session.
46
  Westerners knew well about government without consent.   
 Yet when Teller suggested that the United States could acquire colonies and 
govern other people without consent, he was explaining what the government could 
legally do, not what it should do.  No doubt, he remained a spread-eagle expansionist.  He 
included in his speech hints that American control of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and 
even Cuba were necessary, and made it clear he believed that all would soon be part of 
the American empire.  However, his was ultimately a kind of anti-colonial expansionism.  
In his view, these lands were either to be fully incorporated into the American body 
politic or set free.  “[W]e ought to keep in view all the time that some day these people 
are to be self-reliant and self-governing, as we are, or they are to become a part and 
parcel of this Republic, entitled to all the rights and subject to all the duties of citizenship 
of States.”  He, almost naively, believed that Americans would not tolerate colonialism.  
He called talk of colonialism “idle,” for he did “not think that any considerable number of 
the American people or any considerable number of men in public life propose to adopt 
the system which Great Britain adopted with reference to her early colonies.”  Nor did he 
think that “the American people will believe in holding these islands for the purpose of 
making money out of them, as the French are holding some portions of China and some 
portions of Africa.”  He added that the United States must give the peoples of the new 
possessions good and accountable government—not because of constitutional 
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requirements, but because it was necessary for peace and the maintenance of order.  The 
government would “make a mistake by refusing to do justice” to the Filipinos, he warned.  
“[W]e can have great tribulations brought upon us by so doing. We shall make a mistake 
if we make up our minds that we are going to govern those people from here.”  The result 
of that would be government by force, and even that he thought unlikely to work.  “You 
will need your 50,000 soldiers, and in a little while you will need more, for they are a 
great people.  They are a people who know something of their rights. They are a people 
who are willing to contend for them, and I believe it to be almost an axiom that a people 
who will fight for their liberty, and who are willing to die for it, are capable of 
maintaining it when they get it.”  While in his last remarks Teller proved prophetic, he 
was too charitable in his view of American intentions.  Many did contemplate a colonial 
policy, and his faith that the empire for liberty would be extended would prove 
misplaced.
47
   
Teller rarely broke from his hopeful message to criticize those who differed with 
him.  Many who he had worked with closely in 1896 were opposed to annexation, and 
though he believed their fears were unfounded, he did consider their beliefs laudable.  
The imperialist Republicans were not as generous.  Most suggested (just as they had 
throughout much of 1898) that their opponents were essentially traitors.  Frequently, 
McKinley‟s supporters claimed that any disagreement over the treaty emboldened the 
Filipinos to attack the Americans in Manila.  Tongue claimed that “their ignorance and 
passions are being inflamed by fraud, by falsehood, by deceit, and by slanderers of 
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Americans and American institutions, in the Philippine Islands, in the press there and 
here, and in both ends of this Capitol.”  Tongue went further still, accusing the anti-
imperialists of “shotting guns to be fired into the ranks of American soldiers. They are 
whetting knives to be plunged into American bosoms. They are preparing to make 
American wives widows, American mothers childless, and to slaughter the flower of 
American manhood in Manila.” 48   
Senator Edward Wolcott of Colorado agreed.  Those who wanted to debate policy 
were holding up the treaty vote and complicating the international situation.  He 
complained that the Senate was left “wrangling day after day before the gaze of the 
whole world,” for the benefit of those who were “seeking to belittle the action of these 
commissioners, and by resolutions in open Senate… to strip the treaty of much of its 
force and effect.”  Those who fought the treaty or questioned American policy were 
guilty of giving “counsel and aid” to “those people in the Philippines who might be 
inclined to question our authority.”  Furthermore, the war needed to be put to an end 
before European nations decided to intervene on the behalf of Spain.  “Bar England, there 
is not a country in Europe that is not hostile to us,” he said.  “During all this war they 
stood in sullen hate, hoping for our defeat and that disaster might come to us; and to-day 
they wait with eager and rapacious gaze, hoping that some event may yet prevent our 
reaping the fruits of the treaty which has been agreed upon by the commissioners of the 
two countries.”49   
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Wolcott continued his counterattack by suggesting that those who opposed 
annexation were hoping to use imperialism as “a new issue [that] should be brought 
before the American people to be determined at the next Presidential election. They 
intend that the American people shall be called to pass on the questions arising out of the 
war, and that this shall be the issue of the next campaign.”50  Those unwilling to follow 
the president were playing politics at a sensitive moment, he said.   
  
Imperialism and the Western Reform Response 
Despite the attacks of those like Wolcott, the opposition did continue to contest 
what increasingly appeared to be an imperialist administration policy.  Their fight was 
not confined to any single topic, as western reformers leveled attacks against the 
undemocratic rule, economic exploitation, and militarism they saw as the consequences 
of McKinley‟s vision.  Populists and their allies charged their opponents with quashing 
democracy abroad while strangling it into submission at home.  The republican 
independence they cherished could not survive alongside the machinery of a warlike 
imperial power.  Conquest, they declared, offered no new freedoms, but only served to 
extend the reach of the industrial and financial elite.
51
    
An examination of that moment, as nearly all Populists and reform Democrats and 
other united to oppose expansion, reveals key elements of the imperialist/anti-imperialist 
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debate that have hitherto been ignored by scholars.  For example, some historians have 
claimed that the conflict between anti-imperialists and their counterparts was a “narrow 
and limited debate on the question of which tactical means the nation should use to obtain 
commonly desired objectives”—i.e., the expansion of American overseas trade.  This 
analysis is most notable among historians who have claimed that imperialism was largely 
the result of economic motives.  William Appleman Williams and Walter LaFeber 
described the process by which Americans came to contemplate their place in the 
international scene through market economics.  Nearly all Americans came to view 
overseas markets as a solution to the problem of “overproduction,” Williams and LaFeber 
have claimed, and so the only real difference between imperialists and anti-imperialists 
was the extent to which they believed overseas colonies would facilitate trade.  The 
imperialist willingness to annex distant territories separated them from their rivals, but all 
believed trade—and even the use of force to secure it—was necessary to encourage 
American economic stability.
52
   
Perhaps it would be most useful to first emphasize what Williams and LaFeber 
got right.  While they devoted a large portion of their works to Americans‟ increasing 
desire to find new markets, they most usefully described the conception—finally 
embodied by many of McKinley‟s policies—of an empire based upon trade and backed 
up with a nearby military presence when required.  Whereas European imperialism of the 
                                                 
52
 The subject is most thoroughly explained in Walter Lafeber, New Empire:  An Interpretation of 
American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1963), especially 412-417 (quote 
taken from 416); and William Appleman Williams, The Roots of Modern American Empire:  A Study of the 
Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society (New York:  Random House, 
1969), especially 432-445.   
  
362 
 
era had come to be based on the control of large populations in order to monopolize 
colonial resources and markets, McKinley and his forebears had envisioned a smaller 
footprint, and certainly one without the trappings of colonialism.  Though the situation in 
the Philippines had altered the equation in the short term, this was to become the model 
for America‟s twentieth-century empire.53 
Both historians had little difficulty finding evidence that the anti-imperialists of 
1899 were part of a growing consensus in favor of greater international trade.  Democrats 
had emphasized low-tariff policies designed to improve trade prospects since the 
inception of their party, and the issue was brought back to the forefront in the 1880s by 
Grover Cleveland.  Their classical-liberal mugwump allies were all the more committed 
to free trade.  While Populists had officially labeled the tariff fights of the old parties a 
sham issue, many among them had called for open trade policies that would create new 
markets for American goods.  Furthermore, several Populists had supported the 
development of coaling bases in the Pacific and Caribbean during their congressional 
careers as way to promote greater American influence and trade.
54
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Despite their suggestions, it is only possible to label the western Populists and 
Democrats as essentially imperialist based on a misunderstanding of the most vital 
elements of their worldviews.  Their opposition to the excesses of domestic capitalists 
and their fears of militarism guaranteed that they would relentlessly fight against the 
policies McKinley was already beginning to implement.    
First, it should be noted that while some western anti-imperialists had supported 
the acquisition of overseas naval bases, others among them had always seen them as 
unnecessary.  In a speech in 1898, Senator Stephen White declared his opposition to any 
form of “territorial aggrandizement which would require maintenance by a naval force in 
excess of any yet provided for our national uses... Even as simple coaling stations, such 
territorial acquisitions would involve responsibility beyond their utility.”55  In a similar 
vein, Richard Pettigrew wrote a letter to his brother informing him of his views on Cuba, 
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.  “I would not put a protectorate over any of 
them,” he wrote, “neither would I have a coaling station at any of these points….  
Plutocracy wishes us to enter upon the acquisition of distant countries to govern, and thus 
furnish food for discontent.”56     
Many westerners understood Pettigrew‟s point well—namely that an increasing 
global presence would likely lead to increasing numbers of American interventions and 
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competition with the other industrialized powers.  While they despised the thought of a 
colonial government under the American flag, they were just as opposed to the kind of 
armed entanglements that were likely to follow.  Jerry Simpson pointed out that his 
recent opponent in the election had said that the Pacific islands were “but a stepping-
stone, that that was but the first step in the policy to be laid out, that later on, when China 
was to be divided up amongst the foreign nations, we were to be on hand with a big army 
and a big navy to see that we got our part of it.”57  Nebraska Populist William Greene 
believed that Britain was encouraging the American takeover of the Philippines as a 
counter to the influence of other imperial powers in East Asia.  Ultimately, Britain “wants 
us to form an alliance with her. Why? When the great struggle comes, England wants the 
United States to help her in her plan to steal the biggest portion of the Chinese Empire.”58  
Stephen White considered his earlier suspicions confirmed.  These bases, combined with 
the proposed expansion of the military, were preparations “for not merely a war, but for 
wars.”  In the future, was it not likely that “our growth along the lines of conquest will 
enlist the opposition of other peoples; may it not be that other nations, seeing that we are 
attempting to interfere with them, will here-after, however friendly they may be to-day, 
challenge our superiority?”59  Western anti-imperialists did not merely oppose the 
extension of the nation‟s territorial boundaries, but instead they fought imperialism 
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because they perceived the acquisition of distant stations as the beginning of a new policy 
that would lead to perpetual conflicts and the growth of militarism.   
While certain westerners had spoken of their desire for America to become more 
engaged in affairs overseas earlier in the decade, most opposed the military buildups that 
would have been required for the maintenance of a “new empire.”  Though western 
reformers had a mixed record when it came to military modernization proposals in 
Congress early in the decade, by the latter half of the 1890s they consistently opposed 
any substantial expansion of the nation‟s armed forces.  In early 1898—as war with Spain 
seemed imminent—Jerry Simpson declared that he favored certain limited naval 
construction, but feared what others intended to do with it.  “I hope and trust that our 
policy will be in the future as it has been in the past, one of self-defense.  If it is, we do 
not need a large number of seagoing battle ships.”  Instead of what naval men now refer 
to as a “blue water” navy, Simpson hoped that the American fleet would primarily be 
constructed with coastal defense in mind.
60
  At around the same time, colleagues such as 
the Coloradans John Shafroth and John Calhoun Bell (the former a Silver Republican, the 
latter a Populist) dismissed permanent expansion of the regular army as unnecessary and 
undesirable.  In 1899, Populists and their western allies were even more emphatic in their 
opposition to any military enlargement.
61
  No form of imperialism would have been 
possible without a larger and modernized military establishment, but (as will be 
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explained in greater detail shortly), western reformers detested everything that militarism 
brought with it.    
By early 1899, western anti-imperialists had become all the more committed in 
their opposition to the unnecessary use of force overseas.  Sensing that enforcement of 
McKinley‟s “benevolent assimilation” proclamation could lead to a new war, William 
Allen proposed a resolution stating that “That any aggressive action by Army or Navy on 
the part of the United States against the Filipinos would be an act of war unwarranted on 
the part of the President and the exercise of constitutional power vested exclusively in 
Congress.”62   
Others vented their frustration with a military occupation even closer to home:  
Cuba.  Western calls for action in Cuba had not been based on a belief that the island 
should be forcibly pulled into the American orbit; it was Allen, after all, who had 
declared that “We do not want Cuba.  We do not even desire to be her guardian.  But we 
are determined she shall be free.”63  When it appeared that American soldiers began 
settling in for a long occupation of the Caribbean island, these same members were 
furious.  Representative Curtis Castle (Populist, California) stated that “The solemn 
proclamation of the President that Cuba should have a free and independent government 
is violated both in letter and in spirit.”  While independence was delayed, ostensibly so 
certain “internal improvements” could be made, “Cuba will be ruled by an American 
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captain-general.”64  South Dakota Populist Freeman Knowles noted that “It is now six 
months since hostilities ceased, and no move has been made by the Administration to 
give the people of Cuba the independence and self-government promised them in the 
declaration of war.”  While Cubans were “begging of the President to be permitted to call 
a convention of the Cuban people to form a government,” the South Dakotan said the 
administration was deaf to their cries.
65
  John Shafroth pointed out that some supporters 
of the administration were claiming that the regular army needed to be permanently 
increased in order to police Cuba.  To those who favored a long-term occupation, he 
informed them that they should abandon such a notion because “Public sentiment will not 
long countenance a standing army there.”66  Though some imperialists were even 
reconsidering the pledge they had given to guarantee a free Cuba, most western Populists 
and their allies called for an immediate end to American interference in the island‟s 
affairs.   
Furthermore, opponents of the administration did not accept the argument that 
profits from trade would follow in the wake of militarization and expansion and 
ultimately trickle-down to farmers and laborers.  Representative Curtis Castle asked the 
expansionists, “since the vast majority of our citizens are to have no share in the rich 
treasures of the Orient, I wish to inquire what portion of our population is to be 
permanently enriched?”67  Traders, speculators, and manufacturers could hypothetically 
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make a profit from imperialism, but it was hardly logical to argue that ownership of the 
Philippines would equate to control of Asian trade.  William Greene said that the 
imperialist talk of “cargoes of American produce sailing past Honolulu, down by Manila, 
and over to Hongkong” were “only dreams.”  Despite the supposed advantage that they 
claimed came with being “on the ground,” as some Republicans said, Greene was sure 
that it was impossible to undercut the advantages others had.  “Do you think the 
Chinaman is going to buy American wheat unless he can get it cheaper than he can get 
wheat from India?  Do you think he is going to buy American beef unless he can buy it 
cheaper than he can buy the Australian beef?”  The best proof of that principle had 
already been made by the War Department.  “Where did the Government go to buy the 
beef and the sheep and the flour and the vegetables to feed our army at Manila?” he 
asked.  “Why, we went to Sydney, Australia, and there our Government bought the sheep 
and the cattle, the flour and the vegetables, loaded them on British bottoms, and took 
them over to feed our own army in the Philippine Islands.”  Surely, it was difficult to 
argue that Asia was a ready market for American agricultural products.
68
   
The Populist critique of imperialism was based largely on their earlier attack upon 
industrial monopoly and its reliance upon a corrupted centralized authority.  Western 
reformers believed they were witnessing the continued evolution of a widening 
infrastructure of political, economic, and military control.  Imperialism represented the 
extension of that system for the benefit of economic elites.  One of the best articulated 
examples of this critique could be found in a speech by the Curtis Castle.  The 
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Californian claimed that imperialists planned not only to “deny the Filipinos their well-
earned liberty,” but also to  
send over a horde of hungry exploiters, who, protected by the strong arm of the 
military despotism to be given those unhappy people in lieu of their own 
government, will seize all the natural resources of the islands, and under the guise 
of law, through charters granted by the Government, all kinds and descriptions of 
monopolies are to be farmed out to these ravening harpies. With the land 
sequestered and the instruments of production monopolized, the natives must ever 
remain a subject people, whose cry for liberty will be answered with the lash. 
 
The administration was working to complete the current global system of exploitation.  
“Nowhere upon the earth does labor secure the results of its efforts,” and this would soon 
be as true in the Philippines as it was in America.  Economic opportunity, the hallmark of 
American freedom, was being eliminated through a process that concentrated wealth and 
power.  “The monopolization of the natural resources of all countries and the 
monopolization of the instruments of production, together with the monopolization of the 
means of distribution, forever bar the poor from any portion, however small, of the stolen 
wealth wrung from the unrequited toil of subject nations.” 69   
Castle described this monopolization of power in international terms, but his 
description of America‟s place in the system was complicated.  He would have 
characterized America as part of that global periphery of “subject nations,” but he also 
was sure that the nation‟s elite were part of the scheme:  “The American plutocracy, not 
content with eating out the heart of our democracy, not content with enslaving American 
labor, now comes before Congress with an effrontery born of contempt and demands that 
we plunge into the vortex of war and debt, that thereby they may be enabled to rob and 
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despoil the workers of a foreign land.”  But obviously the elite could not manage this 
alone.  They had solicited the national government to do their bidding, while the “wealth 
producers of America are insolently commanded by their despoilers to furnish mighty 
armies to subdue the wealth producers of other lands, that plutocracy may have other 
fields to devastate.” Imperialism was not so much the extension of national control as it 
was the expansion of economic interests into new fields under the umbrella of 
government protection.   
 Castle‟s speech characterizing commercial imperialism was one of the most 
complete delivered by any western anti-imperialist, but he was certainly not the only one 
to hold such views.  Congressman Jeremiah Botkin of Kansas explained that the present 
case of expansion was quite different from that which had come earlier in American 
history.  “Climatic conditions are such” in the Philippines that a white American would 
“dare not undertake a permanent residence and ordinary labor” there.  While the common 
American could not go, “a wealthy syndicate can secure large tracts of land on which to 
grow the products that constitute our chief imports from those islands, viz., sugar, 
tobacco, and hemp.  Unfortunately the climate can not affect these syndicates. They are 
immunes.”  The military conquest of the archipelago was being plotted so that “the 
organized capital of this country and of Europe” could “exploit great enterprises in the 
Philippines, monopolize the valuable franchises, and lay under perpetual tribute to „the 
bloodless spirit of wealth‟ the resources of that splendid archipelago.”  The large army 
  
371 
 
some proposed was designed to “enforce commercialism and imperialism” in the island 
possessions.
70
   
Another western Populist, Freeman Knowles, questioned the justice of exporting 
the system of exploitation and conflict that Americans had come to know.   “[W]hat kind 
of „blessings of law and liberty‟ is it that we are going to extend to the people of these 
islands?” he asked.  “Is it the same kind which these same „expansionists‟ are now 
extending to our own laboring classes in this country?”  And if the Filipinos “claim 
enough of the products of their own labor to keep their families from starvation, will they 
be shot to death as our own laboring men were” in America‟s coal mining towns?  “You 
talk of „extending the blessings of law and liberty‟ to people 10,000 miles away, while 
our own laboring classes are reduced to absolute serfdom.  Under Philippine native 
government, I wonder if men would be imprisoned for six months without trial for 
advising their co-laborers to demand a fair share of the products of their own toil?”  Was 
this “the kind of „law and liberty‟ we are going to extend to the Filipinos?”71  Knowles 
was not merely critiquing the American system of political economy, but his remarks 
were made with the assumption that that system was to be forcibly pushed across the 
whole of the new imperial domain.   
Western reformers had no desire to extend the reach of financiers and 
industrialists at the point of a gun, but they also believed that the proposed program of 
militarization would have dire consequences on the home front.  Since at least the mid-
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1890s, the top generals had called for a larger army, and the argument that they 
increasingly employed pertained to domestic order.  Though the Indian wars were, for all 
practical purposes, over, the army needed to be expanded and redeployed to bases near 
major urban centers.
72
  The proponents of military reorganization were consistently 
thwarted in the years before 1899, but then the argument changed.  The new claim was 
that soldiers were needed to garrison the “new possessions.”   
Many western Populists, Democrats, and Silver Republicans had been in 
Congress long enough to have seen the previous iterations of the Hull Bill, and they 
certainly had not forgotten.  Jerry Simpson had spent most of the 1890s in the House, and 
he reminded his colleagues of it.  In the history of all nations in which “there is much 
concentrated wealth there comes an anxiety on the part of those who own the wealth of 
the country for a strong centralized government.”  For that reason, certain members of 
Congress had said for years “that our standing Army is too small; that we ought to have 
at least 100,000 men; that we ought to have a force sufficient to suppress domestic 
violence in this country.”  But now, he said, “here comes a new pretext, under cover, of 
course—the pretext that we want a large standing army now because we have got to hold 
the Philippine Islands.”  Simpson refused to consider this a legitimate excuse.  Even a 
brief colonial conflict or short-term policing would not require a permanent expansion of 
the army he said.
73
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Such sentiments were all but ubiquitous among western Populists and Democrats 
in the House.   “It is a significant fact,” said Representative William Vincent, “that since 
the era of corporation rule set in and since our beneficent social system developed the 
tramp, the lock-out, and the strike, the Army has never been called out to suppress or 
hold in check the corporation, but always to suppress the striker.”  While he described his 
distaste for colonialism as well, he also believed “that the great corporate interests of the 
country have been and are now demanding a large standing army” for use at home.74  
William Greene agreed.  They wanted an expanded army “because the great corporations 
of the country, the accumulated wealth of the country, the capitalists, demand it to 
maintain order.  Not order in the Philippines, but order here at home.”75 The Democrat 
James Hamilton Lewis of Washington was every bit as sure that militarists had the same 
purpose in 1899 as they had with a nearly identical bill proposed in March of 1898:  “that 
it is to preserve order in this country.”  “The use of the military force, drawn from 
portions of the country wholly foreign to the community in which they may be serving,” 
would be employed against labor, “to „preserve order‟ by Winchesters and hush protests 
by bayonets!”76  This was but one way in which they believed that war abroad would be 
used to destroy liberty in America.   
Western reformers believed that the centralization and militarization that came 
with imperialism necessarily posed an immense threat to American democracy, but the 
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colonized people posed yet another kind of risk.  Their imperialist counterparts were 
already well aware that their support for the annexation of Pacific islands could leave 
them open to attack.  It was primarily with that fear in mind that Senator Perkins had 
written to the California legislature.  While he was asking for their advice, he certainly 
believed that annexation brought many dangers with it.  He informed them that it:    
seems to me to be contrary to the spirit of our Constitution to acquire a territory 
on the Asiatic coast nine times as densely populated as California, whose 
inhabitants equal in numbers one seventh of the present population of the United 
States, and who are, moreover, a mixed people, consisting of Malays, Tagals, 
Chinese, Visayens, Sulus, and Negritos, that have no conception of a government 
by the people, and can only be controlled by force of arms.      
 
The Filipinos, he argued, were an uncivilized lot who could never become Americans.  
As though that were not enough, he went on to remind Californians of an old threat they 
knew too well.  “Our farmers cannot compete… against the cheap peon labor of these 
islands, where Chinese and Malays work for fifteen cents per day in silver.  We labored 
for many years to pass the Chinese Restriction Act, and remove the blight of cheap 
servile contract labor from our land.”  Territorial expansion would undo all of that, he 
feared.
77
 
Perkins did not get his way—the legislature informed him that, if he was a true 
servant of the state, he would ratify the treaty and make sure the Philippines would be 
American.
78
  But there would be obvious consequences of such a policy, and the western 
reformers were all too willing exploit the apparent weakness.  The Democratic senator 
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from Utah, Joseph Rawlins, crudely asked if Philippines were desired in order to “add a 
wholesome element to our population, that our sons may find wives and our daughters 
husbands?”  He responded to his own query by stating that “The blighting curse of the 
Almighty would rest upon such miscegenation.”79  More commonly, the Filipinos were 
categorized as a threat to American labor.  Senator Allen suggested that this may have 
been the “sinister motive” behind the annexation scheme: “it may be that there are those 
who contemplate the rapid approach of the time when this debased population can be 
brought here and thrown in deadly contact with the laboring men of our country.”  That 
would put an end to Republican talk of tariff protection for the betterment of labor.
80
     
The racial concerns expressed by westerners were closely linked to questions of 
constitutionality.  Anti-imperialists saw no benefits in granting the “new possessions” 
statehood, but they simultaneously derided talk of colonial governance as un-American 
and unconstitutional.  On the other hand, imperialists pointed out that the Treaty of Paris 
left governance of the Philippines solely to the discretion of Congress, and some were 
eager to employ this plenary power to establish absolute dominion over the archipelago.  
Especially in the Senate, western opponents of expansion joined conservatives like 
George Hoar of Massachusetts and Donelson Caffery of Louisiana in attacking this claim 
to absolute power.  While historian Michael Cullinane has recently emphasized the 
constitutional elements of this debate, the legal arguments made by both sides should be 
seen as a product of their positions on expansion and race rather than the other way 
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around.
81
  For example, while Senator Hoar largely emphasized questions of 
constitutional limits and congressional power in his speeches, he too felt the need to ask 
“what rights of citizenship these people are to get by this treaty and the acquisition under 
it.  The question whether those Malays and Mohammedans and others can go anywhere 
in the United States to compete with American laborers, which I think they can, is an 
important practical question.”  In this way, Hoar could use racial and legal arguments in 
conjunction to make imperialism seem undesirable.
82
   
According to western anti-imperialists (and most of their eastern counterparts for 
that matter), race determined the proper boundaries of the American state.  It was an 
argument as old as the republic, and it had most notably reared its head during the 
nation‟s last bout with “manifest destiny” in the late 1840s.83  As Washington Senator 
George Turner put it, the founders had made provision for the addition of new states, “but 
the people who were to be protected by the great charter of our liberties at all times and 
any and every where beneath our flag were to be the American people—the great 
offshoot of the Anglo-Saxon race which had peopled the temperate zone of North 
America.”  Only these people were capable of self-government according to Turner.  The 
founding generation believed that “the greatest menace to the liberty of that people that 
could be introduced would be to permit indiscriminate political connection with other 
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peoples, different in blood, in religion, in habits and modes of thought, and sufficiently 
strong in numbers and in climatic protection to leave no hope of their perfect or even 
approximate assimilation by our own people.”84  Like Turner, Senator Allen feared what 
would happen if the country was “overrun by a horde of alien peoples in no manner 
capable of using or enjoying the blessings and privileges of self-government, or of 
maintaining them when won by others, whose presence and influence would deteriorate 
or injure the nation, ultimately wrecking the Constitution and destroying our political 
institutions.”   Still, the Constitution would be ruined in any case if the people of the 
Philippines were denied government based upon their consent.  “We have no power, in 
my judgment, to hold the Filipinos as vassals,” he said.  “We have no right to deprive 
them, whatever they may be, of the right of self-government if they desire it.”85   
 It is difficult for the modern reader to reconcile some western anti-imperialist‟s 
views of racial inequality with their statements that democracy was the birthright of all, 
but such declarations were indeed plentiful.  During the debate over Hawaiian 
annexation, Senator Stephen White had referred to the peoples of Asia as “semi-orang-
outangs,” and he was no more generous in 1899.86  He now claimed that “the Philippines 
are tenanted by a very peculiar mass, a heterogeneous compound of inefficient oriental 
humanity.”  He did not care “whether these islanders are fit for free government… If they 
are so fitted, they should be permitted to establish a free government; if they are not so 
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fitted, they should not be brought into an alliance with us; we do not in that event want 
them.”  Despite this, his tendency to describe the Filipinos as undesirable citizens did not 
prevent him from arguing that some among them were intelligent and capable, or further 
state that they deserved the right to determine their own style of government.  While 
“there may be a difference in this clime and that as to the method of the exercise of 
liberty” the “sensible American, deeply schooled in the walks of independence,” 
understood that freedom was best for all of mankind.
87
   
William Allen had done nearly as much as White to paint the Filipinos as unfit for 
participation in American democracy, but he too claimed that they were due their 
freedom.  Responding to Ohio‟s Senator Joseph Foraker‟s statement that the Declaration 
of Independence was nothing but a letter of complaint to Great Britain, Allen retorted that 
“it is as much the right of a Filipino to govern himself, if he is capable of doing so, as it is 
the right of an American citizen to do so.  This doctrine is not confined to the people of 
the United States.  It extends, according to the language, to all men, wherever found.”88 
If these statements seem contradictory, they should at least be thought of as part 
of America‟s own contradictory traditions on the subject.  The individual who put the 
phrase “all men are created equal” into writing—and, unlike some who followed, actually 
believed it—was the same as the one who held hundreds of men and women in bondage.  
Lincoln‟s particular fondness for the statement that governments derive “their just powers 
from the consent of the governed” did not speed his acceptance of universal manhood 
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suffrage.  There has not infrequently been a disparity between an individual‟s conception 
of justice and their belief in human equality, and the anti-imperialists were just another 
iteration of this seeming contradiction.
89
     
 Despite the ambiguities in their statements on race, the legal and governmental 
implications were clear.  But, as noted earlier, their rivals had effective counters.  For 
those who pointed to the history of American expansion, Henry Teller responded by 
pointing out that the previous treaties had contained specific provisions which called for 
the eventual statehood of the annexed regions and citizenship for the inhabitants.  Not 
only did the Constitution have nothing to say on the matter but the Treaty of Paris was 
silent on these issues, clearly suggesting that the Philippines and its peoples were not 
viewed in the same light.
90
  Furthermore, anti-imperialists admitted that—even if 
unconstitutional—annexation and whatever followed would not be rejected by the 
courts.
91
  Imperialism could not be stopped except through political action.   
As the final ratification vote approached, the situation in the Philippines changed 
dramatically.  On the night of February 4-5, shots fired by a sentry with the First 
Nebraska on the outskirts of Manila erupted into a full-scale battle.  Aguinaldo and a 
number of his officers were absent at the time of the engagement—clearly indicating that 
they had not planned an attack for that evening.  While the American commanders had no 
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specific intent to open the fighting that evening, they did have a coordinated plan of 
attack they followed as soon as it did commence.  While Aguinaldo sought a truce with 
Otis in the aftermath of the battle, the American general responded that the fighting, 
“having begun must go on to the grim end.”  A new war had commenced in the 
Philippines.
92
   
 
War in the Philippines 
 The American media‟s accounts of the fighting bore little resemblance to the 
facts, but then again neither did the reports from Otis or Dewey to Washington.  The first 
substantial report from Otis—the one which was reprinted on the front page of nearly 
every newspaper by February 6—stated:  “Insurgents in large force opened attack on our 
outer lines at 8.45 last evening.  Renewed attack several times during night.  At 4 o‟clock 
this morning entire line engaged.  All attacks repulsed.”  In later Congressional hearings, 
nearly the whole of those remarks would be proven false.  For the time being, Otis‟s 
report was the most extensive official statement members of the media could their hands 
on and they ran with it, embellishing as they went.  Most papers described a fierce all-out 
assault by Aguinaldo‟s army.  Among the ludicrous statements that made it into the press 
reports—with near ubiquity, regardless of affiliation—was the claim that the Filipino 
force had charged the Americans armed with bows and arrows.
93
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The day of treaty vote had already been set as February 6.  It is difficult to state 
with any degree of certainty how the beginning of war influenced the vote.  Allen 
claimed it had no impact at all on his decision, and most senators concurred.  Most 
historians have been fond of pinning the outcome of the vote on either the President‟s use 
of spoils or Bryan‟s impact on his allies in the Senate.  Of the two, Bryan was certainly in 
the weaker position to provide incentives, and Pettigrew suggested that the Nebraskan‟s 
support for the treaty did nothing more than allow Democrats who already favored 
ratification to vote for it and accept the administration‟s favors to boot.94   
 The final breakdown of the vote was 57-27—just one vote beyond the required 
two-thirds majority.  Heitfeld (Populist, Idaho), Pettigrew, Rawlins (Democrat, Utah), 
Roach (Democrat, North Dakota), and Turner were the only westerners to vote against 
the treaty.  Those who voted with them were largely southern Democrats, along with two 
Republicans, George Hoar of Massachusetts and Eugene Hale of Maine.  Allen and seven 
other western reformers voted for the treaty.  Its ratification technically gave Congress 
greater authority over matters in the Philippines, but the outbreak of war left the initiative 
with McKinley.
95
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The treaty had passed, but the initiation of a second war changed the tone of 
political combat.  As noted above, the conservatives had linked patriotism with 
unquestioned loyalty to the administration, and such rhetoric had been prominent in both 
the previous year and in the first month of 1899.  To bring up just one case involving a 
western reformer, during a speech by Nebraska Congressman William Green a 
Republican yelled out “Did you live here in 1860?”  He claimed that no true American 
who had witnessed the Civil War would question the executive in a time of crisis.  
Westerners responded by saying that the term “patriotism” was being misused by their 
opponents.  Greene himself fired back at his challengers, declaring that “Republicans, 
conscious of the weakness of your position and of the great wrongs being committed by 
your party, are now seeking to distract public attention from your evil deeds by pulling 
around you the flag, and shouting „Patriotism!‟”96  Congressman William Vincent also 
mocked the imperialist definition of the term by suggesting that “Patriotism under the old 
order of things, before the Declaration of Independence was expunged from the record, 
meant love of one's country.”  Now Republicans had changed it to mean “love for the 
other fellow's country.”97   
In the same way, western anti-imperialist talk of “duty” or “obligation” had 
challenged the claims their opponents made regarding a colonial duty or the “White 
Man‟s Burden.”  Instead, they emphasized their duty to the American people, the 
Constitution, and to universal freedom.  They also had no great difficulty in unsettling the 
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definitions their rivals had employed as they advocated expansion.  Senator White, for 
example, openly harangued those who claimed “that it is our duty to encircle the earth.”98  
His colleague Joseph Rawlins admitted that imperialists always spoke of “some humane 
duty or moral obligation,” but what did that really mean?  The Filipinos had so recently 
been allies, and both sides had rendered each other aid in their respective wars against 
Spain.  “Suppose we set off our obligations against theirs, balance the account, and let it 
go at that?”99   
In the immediate aftermath of the battle over ratification, the defiant attitudes 
displayed by a number of westerners became more reserved.  The tone of Republican 
attacks did not substantially change, but western Populists and their allies were measured 
in their responses.  Less than a week after news of the fighting reached Washington, 
Senator Allen nearly sounded like one of McKinley‟s apologists.  Whereas he had 
previously spoken only of the speediest possible withdrawal from the islands, he now 
said that “a duty is imposed upon us by our occupancy of the Philippine Islands that we 
can not escape.”  He did affirm the position that colonialism was wrong, but he also 
stated that he had come to agree with “what I understand to be the policy of the President 
of the United States, to hold them for such reasonable time that the influences and 
education of this Government may prepare them in some slight degree for the duties of an 
independent republican form of government.”100   
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Earlier in the session, western Populists and their friends had attacked not only 
expansion but also the regular army.  Several members had opposed expansion of the 
military because they claimed that the regular army consisted of people who were 
essentially failures, and the professional military only transformed them further into 
unthinking automatons.  Jerry Simpson believed that a man “who enlists in the standing 
Army is generally a person who can not get anything to do in any other way or in any 
other walk of life. He goes into it as an occupation because he is excluded from other 
avenues of life. He is a hired fighter.”  It was for this reason that Curtis Castle considered 
them inherently unreliable citizens.  “They are not anxious to fight at all; but if they must 
fight, they would as soon fight the citizens of the United States as anyone else. They 
become a part of the fighting machine and no longer think or act as individuals.”101  
These statements were actually typical of western reformers, not merely bluster.  Richard 
Pettigrew used similar language in a private letter that expressed his displeasure with the 
colonel of the First South Dakota Regiment—a man originally from the regular army—
whom he considered unsuited to command the unit.  Volunteers had “too much manhood 
and individuality” for a man used to the discipline of the professional military, he said.102  
John Shafroth and John Calhoun Bell had likewise derided the regulars a year earlier, 
calling them unmotivated men who lacked self-reliance.
103
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Suddenly, the derision and scorn heaped upon the army was transformed into 
sympathy and support.  It should be kept in mind that the first reports suggested that the 
Americans forces had suffered a large-scale and unprovoked attack, and additionally 
many of the units in the Philippines were volunteers from the western states.  
Nevertheless, while the details that contributed to the shift are important, the transition is 
itself quite noteworthy.  Western anti-imperialists began to talk as though it was 
everyone‟s duty to rally behind the military establishment.  For example, James Hamilton 
Lewis of Washington said that “we can only view the matter… in one light. These men 
who are there are American citizens; they are the sons of our brother men.”  For that 
reason, their actions were beyond question:   “If they are wrong, they are innocently so; if 
they are right, they are justly so. There is no other position for the American House to 
take but to stand unanimously by the children of its own country.”104  While delivering a 
rather weak criticism of McKinley‟s policies, William Greene was nonetheless effusive 
in his praise for the obedient soldiers.  “[T]he American soldier must do what his officer 
commands him to do…. God bless the soldiers!  They are doing their duty as brave, noble 
men, in obedience to the commands of their superiors.  And I say that nobody on this side 
of the Chamber, or in this country, has anything to say against the men who are wearing 
the uniform of our country.”105   
Only weeks later, near the end of the session, did a few step forward and 
challenge those prosecuting the war.  One of the strongest of these was by Freeman 
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Knowles, the South Dakota Populist and—as he felt the need to state—veteran of “every 
battle in which the Army of the Potomac was engaged from '62 to '65.”  In what would be 
his last major speech in Congress, he lashed out at those who celebrated the deaths of 
thousands of Filipinos, “whose only crime is a desire to govern themselves.  What 
American citizen with a spark of self-respect, to say nothing of national pride or 
patriotism, can look upon this spectacle without hiding his head in shame?” he asked.  
“The Philippine people are struggling in the same cause and for the self-same rights that 
actuated our forefathers in the Revolution.  Every denunciation… against Aguinaldo and 
his followers were simply echoes from the debates in the British Parliament against 
Washington and his army.”  Of course conservatives now argued that the Declaration of 
Independence was “an old-fashioned document, not applicable to any people whom our 
robber classes desire to exploit.”  He predicted that the victory in the present conflict was 
already a lost cause.  “Ten millions of people, with courage and manhood enough to fight 
for their freedom, in a tropical climate unendurable to the Caucasian race, are invincible 
to any and all force you can send against them.”  Knowles depicted Aguinaldo and his 
people as the embodiments of a freedom that Americans had once been proud to 
represent.  “I am glad the Filipinos have the courage and manhood to fight for their 
liberty.  If it was right for our forefathers to fight for their independence, it is right for the 
Filipinos to do the same.”  He concluded by suggesting that “The American people are 
not oppressors, but organized greed has the Administration by the throat.”  Despite the 
conservative command to worship the flag or follow leaders in silent obedience, Knowles 
praised classic American republican values—including those he saw among the Filipinos.  
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Unfortunately, at present he believed the American faith in human freedom had been set 
aside to satisfy the needs of the economic elite.
106
   
 The Fifty-fifth Congress adjourned on March 4, one month after the fighting in 
the Philippines commenced.  The debate over imperialism did not cease but only 
intensified.  The end of the treaty fight allowed anti-imperialists to set aside their 
disagreements over methods and focus on their opposition to what they saw as 
McKinley‟s war of conquest.  Of course, there was also another complexion to the debate 
over empire.  Outside of Congress, in the states, Governors, legislators, and members of 
organized labor were weighing in on the expansion issue.   
 
Local Politics, 1899 
National political debates had always existed alongside many dozens of local 
ones, in which regional context often added new or additional meanings to the broader 
discussion.  This is how it had been with the silver issue, and so it was again.  In each of 
the three states that comprise this study, regional history, geography, and economics 
would play a part in shaping interpretations of the “expansion” question.   
 Colorado‟s new governor, Charles S. Thomas, was certainly no Populist.  Quite to 
the contrary, he likely saw Populists as his chief political rivals.  Shortly after coming 
into office, he wrote with some degree of satisfaction that “populism has run its course,” 
but he did claim that it had a purpose.  “It has compelled the recognition of by the 
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democracy of its ancient principles,” and he would know as well as anyone.107  While a 
few years after leaving office he would return to his position as a successful corporate 
lawyer, including a stint as the attorney for the Anaconda mine in 1904, he was in no 
position to show such inclinations as governor.
108
  During the campaign, he had sworn his 
support for a new eight-hour restriction for mining industry workers and used it to gain 
the support of the Colorado State Federation of Labor.
109
  Additionally, an examination 
of his vote totals demonstrated the extent to which he was counting on Populist support.  
Comparing the elections of 1898 and 1894—when Thomas had also been the Democratic 
candidate for governor—historian James Wright demonstrated that the Thomas vote in 
1898 corresponded more closely to the votes for the radical Davis Waite in 1894 than to 
his own totals from that contest.
110
  The correlation was so strong that no advanced 
metrics would have been needed to see it; Thomas surely knew he had been elected by 
Populist votes.  As a man who was looking ahead to the senatorial election in 1901, he 
could not afford to alienate any of Colorado‟s reformers.   
 Thomas did not even mention the growing sentiment in favor of the eight-hour 
law in his inaugural address, instead focusing on the need to streamline administration 
and collect revenue more efficiently.  Several weeks later, he sent an additional message 
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to the legislature that did cover a different pressing subject that would come to be 
intertwined with the proposal for workday restrictions.  In his inaugural, he had 
mentioned the need for legislation to deal with “the rapid concentration of leading 
industries into general systems, popularly known as „trusts,‟” and he considered the need 
for action to be even more serious than it was when he first mentioned it.  Rumors were 
circulating that several combinations of local industries and utilities were about to be 
effected, including one combination that was believed to include the majority of metallic 
smelting facilities of the nation.  His greatest concerns were that the new industries would 
close facilities, lay off workers, and that control of and the profits from these facilities 
would flow to “distant communities.”  He admitted that the courts might object to state 
anti-trust action, but he contended that inaction was the greater sin.
111
   
 Thomas‟s concern was not without cause.  By 1898, Henry Rogers—a former 
Standard Oil executive—joined with New York stock brokers to approach owners of 
smelting and refining firms with a proposition.  He suggested that they form a single 
combination, cut administrative costs, and control the market for unrefined ores and the 
supply of refined metals.  The arrangements were essentially complete by early 1899, and 
the creation of the firm that would call itself the American Smelting and Refining 
Company (ASARCO) was announced in March.  The greater share of Colorado‟s 
smelters were under the control of this new giant just in time for a labor struggle.
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 Just as they had with the gubernatorial candidates, local labor organizations had 
vetted and endorsed potential legislators during the campaign of 1898.
113
  The legislature 
they elected was firmly committed to an eight-hour law.  Roughly 90% of state house and 
senate members identified themselves as a Populist, Democrat, or “Teller Silver 
Republican,” with representation divided equally among each of the three parties.  
Whether Thomas forgot to mention the eight-hour law in his message or consciously 
hoped to de-emphasize it cannot be determined, but after it passed the legislature he 
followed up on his earlier promise and signed the bill into law.
114
   
The bill actually provided little direct benefit for those engaged in hard-rock 
mining, as most of these heavily-unionized workers had already succeeded in obtaining 
eight-hour work days.  The biggest beneficiaries were the smelter workers included in the 
act, who were largely non-union and typically worked shifts of either ten or twelve hours 
a day.  The law was scheduled to take effect on June 15, but ASARCO challenged it in 
court almost immediately upon its formation.  Just weeks before the law was to take 
effect, the company announced that the daily pay rates were to be replaced by hourly 
ones.  For workers to maintain their wages on the new scale, twelve-hour days would 
have been required.
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By June 15, ASARCO‟s smelters were shut down by strikes.  While the Colorado 
Supreme Court ruled the law unconstitutional in July, and the strike collapsed in mid-
August, the state government‟s approach to the strike was important.  Governor Thomas 
appointed a citizen‟s committee to resolve the strike, and when it failed called in the state 
Board of Arbitration.  The workers declared their willingness to submit to the binding 
arbitration offered, but the company refused.  In the short term, while worker frustration 
with the state continued, labor maintained some confidence that political solutions could 
ultimately be found.  If Thomas and state Democrats did not offer a radical alternative to 
capitalist industrialization, they could at least offer protection.
116
   
 While disputes between labor and capital were at the forefront of politics in 
Colorado, the issue of imperialism had a significant presence in the background.  While 
the state Senate approved a resolution that called for Teller and Wolcott to vote for the 
Treaty of Paris, Populists and Democrats in the Colorado House initiated a two-hour 
debate over a resolution that demanded the opposite.  In a speech that one paper called 
(with a slight degree of condescension) one of the finest speeches any woman had ever 
delivered in the legislature, Arapahoe Populist Mrs. H. G. R. Wright decried any policy 
that involved the acquisition of the Philippines without the consent of the Filipinos.  
Others Populists and Democrats less charitably stated that the islands offered “no 
commerce, no trade, no manufactures, no nothing, except heathens and strife.”  Despite 
their efforts, the measure was voted down.
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The state executive also joined the fray.  Governor Thomas, as perhaps the 
foremost anti-imperialist among state Democrats, was making speeches in opposition to 
the administration‟s presumed policies by at least February, despite the annexationist 
plank in his state party‟s platform.  He also focused a great deal of attention on the return 
of the Colorado regiment from the Philippines, which he declared to be an illegal and 
unconstitutional use of the state militia.  The men had enlisted for the duration of the war 
with Spain, he said, and in any case they were constitutionally bound to be used only 
against foreign invasions or domestic rebellions.
118
   
Thomas did not expect a local rival to use his statements against him.  Populist 
leader, newspaperman, and a former law partner of the Governor, Thomas Patterson, had 
not yet renounced “expansion” and hoped to embarrass the state‟s top Democrat by 
depicting him as a traitor.  In an interview published in Patterson‟s Rocky Mountain 
News, it was made to appear that Governor Thomas hoped the men would lay down their 
arms in the middle of the army‟s campaign.  Thomas soon denied that the content of his 
remarks bore any resemblance to those printed in the News, and he even sought aid from 
Secretary of War Alger to prove he had not incited mutiny among the troops.  Of course, 
this was only one of many ways in which Patterson attempted to bring down his most 
likely challenger for the next available Senate seat.
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The discussion of imperialism within the state should not just be dismissed as the 
simple responses of petty local politicians.  He and Patterson were considered the primary 
competitors for the U.S. Senate seat sure to be vacated by Edward Wolcott in 1900.  As 
noted above, his position as governor also brought him a degree of connection to the 
events overseas that other state officials simply did not have.  His remarks demonstrated 
that he had considered the situation and that he followed the national debate closely.  In 
some of his statements, Governor Thomas attempted to draw connections between 
America‟s new overseas policies and the growing concentration of economic power.  In 
response to a questionnaire he received regarding the platform for the next national 
election, he stated that “Imperialism, both national and industrial, should be opposed, and 
the principle that the government exists by the consent of the governed should be applied 
to, and warfare waged against, the commercial and political oligarchy which is 
centralizing all industries, and repeating the policies and practices of despotisms abroad.”  
Furthermore, in his anti-trust message he suggested that the war had drawn attention 
away from concerns at home.  While most remembered 1898 as “the year of glory,” even 
more so it was “also the year of the trusts.  The people have been diverted by the pomp 
and circumstances of war, during which period trusts, representing $950,000,000 of 
capital, real and fictitious, have been organized.”  In one case, imperialism was described 
as an extension of the systems of domination which were growing in America; in the 
other, war and nationalism prevented desperately needed reforms.  These interpretations 
seem much like those that western reformers in Congress had developed over the last 
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year, and their use by a state politician demonstrates that either these ideas were being 
readily adopted or that the basis for such conclusions already existed among western 
Populists and Democrats.
120
  
In Nebraska, there were no strikes or industrial combinations that could dominate 
the headlines like they did in Colorado.  Governor William A. Poynter had to deal with a 
Republican legislature, and there was no real hope for major reform legislation.  A few 
Republican-sponsored “reform” measures did pass and were signed into law, namely a 
law to regulate the use of money in politics and another that limited the hours of railroad 
workers.  In reality, both were weak measures.  The penalty for committing bribery or 
exceeding campaign limitations was set as “not less than fifty dollars,” while the other 
law merely limited employees of the railroads to a maximum of eighteen consecutive 
hours of work.  The new laws were so non-controversial that they passed the Nebraska 
Senate without a dissenting vote.
121
  Fate seemed to have ordained that the legislature 
would collect no great accomplishment.  Even though they were able to quickly select the 
defeated gubernatorial candidate Monroe Hayward to replace Allen in the Senate, 
Hayward died before ever taking office and Poynter appointed Allen to take back his old 
seat.
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Instead of focusing on reform measures, the legislature devoted a great deal of 
time to discussion of events overseas, particularly those involving the state‟s regiment in 
the Philippines.  One of these debates centered upon Colonel John Stotsenburg, 
commander of the First Nebraska.  In the months preceding the opening of the 
conflagration, members of both houses had received letters from concerned parents and 
friends of the men in the regiment who condemned the colonel for his harsh treatment of 
those under his command.  Because of these reports of “unjust and unsoldierly treatment 
of the men in the First Nebraska Regiment,” on January 11, Representative Fisher, a 
Republican from Dawes County, demanded that the legislature call for Stotsenburg's 
immediate removal from command.
123
  Debate of the resolution was held on the 
following day.   
After an abortive attempt by one fellow Republican to kill the proposal, a series of 
chaotic, non-partisan, yet rather divisive engagements took place on the floor.  A 
fusionist from Buffalo County, J. M. Easterling, offered to have the resolution referred to 
committee in order to formally “investigate and report to this House.”124  Easterling 
argued that the legislature was stepping outside of their mandate, and the War 
Department could handle this issue on their own.  Before a vote could be taken on the 
two main options, yet another Republican offered up an amendment designed to gut the 
original resolution.
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 First the amendment was voted down, fifty-four to forty-four.  Twenty-five 
fusionists and nineteen Republicans worked together to defeat it, with one member from 
each side abstaining.  When Easterling's alternative was defeated in its own turn by forty 
Republicans and nineteen fusionists, the representative from Buffalo County felt the need 
to explain his intentions.  He declared that Fisher's resolution was a “criticism of the 
national administration,” and he justified his rejection of such an act:  “Owing to the 
critical situation in the Philippines, and the criticism of an officer without his having been 
heard, and a desire to support our president at this critical moment, and as a mark of my 
confidence in his prudence and loyalty, I vote „No.‟”126  This reform legislator believed 
that to question the authority of the War Department or the commander-in-chief was 
unacceptable at that time.  These statements were made over three weeks before the 
beginning of fighting in the Philippines, at a time of peace.   
 The debate reflected the extent to which state Republicans had attempted—and 
succeeded—in cultivating a narrative of national unity amid crisis.  They had claimed in 
the campaign of 1898 that any form of criticism directed at the president or his 
administration was a shameful and traitorous act, and it was for that reason the members 
of Fisher‟s own party attempted to stifle his proposal.  Easterling was no Republican, but 
he accepted the narrative without question.   
The original version of Fisher‟s resolution did pass with support from all parties, 
but its opponents were all but vindicated in the days that followed.  When fighting 
commenced, Stotsenburg led the regiment quite successfully, and was often noted as a 
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commander who led from the front (a characteristic that likely led to his death in battle in 
late April).  On the last full day of the session, both House and Senate sought to make 
amends.  The legislature expunged the record of what came to be called the Stotsenburg 
affair, with the House admitting they were guilty of “severely criticizing and censuring” 
the Colonel without just cause.
127
       
 Remarkably, the legislature was not done discussing military matters.  In late 
March of 1899, nearly two months after the outbreak of war in the Philippines, both 
houses of the Nebraska legislature passed a resolution in support of the actions of the 
state‟s regiment.  In its entirety, this resolution declared that the soldiers were “defending 
in the far-off Philippines the principles of our government and adding new glory to the 
flag.”  Remarkably, not a single member voted in opposition to the resolution.128 
 Populist governor William Poynter could not bring himself to condone such a 
blanket approval.  While his veto message did not question the bravery of the volunteers, 
he did “regret that circumstances have compelled them to give their services and sacrifice 
their lives in a conflict at utter variance to the very fundamental principles of our 
government and contrary to the established policy of the nation for more than a century.”  
The soldiers had enlisted in a fight for human liberty, but now they were compelled to 
“engage in a conflict against a people who have been battling against the oppression of 
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another nation for nearly 400 years.”  In conclusion, Poynter stated “I cannot stultify 
myself and the calm judgment of the thinking people of this commonwealth by giving 
official approval to the statement that the war of conquest now carried on in the far away 
Philippines is in defense of the principles of our government and is adding new glory to 
our flag.”129   
 Poynter‟s treatment of the resolution received mixed reviews.  On several 
occasions, he had asked the legislature to make appropriations for aid to be sent to the 
troops, but they had refused.  A writer for the Omaha World-Herald claimed that the 
legislature had refused to help the troops, but was full of the worthless sentiment.  Worse 
yet, the original version of the resolution required that it be telegraphed to the regiment in 
the Philippines, which it was claimed would cost $850.  Several private citizens also 
wrote to the governor in support.  One of these was a mother whose son was still serving 
in the Philippines and who felt that the veto was a powerful message and inspiration to 
others.  Since his public repudiation of the conflict, “other men and women have entered 
their protest against this unholy war.  I hope and expect a storm to sweep across the land 
condemning the administration and make the powers that be call a halt and listen to the 
voice of the people.”130   
Republican newspapermen, by contrast, quickly attacked Poynter for opposing the 
will of the president.  Republican journals tended not to print the governor‟s reasoning, 
instead claiming that the veto “was purely on political grounds, and indicates that our 
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governor is more a politician that [sic] a statesman.”131  Others were less restrained in 
their attacks.  According to one paper, the governor “placed himself on the side of 
Aguinaldo and his band of bandits, who wished to walk over the American army and 
pillage the city of Manila.”  Claimed yet another, “As between a Filipino and our brave 
Nebraska boys the governor goes on record as in favor of the dirty Filipino…. It may be 
all right for a popocrat campaign argument, but as sure as there is a God in heaven the 
insult to our brave boys at Manila will be remembered by a good many people in the state 
at the ballot box in the coming election.”132  Members of the Grand Old Party of 
Nebraska now had an issue they felt they could win with.   
In Washington, the legislature was no more productive, and even less 
controversial.  Nearly the whole of the session was devoted to a fight for the U.S. Senate 
seat.  The incumbent, Republican John L. Wilson had believed that he would easily win 
reelection.  He, like recently elected Silver Republican George Turner, was from 
Spokane, and western Washington legislators demanded their share of representation in 
the Senate.  Working with the few Populists and Democrats left in the legislature, the 
coastal legislators blocked Wilson‟s victory.  They eventually forced his withdrawal from 
the race in favor of Addison Foster, who one author has described as a “deservedly 
                                                 
131
 Albion Weekly News (NE), April 7, 1899.   
132
 “Poynter and His Two Vetoes,” Omaha Daily Bee, April 10, 1899, p. 4, reprinted from the Pierce Call 
and the Aurora Republican, no dates.  The listed page from the Bee included twelve reprinted responses by 
Nebraska‟s Republican papers, despite the fact that the Bee itself was still attempting to advocate an anti-
imperialist position.  Considering it was only the veto of a resolution of sentiment and not an actual law, 
Poynter‟s action gained some national attention.  See:  “Holding Nebraska in Check,” Evening Star 
(Washington, D.C.), April 3, 1899, p. 6; “A Bad „Poynter,‟” Times (Washington, D.C.), April 4, 1899, p. 4; 
“Governor Poynter and Our Soldiers,” Sun (New York, NY), April 4, 1899, p. 6; “Practical Rebuke to 
Imperialism,” Watchman and Southron (Sumter, SC), April 5, 1899, p. 6.  It also remained significant in 
Nebraska‟s papers for weeks afterward.  For one example, see “Who Was Patriotic,” Custer County 
Republican (Broken Bow, NE), June 15, 1898, p. 4.    
  
400 
 
obscure partner in the St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Company.”  The move essentially 
replaced an experienced political manipulator with a novice, but it represented a desire 
for ever-greater patronage rather than an ideological shift.
133
   
The legislature took no position on the growing debate over imperialism, but 
others did.  The Western Central Labor Union of Seattle devoted the entirety of their 
February 1 meeting to the matter, and a week later (just days after the treaty was ratified) 
passed resolutions in opposition to “the so-called „expansion‟ theory of the National 
Administration.”  It should be noted that, while the union had long been hostile to the 
idea of Asian immigration, its protest was not framed in such a manner.  Instead, they 
stated that they were opposed to “the United States setting the example of abrogating the 
right of self government [sic].”  While they may have had their own interests in mind, 
they chose to emphasize what they said was a universal right.
134
    
 Governor Rogers—who, oddly enough, was about to print a pamphlet titled The 
Inalienable Rights of Man—had a rather different perspective on the subject.135  When 
asked to explain his position, the governor declared that “I believe in progress and the 
manifest destiny of the American people to leave the impress of their directing force upon 
the political economy of the future.”  Rogers described the prospect of trade with Asia in 
remarkably rosy terms, and in another message even suggested that “Our flour is even 
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now replacing rice in China.”  For Washington, and the Puget Sound region in particular, 
an empire in Asia provided benefits that could not be ignored.  His discussion of 
imperialism never touched upon the rights of the Filipinos, merely the American right to 
do as they would.  His writing had so frequently emphasized universal rights and 
freedoms, and because of that contradiction it may have been easier for him to describe 
the inhabitants of Asia as a faceless mass rather than deal with very real issues he 
normally confronted directly.  On this subject, he ultimately chose the pragmatic 
solution.
136
   
Of course, the alternative was not an easy course.  In April, one of the more 
prominent Democrats in the state, F. A. McDonald, gave a speech in which he sought to 
convince members of the reform coalition to oppose the policy of imperialism.  The war 
in the Philippines represented an attempt to “put us into the Eastern struggle to wrangle 
over territory like dogs over a bone.”  He would gladly take back the life of one of the 
state‟s dead in exchange for “all the niggers in the Philippines.”  His audience of 
Populists, Democrats, and Silver Republicans was impressed.  The editor of a Republican 
journal, on the other hand, called it a blunt expression of “the copperhead doctrine of the 
democracy of this state—the platform upon which it will go before the people in 1900.”  
Certainly, there were risks that came with opposition to imperialism.
137
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The debate over the future of the Philippines had entered its own as a subject of 
political debate.  By the end of 1898, opinions on expansion had not conformed closely to 
party lines, in part because the final fight over Hawaiian annexation had taken place in 
wartime but also because of America‟s history of influence in the archipelago.  As it 
became increasingly clear in the last weeks of 1898 that the administration had taken aim 
at the Philippines, more serious opposition developed.  Rogers was the most prominent of 
the few western state politicians to argue for an imperial policy, while among those left in 
Congress who had followed Bryan in 1896 only Teller and Stewart advocated the 
retention of the Philippines.  The rest united to oppose what they deemed rule by force.  
These western anti-imperialists developed a complex critique of the military, political, 
and economic policies employed or supported by conservatives, one that fit perfectly 
with their broad attack on the capitalist threat to American democracy.  They did not 
merely dissent regarding the methods of imperialism, but instead they totally refuted the 
doctrines that accompanied such a system of domination.   
At the same time, there were complicating factors that had the power to 
substantively hinder the success of the anti-imperialist cause.  The divergent philosophies 
held by anti-imperialists of different regions and parties were—and would consistently 
prove to be—real obstacles to the formation of a unified opposition.  Local factors made 
the cause less attractive to others, and their partisan enemies were once again able to 
draw on wartime nationalism to disparage their efforts.  Furthermore, western reformers 
were losing power in much of the region and they were in no position to push the 
wholesale transformations they had once promised.  If they could not convince voters to 
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support their vision of freedom at home and abroad in the contest of 1900 the whole 
purpose of their crusade would be defeated, likely forever.   
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CHAPTER VIII 
SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE CAMPAIGN 
Senator Henry Moore Teller of Colorado was running short of allies in the 
nation‟s capital.  Since his dramatic break with the Republicans in the summer of 1896, 
he had continued to lambaste McKinley and his old party for their subservience to 
financial interests.  His western friends were fond of him, but since the outbreak of the 
war with Spain he had differed with them on the question of expansion.   To be plain, it 
was not merely that he disagreed with them, but in fact he had become one of the most 
consistent defenders of the administration‟s policy.  Early in 1900 he continued this 
course, at one point attacking the anti-imperialist Senator Bacon of Georgia.  The 
problem with the senator‟s most recent speech, according to Teller, was that it was based 
on the assumption that “when the war is terminated, we propose to do something which is 
contrary to the Declaration of Independence.”  All of the anti-imperialists had declared 
that expansion in the Pacific would be accompanied by colonial rule, meaning 
government without consent of the governed.  Neither McKinley nor the majority of his 
expansionist supporters had declared any intent to rule in such a way—in part because the 
President made no policy declaration at all—but Teller wanted to believe the 
administration would act in accordance with American principles.  The so-called anti-
imperialists were fighting against a hypothetical evil, he said.  “They set up a condition 
which we hope will never exist, and then denounce that condition.”  He denied that either 
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Republicans or the American people would tolerate such a foreign concept as 
colonialism.
1
   
Of course, his support for expansion was perceived to be a boon to the President.  
Among westerners, Teller had the longest and most distinguished record of any in public 
life, and when he rejected claims that America was acting the part of an imperial power 
he bolstered the position of McKinley and his backers.  As Richard Pettigrew lamented to 
a former colleague, “Teller is an Expansionist, and of course will be of no value to us in 
this campaign…. He is a dear splendid old fellow, but he does not agree with us on 
anything but silver.”2   
In that regard, Pettigrew was wrong.  Teller had always argued that expansion 
could take place without colonial oppression.  While he did believe that the nation had 
the legal power to hold colonies, he simultaneously contended that “we have no right to 
use it.  There are plenty of powers given to a government that it is not required to use and 
would not be justified in using.”  At no point did he suggest that the people of the “new 
possessions” lacked basic rights.3        
By the summer of 1900, the evidence was finally clear that the anti-imperialists 
had been right all along.  In the preceding months, Republicans had passed an organic act 
for Puerto Rico, proposed resolutions declaring the Philippines to be a perpetual 
dependency, and even defended the right of other empires to enforce their will around the 
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globe.  The senior senator from Colorado turned away in disgust.  “[T]he way to govern a 
people is to give them the right to govern themselves,” he declared.  “It will not do to say 
that the people of the Philippine Islands are incapable of self-government.  They are 
capable of it. The people of Cuba are capable of it.  The people of Porto Rico are capable 
of self-government.”  While he admitted that “They may not escape some trouble” as 
they developed democratic societies, he noted that American democracy was far from 
perfect in its own right.  “In our early history we had a whisky revolution in 
Pennsylvania… and only a few years ago you had an army standing guard over the 
property of a railroad company for months in the city of Pittsburg…. You have now 
armed forces standing guard over property in the State of Idaho.”  Such examples did not 
prove that Americans were incapable of ruling themselves.  “No nation in the world ever 
escaped these difficulties, and none ever will.”  Whatever the challenges, he denied that 
America could promote the cause of freedom by governing others without their consent.   
From the close of the Fifty-fifth Congress in March of 1899 until the national 
conventions of 1900, events unfolded that kept the issues of imperialism, militarism, and 
economic centralization at the forefront of public attention.  Both anti-imperialists and 
their rivals used the events of the year preceding the campaign to frame the terms of the 
contest.  Imperialists pointed to strife, both overseas and closer to home, to justify the 
formation of a paternalist federal government and its deployment of force.  While western 
reformers no longer held the balance of power in Congress, those who remained in the 
House and Senate were no less determined to voice their opposition to the war and what 
they perceived to be the forces that drove conquest.  In these efforts, western Populists, 
Democrats, and Silver Republicans in Congress were aided by local activists and 
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organized labor.  In the run-up to the election of 1900, these dissidents contended that 
global events and local conflicts were the harbingers of a new age.  As they presented it, 
the worldwide struggle for freedom was being waged against tremendous odds, but it 
could still be won if enough American voters were ready to join the fight.   
 
Boers, Boxers, and Miners 
When war began in the Philippines in February of 1899, Congress was already 
debating a military expansion bill.  While many decried the dangers of militarism, 
McKinley wasted little time in making their warnings appear justified.  In the last days of 
April, 1899, a dispute over pay at the Bunker Hill mine in Coeur d‟Alene region of Idaho 
turned violent.  Frustrated by obstinate managers who refused to pay the district‟s going 
wages, several hundred miners from throughout the county organized themselves to 
attack the mill at Wardner.  After an exchange of gunfire with company guards (which 
left two men dead) the miners dynamited the ore concentrator, a facility valued at 
$250,000.  The violence proved to be a sudden spasm, and there was no further escalation 
or threat of a further impending conflict.  Still, Governor Frank Steunenberg decided that 
the outbreak required a massive response.  While labor clashes in the Coeur d‟Alenes had 
been dealt with by federal troops before—in both 1892 and 1894—this time the governor 
could further rationalize their use to McKinley by pointing out that Idaho‟s National 
Guard regiment was currently in the Philippines.  With little hesitation, the President 
complied with the request.  The first trainload of regulars arrived in northern Idaho on 
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May 2, and Steunenberg officially proclaimed martial law for Shoshone County on May 
3.
4
   
As had been the case in 1892, the soldiers were used as the mine owners‟ police 
force, and they began rounding up suspected participants and placing them in boxcars or 
“bull pens”—open warehouses that were used as mass holding facilities.  Added to the 
suspects in the case, large numbers of union men and possible labor sympathizers were 
also arrested.  The estimated total taken into custody ranges between 700 and 1,000, 
roughly half of whom would be held for months in the inadequate shelters that served as 
their prisons.   Furthermore, the state (with direct support from the army under General 
Henry C. Merriam) instituted a mandatory work permit system.  In order to obtain a 
permit, laborers had to openly renounce any allegiance to organized labor and forswear 
any interest in doing so into the future.  Unlike previous federal interventions, which had 
lasted between two and four months, this time martial law remained in effect for 
Shoshone County for nearly two years.  The Democrat Steunenberg all but openly 
declared his intent to use the obedient regulars to destroy both the Shoshone County 
Populists and the local union, an affiliate of the radical Western Federation of Miners.   
 Republicans celebrated the actions of McKinley, Merriam, and even 
Steunenberg.  The only dissenting voices among them suggested that not enough had 
been done.  One editor gleefully celebrated news that that the “anarchists and murderers” 
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were now where they belonged after it was announced that the entire male population of 
Burke, Idaho, had been arrested.
5
  A writer for one of Colorado‟s Republican papers 
suggested that their own state should learn from the troubles in the Coeur d‟Alenes.  The 
miners were fooled by outside agitators, and the Colorado legislature should pass a law 
“making it a criminal offense for any of these outsiders… to come here and by their 
council and advice as „organizers‟ or officers of organizations to egg on ignorant or 
inflammable men in our state.”6  Still others sought to directly associate the violence in 
Wardner with their political opponents.  “The republican party is the party of law and 
order in Idaho and everywhere,” said Bartlet Sinclair, a former aid of Steunenberg, when 
he declared his return to the regular Republican Party.  Those who took part were “either 
populists or democrats…. The dynamite methods are distinctively populistic.”  With no 
apparent sense of irony, he added that “Republicans, by training and belief, oppose 
violence.”7   
Western Populists, Democrats, and labor leaders countered that, while they did 
not condone violence, the real “anarchists” were those who imposed martial law, 
discarded habeas corpus, and replaced democratic rule for rule at the point of a gun.
8
  
Gilbert Hitchcock, editor of the Omaha World-Herald, delivered biting commentaries 
and speeches in opposition to military rule in Idaho.  In the fall of 1899, he told 
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Nebraskans not to forget that men were “imprisoned because they belonged to the 
miners‟ union,” and—citing a popular but inaccurate rumor regarding the controlling 
interests of the Bunker Hill mine—that they were held captive “because the Standard Oil 
company wants that sort of thing done.”  Hitchcock considered this to be more than 
corporate favoritism, instead describing it as an overt display of military force designed 
to cow organized labor wherever it was active.
9
  Jason Lewis, an Omaha labor organizer, 
shared this analysis.  “[T]his man Merriam would make it a crime for laboring men to 
organize and ask for better wages,” he declared to a Labor Day gathering.  “This is a 
military man‟s idea of justice.  The military, blinded by pomp and power, care nothing 
for liberty or justice.”10    
Those in the mining regions went even further in their categorization of the 
Army‟s rule in Idaho.  To a surprising extent, they directly tied the plight of the miners 
under arrest with that of the Filipinos still fighting American control across the Pacific.  
One Aspen resident (to state it generously) attempted to use poetry to draw parallels 
between the two cases, and in the process indict those who claimed these acts were 
necessary to preserve safety and freedom.   
Take down the Statue of Liberty 
   And build one in its place 
With a tyrant on its pinnacle 
   And a slave bound at its base. 
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Erase your declaration 
   That all the world may know 
We endorse the foul, despotic laws  
   Of ill-famed Idaho 
 
Take down the Stars and Stripes,  
   It should no longer wave 
As an emblem of liberty 
   O‟er despot, serf or slave:   
Transform your constitution,  
   Suppress the eagle‟s scream 
„Till the spirit of Glorious „76 
   Prevails at Coeur d‟Alenes.   
 
Since you have learned from cruel  
 Spain 
   The wisdom of stockades 
That relate more agony, woe,  
   Than Weyler‟s bloody raids.   
Siberia blushed at our shame,  
   Her victims sigh to know 
Their tyranny is mild compared  
   To that in Idaho.   
 
You sowed the seeds of liberty  
   On Cuban soil, „tis true,  
But does that justify you in  
   The course you now pursue?   
Well may Old Glory be despised 
   In the far-off Philippines,  
While barbarity in the name of law 
   Exists in Coeur d‟Alenes.11   
 
However crude it was, the author did draw an interesting parallel between oppression 
overseas and that at home, and he would not be the only one to do so.  America had 
ostensibly gone to war in 1898 to aid human freedom—at least in the popular 
imagination.  Many Americans had wanted to believe that their country was an example 
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of liberty that people the world over envied and wished to follow.
12
  The author stated 
that this confidence was misplaced, for America had set aside its own guarantees of 
liberty in order to pursue policies of subjugation, both at home and abroad.   
The sharpest critics of military rule in the Coeur d‟Alenes came, expectedly, from 
inside the Western Federation of Miners.  The organization had been born out of the often 
violent labor confrontations of the Rocky Mountain region (and the Coeur d‟Alenes in 
particular), and its initial growth during the period of Davis Waite‟s administration in 
Colorado had demonstrated the potential utility of political action.  By the end of the 
decade it had become a substantial force in labor and politics throughout the region, and 
in many ways had come to act as the representative of Populist labor.
13
   
Leaders of the WFM railed against the use of the permit system, mass arrests, and 
coercion used against the laborers of the region, but they joined with others in framing 
the campaign of intimidation as an act of militarism.  Article after article in Miners’ 
Magazine—the WFM‟s official publication which began circulation in 1900—declared 
that “The Krag-Jorgensen [rifle] is the law of the land, it is superior to all petitions, 
protests, legislatures, courts, and constitution; its report sounds the enslavement of the 
people, for it is forever trained upon them by the military men who are the servants of the 
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privileged few who rule without mercy.”  Those who desired to strangle organized labor 
need only apply for aid from “Emperor McKinley,” they claimed.14     
While the conflict in Idaho dominated the pages of Miners’ Magazine for its first 
year of existence, there was also substantial coverage of overseas imperialism and its 
impact.
15
  The first issue of the magazine included a satirical article by the “Sultan of 
Sulu” that declared the Filipino leader‟s admiration for American efforts to protect the 
sanctity of the home, then added “My neighbors here in some of the other Philippine 
Islands had firesides and homes, but the American soldiers set them on fire, and burnt 
them to the ground.”  The concluding remarks by the “Sultan” stated his intent to remain 
a Muslim because, while the government had given him money for his promise of peace, 
“they don‟t do it with the Christian Filipinos and just kill them off.”16  The next month, 
when reports began to circulate that the popular General Henry Lawton had been killed in 
action in the Philippines, a writer for the magazine wryly responded that if instead he had 
“imitated Merriam and arrested the Filipinos and imprisoned them in a „bull pen,‟ and 
then fought their wives,” the Lawton “would now be a live coward instead of a dead 
hero.”17   
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While they rarely linked the two directly, leaders and advocates of the miners 
often simultaneously attacked overseas imperialism and military rule in Idaho.  By the 
time of the WFM convention in May of 1900, there was near unanimity among members 
that both should be opposed.  In his address to the delegates, James R. Sovereign—a 
supporter of the union, former Grand Master Workman of the Knights of Labor, and 
Populist leader—warned of both “the alarming tendency toward militarism in the United 
States” and the “increasing tendency by corporations to flood the country with Oriental 
labor to the ultimate annihilation of the American workman.”  It was suggested that both 
were methods by which labor could be made servile to the demands of capital.
18
    
The declaration of principles adopted by the convention was an interesting 
amalgam of anti-imperialist and anti-militarist declarations fastened onto the Omaha 
Platform.  It called for government ownership of the railroads, direct federal control of 
the currency, the “rehabilitation of silver as money,” and the enactment of direct 
legislation laws.  As familiar as these appear, much of the platform had a very different 
emphasis. The second plank opposed the annexation of territories “populated by other 
than the Caucasian race,” and the eleventh supported the exclusion of all Asian 
immigrants.  These clearly reflected a traditional fear among western laborers.  While 
these provisions seemed exclusionary, the third demanded that “civil government under 
our constitution be extended” to all the “insular possessions of the United States,” which 
would have meant the complete incorporation of the people (and laborers) of the 
islands—presumably after the Philippines had been given up.  The fourth and fifth planks 
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attacked “arbitrary interference by the federal authorities in local affairs” and condemned 
proposals for an expanded national army.  Their placement immediately after two anti-
imperialist statements suggests some desire to link the condemnations of conquests 
overseas with domestic government without consent.
19
 
The conflict in the Coeur d‟Alenes was not the only one that placed imperialism 
and militarism at the forefront of public debate.  When in the fall of 1899 war broke out 
between Great Britain and two small settler-colonial republics in southern Africa, public 
attention was drawn to the conflict.  By that time the American war in the Philippines 
was beginning to bog down, and soon Aguinaldo would order his units to disperse to 
conduct guerrilla operations.
20
  By comparison, in late 1899 and for much of 1900 the 
South African War (or Boer War) provided the media with epic battles waged between 
two very unevenly matched foes.  Popular sentiment in America largely favored the 
underdog Boers of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, and their early victories in the 
war only added to their popularity.  Anti-imperialists—from both the East and West—
soon declared their sympathy with the Boer cause.  If Americans could sympathize with 
one anti-colonial movement, it was rationalized that they could do so for another.
21
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For modern historians, the descendants of the Dutch settlers are hardly the 
archetypal heroes for an anti-imperialist narrative.  The Boers were themselves 
imperialists who had conquered or displaced African peoples as they attempted to claim 
sovereign possession of lands to which they were relative newcomers.  Yet the typical 
accounts of the conflict or the descriptions of the Boers that wound up in the American 
press ignored these facts.  When black Africans were mentioned at all—and it was 
always very brief in the mainstream media—it was claimed that they had worked out 
amicable relations with the Boers by this time.  For most Americans, it was a white man‟s 
fight that had been complicated by economic factors, not race.  The diamond and gold 
mines of the Boer states had encouraged British immigration to the region, and the 
demographic threat that such an influx posed had been partially responsible for increased 
tensions in the months before open hostilities.  The war, then, was portrayed as a fight 
between the greed of the world‟s greatest colonial power and the freedom of two small 
states made up of white farmers and ranchers.
22
   
Western reformers quickly joined the new cause.  In early December, Governor 
Poynter of Nebraska presided over a packed pro-Boer gathering in Omaha.  In his 
keynote address, he declared his own lack of sympathy for “the sickly sentimentalism 
being fostered in favor of the mother country, on account of Anglo-Saxon kinship.”  
There was no special relationship between Britain and America, and he suggested that 
recent indications of British friendship had only followed “indication[s] on the part of 
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this government to depart from those great principles upon which this republic was 
founded.”  Others speakers discussed Britain‟s motives for war.  Senator Allen, though 
not able to attend, had a letter read in which he claimed that “because of the discovery of 
diamond and gold mines of almost limitless value they [the Boer republics] are, under 
one pretext or another, through a spirit of greed, assailed by Great Britain.”  Allen‟s 
analysis seemed to typify those presented at the meeting. Among the resolutions adopted 
was one which condemned England for its recent history of land grabbing.  “As England 
sought to claim the gold fields of Venezuela by a dispute over a boundary line… so it 
does by a pretense against the laws of the Dutch republic seek to wrest from that people 
their liberty and independence, if necessary, in order to reach the gold fields of South 
Africa.”  After the meeting, some participants stayed behind to discuss the possibility of 
forming an anti-imperial organization that could oppose the both the war in South Africa 
and that ongoing in the Philippines.
23
     
In many ways, westerners described the fight of the Boers as much like their own.  
In the Miners’ Magazine, one article explained how this association was based upon more 
than emotion.  In part, the story followed the career of John Hayes Hammond, a mining 
engineer and manager.  According to the piece, in 1892 Hammond served as an operative 
for the Mine Owners Association of the Coeur d‟Alenes, and in that year he played a key 
role in the confrontation that led to the suppression of organized labor and, for that 
purpose, the first intervention of federal troops into the region.  By 1895, Hammond had 
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relocated to South Africa where he was in the employ of the arch-imperialist Cecil 
Rhodes.  Following the defeat of the Jameson Raid—Rhodes‟s privately orchestrated and 
premature attempt to open hostilities between the British and Boers—Hammond was 
arrested by the authorities in Transvaal for his role in the conspiracy.  Though he was the 
focus of the article, the author suggested that Hammond was only one example.  “[T]he 
same stockholders in the South African Goldfields Company are stockholders in the 
mines of the United States and Canada.”  Their greed, and that of those like them, was at 
the core of all imperialism.  Whether speaking of the miners of Idaho, the Boers of South 
Africa, or “the poor Filipinos who wrested their island homes from Spanish tyranny to 
find that a still greater tyrant had paid $20,000,000 for the privilege of shooting them 
down,” it mattered not at all.  All suffered so that “a few designing millionaires might 
increase their dividends.”  Global capitalism was the source of all these conflicts, and 
only its defeat could resolve them.
24
       
Though they did so less dramatically, western congressmen were no less willing 
to link their own struggle with that of the Boers.  In the House of Representatives, John 
Shafroth of Colorado claimed that the world‟s powers should be interested in stopping a 
conflict that was “shutting off more than one-third of the world's supply of gold.”25  
While he suggested that this clearly caused damage to world markets, his description of 
the struggle in South Africa actually bore a close resemblance to the local fight for 
regulation in America.  The Boers had looked forward “to the building of a great 
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commonwealth,” but they knew that “in order to do so, it is necessary that great 
institutions should be founded, requiring immense revenue, that fine public buildings and 
vast internal improvements must be constructed, at enormous cost.”  Unfortunately, the 
Boers saw “that most of these diamond fields and gold mines have passed into the hands 
of a few corporations, whose directors and officers nearly all are citizens of, or reside in 
other countries, and have no common interest, with him, in building up a great republic in 
Africa.  He sees the only wealth the country possesses, being daily exhausted and shipped 
to foreign lands.”  While he did not make an overt comparison between the Boer 
republics and his own region, he seemed to understand their frustration that “this vast 
wealth is used in building magnificent structures in foreign cities and gorgeous palaces 
on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea,” while the common Boer farmer “still lives in 
poverty, in his unpretentious cottage.”  The vivid imagery employed by Shafroth may 
have been more akin to the plight of the western homesteader than it was to any reality in 
South Africa, but in that way it suggests his willingness to associate the struggle he took 
part in with that of the Boers.
26
 
Another westerner viewed British colonialism in a different light, but essentially 
agreed that their goal was economic oppression.  Senator Richard Pettigrew contended 
that the British goal was to destroy the independence of labor in South Africa.  He cited 
as evidence the latest speeches by the British economist (recently turned anti-imperialist) 
J. A. Hobson, who claimed that “the mine owners in the Transvaal desired to overthrow 
the Republic so they could enact the same slave-labor laws in force at Kimberley [in 
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British South Africa]; so that they could repeal the eight-hour law and compel the black 
laborers, at least, to work twelve hours a day; so that they could repeal the Sunday laws 
and run the mines seven days each week, as they do at Kimberley.”  Pettigrew argued that 
the brutal contract labor system was employed in British colonies, and it necessarily 
degraded both those held to service and those who still struggled to maintain their 
independence.  The South Dakotan said British imperialism was rooted in the defense of 
corporate profits, and so was its American counterpart.
27
 
While American popular opinion favored the Boers, the national administration 
showed no interest in challenging the British.  Many Boer supporters criticized McKinley 
for his unwillingness to make even the slightest display of sympathy for the South 
African republics, but most suggested that the United States was in no position to do so.  
Pettigrew rhetorically asked why the president said not a word “in behalf of liberty and 
humanity,” before he answered:  “Simply because he is engaged in the same wretched 
business as that which is drenching the soil of Africa with the blood of martyrs.  He is 
busy with an effort to rob the people of the Philippine Islands, and is slaughtering those 
who resist robbery because, forsooth, it will pay, because they are rich and are worth 
robbing, and because their island possessions will furnish a foothold for other robberies.”  
Furthermore, at least since the opening of the war with Spain, rumors had circulated that 
Britain and the United States had established an informal alliance.  To what extent such 
an agreement was formally recognized, Pettigrew was not sure.  “Even if there is not a 
verbal understanding between Mr. Hay, our Secretary of State, and the English 
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Government, approved by the President, it is evident that as long as Mr. McKinley is in 
power England will have at least the moral support of the United States in whatsoever she 
may do.”  This constituted nothing less than an agreement on the division of global spoils 
between the two powers.
28
   
Whatever his policy objectives, McKinley could not prevent others from taking 
sides.  Western reformers conspicuously flocked to the Boer cause, and certainly many 
did so with the political situation in mind.  When Boer representatives in America 
attempted to mobilize public support for their cause, western reformers became some of 
their strongest allies.  By May of 1900, the most prominent members of the National 
Boer Relief Fund Association were senators, congressmen, and governors of western 
states.  At that time, two of the six senators they listed as members of the general 
committee were from the West (Pettigrew and Allen), as were three of the five governors 
(Thomas of Colorado, Poynter of Nebraska, and Rogers of Washington).  Of course all 
but Rogers were anti-imperialists, and eventually the out-of-place governor of 
Washington seemed to regret his decision to support them at all.  But for other westerners 
this organizational effort could be used to further their own campaign against 
imperialism.  When several Boer envoys toured a number of states to drum up public 
interest in the summer of 1900, they added Omaha to their list of stops.  The rally held in 
their honor was attended by William Jennings Bryan, refocused attention on matters 
closer to home by declaring that there must never be a day “when those fighting for 
liberty will look to the American nation in vain for sympathy and aid in their struggle.”  
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At a time when overt displays of admiration for Filipino insurgents were deemed 
traitorous, the Boers could be used as valuable proxies.
29
   
 As much as western reformers used the South African War for their own 
purposes, it should not be suggested that they were interested only in political gain.  
Many of them had taken up anti-imperialism at an early point in the public discussion of 
expansion, and so any extension of that viewpoint should not be considered disingenuous.  
In fact, for some among them it was fundamental to their vision of human freedom.  
Franklin Pettigrew, the twenty-something son of the senator, was so deeply impressed by 
his father‟s anti-imperialism that he took up the cause as his own.  In May of 1900, 
Senator Pettigrew drafted a letter that his son Franklin was to carry with him to the 
Transvaal, where he was to join the Boers in their fight.  To Paul Kruger, president of the 
South African Republic, the senator wrote that his son “is prompted by a sentiment of 
devotion to the principles for which you contend.”  He concluded by asking the Boer 
leader, “Will you look after him as you would your own son?”  For the senator from 
South Dakota, the fight against empire—wherever it was—was far more than just 
rhetorical.
30
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By the summer of 1900, troubles in another region had become an international 
crisis.  McKinley‟s policy in Asia, while never clearly outlined to the public, had always 
put a great deal of emphasis on the China.  Of all the states of East Asia, none offered the 
resources or, most vitally, the markets that China could.  It was for that reason that the 
European powers, soon joined by Japan, had coerced the old empire into unequal treaties.  
It was widely known that the great powers all contemplated the day when an independent 
China would be no more, and each sought to position themselves for such an eventuality.  
McKinley‟s new Secretary of State, John Hay, considered the partition of China to be 
contrary to American interests.  In the closing months of 1899, much aided by the 
knowledge and pen of American diplomat William Rockhill, the administration first 
formally expressed to the other powers its desire to maintain the “Open Door” to China.   
While hardly a new idea, and in fact it had generally been the established policy of 
Britain for most of the last century, it did lay out America‟s policy objectives.  The 
avenues of trade must be kept open and the territorial integrity of China should remain 
intact.
31
   
In the Open Door notes China was described more like a passive object than an 
active participant in the affairs of East Asia.  The great powers were to come to an 
understanding, and their collective will would then be projected onto the Chinese state.  
This evaluation held little concern for the desires of China‟s government or its people, 
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but these factors still had the power to thoroughly upset American plans.  As the people 
of China felt foreign powers gaining increasing influence over their government and their 
lives, a movement had formed that channeled these frustrations into an anti-foreign and 
anti-Christian organization.  Known to English speakers as the Boxers, their influence 
grew rapidly in the last years of the 1890s.  By 1899 in some parts of China, they had 
already begun their attacks on native Christians, though by abstaining from assaults on 
foreign missionaries they had aroused little concern overseas.  That too would change in 
the spring of 1900.  In March, open rebellion broke out in the coastal province of 
Shandong, and within weeks it had spread to the provinces surrounding Beijing.  By the 
middle of June, the foreign legations in the capitol found themselves besieged, and soon 
the Dowager Empress ordered China‟s armies to aid the Boxers.32   
If the American minister to China was to survive—along with the legation staff 
and the missionaries who had crowded in for protection—some kind of intervention was 
required.  Japan and the European powers began hastily assembling forces for an 
intervention, and with intervention came the danger of partition.  If the United States was 
going to demand maintenance of the Open Door, it could not dictate from the sidelines.  
On June 16, shortly after Congress had adjourned, McKinley ordered a regiment (soon 
supplemented by additional units) to be sent from the Philippines to the coast of China.  
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There, they would work in an informal alliance with the forces of the other imperial 
powers and battle their way inland to Beijing.
33
 
From mid-June until at least mid-August of 1900, the conflict in China captured 
the headlines of the nation‟s press.  Without exaggeration, one contemporary claimed that 
“Even the presidential campaign… occupies a subordinate place in the estimation of the 
American public.”  Whether this was true of the American public, it was an accurate 
reflection of the media‟s account.  The threat posed to American lives—including both 
government officials and those in large the missionary community—made the stories all 
the more compelling.  It also necessarily had implications for the upcoming electoral 
campaign.
34
   
Those opposed to imperialism were suddenly in an awkward position. Despite 
generally negative descriptions of the Boxers as xenophobic and barbarous, some western 
anti-imperialists did understand the source of Chinese anger, and many underscored the 
fact that the Europeans, Japanese, and Americans themselves had long held ill intentions 
toward the Middle Kingdom.  While industrialized nations claimed to possess “no motive 
but that of the most unselfish philanthropy,” one writer suggested that, “in reality we 
cared nothing at all as governments about Christianizing and civilizing the Chinese, but 
everything about the riches of spoliation which lay in the mysterious interior of their 
mighty empire.”35   Another writer agreed that China‟s wealth was the cause of foreign 
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interest, and for that reason “The partitioning of China is apparently close at hand.”  This 
author did not ascribe the collapse of China to any weakness on its part.  Instead, the 
Boxer turmoil merely represented the “breach” of Chinese insularity “created by the 
entering wedge of commercialism.”  China was in turmoil because of the disruptions 
created when it was forcibly integrated into the global economy, and that chaos now 
provided the opportunity for “Greed and intrigue combined with military might” to 
“bring the numerically greatest nation in the world under the foot of the trader.”36   
The anti-imperialists made their most favorable statements regarding the Boxers 
in the days before McKinley‟s decision to intervene.  Shortly after that, as the media 
came to see the Boxer crisis as serious issue with global implications, few depicted the 
Boxers as anything other than irrational and violent.  Even anti-imperialists made few 
declarations in opposition to intervention altogether.  To support the Boxers or oppose a 
response was seen as essentially traitorous.   
Whether or not Populists and Democrats supported the Boxers was a fact of little 
consequence to their rivals.  Republicans were eager to associate Bryan and his allies 
with murderous hordes from Asia.  Surely, one argued, “The matter of killing a few 
missionaries ought not to count” when compared to savage plans of Aguinaldo, and 
Bryan‟s followers had already declared that attacks upon the Filipino leader “and his 
brother cutthroats was an unspeakable crime.”  The same author further asked “how 
much worse is it in Tien Tsin [a city on the road to Beijing where a foreign cession was 
besieged] than it was in northern Idaho some months ago,” when the anarchist miners 
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ruled the Coeur d‟Alenes?  The Populists and Democrats always sympathized with those 
who represented disorder.
37
    
Other Republicans chose to emphasize the opportunity presented by the outbreak 
of violence in China.  The old civilization of the Chinese had become moribund, and 
while the people had thus far “resisted improvements and fought those who in a spirit of 
friendliness sought to aid her,” they would now be commanded to change.  The imperial 
powers, especially the United States, could guide the “almond-eyed and swarthy-skinned 
celestials,” and suddenly “400,000,000 souls” would be awakened to the opportunities of 
the modern world.
38
   
 
The Debate over Colonialism 
While domestic conflicts and global affairs were used to shape political discourse, 
both sides geared up for the fight in Congress that would determine America‟s 
relationship with its “new possessions.”  McKinley had still made no declaration of 
policy regarding the islands taken from Spain, but that could not continue for long.  There 
were pressing and intertwined issues pertaining to constitutionality, free governance, and 
trade that could not be perpetually postponed.   
The President and his allies in Congress—such as Senators Albert Beveridge and 
Henry Cabot Lodge—were still actively making their case that the war in the Philippines 
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was necessary.  In his annual message to Congress in December of 1899, McKinley 
continued to stress that Aguinaldo and the other insurgent leaders had carefully plotted 
the attack of February 4.  The insurgents represented a small minority, and it was now up 
to the military to secure order.  No proper civilian government could be installed “until 
order is restored,” so all authority in the islands rested with the commander-in-chief and 
his subordinates.
39
   
McKinley  still made no declaration of long-term policy.  Instead, freshman 
senator Albert Beveridge took it upon himself to declare what America‟s attitude should 
be.  The trade possibilities with Asia were too vital to simply abandon, and he saw the 
Philippines as a gateway to those markets.  “Our largest trade henceforth must be with 
Asia.  The Pacific is our ocean.  More and more Europe will manufacture the most it 
needs, secure from its colonies the most it consumes.  Where shall we turn for consumers 
of our surplus?  Geography answers the question. China is our natural customer.”  For 
Beveridge, American profits and power were foremost, and he contended that “The 
power that rules the Pacific… is the power that rules the world.  And, with the 
Philippines, that power is and will forever be the American Republic.”  For that reason, 
the United States must “hold it [the Philippines] fast and hold it forever.”40 
While Beveridge suggested that the United States was to retain possession of the 
Philippines in perpetuity, and no mainstream Republican suggested otherwise at this 
time, the question of status remained.  Though neither the President nor his supporters 
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initially presented a clear solution, Beveridge and Lodge considered the Filipinos totally 
unfit for American institutions.  Beveridge claimed that “It is barely possible that 1,000 
men in all the archipelago are capable of self-government in the Anglo-Saxon sense.”  
According to the Indiana Senator, this was a result of their racial qualities.  In the same 
breath with which he called them mere “children,” he again stated “They are not capable 
of self-government.  How could they be?  They are not of a self-governing race. They are 
Orientals, Malays.”  He did also declare that their education had only been inhibited by 
years of Spanish misrule, but he primarily attributed their incapacity to racial attributes.  
Henry Cabot Lodge saw the situation in much the same light.  “There never has been… 
the slightest indication of any desire for what we call freedom or representative 
government east of Constantinople,” he said.  “The form of government natural to the 
Asiatic has always been a despotism.”  This was the mandate of biology.   The “theory, 
that you could make a Hottentot into a European if you only took possession of him in 
infancy and gave him a European education among suitable surroundings, has been 
abandoned alike by science and history as grotesquely false.”  Somehow, he did suggest 
that the Filipinos could better their race under American guidance, but he also made it 
sound as though this process would be so imperceptibly slow that it would require 
permanent American occupation of the islands.  The claim that Filipinos, as a race, 
lacked the “capacity” to govern themselves would be used as one of the primary 
justifications of American occupation for the whole of the colonial period.
41
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Proponents of expansion were eager to legitimize conquest and colonial rule, and 
their explanations of national intentions designed to fit imperial ambitions with American 
ideals. The defensiveness of McKinley‟s message to Congress suggested that the 
president intended to cling to the narrative of self-defense even as evidence to the 
contrary began to mount.   In particular, information from western volunteers made it 
clear that the Filipinos did not launch an all-out assault on the American positions 
surrounding Manila.  The correspondence between Otis and the War Department also 
made it clear that Aguinaldo had sought peace immediately after the outbreak of 
hostilities, but that his request was rejected by Otis.  Despite renunciations of Henry 
Cabot Lodge, who joined the President in declaring that “They attacked us; we did not 
attack them,” senators like Richard Pettigrew, George Turner, and John L. Rawlins 
(Democrat, Utah) questioned the account and presented proof that Aguinaldo had been 
treated as an ally and then betrayed, that Otis had provoked the war, and that the soldiers 
in the Philippines had committed atrocities against civilians.
42
   
Western anti-imperialists were just as willing as Lodge or Beveridge had been to 
frame the debate for the coming national campaign.  While several expressed frustration 
with elements of the Republican program (or lack thereof), Senator George Turner 
provided one of the most extensive and complete critiques rather early in the session, in 
late January of 1900.  As had so many anti-imperialists in 1899, he proposed a resolution 
                                                                                                 
Race, Empire, the United States & the Philippines (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 
especially 159-227; Warwick Anderson, Colonial Pathologies:  American Tropical Medicine, Race, and 
Hygiene in the Philippines (Durham:  Duke University Press, 2006).   
42
 For just a few examples of this, see Congressional Record, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., Dec. 14, 1899, p. 378-
379, Jan. 8, 1900, p. 669-670, Jan. 22, 1900, p. 1038-1043, Mar. 12, 1900, p. 2763-2772.     
  
431 
 
designed to declare the status of the archipelago.  It renounced permanent possession of 
the islands and declared that the objective of the United States was to offer protection to 
the independent Philippine nation that would be formed following the end of the current 
conflict.  As he defended his proposal, he did agree with others that the Filipinos had no 
capacity “for Anglo-Saxon government, and never will have,” so statehood was not 
possible.  But that did not mean that they should be governed by the kind of despotism 
advocated by those who supported the President.  Though “their ideas of free 
representative government are crude,” and “they are unfitted to administer government 
based on an Anglo-Saxon model,” he considered it “an absurdity, if I may be pardoned 
the expression, to say that they are barbarians.”  Too many Filipinos were educated for 
them to considered savages, and their society showed tremendous respect for peace and 
orderliness.  They could not be integrated into the American system, but surely such 
people were entitled to self-government.
43
 
  Turner also depicted a fear held by many from the West.  If the Philippines were 
not to be set free, its people would have to be integrated into the American system.  Even 
if the archipelago did not become a state or states in the union, Filipinos could not be 
legally excluded.  Under the Constitution, “these people and their descendants would 
become citizens of the United States, although not citizens of any particular State.”  The 
Filipinos would become citizens, he predicted, and they would have “perfect right and 
title to flow into any of the already organized States and to there assist in controlling their 
destinies, and, through them, the destinies of the American Republic.”  Even beyond the 
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threat of immigration there were dangers.  Whether they came or not could prove trivial, 
for he presumed there could be no constitutional method of prohibiting or taxing the 
shipment of goods from the islands.  This would effectively “debauch the labor of the 
country,” and “pit the 10,000,000 underpaid and underfed Filipinos against the mechanic, 
the artisan, and the laboring man of the land.”   
Turner hit on the great conundrum that imperialists faced.  The most idealistic 
expansionists in 1898 and 1899, such as Henry Teller, had argued that the United States 
would bring freedom and democracy to the “new possessions.”  Yet if that great legal 
guarantee of American freedom—the Constitution—was extended over the islands, then 
their inhabitants would be free to immigrate wherever they pleased or ship their goods to 
the mainland.  The threat of the latter proved too daunting for the administration to face, 
especially in an election year.  The next political confrontation would take place as the 
President and his allies announced their rejection of the idealist position in favor of 
pragmatic colonialism.   
While the Philippines remained foremost in everyone‟s minds, soon a debate over 
something as seemingly trivial as a tariff for Puerto Rico would force the administration 
to reveal its intentions.  Of all the islands the United States had recently claimed, 
Americans may have already been most sympathetic to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico.  
They had not rebelled against American rule but instead were remembered for welcoming 
the invasion force under General Nelson Miles.  Then, in August of 1899, one of the most 
powerful hurricanes ever recorded in the Atlantic barreled through the island of Puerto 
Rico, killing at least 2,500 and causing $20 million in damage.  Clearly the people of the 
island needed assistance, but no act had yet established the nature of relations between 
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Puerto Rico and the United States, and the Treaty of Paris had left the power to define the 
relationship solely with Congress.  In his annual message to Congress in December, the 
President called for a direct aid bill, but then added that it was “Our plain duty” to 
establish free trade between the island and the mainland.  He clearly did not foresee the 
fight that would ensue.
44
   
The great oddity about the fight over the Puerto Rican tariff (also known as the 
Organic Act of 1900 and the Foraker bill, for the Ohio Senator who managed it in 
Congress) was that the debate was not in actuality about the tariff itself or for that matter 
just about Puerto Rico.  Though President McKinley had been opposed to the customs 
duties with the hope that favorable legislation would encourage economic recovery on the 
island, he quickly reconsidered when anti-imperialists declared that Puerto Rico was an 
integral part of the United States and they denied that Congress had the power to erect 
such boundaries.  Anti-imperialists argued that the Constitution followed the flag, and so 
the same legal freedoms that existed in territories like New Mexico also existed in the 
island possessions.  McKinley, and the vast majority who understood the logic of 
American overseas imperialism, contended that the colonies were not part of the U.S., 
and Congress should hold plenary power over customs, governance, and even citizenship 
status.  This principle needed to be demonstrated, especially before such an issue would 
arise for the more controversial Philippines.  As if to prove that this was merely 
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symbolic, the tariff rate was set eighty-five percent below the standard rate.  Though 
some did try to claim that it still constituted a protective tariff, the debate itself was really 
about colonialism and the limits of Congressional power.  For supporters and opponents 
alike, the tariff fight was about what could be done to the colonies, especially the ever-
troubling Philippines.
45
   
The greatest question of the debate pertained to the legal classification of the 
Puerto Ricans.  The original bill presented by Foraker was somewhat contradictory in that 
it included the low tariff, and thus made clear that Puerto Rico was not integrated into the 
American body, yet it also granted citizenship to the inhabitants of the island.  It 
simultaneously established a civilian government, but allowed few openings for Puerto 
Rican self-government.  Henry Teller especially pointed out the juxtaposition in which 
the people were integrated into the American system but the island and its government 
were not.  Foraker explained that this was his intention, but he stated that when “we 
adopted the word „citizens‟ we did not understand… that we were giving to those people 
an rights that the American people do not want them to have.”  He did not believe that the 
grant of citizenship would have limited the plenary power of Congress to rule Puerto 
Rico as it wished. In response, Teller asked aloud if the Puerto Ricans were made 
citizens, then “are we not bound to extend to them all the rights and privileges of the 
people of the United States?  Are we going to have a section of country where there are 
citizens, where they take the oath to obey the Constitution every time they hold office, 
and yet treat them as foreigners?”  Soon enough Foraker amended the bill, and the 
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residents of the island were labeled as “citizens of Puerto Rico” who were “as such 
entitled to the protection of the United States.”  This new construction, though no less 
awkward than the previous version, did further establish the line of division between the 
colony and metropole.
46
    
By drawing legal distinctions between American territory and the insular 
possessions, the Foraker bill was designed to create the legal basis for a system of 
colonialism.  While Teller had consistently argued that even a democracy like the United 
States could possess colonies, he also reiterated his claim that there was a difference 
between authority and propriety.  In this case, he did agree that Puerto Rico could be 
governed differently than territories had been previously.  Still, he wanted to “extend to 
them all the privileges which are consistent with their relations to this Government save 
that of citizenship.”  Unlike the statements of Beveridge or Lodge regarding the Filipinos, 
Teller had “no doubt of their [the Puerto Ricans‟] ability to manage their own internal 
and domestic affairs practically without our super vision.”  Teller‟s vision differed 
markedly from that of the most aggressive expansionists, and for that reason he was soon 
forced to admit that his association with them had been a mistake.
47
   
Teller accepted the underlying legal contention of the imperialists, namely that 
Congress held plenary power of the acquired islands.  Most western anti-imperialists 
argued otherwise.  Foremost among them was William V. Allen.  He challenged Foraker 
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in a number of exchanges on the floor of the Senate, forcing the friend of McKinley to 
repeatedly admit that—in his view—the Puerto Ricans had no guaranteed legal rights.  
Allen instead claimed that “When we ratified the treaty of Paris, Puerto Rico became as 
much a part of the territory of the United States as New Mexico or Arizona.”  Rather than 
colonies, he viewed the insular possessions as no different than territories.  The 
Constitution made no allowance for anything else.  Furthermore, he did not consider the 
people of Puerto Rico to be so exceptionally different from others who had been 
integrated into the American body, and so there was no basis in necessity for unrestrained 
colonial authority.  The people of Florida and Louisiana were of much the same stock 
when they were annexed, he said.  The people of Puerto Rico were also “substantially the 
same people who dwell in South America. There is much of the Mexican in their nature; 
much of the blood of all the people who dwell in Central and South America, in 
Venezuela, for instance… Everyone of these South American countries has a republic.”  
Even if they were not suited to American forms of self-rule, they were undoubtedly 
capable of governing themselves.  Whether the island would be independent or integrated 
into the American system, the people must have free government.  Race did play some 
part in Allen‟s analysis, just as it had for most anti-imperialists, but like others in 
Congress he attacked the proposed bill was as both unwarranted and unconstitutional.
48
   
Western Republicans in Congress were virtually silent during the debate, as they 
frequently had during all the controversies of the McKinley administration.  During the 
Puerto Rico debate, one of the rare exceptions was Senator George Perkins of California.  
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He had always been a skeptic of expansion, and it was for that reason he had asked for 
the recommendation of his state legislature before the vote on the Treaty of Paris.  
Despite his own fears that it could provide the people of the Philippines easy entry into 
the U.S., he had voted for the treaty as the legislature advised.  Still, he had only 
succeeded in briefly setting aside his anxieties.   
Certainly, Perkins was not the only supporter of the administration who must have 
sensed the danger of expansion.  His vocal support for the Foraker bill demonstrates the 
priorities of some western Republicans, and those from the Pacific Coast especially.  
While others remained silent, Perkins was proud of the fact that he was on the committee 
that assembled it in its final form.  Despite the low rate of tax it imposed, he suggested 
the tariff was necessary for protective purposes, because “More than one-third of the 
entire population [of Puerto Rico] is of the negro or mixed race,” and perhaps as many as 
half of the population qualified as “poor.”  In particular, the nation‟s sugar production 
was endangered by this cheap labor.  While some idealists wanted to claim “the 
Constitution follows the flag,” all such language was “merely claptrap and untrue.”49   
 Perkins primarily focused on Puerto Rico in his discussion, but when the proposal 
was challenged, he made its real intent clear.  South Carolina‟s anti-imperialist senator, 
Ben Tillman, attacked the bill on grounds much like those presented by Senator Allen, 
and he claimed that it was both unnecessary and unconstitutional.  The Californian 
responded with a query:  since Tillman supported free trade with a region where labor 
was valued at “15 to 20 cents a day,” was he also “in favor of free trade with the 
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Philippine Islands?”  When the Tillman said he was, Perkins was aghast.  “Is it right for 
that cheap labor, that peon, contract labor, to come into competition with American 
labor?” he asked rhetorically. 50  Perkins understood they were legislating to establish the 
principle.  Even if the tariff rate between the U.S. and Puerto Rico was nominal, there 
was nothing to say the rate could not be higher when it was time to legislate for the 
Philippines.  While the Philippine Organic Act was two years away, it was vital for 
western Republicans to set the precedent before the election.   
By this time, Senator George Turner of Washington was one of only two non-
Republicans representing the Pacific Coast in either house of Congress.  Though in many 
ways he agreed with Perkins that the immigration and labor threats posed by the people 
of the Philippines posed serious risks to American industries and white workers, he also 
thought the bill made a mockery of American law.  He had already attacked those who 
had been in favor of “admitting the labor and the products of the labor of the underpaid 
and underfed people of the Philippine Islands,” but he thought the problem could not be 
counterbalanced by another violation of the Constitution.  Republicans had “apparently 
awakened” to the danger, “which they are now trying to guard against.”  Imperialists 
were covering their weak spot, but it seemed to Turner that they were simultaneously 
discarding the foundations of American law and justice.
51
   
While the debate was heated, the results were little in doubt.  The final version of 
the bill was passed in the Senate on April 3, by a vote of forty to thirty-one.  Of the 
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westerners who had supported Bryan in 1896, only John P. Jones and William Stewart of 
Nevada voted in favor of the bill.
52
  The House decision a week later was much the same.  
There, the bill passed 161-153, with no western Populist, Democrat, or Silver Republican 
support.
53
  No western Republicans in either house of Congress voted against it.  
Members of the reform coalition, now all united behind the cause of anti-imperialism, 
understood that to vote in favor would have provided sanction for a system of colonial 
rule.  It was impossible to oppose such a policy and support the legal framework that the 
system would be based upon.  Western Republicans pulled together with the same 
understanding.  Unequal colonialism—which would provide benefits to Americans 
without altering their definitions of citizenship or posing risks to interests within their 
domestic economy—required such a law, and they happily approved it in a campaign 
year.        
 The passage of the bill could not heal all of the wounds created in the fight.  
Nationally, the bill became an object of scorn among Democrats and Republicans alike.  
While westerners in Congress divided clearly along party lines, it was not so for the rest 
of the House or Senate.  Samuel McCall of Massachusetts and Charles Littlefield of 
Maine joined twenty other House Republicans in harsh criticism of the original bill; all 
but six eventually voted in favor of it.  In the Senate, even the imperialist Albert 
Beveridge initially opposed the tariff in favor of free trade, but he too found it to be a 
fight he could not win.  Republicans directed their vitriol at the bill in part because of 
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growing clamor for free trade with the island.  In this regard, free trade was deemed a 
moral imperative in no small part because the President had promised it and pronounced 
it to be a humanitarian measure.  When McKinley changed course later, he did so in 
silence.  He had also never made a statement regarding the legal status of the Puerto 
Ricans.  When Congress proposed the erection of tariff boundaries, even the nation‟s 
Republican press charged that they were either defying the will of McKinley or 
mistreating the nation‟s new citizens.  Papers throughout the East and Midwest were 
particularly vociferous in their attacks upon the bill, including portions of the Republican 
press in Boston, Philadelphia, Indianapolis, and Chicago.
54
    
 Surprisingly, these eastern and Midwestern critics of the policy were joined by 
some of the most emphatic imperialists on the Pacific Coast.  The editor of the Evening 
Tribune of San Diego, California, for example, consistently denied that McKinley had 
rethought his position, and went on to call the tariff bill “The most radical measure of 
change in the policy of the United States since Abraham Lincoln‟s proclamation of 
emancipation.”  While they admitted that southern California fruit producers might 
approve of a tariff to protect their own interests, “nine out of ten of our fruit growers will 
raise the thought… that we are unfairly handicapping these new citizens of our nation.”55  
The otherwise pro-McKinley Oregonian of Portland also detested the measure and even 
suggested it was for the “Protected Interests.”  These interest groups hoped to deny the 
basic right of free trade with Puerto Rico that should exist between all states and 
                                                 
54
 Rystad, Ambiguous Imperialism, 73-81.   
55
 “The Puerto Rico Tariff,” Evening Tribune (San Diego, CA), March 1, 1900, p. 2; Evening Tribune, 
March 7, 1900, p. 2;  “Puerto Rico‟s Tariff,” Evening Tribune, March 16, 1900, p. 2.   
  
441 
 
territories; undoubtedly “they will give the Philippines the same treatment.”56  The 
Oregonian‟s writers had contended that American culture and institutions would civilize 
and invigorate Asia:  “in confidence and reliance we can indulge the hope to bring the 
Asiatics up to our level of ambition and comfort.”57  Tariffs and other boundaries created 
resentment rather than a sense of common interest or identity, and it was no way to 
cement the American position in any of the islands.  In a similar tone, the editor of the 
staunchly Republican San Francisco Chronicle, argued that the “general laws and the 
Constitution of the United States must cover the islands.”  Though the paper also noted 
the importance of trade, it suggested that the purpose of this trade was to extend both the 
nation‟s “commercial identity” and the “spirit of American nationality,” and both traits 
would mutually reinforce each other.
58
   After the bill passed, the paper printed two 
complete pages of an angry attack on the tariff, and its overall argument was hard to miss.  
Though again it gave a nod to economic self-interest, nearly every paragraph that 
discussed the Filipinos or Puerto Ricans was littered with the word “citizen.”  As soon as 
possible, the author demanded, it was Congress‟s duty to “pass laws which will give such 
of the inhabitants of the Philippines as we have made citizens of the United States by 
annexation all the benefits and immunities of the Constitution.”59  
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 Republicans were reaping the whirlwind they had sewn over the course of nearly 
two years.  They had claimed that democracy and freedom followed the flag, and that 
their policy was one of “benevolent assimilation.”  They had never mentioned whether 
citizenship accompanied the flag, nor did they devote many words to the limits of their 
benevolence.  Only the most bellicose among them had openly called for a genuinely 
colonial policy, and much of that language had only been employed quite recently.  
Ultimately, members of the Republican press were only guilty of taking the 
administration at its word.  Yet the attacks on the administration were far from universal, 
and in fact the Republican press in most of the western states rarely criticized the tariff or 
any other provision of the bill.  The examples from Oregon and California stand as 
representatives from the only two far western states that had voted for McKinley in 1896, 
and there was little threat that the party would be dethroned in either in 1900.  There, 
Republicans could demand free trade to benefit their industries and the full, permanent 
integration of all the islands to guarantee long-term connections while also fulfilling the 
moral imperative many expansionists employed to justify the policy.   In other places in 
the West, Republican papers expressed few opinions on the subject, but when they did 
they were nearly all supportive of the bill.   
In Nebraska and Colorado, the Republican press was largely dismissive of the 
attacks upon the proposal.  Generally speaking, they did not discuss the issues of 
citizenship or governance for the people of Puerto Rico.  Instead, they characterized the 
bill as merely a tariff measure.  The whole fight was overblown and partisan, they said, 
and there was no need for the public to take it seriously.  The McCook Tribune, for 
instance, declared that an analysis of the tariff “shows that it will be vastly more 
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advantageous to Puerto Rico as well as to the United States than that which formerly 
existed in the island.”60  The formerly anti-imperialist Omaha Daily Bee also adopted this 
view.  “The popocratic press must be very hard up for political capital when it has to fall 
back upon the Porto Rican muddle,” claimed one writer for the paper.  A tariff of just 
fifteen percent of the normal rate was hardly worth protest.
61
  Colorado‟s Republican 
press likewise categorized all opposition protests as a sign of the “desperate straits” the 
Democrats were in as they sought to “make a mountain out of this molehill” for the 
coming campaign.
62
   
 Further to the west the emphasis was different.  Writers for the Seattle Post-
Intelligencer understood full well that the tariff was never about taxation.  In a series of 
pieces over weeks leading up to the vote, they attacked Democrats who argued that the 
Constitution “follows the flag” to any acquired territory, “no matter what the 
circumstances or the character of its people.”63  The purpose of this bill was to 
emphatically reject “the plea that our new possessions come immediately within the 
constitution, with explicit rights to statehood.”  The Democrats were trying to “put us in a 
dilemma where we should have had to confess that statehood must go ultimately to the 
Philippines or else that we must turn them over to Aguinaldo.”64  Analysis in the Morning 
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Olympian was much the same.  While the paper initially supported a more inclusive 
relationship with Puerto Rico, the opinions presented soon shifted.  Even Britain‟s free 
trade policies did not extend to its colonies, one writer explained.  A month after the bill 
had passed, another stated that “Wages paid in Puerto Rico should more closely 
approximate those paid on the mainland before the average islander should be permitted 
to come here in competition with the American wage-earner.”65   
Any differences between the reactions in western states should not be overstated.  
Of course, there was no shortage of Washington papers that were just as dismissive as 
those of Nebraska or Colorado.
66
  But it was more than coincidental that Washington 
Republicans saw the Foraker Act‟s significance in terms of citizenship and immigration.  
Local papers had confidently described their state‟s location as a logical gateway to Asia, 
but the implications of that depiction were not lost on them.  Interestingly, the act had not 
actually prohibited immigration from Puerto Rico, but because it denied the people of the 
island American citizenship it was presumed to de-incentivize the movement of people to 
the mainland.  It also hypothetically allowed for future immigration restriction, 
something that the Washington Republicans would play up in the coming campaign.    
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The Gold Standard Act 
 At the same time that Congress debated the Puerto Rican tariff, the McKinley 
administration made one more effort to secure new banking and monetary legislation.  
Their efforts in 1898 had led to humiliating defeat, but by the Fifty-sixth Congress 
opponents in the Senate could no longer block their way.  As had been the case with the 
Foraker Act, it was deemed especially desirable to pass such legislation before the 
upcoming election.  Both demonstrated the position of the administration on key issues, 
and both would be presented as “safe” in that they recognized and legalized the 
established order as it was.
67
   
The proposed “reform” measures, presented in a single bill, would make gold the 
currency of ultimate redemption, take $150,000,000 of greenbacks out of circulation, 
authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to issue bonds if the greenback redemption fund 
dropped below a certain level, re-fund the national debt and postpone its final repayment, 
and allow national banks to issue bank notes equal to the value of federal bonds they 
owned.  While not a wholesale overhaul of the existing currency system, the changes 
contained in the bill were nonetheless substantial.
68
     
The reaction of the western reformers was—of course—overwhelmingly 
negative.  They had waged the last national campaign against the gold standard, and they 
remained opposed to every element of the new bill.  Allen, Turner, Teller, and others 
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took turns accosting the sponsors of the bill, especially senators Nelson W. Aldrich of 
Rhode Island and William B. Allison of Iowa.  There was not enough gold in the world to 
function as the global medium of exchange, they declared yet again.  The destruction of 
the greenbacks and the further marginalization of silver would contract the currency 
supply and leave producers at the mercy of creditors.  Such a proposal was sure to 
produce national calamities, they predicted.  Senator Teller even suggested that a recent 
famine in India was a direct result of Britain‟s attempt to impose the gold standard on her 
colony.
69
   
While they denigrated the gold standard, the bill‟s opponents in Congress actually 
focused more of their ire upon the proposed entrenchment of a money and banking 
system that would be even further removed from democratic influence.  All remembered 
the bond issue of the Cleveland administration—done without Congressional approval—
and none looked forward to a repetition of it.  Turner called it a “most remarkable means 
to the accomplishment of the ends sought,” as it essentially gave the Secretary of the 
Treasury policy-making power.  Allen took the same principle even further, suggesting 
that it was tantamount to handing “over the power of taxation to the Secretary of the 
Treasury.  By it we abdicate that power, for when we say that the Secretary of the 
Treasury may issue Government bonds ad libitum, as he sees fit, as this bill provides, 
then the question of taxation to meet the interest upon those bonds is merely perfunctory, 
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because the foundation for the taxation has been laid by the mere caprice of an executive 
officer, and the taxation can not be escaped.”70 
That kind of authority in the hands of a lone bureaucrat was too much for them to 
accept.  Teller pointed out that such a centralization of power was especially dangerous 
because of the pressure likely to be applied upon anyone in that position.  A 
congressional investigation had just exposed letters sent by A. B. Hepburn (vice president 
of National City Bank of New York, the predecessor of modern Citibank) to Secretary 
Gage in which the banker expressed hope that his institution could retain its position as a 
national depository, and then emphasized the political contributions of its director as 
evidence that it should.  Obviously, said the senior senator from Colorado, such examples 
only made clearer the dangers of investing such power to a person in an appointed 
position.  Allen likewise stated that the Republicans were “debtors” to those he called 
“the gold gamblers and the money sharks,” and for that reason control of the national 
purse strings must never be taken from the national legislature.
71
     
 The greatest danger posed by the bill pertained to the position it gave to national 
banks.  Teller believed “that 75 per cent of all the loans made in New York City by those 
banks are made to speculators and to operators, and that it is a very common thing for the 
banks themselves to engage in such operations.  If they do not do so, their officers do.”  
This gave the banks a direct interest in the outcomes of certain markets (especially for 
commodities, according to Teller).  Such institutions were too deeply involved in profit-
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making activities to simultaneously be given power over the money in circulation.  At 
any moment they could disperse or withdraw their bank notes and inflate or deflate the 
currency as they wished.  These concerns were at the heart of the issue.  As 
Representative Edwin Ridgely (a Kansas Populist) put it, “the real issue involved in this 
whole money question is not between gold and silver alone; it is, in fact, a question of 
who shall issue and control our money supply.  Shall we by this legislation make a gift of 
this great power and profit to the bank syndicate?”  Properly, this was a power that must 
be held by the people and those chosen by them.  “All money is the creation of law.  In a 
republic all laws emanate from the people; hence the power to create and issue money is 
inherent and belongs to all the people.”  Money, as Peffer had insisted at the beginning of 
the1890s, was a tool to be used for public benefit.  Instead, the proposed bill would give 
control of something as fundamental as currency to private enterprises, and there were 
few controls to determine how they employed that power.
72
   
In their analysis of the bill, Populists predicted it would only accelerate the 
destruction of traditional American freedom.   Allen considered it a harbinger of the near 
future, in which the nation would “raise up a great army of industrial and agricultural 
serfs” to take their place of independent farmers and laborers.73  Ridgely declared that 
“We are approaching the rapid culmination of the most tyrannical forms of capitalism.”  
He believed that world events were demonstrating the guiding influence of capitalists, 
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and this bill only represented one form of this power.  In the same speech, he noted that 
armies were being  
directed in their operations to support and extend the rights and interests of 
capital, even in the present wars waged under its orders against the Filipinos and 
the Boers; we hear the bold demand of capital claiming its right to conquer those 
people in order that it may appropriate nature's rich resources, using our armies to 
hold the people there in subjection, while capital works them at a few pennies per 
day, throwing their product of rice, tobacco, sugar, cotton, etc., on the market to 
force down wages of our home people. 
 
The American people would not long tolerate the continuous degradation of their 
lifestyles.  The next step, and one that Ridgely seemed to look forward to, was 
socialism.
74
   
 All western reformers agreed about the source of the bill.  The financiers, bankers, 
and bondholders were the driving force that demanded it.  Interestingly, while this was an 
old enemy for all of them, their rhetoric was different than what it had been for much of 
the last ten years.  While Allen made a single reference to the “money power,” he spoke 
just as much of the “plutocrats” and “aristocrats.”  Ridgely attacked the gold trust—
presumably made up of those who had successfully hoarded gold and had gained wealth 
through its appreciation in value.  Turner claimed that the purpose of the bill was to 
“establish in favor of the national banks of the country a monopoly in the issue and 
control of all money save gold, and thereby to establish the great trust of trusts, around 
which all others shall revolve.”75   
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The transition was not unimportant, but the meaning was also not totally novel.   
They now spoke of trusts, syndicates, and combinations and the plutocrats or aristocrats 
who owned them, but hints of conspiracy remained.  Even the moderate Teller claimed 
that the banks could not be trusted because “We saw in 1893 a panic in this country 
created by the banks.”  He claimed they had intentionally caused the market crash in 
order to provide the “object lesson which the President of the United States declared the 
American people had to receive in order that he might secure the repeal of the purchasing 
clause of the Sherman Act.”76   
The new language served as a substitute, and one that had a certain utility.  The 
great mergers that took place in the last years of the 1890s and first of the 1900s had 
reaffirmed the importance of the Populist “anti-monopoly” stance.  The discussion of 
financial conspiracy had at times overshadowed their broader critique of concentrated 
wealth and centralized power, but the alternative rhetoric that they turned to made the 
financial “trust” just one of many—and all posed their own threats.  Simultaneously, this 
shift marked a difference between the most serious reformers and those who had adopted 
silver as an issue but remained conservative in all other regards.  As the silver-only 
conservatives soon gravitated to McKinley (often dropping the money issue along the 
way), the differences between the parties only became clearer.   
McKinley and his managers in Congress had been more careful than they were 
two years ago.  They had secured the necessary votes well before the final determination 
was to be made, and both sides understood the inevitability of its passage just as soon as 
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the dates were set.  On March 6, the Senate passed the bill by a vote of forty-four to 
twenty-six.  Seventeen took no part in the vote, including Edward Wolcott, James Kyle of 
South Dakota, and William Stewart of Nevada—the former owner of the Silver Knight-
Watchman.  One week later, it was the House‟s turn to do the same.  The vote was 
somewhat closer—166 to 120, with sixty-six House members either absent or voting 
“present”—but still never in doubt.77  McKinley had secured a substantial legislative 
victory.   
 
The two sides had effectively laid the groundwork for the campaign of 1900 well 
before it was officially underway.  Republicans went into the campaign by declaring their 
devotion to trickle-down prosperity within a united nation, one in which the divisions of 
class and race were perpetually muted by the acceptance of orderly hierarchy.  Empire 
secured the markets while gold provided the monetary foundation for economic stability 
based upon capital investment.  In many ways, the events of the preceding four years had 
led to the recent culmination of their party‟s domestic and foreign policy initiatives.  
Over the course of 1899 and early 1900 challenges had emerged in opposition to their 
novel system, but in each case they had responded by reinforcing its structure rather than 
abandoning it.  These challenges provided opportunities to demonstrate and clarify their 
vision of American wealth and power.     
The western reformers maintained a starkly different dream of what America 
should be.  As the administration had bolstered the gold standard, implemented a colonial 
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policy, and informally allied the nation with America‟s oldest enemy, Democrats and 
Populists classified these developments as boons for special interests and threats to 
republican institutions.  If political and economic freedom were to be saved—in America 
and around the world—the grip of powerful corporations and authoritarian government 
had to be loosened.  They looked forward to the coming campaign as a chance to reverse 
the present course of the nation, and they looked for Bryan to lead them in the contest 
against militaristic empire and arrogant wealth.       
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CHAPTER IX 
THE CONTEST OF 1900 AND THE DEFEAT OF REFORM   
In the summer of 1900, William McKinley and William Jennings Bryan 
campaigned against each other for the presidency of the United Stated for the second time 
in four years.  The nominations of the two parties had been mere formalities, and in many 
ways the previous campaign had never actually ended.  Bryan had only strengthened his 
position as party leader since 1896, and McKinley had justified every action taken during 
his term of office as though he was running against that same opponent of economic 
orthodoxy.  In July and early August it remained only for the two contenders to make 
their acceptance speeches, which would serve as the keynotes of the campaign.   
McKinley acknowledged his party‟s nomination in a speech on July 12, just a 
week after the Democratic convention.  In it he boasted of the successes of the 
administration, especially the recent passage of the Gold Standard Act.  The second half 
of this address discussed the liberation of Cuba, the “beneficent government” which had 
recently been established over Puerto Rico, and the “obligations imposed by the triumph 
of our arms” in the Philippines.  In those islands, those who had been “misled into 
rebellion” were dispersed, and conditions were improving.  There were no longer any 
obstacles to the restoration of “peace and stable government” in the islands, but the real 
“obstructionists are here, not elsewhere.”  In his conclusion, the President had the 
audacity to declare that the same party that “broke the shackles of 4,000,000 slaves” was, 
under his own guidance, responsible for the “liberation of 10,000,000 of the human 
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family from the yoke of imperialism.”  With no apparent sense of irony, McKinley chose 
to emphasize the anti-colonial legacy of the war with Spain.
1
   
 The President had attempted to summarize his term, and he did so by 
underscoring the security Americans could feel and power their nation now held.  While 
he had suggested that his policies had created prosperity and safety in the new American 
empire, his opponent chose to highlight the terrible consequences of those policies.  
Bryan would do so by focusing on the one issue he considered the most dangerous and 
meaningful of them all:  imperialism.   
While imperialism and militarism were the chosen focus of his address, Bryan 
integrated his view of domestic ills into his critique of American foreign policy.  On 
August 8, a crowd of 40,000 people gathered in Military Park in Indianapolis to hear 
Bryan open with the declaration that “the contest of 1900 is a contest between democracy 
on one hand and plutocracy on the other.”  Through their actions in the last four years, 
Republicans had shown themselves to be “dominated by those influences which 
constantly substitute the worship of mammon for the protection of the rights of man.”  
McKinley had dared to suggest that the war in the Philippines was for the benefit of the 
Filipinos; Bryan called it a war for corporate profit.
2
   
From there, Bryan went on to describe the incongruence of imperialist policies 
with American principles.  The war in the Philippines did not stem from a 
misunderstanding or the encouragement of disloyal Americans as McKinley had 
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suggested, but it emanated from the principle of self-government that had been espoused 
by the founders of the American nation.  The right to govern oneself was not bound to 
any one group of people, and while he believed that there may be differing “degrees of 
proficiency,” he added that it was a poor “reflection upon the Creator to say he denied to 
any people the capacity for self-government.”  The nature of colonialism also gave lie to 
the talk of uplift, for education would make the subject peoples all the more aware of 
their oppression and could only intensify their desire for freedom.   
Bryan then laid out his own vision of what was possible.  The Philippines should 
be guaranteed their freedom and then protected from outside interference, just as Cuba 
had been.  This would set the stage for America‟s future greatness, in which its moral 
authority would extend far beyond the influence it could ever attain as a colonial power.  
The United States could seize the opportunity to put its own house in order and be a 
republic in which “every citizen is a sovereign, but in which no one cares to wear a 
crown.”  At the same time, it could be “a republic, increasing in population, in wealth, in 
strength, and in universal brotherhood—a republic which shakes thrones and dissolves 
aristocracies by its silent example and gives light and inspiration to those who sit in 
darkness.”   
 In the campaign of 1900, Bryan and his allies offered voters an alternative path 
for American development, one based upon policies of moral influence abroad and the 
restraint of corporate power at home.  Comparatively speaking, the differences between 
the two sides had not been as dramatic in the “battle of standards” of 1896.  The previous 
contest had been based upon contrasting economic policies, the likes of which were rare 
in the Gilded Age.  While the campaign rhetoric had spoken to certain concerns regarding 
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egalitarianism in the republic, the Bryan campaign did not confront many of the key 
facets of industrial power.  Conversely, the Democratic and Populist campaign at the 
dawn of the twentieth century was focused squarely on the rights and freedoms of people 
in a world that they believed was dominated by aggregated wealth.   
The stark contrast between the two sides did not make the campaign any easier for 
Bryan or his western allies.  McKinley was thoroughly entrenched after four years in 
office, and it would take a monumental effort to unseat him.  In no small part due to his 
involvement, the westerners had taken a rather severe thrashing in the mid-terms, and 
now they faced the challenges associated with once again working out the differences 
between the parties involved in their coalitions.  Bryan‟s bid for the presidency was also 
threatened by fractures in the national Democratic Party and, even more ominously, the 
hesitance with which eastern anti-imperialists embraced him as the candidate of the 
movement.   
Despite the many reasons to consider their defeat likely due to those reasons 
alone, the evidence suggests that the western reformers did not beat themselves.  The 
outbreak of a new war (and their opponents opposition to it) allowed western 
Republicans to focus on foreign policy, as they had in 1898.  They successfully shifted 
the terms of debate from economic reform and equal rights to a discussion of power, 
profit, and patriotism.  They rarely refuted the claims that corporations grew in power by 
the day, and they blandly denied that there would be any downside associated with the 
new global market order they were establishing.    
The debate between imperialists and anti-imperialists necessarily took center 
stage in the campaign.  No other single issue could so fully embody the opposing visions 
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each side presented.  No other issue could simultaneously evoke the kind of emotions that 
it could.  For western anti-imperialists, the cause related to all those they had worked for 
over the course of the decade.  For all anti-imperialists, it represented the cause of self-
government and the maintenance of American traditions.   
 
Anti-Imperialism in the East 
The tendency to downplay the political importance of American anti-imperialism 
began with the earliest historians of the movement.
3
  While some have attempted to argue 
that its greater significance has been downplayed, that same general trend continues up to 
the present time.
4
  This interpretation is understandable due to the consistent focus of 
historians upon eastern conservative anti-imperialists.
5
  The fact remains that the anti-
imperialists who have been studied previously had a rather pessimistic view of the 
political situation, and after 1900 they moved on quickly—perhaps even with a degree of 
relief at their own failure.  While the purpose of this dissertation has been to focus upon 
those who have formerly been neglected, a description of the circumstances facing 
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eastern anti-imperialists provides a more complete picture of the national situation 
leading up to the campaign.   
Though there was much they all shared, there were substantial divisions among 
the anti-imperialists.  All agreed on the same basic principles—that the United States 
should not possess overseas colonies; that American government required the consent of 
the governed; and that the spirit of militarism that had followed the War of 1898 was 
contrary to the nation‟s values—other elements of their analysis differed markedly.  Of 
course differences were bound to exist among any group of people and, as Robert Beisner 
has shown, even conservative individuals found their own reasons to oppose empire.  
Still, whatever divergence existed between the views of George Hoar and Andrew 
Carnegie or Carl Schurz and E. L. Godkin, these differences seemed insignificant when 
compared with their own intellectual distance from Bryan and his allies.  But it is patently 
false to suggest—as at least one historian has—that there was one group of “real” anti-
imperialists whose ideas were the basis for the arguments of all others.
6
   
As should be plain by this point, the ideological differences that separated the two 
groups were indeed substantial.  They differed on the importance of the tariff, on 
currency and banking matters, and, most fundamentally, on the state‟s role in the 
management of the economy and the equalization of wealth.  It should then only be 
expected that they would view imperialism in different lights.  Based upon the material 
presented in the preceding chapters, it is clear that Populists and their western allies often 
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described industrial and financial capitalists as the source of the new aggressive policy 
and additionally that accumulated wealth would ceaselessly seek new fields to exploit.  
Because of these views, they saw the fight against imperialism as a logical extension of 
their battle against “monopoly” at home, and further that the first of these contests could 
not be won while the other was ignored.  The eastern conservatives they attempted to 
cooperate with in 1900 were, at best, ambivalent about such reform, while at worst they 
were openly hostile to it.   
While it would be equally wrong to suggest that the conservatives did not believe 
that economic factors played a role in overseas imperialism, it held a different kind of 
relevance for them.  The eastern conservatives who dominated the League downplayed 
economic factors generally, but when they did make such statements they largely treated 
the subject in the same kind of disjointed way that they discussed the other consequences 
of inequality in industrial America.  Though the conservatives were aware that changes 
had taken place, they rejected the claim that there were insurmountable structures of 
power that had arisen in the years after the Civil War.   
Instead of examining the whole of the American economic system, eastern anti-
imperialists frequently attributed the conquest of the Philippines to “greed.”  This attack 
on greed was usually vague and not infrequently rooted in the same kind of issues which 
most interested them.  When he described the likelihood of future wars that an imperial 
America would have to face, Carl Schurz claimed that the “greed of speculators working 
upon our Government will push us from one point to another.”  As a man who was 
devoted to the elimination of corruption and to the development of civil service reform, 
this was a reasonable statement for him to make.  It was not, however, a condemnation of 
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wealth so much as it was an extension of his arguments in favor of a minimalized state.  
Schurz went further in other statements, and in one instance he even suggested that the 
only ones who desired to keep the islands were “Jingoes bent upon wild adventure, and 
some syndicates of speculators unscrupulous in their greed of gain.”  Certainly, like all 
the classical liberal reformers of the era he readily agreed that the excesses of certain 
capitalists were repugnant.  Interestingly, many of his remarks also focused upon 
“speculators,” like those who he believed had profited from the “dishonest” money of 
Civil War era.  Despite these misgivings, there was a clear difference between the claim 
that greedy capitalists would try to exploit the Philippines and the suggestion that 
capitalists (including industrialists and proper financiers) were behind it all and that the 
inequality created by capitalism was inherently at fault.
7
   
This conservative discussion of “greed” is instructive as it demonstrates the limits 
of their analysis.  While western reformers used the term, it was used just as widely—if 
more vaguely—by conservatives.  For members of the eastern elite, greed was a quality 
that an individual possessed, one suggestive of a personality flaw or a moral lapse.  
Greedy or corrupt persons were aberrations, not the norm; industrialist and writer Edward 
Atkinson actually claimed that greed and commerce were antithetically opposed to each 
other.   Markets did not create greed, at least in the sense that they did not force people to 
covet wealth at the expense of others.  By placing the emphasis on morality and the 
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failure of individuals, they avoided any attack on the system that allowed the attribute to 
flourish.
8
   
In rare instances conservatives appropriated the language of radicals, and 
historians have often used these to suggest that all anti-imperialists blamed economic 
factors.  One biographer of prominent League member Moorfield Storey felt the need to 
include a statement in which the old mugwump attributed imperialism to “the alliance 
between financial and political powers,” despite the author‟s admission that such 
declarations were rare for him.  The historian who examined Mark Twain‟s attack on 
imperialism claimed that the great writer feared an “alliance between the trusts, the 
politicians and the military,” but in the example he provides Twain is merely critiquing 
those “money changers” who had “bought up half the country with soldier pensions”—
not so much capitalists as politicians who used the corrupting influence of money for 
their own advantage.  Another historian attributed similar attacks on corporate power to 
both Erving Winslow, the wealthy merchant who served as secretary of the original Anti-
imperialist League (based in Boston), and George Boutwell, a conservative Republican 
who was president of both the Boston League and later the American Anti-Imperialist 
League (based out of Chicago).  The same writer willingly admitted that Winslow‟s 
economic critiques were uncommon and ill-defined.  In the case of Boutwell, he was 
known to occasionally attack imperialism as the tool of the wealthy, but these should be 
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seen as exceptions.  It was never a developed point in any of Boutwell‟s works, and more 
frequently he tried to distance himself from any serious critiques of capitalism.  In an 
earlier speech that seems more in line with his general views, he told an audience that “I 
have no hostility to wealth, I have no great fear of trusts.”  He emphasized that he was no 
radical, even if he was forced to work with some who were.
9
   
The real source of anti-imperialism among the eastern conservatives was their 
belief that perpetual subjugation ran against historic American practices and beliefs and 
was contrary to the demands of a republic.  Schurz, Atkinson, Hoar, Carnegie, Boutwell, 
Edwin Burritt Smith, and undoubtedly others used the writings of the founders and 
America‟s greatest statesmen to describe national anti-colonial, anti-militarist traditions.  
Washington‟s farewell address—in which the first president warned against involvement 
in foreign entanglements—was one particular favorite.  All their references to “consent of 
the governed” were also self-consciously borrowed from a famous statement by Abraham 
Lincoln.
10
   
The new course was not only unappealing because it was novel, but because it 
seemed great peril would accompany it.  Edwin Burritt Smith, secretary of American 
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Anti-Imperialist League (based out of his home city of Chicago), only added to the anti-
imperialists‟ indebtedness to the martyred president when he used Lincoln‟s statement 
that “this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free.”  If the United 
States was to become “the military base of the new despotism,” then no one should be 
surprised if “the present ill-concealed impatience of constitutional restraints will grow 
until only the forms of representative government remain.”11  Carl Schurz agreed that it 
was a violation of American principles to rule others without consent and that to do so set 
a dangerous precedent, but to incorporate new lands as they had been in the past posed 
dangers all its own.  Even if the United States was only interested in acquiring territories 
closer to home, was it safe to grant citizenship to those with “the mixture of Spanish, 
French and negro blood on the West India Islands,” he asked.  Tropical peoples could not 
be integrated into the body politic, and despotic rule was equally impossible.  According 
to Schurz, the only option was to leave all of these peoples to govern themselves.
12
    
Conservatives relied heavily on arguments of just this sort, and to these they 
added attacks upon the moral basis for imperialism.  Public morality already was, 
according to their historians, a specialty of the mugwumps, but in 1899 and 1900 it was 
the common language employed by all anti-imperialists.  Edward Atkinson and others 
repeatedly brought up an earlier message of the President in which the commander-in-
chief declared that the forced annexation of Cuba would amount of “criminal 
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aggression.”  Surely, they suggested, the forced annexation of Philippines was no less 
criminal.
13
  Others noted that the most vigorous defenders of imperialism spoke more of 
economic and strategic benefits of expansion rather than the morality of the action.  
George Hoar responded to the most bombastic declarations of fellow Republican Albert 
Beveridge with the observation that “the words Right, Justice, Duty, Freedom were 
absent, my friend must permit me to say, from that eloquent speech.”14  The industrialist 
Andrew Carnegie joined in as well, and he denounced the kind of militarism and rule by 
force which was certain to accompany an imperial policy.  “Moral force, education, 
civilization, are not the backbone of Imperialism,” he said.  “The foundation for 
Imperialism is brutal physical strength, fighting men with material forces, war-ships and 
artillery.”15   
Discussion of morality was bound to come up in any debate that centered upon 
the conquest of a distant country, and in this regard there was little difference between the 
eastern conservative view of imperialism and that of the western reformers.  All 
considered the conquest of the Philippines abhorrent, and all were troubled by the 
concentration of power around an imperial government.  Most of the arguments of the 
mugwumps and conservatives were also used by Populists and Democrats, and it is for 
that reason that some have incorrectly claimed that one derived their interpretation from 
the other.  But the distinctions between them remained large.  The critique of the 
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conservatives stuck close to the causes that already drove them:  minimal government, an 
informed electorate, and a moral code based upon restraint.  The mugwump solution to 
these ills involved a combination of public instruction and electoral influence.  If 
politicians could not be convinced to conduct affairs professionally, then they would have 
to be replaced.  Put simply, they called for personal accountability, not structural change.  
It was in this regard that the perspective of Populists and Democrats contrasted most 
sharply with that of the prestigious easterners.    
While their differing views of imperialism were insignificant obstacles to 
cooperation in their own time, other dissimilarities combined with a general distrust to 
make an effective coalition impossible.  Even among conservatives, Republicans like 
George Hoar kept many members of the League at arm‟s length, sure their motive was 
nothing less than the destruction of his party.
16
  Hoar was even less capable of viewing 
the westerners as allies, as he had long ago established himself as one of the fiercest 
opponents of the Populists and western Democrats in Congress.  He had consistently 
ridiculed westerners for any talk of the existence of a money power, and on the whole he 
thought the Populists no better than a mob of malcontents, led by demagogues, who 
wished to take from those who had done better than themselves.  During a relatively brief 
debate over the arrest of Jacob Coxey in 1894, he stared down senators Allen and 
William Stewart as he delivered the conservative rebuttal to their defenses of the 
“general.”  His low opinion of the westerners was largely reciprocated.  In a letter to a 
friend, Richard Pettigrew lumped together Hoar and Lodge as examples that proved that 
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“there is no independence in the East,” and he further accused the two senators of having 
“abandoned their convictions on the great economical and national questions at the beck 
and nod of the money-lenders of their States [sic.].”17  While it is fascinating that 
Pettigrew and Hoar were soon defending each other from charges of treason on the floor 
of the Senate, Hoar also demonstrated the limitations of such a limited partnership.  
When he was not attacking the administration for its war of aggression in the Philippines, 
the senator from Massachusetts devoted an inordinate amount of time in his speeches to 
the defense of William McKinley, support for the gold standard, and the benefits 
provided by “good” trusts.  As if to explain his position further, in May of 1900 he sent a 
letter to William Jennings Bryan in which he assigned the blame for the passage of the 
Treaty of Paris to both the President as well as to the nation‟s leading Democrat equally.  
But while he said “President McKinley has been honestly misled” by his advisors, Hoar 
intimated that Bryan was not so innocent.  In his conclusion, he reaffirmed his loyalty to 
the Republicans even suggested that Bryan‟s followers were the real supporters of 
imperialism.  The small degree of cooperation in the Senate did not signify Hoar‟s 
conversion to any new beliefs; he was still the partisan hack he had been throughout his 
career.
18
   
The suspicion or partisanship of the eastern anti-imperialists was not responsible 
for all of the obstacles to coalition.  Both sides viewed each other with an intense distrust 
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born of both substantial ideological differences and a history of clashes in Congress and 
on the stump.  A quick review of the some of the top names of the Anti-Imperialist 
League can further illustrate this point.  Some were guilty of old transgressions.  George 
S. Boutwell, president of the League from its formation until his death in 1905, had been 
out of the political limelight for twenty years by the time he took that post.  Despite that 
fact, forty years earlier he had been Treasury Secretary under Grant, and it was at his 
urging that Congress had passed the Coinage Act of 1873 (the “Crime of „73” to many in 
the West).  Former senator and Secretary of State John Sherman was one of the capitol‟s 
arch-conservatives for over a generation, and it was he who had helped Boutwell 
formulate that same currency bill and then manage it as it was swiftly adopted by both 
houses of Congress.  Most of the muguwumps had earned their ill-repute among 
westerners more recently.  In the 1896 campaign, the editor and civil service reformer 
Carl Schurz had been more active in his opposition to Bryan than he had been in any 
contest since he led the mugwump revolt in 1884.  In the same campaign, E. L. Godkin 
informed readers of The Nation that it was perfectly acceptable for businessmen to coerce 
labor into opposition of the Democratic candidate.  The industrialist and free-trade 
economist Edward Atkinson, one of the chief pamphleteers of the League, was so well-
known for his anti-silver articles that in 1899 one Populist paper still identified him as 
“the great juggler of figures for the Republican party.”19 
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This distrust manifested itself in clear ways.  Eastern anti-imperialists were 
hesitant to contact western leaders, and western politicians likewise feared the 
consequences that would come with a close relationship to those so different than 
themselves.  The case of Andrew Carnegie and William Jennings Bryan best illustrates 
this latter point.  Carnegie was one of the few eastern anti-imperialists of consequence 
who was in direct correspondence with Bryan, but while the Nebraskan tried to keep the 
dialogue between the two open he simultaneously sought to keep it out of the public eye.  
In December of 1898, the two had held a private meeting in New York which left the 
industrialist so impressed he decided to publish an article endorsing Bryan‟s presumed 
presidential run in 1900.  Bryan was warned of Carnegie‟s intentions by a friend in the 
press who strongly advised “against permitting public endorsement of you by promoter of 
homestead riots [sic.].”  Bryan hesitated, then took the safest course available.  “I have 
not discussed [the] interview publicly,” he told Carnegie, “and prefer that you do not.”  
He denied that he was as yet a candidate for any office, and then pointed to the necessary 
limits of their relationship.  “You and I agree in opposing militarism and imperialism, but 
when these questions are settled we may find ourselves upon opposite sides as 
heretofore.”  He understood he had little to gain and much to lose from an alliance with 
the world‟s leading steel magnate.  After the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, their 
correspondence withered away to practically nothing.
20
   
                                                 
20
 A. Brisbane to William Jennings Bryan, 23 December 1898, William Jennings Bryan to A. Brisbane, no 
date, William Jennings Bryan to Andrew Carnegie, 24 December 1898, WJB Papers, Box 22; Louis W. 
Koenig, Bryan:  A Political Biography of William Jennings Bryan (New York:  G. P. Putnam‟s Sons, 
1971), 289.     
  
469 
 
 Few conservative anti-imperialists even tried to do what Carnegie had done.  As 
1900 commenced, it was apparent that the Nebraskan would again take the Democratic 
nomination.  Their denunciations of McKinley should have made anti-imperialists of all 
stripes eager to support the most viable alternative, but most from the East could not even 
bring themselves to initiate correspondence with Bryan.  Instead, someone was forced to 
take the position of intermediary.  Elwood Corser, a Minneapolis banker and Silver 
Republican, took on this role.  It may have been through his banking connections that 
Corser found himself in correspondence with Smith, the Chicago reformer and banker 
who was secretary of the American Anti-Imperialist League.  Corser hoped to open up 
the lines of communication between easterners and westerners, but his efforts were 
largely in vain.  In February, Smith informed the Silver Republican that the best course 
Bryan could follow would be to make the next campaign about imperialism and civil 
service reform—one of the other great concerns of many mugwumps.  In fact, Smith even 
suggested that such a platform “will be especially effective is this is coupled with the 
charge that the controlling motive for the acquisition of the Spanish islands is spoils.”  
Perhaps most importantly, for Bryan to win over the “many conservative men who 
opposed his candidacy in 1896” who were now “coming to regard him more favorably,”  
the Democrat‟s Kansas City platform had to be “as free from objection as possible.”21   
Smith‟s letter was a portent of the kind of relationship many of the conservative 
anti-imperialists envisioned:  they would instruct and the Bryanites would have to follow 
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along or suffer the electoral consequences.
22
  What they demanded was the abandonment 
of the issues which had so effectively won the West four years earlier.  They would be 
replaced by sound liberal issues, the kind that would have been perfectly acceptable to 
any supporter of Grover Cleveland.  When it came to this, Bryan was not in a mood to 
listen.  The conservatives—influential though they may be—were only one of many 
groups who demanded his attention, and all claimed the right to dictate his agenda.  If he 
was going to follow anyone, it was not going to be his erstwhile enemies.   
 With their own conflicted feelings toward Bryan and no reason to believe he 
would take what they considered the prudent course, many anti-imperialists wanted to 
explore the possibility of a third party.  A new party thrown together at the last minute 
would have had no chance of victory, but some believed it could do to McKinley as the 
Gold Democrats had done to Bryan in 1896:  provide an outlet for those unwilling to 
commit political apostasy.  At a meeting held on January 6, 1900, anti-imperialists 
interested in the third party option—including Senator Richard Pettigrew—met at the 
Plaza Hotel in New York.  According to Pettigrew‟s unreliable account, written well after 
the fact, it was decided then and there to form a new party and that Carnegie himself 
would provide the funding.  This plan was abandoned when those who would soon form 
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U.S. Steel forced Carnegie to reconsider.
23
  In reality, there was no such agreement at the 
meeting, and evidence suggests that Pettigrew was himself too deeply committed to 
Bryan to have been contemplating other candidates at the time.  Instead of calling for the 
formation of a new party, it was agreed to postpone that decision while maintaining a 
non-partisan approach.  This did not kill interest in the third party initiative, and talk of it 
continued to drift about while such a step became increasingly unlikely.
24
   
 Proponents of the third party option continued to organize behind the scenes.  Carl 
Schurz began serious discussions on the subject with Moorfield Storey and Edwin Burritt 
Smith in March.  Though Smith showed little initial enthusiasm for the plan, all three 
remained too keenly interested to ignore the possibility.  Bryan was too repugnant to all 
of them for the option to be discounted without proper exploration.  They played a part in 
organizing a “Liberty Congress,” a gathering of anti-imperialists to be held in 
Indianapolis after the two major party conventions.  If the Democrats did not make 
themselves an attractive alternative to the rule of McKinley, the meeting could either be 
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transformed into a nominating convention or it could set the stage for a separate 
convention.  Up to the very last moment, the conservative anti-imperialists continued to 
seek a way out of what they saw as a Faustian bargain.
25
   
 
Populism and the Fusion Campaign 
Whatever the eastern conservatives thought of Bryan, it seems to have concerned 
him little.  He seemed much more concerned about securing the West as he had in 1896 
and laying out the guiding principles of the campaign—both of which were done with 
little reference to the eastern conservatives who were all too willing to provide him with 
advice.  Bryan had some reason for concern.  In many of the western states in 1898, the 
fusion of Populists, Democrats, and Silver Republicans had either failed to materialize or 
they it had suffered defeats.  There had always been those among the Populists those who 
opposed fusion agreements unless the Populists themselves could dictate the terms of 
cooperation.  The alliance of parties had been difficult to pull off when victory seemed 
certain.  Now that the prospects had dimmed, Populists who favored fusion would have to 
either unify their parties or find a new way to win.   
The anti-fusion “middle-of-the-road” faction had already made loud 
demonstrations in 1898.  Davis Waite in Colorado and Henry Loucks of South Dakota 
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had both openly supported the Republicans that year, and both had decried what they saw 
as the domination of their organizations by the Democrats.  The latter kind of response 
could be seen with increasing frequency in many places, even among those who 
maintained their Populist loyalties.  In 1898, one Populist legislator had complained that 
the party‟s candidates did not represent the wishes of the party rank-and-file.  “These 
matters are already fixed from the primaries up…. [N]o matter whether straight pop, 
fusion, or straight democratic, it is all the same outfit nominated by the democratic club 
in Omaha.”26  The remainder of the Nebraska Farmers‟ Alliance also sounded the call for 
mid-roaders.  Twice in 1898 it had called for those “who are opposed to fusion with 
either wing of plutocracy” to meet and organize.27  The story was much the same in 
Washington.  Governor Rogers had fought with the mid-roaders over appointments in 
1897, and his willingness to appoint Democrats to key posts had led many of this wing of 
the party to denounce their titular leader.  By 1898, Rogers was forced to turn to 
Democrats for support during the fusion conventions.
28
   
There were, however, indications that the mid-roaders may not have been 
particularly strong.  Also in 1898, the mid-roaders had held a lightly attended convention 
in Cincinnati.  There, they renounced free silver and nominated Wharton Barker for 
president for the campaign of 1900, with Ignatius Donnelly (author of the preamble to the 
Omaha Platform) the vice-presidential candidate.  The small number of attendees—well 
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under one hundred—and the peculiarity of nominations two years in advance of an 
election suggest a sense of desperation on the part of mid-roaders.
29
  It had been much the 
same in Nebraska, where the Alliance‟s calls for conventions had largely gone 
unanswered—despite the fact that in the same year the Populist state convention had over 
one thousand delegates in attendance.
30
  Elsewhere, there is little evidence that the 
defection of Waite hurt the fusion ticket in Colorado in 1898.  Even in South Dakota, 
after Loucks returned to the Republican fold, Populist Governor Andrew Lee managed to 
win re-election.  This is not to say that the mid-roaders were insignificant, but instead that 
the destruction of the state Populist parties cannot be attributed to that one factor alone.   
Those Populist leaders who supported fusion treated the middle-of-the-road 
faction as a real threat to stability, and it may have been one reason why some discussed 
the possibility of organizing yet another new party.  Many western Populists had believed 
that the election of 1896 had so changed the political landscape that the existing party 
structures would prove inadequate in the future.  While most claimed that it was the 
Democratic Party that was most likely to disintegrate, the reorganized party that they 
believed would emerge from it all would make the discomfort of fusion politics a thing of 
the past.  In 1898, Richard Pettigrew—a relatively late convert to Populism—told several 
South Dakota political leaders that it was only a matter of time before a collection 
Populists and Democrats came “to an agreement upon a new name for a new party which 
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will combine all the elements of reform into one solid mass.”  The imperialist debate 
provided just one more cleavage that served to divide the old parties, and again provided 
evidence that a reshuffling was necessary.  As the editor of the Ellensburg Dawn pointed 
out in 1899, “There are Bryan Democrats and Anti-Bryan Democrats, Expansion and 
Anti-Expansion Democrats, Silver Democrats and Gold Democrats.”  Such divisions 
need not exist under the roof of a single party, and the writer called for “all of the 
different reform parties to drop their present names and all unite into one new grand 
party.”  While the hopes of these Populists may have been overly optimistic, any other 
scenario was too hard to imagine.  “I have little faith or confidence in the old Democratic 
leaders,” wrote the ever direct Pettigrew.  “In fact, the Democratic party have not 
advocated a principle to fight for for twenty years, and when they happened to stumble 
upon a principle at Chicago, they hardly knew what to do with it.”  Even among the 
fusion wing of the Populists, much skepticism of the Democrats remained.  It was not 
until 1899 and 1900 that this talk died down in preparation for the coming campaign.
31
 
  Washington‟s leading Populist, Governor John Rankin Rogers, took a very 
different approach to party reorganization.  While in some of his correspondence in 1898 
he had suggested that a new party could be formed in the future and the mid-roader 
frustrations overcome, he was less sanguine in other letters.  He told Senator George 
Turner in their private correspondence that while “We in Washington are engaged in the 
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formation of a new party,” at the national level, “the battle of 1900 will largely be fought 
under the democratic name.”  At the convention in 1898, he had aided the single-tax 
faction of the Democrats—likely with the hope that he could gain their support against 
future rivals from inside the coalition.  His frustration with the mid-roaders (which he 
referred to as the “irreconcilable element”) and his projection that the Democrats would 
become the dominant party in Washington led him to officially join their ranks in April 
of 1900.
32
   
Few who still held office followed the example of Rogers.  Instead, most Populist 
leaders sought an alternative means of securing the vote of the mid-roaders.  In 
Pettigrew‟s correspondence, he revealed his own preference for an early Populist 
convention in 1900.  With “these new and aggressive issues” he declared that the 
Populists “should come bravely to the front, add to the Chicago platform those things 
which time has made necessary, re-assert the doctrines then asserted, and begin the fight, 
waiting for nobody.”  He informed his associates in South Dakota that Marion Butler, the 
North Carolina senator and chair of the party‟s central committee, held a similar belief.  
They needed to embark on an educational campaign, and the earlier it was commenced 
the better.  The Democrats, on the other hand, did not want an early campaign, largely 
because they did not have the money available to fund one.
33
  Fusion Populists could hold 
an early convention, name Bryan and their own choice for vice president (Pettigrew‟s 
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favorite was the Silver Republican Charles A. Towne), and push the Democrats to accept 
their choice.  As Pettigrew would tell Bryan in April, any mistake “will recruit the ranks 
of the Cincinnati [middle-of-the-road] wing of the Populist party,” and if the Democrats 
refused to follow the Populist lead, “serious consequence might follow.”34     
Bryan was unsure about a Populist candidate for vice president, but he had 
already made moves to shore up his support among the Populists.  Perhaps the most 
important of these was the broad platform that he came to openly advocate before the 
year even began.  To take a step back, it is important to emphasize how both 
contemporaries of Bryan and modern historians frequently labeled Bryan‟s campaign of 
1896 as simple or myopic.
35
  Despite the loaded meanings and deeper reforms many 
people of the era associated with free silver, the movement for free silver has been 
described as a narrow and shallow emasculation of the Populist vision.  But as mentioned 
in an earlier chapter, a coordinated drive for more sophisticated reform was simply not 
possible at that early date.  The Democrats and Silver Republicans that made up so much 
of Bryan‟s base of support remained divided on tariff and tax concerns, and few among 
them were willing to go as far as many radical Populists in their attacks upon monopoly 
and wealth.  Bryan emerged as a leader who could pull these groups together, and he 
consciously understood that to do so required a simple platform.   
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The year 1900 would prove quite different than 1896.  After his defeat in 1896, 
Bryan had continued to give speeches in favor of free silver, but he added a more 
sophisticated view of wealth and power along the way.
36
  The increasing rapidity of 
mergers had forced those who supported silver in 1896 to take notice, so that Bryan soon 
joined Populists in their attack upon the “trusts.”  Many from the western reform 
coalition attended a major conference in Chicago on the trust problem in September of 
1899.  Bryan delivered one of the featured addresses, in which he declared that “a 
monopoly in private hands is indefensible from any standpoint.”  Unlike certain 
conservatives, “I do not divide monopolies in private hands into good monopolies and 
bad monopolies.  There is no good monopoly in private hands.”  To those who claimed 
that efficient monopolies provided goods and lower prices, he stated his opposition to 
“settling every question upon the dollar argument.  I protest against the attempt to drag 
every question down to the level of dollars and cents.”37  Bryan argued that it was the 
right of the people to control the market, and it was they who must have the ultimate 
decision.  This fit well with the argument of the anti-monopoly Populists, and it 
dovetailed well with his interpretation of imperialism.   
Added to anti-imperialism and anti-trust was the issue of 1896, free silver.  
Easterners had repeatedly called for silver to be kept out of the coming campaign, and in 
all likelihood even Bryan had hoped to de-emphasize it.  Even at the beginning of the 
year, before he was regularly bombarded with letters from easterners, Bryan had 
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expressed to Pettigrew fear that the nomination of Towne for the vice presidency would 
“intensify the silver issue a little too much.”38  Despite that, it was not to the advantage of 
Bryan to discard the old issue altogether.  He had so thoroughly associated his leadership 
with the cause of currency and banking reform that to suggest that it could be dropped 
would only have left the door open for easterners to challenge his leadership.
39
  Bryan 
also wanted to use silver to demonstrate his commitment to Populist-style reform.  When 
one supporter asked him if he would abandon silver for the new issues, Bryan responded 
negatively.  He denied that it was beneficial to support one (or two) issues when all three 
represented critiques of the policies pursued by the present administration.  Furthermore, 
“The people who oppose the gold standard also oppose the trusts and imperialism and 
there are nine who oppose all three to one who favors the gold standard and yet opposes 
the trusts or imperialism [emphasis in original].”  He then castigated the gold Democrats 
who had “left the party and did what they could to defeat the ticket…. Now they want to 
drive away the Populists and silver republicans who came to us when the gold democrats 
deserted.”40  Bryan‟s continued support for free silver was supposed to represent his 
loyalty to the other members of the fusion coalition.   
Bryan and his closest allies set the fusion platform well in advance of the 
campaign‟s official commencement.  In May of 1899, Bryan had hinted that the three 
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issues were the most pressing and would hopefully be addressed in the next campaign.
41
  
Charles Hartman, a Silver Republican and former member of congress from Montana, 
likewise told audiences that Democratic platform of the next year would focus upon the 
money question, trusts, and anti-imperialism.
42
  In late 1899, William “Coin” Harvey 
produced a new pamphlet entitled Coin on Money, Trusts, and Imperialism, in which his 
youthful protagonist debated all three subjects with major figures of the day.
43
  And so it 
was with a great deal of satisfaction that Richard Pettigrew informed a friend in early 
January that the platform was set.  “The issue will be the question of Imperialism and 
Militaryism [sic.], (as opposed to the doctrines of the Declaration of Independence,) this 
wretched currency bill [the Gold Standard Act], and the trusts.”44  The emphasis upon all 
three issues had not been imposed by Bryan or any other leader, but had it come about 
more or less organically.  Those westerners who remained committed to reform largely 
accepted that change on all fronts was necessary for the continuation of American 
institutions and ideals.  Bryan did not lead them to reform, but he viewed the unfolding of 
events in the same light as had many of the Populists, Democrats, and Silver Republicans 
from the West.  While he had not fully adopted the ideology of the Populists, his actions 
and words led many to see him as one of their own.  “I think he is as good a Populist as 
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any of us,” wrote Pettigrew to a friend.45  While the most dedicated of the mid-roaders 
may have disagreed, Bryan and other members of the reform coalition had effectively 
developed a national platform with their western political base in mind.   
 
Conventions and Campaign 
By the spring, the convention season approached.  The head of the national tickets 
were never in doubt, and generally speaking the planks of the platforms had already been 
determined.  Despite the few significant surprises, the conventions offered another 
opportunity to demonstrate each party‟s priorities.  In particular, the vice-presidential 
nominations received a great deal of attention, and each clearly demonstrated a desire to 
emphasize a particular issue or shore up a needed base of support.    
As Butler had hoped, the Populists did get their early convention.  The fusionists 
began the meeting in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, on May 9—the same day Wharton 
Barker and the mid-roaders held theirs in Cincinnati.  The platform that was adopted was 
a lengthy indictment of the ills that still challenged American producers, but it focused 
largely on the issues that all of the western reformers had already come to emphasize.  
The first section was devoted to finance, and it denounced the recently passed Gold 
Standard Act and pledged the party to ceaseless “agitation until this great financial 
conspiracy is blotted from the statute-books,” called for silver and greenbacks to replace 
national bank notes.  The second section attacked land monopoly and trusts, and in 
response to this “overshadowing evil of the age,” it stated that “The one remedy for the 
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trusts is that the ownership and control be assumed and exercised by the people.”  The 
third major section was devoted to the evils of imperialism and militarism, which were 
policies “at war with the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the plain 
precepts of humanity,” and the platform demanded that the war in the Philippines be 
halted and the people guaranteed their independence.  While the Populist platform would 
in many ways resemble that adopted by the Democrats nearly two months later, this was 
due to the transformation of the Democrats, not the collapse of Populist reform.
46
   
The only disagreement in Sioux Falls existed between those like Senator Allen, 
who favored a conference committee with the Democrats to select a nominee for vice 
president, and leaders such as Butler and Pettigrew, who preferred to name their own 
vice-presidential candidate.  Those who favored naming the complete ticket were clearly 
hoping to deprive mid-roaders of the claim that they merely followed the orders of Bryan 
and the Democrats.  In a brief but heated contest, one delegate shouted that easterners 
wanted to control the nomination, and that the real opponents of a Populist nomination 
came from “the Tory end of the country” who wanted “a moderate man—a veneered 
man.”  Those who wanted to nominate won out, and Charles Towne of Minnesota was 
named to the ticket alongside Bryan.  His selection demonstrated the importance of silver 
and the West to the Populists, and it was also clear that their delegates had no desire to 
cede the last of the national organization‟s authority to the Democrats.47   
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 The Democrats held their convention in Kansas City, and the opening session 
began on July 4.  Both the location and the date were intentionally loaded with 
symbolism.  Though Bryan was not in attendance (following the tradition for favored 
candidates), the selection of a city so close to his home was a gesture at his certain 
nomination.  Obviously, the anniversary of the nation‟s independence held a special 
meaning, especially for a campaign that would place anti-imperialism at the center of the 
debate.  But July 4 was also the eighth anniversary of the Populist‟s Omaha convention, a 
day in which that body had proclaimed a “Second Declaration of Independence”—what 
some quite consciously considered to be the beginning of a new campaign to throw off 
the financial domination of Europe and the East.
48
   
It was easy for Populists or other western reformers to view the timing of the 
convention in this light, and some made this reading plainly clear.  The portrayal of the 
convention in the Rocky Mountain News was based upon full recognition of the 
connotations that Bryan and his allies invoked.  The opening page included a large split 
image, with Jefferson on one side holding up the Declaration of Independence and Bryan 
on the other holding up a paper titled “The New Declaration of Independence”—the 
presumed planks that would be adopted by the Democratic convention.
49
  One writer 
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made clear that Bryan was the true follower of the Jeffersonian tradition.  When he 
assumed the presidency, the author of the Declaration had “rescued the youthful nation 
from the centralizing tendencies of the Federal party, and gave to  the republic a system 
of governmental principles which have ever been the light of the people in their contests 
against the aggression of organized and concentrated wealth and power.”  At the dawn of 
a new century, a  
power more insidious, more dangerous, more arrogant even than the despotism 
against which the men of 1776 rebelled, has gained a foothold in the republic, and 
it seeking to enthrone itself in the national government.  It is the power of 
plutocracy that is seeking to elevate the dollar above the man, to create an empire 
within the forms of a republic, and to fasten upon the people a system of finance 
that will forever enslave the industrial classes and condemn the laboring poor to a 
life of continuous servitude.  
 
Just as the founders had fought against the British plan to enslave the colonists, those 
who met in Kansas City opposed the “schemes of plutocracy and the money power,” and 
Bryan was “the Jefferson of 1900.”50   
 Unlike the Populist platform, the Democratic version opened with a flourish—a 
reaffirmation of “our faith in that immortal proclamation of the inalienable rights of 
man.”  Nearly half of the document covered the issues of imperialism and militarism, and 
specifically attacked colonial rule in Puerto Rico, the American military occupation of 
Cuba, and the “unnecessary war” in the Philippines.  Because they further claimed that 
the “Filipinos cannot be citizens without endangering out civilizations,” and they “cannot 
be subjects without imperiling our form of government,” the platform favored an 
immediate declaration of policy by which the Philippines would be guaranteed 
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independence.  It also condemned the “greedy commercialism” that Republicans used to 
justify overseas conquest.  While it did proclaim support for the extension of “the 
Republic‟s influence among the nations,” that influence “should not be extended by force 
and violence, but through the persuasive power of a high and honorable example.”  The 
second section of the platform pledged the party to “an unceasing warfare in nation, 
State, and city against private monopoly in every form.”  After several paragraphs 
devoted to the potential for legal action against monopolistic combinations, a mere two 
paragraphs were devoted to the currency dispute.  It fully reiterated the demand for free 
silver at the ratio of sixteen to one, and condemned the recently passed law for ceding 
federal authority over the currency to private corporations.  Additional planks supported 
direct election of senators, opposed “government by injunction” and favored arbitration 
of labor disputes, and called for the creation of a federal Department of Labor.
51
    
The Democratic platform offered much that could appeal to Populists, but the 
convention also snubbed Bryan‟s western allies.  Though Bryan thought very highly of 
Charles Towne, the Populist selection for vice president, Democrats at the convention 
had no interest in nominating a member of another party.  Instead, they selected Adlai 
Stevenson, the Illinois bimetallist who had already served in that position in the second 
Cleveland administration.  Stevenson was sound enough on the issues that mattered to 
Bryan, and his loyalty to the Democratic Party in both 1892 and 1896 made him 
acceptable to eastern and western wings of the party.  If the nomination of Stevenson 
represented an olive branch to the eastern wing of the Democratic Party, it was a slap in 
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the face to the Populists.  No one wanted to replicate the confusion of 1896, in which 
Bryan had two vice-presidential candidates.  But Bryan would not ask Stevenson to quit 
the race, and Towne‟s involvement in the election was important for the legitimacy of 
fusion.  For those who hoped that either a new party would emerge or that Populists and 
Democrats would amicably come together, the withdrawal of Town would represent the 
subservience of their party to the Democrats.  Both before and after the Democratic 
convention, Populists fretted over such a possibility.  Governor Poynter received a report 
from one concerned party member who feared the state‟s Populists would abandon the 
party if Towne withdrew.  Pettigrew had warned Bryan repeatedly that he foresaw such a 
scenario if Towne were forced out.  Despite the warnings, Towne had no desire to be a 
spare running mate.  Unlike Watson, he knew Bryan well and had no desire to cause any 
further embarrassment for the campaign.  He formally withdrew his candidacy shortly 
after Bryan‟s acceptance speech in August.52      
 The Bryan campaign was constantly hamstrung by the delicate balancing act that 
it was forced into.  Even so, the addition of anti-imperialism to an otherwise Populist 
platform forced anti-imperialists conservatives to take Bryan seriously.  Not only did it 
encourage many eastern Democrats to return to the party, but Bryan‟s effective 
acceptance speech may also have killed the movement for a third party.  Carl Schurz, one 
of the leading advocates of a separate ticket, attempted to tamp down some of the 
enthusiasm it had created, but even he was forced to admit that, “As to Imperialism, he 
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cannot do better than he has done in his speech.”53  Bryan‟s speech was delivered just 
days before the opening of the Liberty Congress, and it would prove difficult to rally 
support for a second anti-imperialist ticket in the field after Bryan had demonstrated his 
commitment to the issue.
54
 
 When the congress met, the results were uninspiring for third-party advocates.  
Attendance was poor, and almost none fought against endorsing the Bryan campaign.  
Edwin Burritt Smith wrote to Schurz that this was representative of the whole movement, 
but he, Schurz, and Moorfield Storey continued to entertain the notion of an independent 
ticket up until nearly a month before the election.  All three lined up behind Bryan in the 
end, but a large minority of those like them still found they could not stomach him and 
the ideas for which he stood.  Conservatives were left to either accept Bryan as their 
candidate or they would abandon political anti-imperialism.
55
   
 The Republican gathering in Philadelphia on June 19 bore little resemblance to 
the affairs that bookended the national convention season.  While the presidential 
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nominations had already been determined well beforehand in all cases, at least some 
controversy had stirred the Populist and Democratic assemblies.  There would be none 
among the Republicans.  Senator Edward Wolcott of Colorado acted as temporary chair, 
a reward for this loyalty in 1896 and thereafter.  Henry Cabot Lodge, the avid imperialist, 
was then named permanent chair.  Despite mild protests from McKinley and Hanna in the 
weeks leading up to the convention—not to mention his own public denials—Governor 
Theodore Roosevelt of New York had made himself the all-but-presumptive favorite for 
the vice-presidential nomination, taking the place of the deceased Garret Hobart.  The 
eagerness which accompanied the selection of that self-proclaimed war hero and siren of 
imperialism suggested the mood of the delegates far more than any formal declaration 
could.
56
   
 The party‟s platform opened with some revisionist history.  It stated that four 
years earlier, when the Democrats offered no solution to the economic crisis other than 
“to coin silver at the ratio of sixteen to one,” the Republican Party had promised to save 
the nation‟s economy with “a protective tariff and a law making gold the standard of 
value.”  Next, it congratulated the administration for leading the nation to victory in “a 
war for liberty and human rights.”  Ten million were “given „a new birth of freedom,‟” 
while the American people inherited a new global responsibility.  These were the words 
that would be echoed in McKinley‟s acceptance speech a month later.  The planks 
included vague anti-trust and pro-labor planks and warnings that business could only be 
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conducted if the public confidence in its government was maintained.  A few additional 
words were used to praise the policy of the President regarding Cuba, Hawaii, Puerto 
Rico, and the Philippines without any explanation of that policy or that to be pursued in 
the future.  On the whole, the document was as self-laudatory as possible without making 
any substantial statement about future policies, domestic or otherwise.  All controversies, 
including the ongoing war in the Philippines, were avoided altogether.
57
   
 The Republicans were playing a double-game.  The anti-trust plank seemed out of 
place for a party with Mark Hanna as chair of its national committee.  Weeks later, when 
he went on the campaign trail personally, Hanna would declare “There is not a trust in the 
United States.”58  They also downplayed imperialism while making conspicuous use of 
the policy‟s most vociferous advocates.  McKinley had undoubtedly wanted to downplay 
these issues and viewed them as weak spots.  He had instead hoped to emphasize 
conservative economic values and the safety that would be guaranteed by the 
maintenance of his own administration.  But if he could not get those most interested in 
his success to follow that script, it is hardly surprising that local campaigns took on a 
complexion all their own.   
 
The State Conventions and Fusion 
 The campaign in each western state contained certain unique features, though 
unlike two years earlier there was a national campaign that made certain issues central to 
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the debates throughout the region.  As it had been all decade long, the shape of 
“development” was once again a topic of political discussion.  Unlike national elections 
in the recent past, there was a foreign policy component present as well.  At some 
moments it overshadowed the discourse of progress and prosperity, but in others it 
became part of that debate.   
Fusion arrangements were once again made in Nebraska, Colorado, Washington, 
and elsewhere in the West, though the usual difficulties accompanied the arrangements.  
Because it was a national campaign year, there were actually two rounds of conventions.  
In Nebraska, the first set of fusion conventions took place in March to select delegates to 
their national conventions and also create party platforms.  It may have been Bryan‟s 
intent to use these platforms to reiterate his points of emphasis in advance of the meeting 
in Kansas City.  The state Democrats used theirs to attack trusts and the gold standard, 
but well over half emphasized the injustice of colonialism.  The Populists had even less to 
say regarding either money or trusts, and instead devoted nearly the whole of their 
platform to imperialism and militarism.
59
   
The conventions reconvened in Lincoln just days after the conclusion of the 
Kansas City convention.  Bryan, Towne, and even James B. Weaver were in attendance, 
encouraging unity at every step.  Such efforts were necessary.  The large Populist 
convention held over 1,200 delegates, and even the widely respected Senator Allen had a 
difficult time maintaining order.    The Governor‟s vocal stands on the issues of 
imperialism and trusts put Poynter in a strong position, and this time he won the 
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gubernatorial nomination of the fusion parties with little opposition.  The Democrats 
were disappointed that they only able to obtain the position of state attorney general, but 
their representatives informed them that the Populists would give up no more.  With little 
disagreement, the ticket was agreed to on July 12.
60
     
 The relative harmony in Nebraska was absent in its neighbor to the west.  In 
Colorado, the silver consensus appeared to be in jeopardy.  Many Silver Republicans 
rejoined the party of McKinley and Hanna.  Some Populists, including former Democrat 
Thomas Patterson, had hoped to bring members of the party into the Democratic camp, 
but this proved to be a long and more delicate process.  The state‟s Democratic leaders 
themselves were increasingly opposed to sharing offices with the other parties, and there 
was a chance they would abandon the coalition altogether.  There was reason for 
skepticism on the part of reformers as the planned conventions approached in mid-
September.
61
   
 The greatest obstacle to fusion appeared to be the heads of the Democratic Party.  
At the first sign of difficulty, Governor Thomas declared fusion to be dead.  Both Henry 
Teller and the writers for the Denver Post attested that the majority of delegates felt 
differently.  In an unprecedented move, Teller and Patterson were given the opportunity 
to address the convention and plead for the renewal of the coalition.  Before the delegates 
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could vote fusion up or down, the Democratic conference committee took the opportunity 
to reconsider.  Shortly thereafter, a fusion agreement was reached.
62
 
Through the arrangement, most state offices went to the Populists and Silver 
Republicans while the two House members, John Shafroth and John C. Bell, were re-
nominated for their congressional seats.  Democrats claimed the nomination for governor, 
and they selected James Orman, former mayor of Pueblo.  Though they had acted 
arrogantly, the Democrats still desperately needed fusion.  Their state platform was far 
milder than that made by the national party at Kansas City, and Orman‟s record of 
moderation hardly added to their appeal.  Their bland candidate and platform illustrated 
their own anomalous position.  Only fusion made the Colorado Democrats something 
more than the old party of laissez faire.  The state convention of the Populists made 
statements against both overseas imperialism and the “Wardner [Idaho] outrages,” and 
they also supported an amendment to the state constitution that would allow for eight-
hour law.  To this platform they added candidates with known records of labor advocacy.  
Their first selection for lieutenant governor was rejected by their fusion partners due to 
claims that he was a proponent of violence; their alternative selection, President David C. 
Coates of the Colorado State Federation of Labor, was accepted.  While Democrats were 
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to receive the highest state office, they had no chance of victory on their own in a state 
where the votes of militant organized workers were decisive.
63
   
 Perhaps the strangest situation of all was in Washington.  There, Governor John 
Rankin Rogers had succeeded in alienating at least some portion of both major fusion 
parties, but he maintained high political ambitions.  He had fought mid-roaders among 
the Populists shortly after his election.  Since then he had blamed the single-taxers among 
the Democrats for the fusion defeats of 1898 and delivered speeches against them in the 
months that followed.  He had announced his conversion to the Democrats in the spring 
of 1900, distancing himself from support within the Populist organization.  While most of 
Rogers‟s disputes had been factional and not due to differences in ideology, he was also 
out of place in this regard.  Unlike most other Washington fusionists, he favored retention 
of the Philippines and argued that it would provide new markets in Asia, and so make 
Seattle one of the greatest ports of the country.  He also felt that popular support for the 
war with Spain and anger over the deaths of Americans in the Philippines made anti-
imperialism a risky proposition.  As was the case with many western governors, he was 
widely regarded as a senatorial aspirant, and so the foreign policy statements of the 
governor should not be seen as just the offhand comments of a local politician.
64
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 All parties had agreed to participate in a single convention to make nominations, 
with a two-thirds majority vote required for a winning candidate.  The delegates were 
apportioned so that the Populists and Democrats were evenly represented, while the 
Silver Republicans received a number roughly a third the size of the other two parties.  
These arrangements were agreed to well in advance of the convention, and some assumed 
the amalgamated convention would provide an opportunity for the anti-Rogers forces to 
unite.  The exact opposite proved to be true.  The alternatives to Rogers were, one after 
another, discredited or outmaneuvered.  Rogers‟s friends at the Seattle Times dredged up 
lurid and personal stories on one rival in the weeks before the convention, practically 
removing him from consideration.  Turner‟s deft maneuvering in the convention also 
made Rogers the only likely candidate for the nomination.  While the anti-Rogers 
delegates were left divided and still looking for alternatives, the pro-Rogers Populists and 
Democrats came together without hesitation.  Following the first rounds of balloting, 
votes began to shift to Rogers.  Rogers emerged victorious after eight contentious rounds, 
but his victory did not heal any wounds.
65
   
The Governor had survived the convention, but divisions were obvious.  The 
platform that was adopted was a blatantly anti-expansionist document which condemned 
“the twin relics of barbarism—imperialism and militarism—whether in the form of trusts 
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at home or greed of conquest abroad.”  Rogers remained an outlier.  To further emphasize 
their own hostility to Rogers, his opponents left the convention with a declaration that 
Senator Turner and Governor Rogers had bribed delegates and promised offices in 
exchange for votes.  They publicly condemned the “cajoling and bull-dozing” of 
delegates by the pair and their representatives.  It was hardly the image of unity that the 
fusion parties had hoped to project going into the campaign.
66
  
The Republicans in each state came together as if following a script.  While there 
had been conflicts between silver or reform factions and dedicated conservatives at times 
earlier in the decade, now was not the time for that.  The sweeping victories that many 
western Republican parties had won in 1898 gave them confidence that now was a time 
for banal unity rather than strife.  All followed the script laid out by the Republican 
convention in Philadelphia.   In Washington state, the Republican platform praised 
prosperity, which it claimed resulted directly from Democratic defeat.  It added praise for 
the gold standard and American rule in the Philippines, where the inhabitants were 
“rapidly learning to appreciate and accept that kind of liberty which is known and 
understood only by the American people.”  They then named a ticket of arch-
conservatives led by gubernatorial candidate John M. Frink, one of the wealthiest men in 
King County.  The Nebraska Republicans openly mocked fusionist fears of “imaginary 
evils threatening our country” and openly endorsed the gold standard for the first time in 
recent memory.  Imperialism and militarism were described as un-American, but the 
platform denied that McKinley‟s policies qualified.  For governor, they nominated a 
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German-American banker from Hastings, Charles Dietrich.  In Colorado, Wolcott again 
was the dominant figure, but he understood that the party was in an especially vulnerable 
position.  As late as 1898, he had tried to argue that Republican Party was the only one 
that could every reintroduce the bimetallic standard.  He was hardly alone in this regard; 
the head of their state ticket, Frank Goudy, had been one of the bolters in 1896.  Now, the 
national convention had declared that silver would destroy the economy.  Instead of 
dealing with the change, Colorado‟s Republicans simply ignored the currency question 
altogether.  Even more so than other Republicans in the West, they chose to ride the 
coattails of McKinley and Roosevelt back into office.
67
 
 
The “Full Dinner Pail” and the Economic Debate 
The typical descriptions of the campaign of 1900 have emphasized the return of 
prosperity rather than the impact of imperialism or foreign policy—essentially the same 
narrative that McKinley and Hanna had employed in their bid to secure the President‟s 
re-election. While some of these histories have also mentioned the difficulty inherent in 
disambiguating between votes for prosperity and foreign policy votes, most of these 
works still essentially accept that the economy made McKinley invincible.
68
  This typical 
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view misses some key points, especially in regard to the situation in the West.  First, the 
argument that “prosperity” made all other factors moot is based upon the belief that those 
who opposed McKinley in 1896 abandoned their cause rapidly after economic conditions 
improved.  According to this version of events, Bryan‟s support in the West dried up 
because farmers (in particular) had more interest in the value of their crops in the short 
term than they had in the structural changes that would have guaranteed them security in 
long term.  Additionally, perhaps the most notable weakness of such economic 
determinism pertains to its inability to explain the motives of historical actors.  Finally, it 
should be pointed out that the political studies of the campaign have tended to discuss the 
issues of wealth and prosperity as separate from those that accompanied the formation of 
overseas empire.  As will be explained in a subsequent section, the debates over political 
economy and imperialism overlapped to a much greater degree than those studies have 
suggested.    
The economic debate of the campaign was not a mere rerun of that of 1896.  In a 
reversal of that situation, Republicans held the highest national office but fewer state and 
local offices throughout the West.  They also now claimed that the prosperity had 
returned, and they sought to take credit for it by any means possible.  While it has 
frequently been stated by historians and others who have looked back at the period that 
an increase in global gold production helped bring about the resurgence of the American 
economy, Republicans (and especially those in the West) were hesitant to make the same 
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argument.
69
  Bryan and the reformers of 1896 had argued that the money supply was 
inadequate.  To essentially agree with their contention would have been heretical for any 
good partisan.   
Instead, Republicans argued that their party‟s success was itself the harbinger of 
economic growth.  The “policy” they advocated, then, involved a defense of the existing 
corporate order and the administration that effectively symbolized prosperity.  Anything 
else would spark fear in the business community, they said.  It was in this line of 
argument that a writer for the Omaha Daily Bee suggested that the cause of the last 
economic calamity had been the threat of silver itself, and prosperity was a product of 
Bryan‟s defeat.70  The state secretary of Washington‟s Republican Party likewise 
declared that “When President McKinley was elected the whole country was immediately 
revived from the effect of democratic maladministration,” and prosperity was the 
inevitable result.
71
  Remarks of this kind came from Republicans throughout the West.
72
   
The Republican focus on the impact of the electoral victory obviously fit with the 
needs of a campaign, but there are additional reasons for it.  First, except a slight revision 
of the tariff and War Revenue measure, McKinley had not succeeded in pushing through 
any economic legislation until the third month of 1900.  Clearly, if prosperity reigned, 
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that could not have been the source.  Of far greater significance, few western Republicans 
had the stomach to discuss the past—in which a great many of them had supported silver 
or other broad economic reforms—or the future—for which McKinley had made no 
promises.  The western Republicans who in 1896 had scrambled to find articles from 
gold advocates did not even bother to make ideological justifications four years later.  
While they attempted to dismiss the arguments for silver, free coinage was essentially set 
aside as unnecessary when the nation was under Republican guidance.  In the local press, 
the gold standard was not described as the positive good or exemplar of economic 
morality to the extent that it had been in 1896, but it was instead just an element of the 
status quo that should not be upset if good times were to continue.
73
 
Following this model, the partisan press consistently delivered the plainest 
possible argument against change.  “If the Republican policy has brought prosperity, 
which it surely has, how could an opposite policy, intended to upset the Republican 
policy, bring other than the reverse?” asked one Nebraska paper.  Security could be 
maintained if only fusionists would “Lay aside partisanship for a moment and give these 
facts and figures sober and dispassionate thought.”74  At times, they even suggested that 
the party could be trusted when an individual thought they were in error.  Another paper 
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claimed that, while many in 1896 had believed silver would bring prosperity, “the 
majority, remembering the history of the republican party, were willing to trust it with the 
duty and they have not been disappointed.”75 
The partisan claim of widespread prosperity must be thought of relative to the 
context of the 1890s.  The grievances of the Populists and the reformers who followed in 
their footsteps did not merely pertain to the quantity of money in their pockets.  What 
they demanded was democratic control of the economy, and they believed that only that 
could provide long-term security for farmers and laborers.  They also sought this power 
to counteract the ever-growing influence of corporate power in the political sphere.  
McKinley and his backers provided no current or future domestic policy that responded 
to these demands.  Bryan and the rest of the western reform coalition advocated an 
alternative form of development, and the need for that program would have remained as 
apparent as ever.  This was further reinforced by the new emphasis upon the trust issue.     
The public had developed a keen awareness of the growing tendency toward 
combination among corporations, just as they had never forgotten about their ability to 
control the agents of government.  One event in Nebraska highlighted the extent of their 
influence.  Over the course of his brief tenure as Nebraska Attorney General, Constantine 
J. Smyth had made good use of his state‟s anti-trust laws in cases against a combination 
of grain dealers and against the “starch trust,” which was believed to have purchased a 
Nebraska factory just to shut it down.
76
  But before he tackled these foes, in late1899 
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Smyth also brought suit against one of the largest corporations in America, Standard 
Oil.
77
  The case initially brought little controversy, at least until February of 1900 when 
Senator John Thurston raced back from his duties in Congress to take part in the case as 
the representative of the Rockefellers.  Thurston was immediately attacked by the state‟s 
Populists and Democrats, and the story even gained some coverage in neighboring states.  
When the Denver Post ran a front-page cartoon of Thurston, with bags of money from 
both of his employers under his arms, even the conservative Omaha Daily Bee borrowed 
the image to lampoon the Senator.
78
  It was a moment that thoroughly demonstrated the 
influence of the one corporation that all parties acknowledged was indeed a trust, and 
Thurston was soon forced to declare he was not a candidate for re-election.
79
    
Remarkably, even after such a moment, Republicans throughout the West denied 
that the trusts were a serious issue at all.  Edward Rosewater, owner and editor of the 
Omaha Bee, was one of the few to declare that they needed to be regulated, but he 
simultaneously declared that “You cannot destroy these corporate concerns” without 
damaging the overall economy.
80
  Most others denied that trusts were a serious problem; 
more than a few agreed with Hanna that they did not exist at all.  Shortly after Hanna 
made his remarks, the editor of the Colorado Springs Gazette agreed with him and called 
Bryan‟s attacks hollow, because “there is no such thing in the United States as a private 
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monopoly.”81  The paper had already run articles that praised the benefits of massive 
corporate combinations, and continued to do so for the remainder of the campaign.
82
  In 
the same tone, the editor of the Morning Olympian asked “What does Mr. Bryan mean by 
trusts?”  If he meant a monopoly which “destroys all competition,” then “how many such 
trusts are there, what are they and where are the evidences of their appaling [sic.] 
growth?”  Surely, their number was “insignificant compared with the combination of 
capital that are perfectly legitimate,” and they had brought none of the “evidences of 
calamity” that could interrupt Republican prosperity.83  Still another paper claimed that 
even “suspicion that a corporation is obtaining exhorbitant [sic.] profits at once brings 
competition into the field” and destroys any chance for true monopolies to arise.84     
This was the fundamental problem with the Republican argument in 1900.  In 
their most basic descriptions of the American economy, western Republicans still offered 
little of appeal.  They had no real explanation of the improvement in the national 
economy.  Their plans for future prosperity were tied to an unquestioned allegiance to the 
status quo, and they proposed no plans for a future restructuring of the economy or any 
substantial restriction of the powers of concentrated wealth.  It had even become the 
standard line of the party to suggest that monopolies and trusts existed only in fiction.  
All of their statements regarding domestic economic policy—whether it was that of the 
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last four years or that proposed for the next term—totally ignored the discussion of 
political economy that had reshaped the electoral landscape of the West over the last ten 
years.  While it is reasonable enough to assume that their refusal to engage with domestic 
reform in any serious way was due to confidence, such certainty would have seemed 
unwarranted due to the electoral precedents of the last generation.
85
   
Western Republicans were forced to campaign upon the full suite of issues, in no 
small part because Democrats and Populists questioned the form of “prosperity” their 
rivals had claimed to have ushered in.  While Republicans downplayed the role gold 
discoveries and inflated currency had upon economic growth, western reformers 
suggested that any economic improvement was due to the increase in the supply of 
money.  Charles Towne, vice-presidential pick of the Populists, reminded one audience 
that “McKinley‟s own letter of acceptance four years ago declares that we had money 
enough,” but by now “we have in the country not far from five hundred millions of 
dollars more, six dollars a head more, than we had four years ago.”86  Fusion newspapers 
of all sizes also mocked Republicans for downplaying this fact while they instead 
suggested that McKinley “gave this country „immediate prosperity‟ from the day he 
entered office.”87  Better times are the result of the “higher prices of farm products 
resulting from more money in circulation,” and what the people really wanted was 
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“prosperity that will stay with them during years of peace at home and plenty abroad.”88  
The Republicans offered no domestic reform that would limit the ravaging effects of 
global market swings, and western reformers brought that point home.     
There was also plenty of reason to doubt the rosy picture that Republicans were 
trying to paint.  One writer noted the reported 947 business failures in May—the largest 
ever on record for the month—“as compared with 581 last year and 917 in the 
„calamitous‟ year of 1896.”89  Critics of the administration also noted the reports in 
circulation that bankers and industrialists had become pessimistic about the short-term 
prospects of the economy.
90
  This was not just campaign rhetoric.  There is evidence of a 
real economic slowdown that had begun by the summer of 1899 and continued through 
the end of 1900.
91
  While it was not nearly as severe as the Panic of 1893, nor would it 
have substantially altered the prices of the West‟s commodities, it did suggest that 
perhaps not all was well.  There were other indicators to that effect as well.  Republicans 
were fond of saying that huge quantities of farm mortgages had been paid off in the 
preceding four year, but Bryan noted that statistics from Nebraska showed that many of 
those had been “paid” through foreclosure.92  Information on farm mortgages and tenancy 
published by the Census Bureau in 1910 (the Bureau dramatically scaled back its work on 
those subjects in 1900) demonstrate that Bryan was not exaggerating.  In 1890, when the 
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Populist movement made its first foray into politics, 39% of Nebraska farmers held 
mortgages, nearly 25% were tenants, and the remainder owned their land outright.  By 
1900, the rate with farm mortgages had dropped to less than 29%, but now 37% of the 
state‟s farmers worked lands owned by someone else.93  This trend was even more 
significant in central Nebraska, which had been the heart of Populist power in the state.
94
    
Of course, the figures some cited did not really encompass the main thrust of the 
reformers‟ economic argument.  For them, the real question was not merely full 
employment or industrial productivity, but it was instead about popular control of the 
economy and the distribution of wealth.  The growing imbalance in wealth—and the 
power that came with it—made all of the Republican talk of a “full dinner pail” seem 
hollow.  Senator Allen went into the countryside and reminded farmers that those of their 
avocation had held nearly half the nation‟s wealth in 1860, whereas today they held 
eighteen percent.
95
  A writer for a rural Washington paper told readers that “The 
modicum of prosperity we have is artificial… [T]he only prosperity there is goes to the 
syndicates, carpetbaggers and subsidy hunters.”96   
The editor of Nebraska‟s most prominent Populist paper, the Independent, used a 
recent personal example to summarize the real purpose of their movement.  Just the 
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previous Sunday, he had heard a local minister declare that “I would rather trust the one 
per cent who own one-half of the property of the United States than the fifty percent of 
the poorest classes.”  This kind of sentiment, the principle which McKinley and his 
supporters embodied, represented “plutocracy pure and simple… It is the most dangerous 
sentiment ever expressed on American soil.”  It was incomprehensible that those like 
Rockefeller, who had “stolen the hard earned wealth of hundreds of men by the vilest 
means ever employed by man,” had earned anyone‟s trust over the “thirty-five or forty 
millions” who had actually created the wealth.  The fight was not just about whether 
farmers or laborers had enough for themselves now, but instead it was about who would 
hold the reins of government and shape the nation‟s economic future.97    
Conspiratorial rumors only made it easier for reformers to further emphasize the 
extent of power held by industrialists and financiers.  There was still frequent circulation 
of the usual stories of an English plot to drive down prices, and there were many 
suggestions that the recently passed currency bill would create a perpetual debt for the 
benefit of bankers, but others went far beyond the old emphasis on money.
98
  Some 
papers also reported that “as a last desperate expedient the trusts and the money power, 
controlling the industries of the country, propose to adopt again the methods used before 
for the coercion of the people by bringing on, just prior to the election, a panic.”  It was 
the same method used to repeal the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, they claimed, but this 
time it would be claimed that “the panic is wholly due to apprehension of the success of 
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the Democratic party at the polls and that only by McKinley‟s re-election can prosperity 
be regained.”99  These stories came at the same time as rumors that several major 
industrialists (particularly those engaged in the steel industry) faced a sudden diminished 
demand for their products, but they were holding off work stoppages or layoffs until after 
the election in order to aid McKinley.
100
  These claims underscored the perceived 
influence of the great business entities of the age, and also the need for reform if 
republican freedom was to be maintained.   
The debate over domestic economics made up only one portion of the broader 
debate, and perhaps not even the most important part.  Republicans in the West had 
followed the national script and beaten the drum of “prosperity,” but it did not go without 
a challenge.  The question of trusts and monopolies—one that had become increasingly 
dominant in the political discourse of the region—was essentially shunted aside by 
McKinley‟s supporters.  In many regards their statements were the most honest 
assessments of the party‟s economic philosophy in years, but certainly western 
Republicans could not count on honesty alone to win over voters.  Reformers continued 
to shift the emphasis to popular control and the kind of restraint of power necessary in a 
democratic country, and they refuted the suggestion that any temporary improvement in 
the economy should be allowed to forestall that kind of change.  Still, their claims carried 
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more weight when accompanied by examples that demonstrated the anti-republican 
tendencies of the administration.     
 
Imperialism, Militarism, and the Campaign of 1900 
The debate over the use of American power overseas was a central point of 
contention between the two sides.  Additionally, both Republicans and reformers used the 
issues that accompanied the war and the acquisition of empire to appeal to differing 
aspects of American identity.  Western reformers used imperialism to further reinforce 
their points about concentrated wealth and power.  They had always declared that 
government was too distant from its people, that it ruled for the benefit of the few, and 
that it helped the great business combinations crush resistance to their power.  The 
reformers described an imperial America as the antithesis of the republican ideal, and 
they focused their campaign upon the identity of free white laborers whose positions 
could be threatened in a militarized, aristocratic, and racially diverse society.  Western 
Republicans, too, sought an adjunct to their domestic platform, but while their rivals 
sought to use the imperial policy to demonstrate the need for domestic reform, 
Republicans saw the conflict as a means of smoothing over domestic strife.  Patriotism 
and nationalism were the keys to their campaign.   
Shortly after Dewey‟s victory over two years ago, politicians and members of the 
media had made great projections about the great wealth that would come to America in 
the future through Pacific trade.  As imperialism emerged as a subject of debate, the tone 
of these forecasts took a progressively partisan tone.  By 1900, Republicans were 
attempting to turn all evidence of increased foreign trade into propaganda devices, and 
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their opinion columns were increasingly laced with figures designed to demonstrate that 
this trade was of central importance to future economic growth.  Nowhere was this more 
true than in Washington state.  There, even the smallest local papers reported that “our 
exports to Asia and Oceanica are gaining with greater proportionate rapidity than to any 
other part of the world,” and claimed that such growth was likely to continue.  An eastern 
Washington weekly added that “If we can place three ounces of flour a day in each Hong 
Kong and Shanghai, it will raise the price of Washington wheat to seventy-five cents per 
bushel.”101  In the last weeks before the election, several Nebraska papers began printing 
identical campaign supplements that were designed to convey the same message.  One 
showed a grinning Uncle Sam holding a piece of paper with the words “Agricultural 
Exports,” at the top.  It listed a nearly 50% increase in exports over that of 1895, which 
caused Uncle Sam to remark, “It sort o‟ looks as if I‟d have to expand.”102  Another 
included a number of small articles surrounding a map which showed the historical 
expansion of the United States.  Most of the information was designed to impart the 
importance of foreign trade, and in particular the importance of the Philippines to foreign 
trade.  One of these articles suggested that the “commerce of half of the world‟s 
population, of which Manila may be made the great commercial center, now amounts to 
more than $2,000,000,000 per annum,” and that nearly all of that quantity of money “is 
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expended for the class of goods for which the people of this country are now seeking a 
market.”103   
 It was obviously useful for the Republicans, who were attempting to portray their 
organization as the party of prosperity, to suggest that they were working to secure 
markets to absorb American overproduction.  However, this kind of talk was much less 
frequent by the time of the campaign than it had been a year, or even two years, earlier.  
Perhaps the strongest explanation for that change has to do with the arguments of Bryan 
and his followers.  The Democratic platform had, after all, condemned the Republicans 
for justifying their war of conquest in the name of “greedy commercialism.”  While this 
charge had always been thrown at the imperialists, it became increasingly effective in the 
wake of the Puerto Rican tariff bill.  The controversy over the bill had made many in the 
public doubt that American rule could be simultaneously benevolent and profit-
seeking.
104
    
Whether Republicans continued to deploy the argument or not, western reformers 
continued to attack them for ever having made it.  On the stump and throughout their 
press, the reformers ridiculed their rivals for emphasizing wealth over human rights.  This 
took many forms.  In one case, a Colorado editor simply tacked the headline “McKinley 
Prosperity in Province of Luzon” onto an article about bloody battle that had just taken 
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place in the Philippines.
105
  Another simply pointed to what seemed to be the most 
unfortunate contrast of all:  “While our soldier boys, though poor, are bleeding for their 
country, the wealthy monopolists are bleeding their country.”106   
These simple swipes at imperialism dotted the pages of reform papers, but many 
drew direct links between aggregated capital and imperial policies.  In a letter to the 
editor, one supporter of reform noted that “Nearly all imperialists are trust defenders, and 
all trust defenders are single gold standard advocates.”  Was this “merely coincidental, or 
does it not denote a well defined plan of co-operation?” they asked rhetorically.  
Certainly, “Imperialism cannot long endure without substantial financial backing and 
wealth cannot long be concentrated without imperialistic support.”107  By “imperialistic 
support,” the author was referring to the force that had been used to protect capital in the 
post-bellum era.  Many believed that such militarism posed a serious threat to industrial 
independence.  When coal strikes broke out in the Appalachians, the editor of the Yakima 
Herald claimed that “The next move, and the republican leaders are now demanding it, is 
to have a standing army of 100,000 soldiers to force the miners, and other laborers 
working at starvation wages, to submit to the dictates of these great combinations of 
capital which will not permit competition.”108  The methods by which people were denied 
freedom was much the same in the colonies as it would prove to be in America.  Populists 
pointed out that it already have been proven so in Idaho.  “Having denied the right of 
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self-government to millions in the Philippines and Porto Rico and even the right to labor 
in one of the states of the union,” what would prevent a re-elected McKinley from 
extending “his imperial power over larger sections of these states?”109  Western reformers 
argued that this power, employed for the benefit of concentrated wealth, would destroy 
the basis of republican democracy.  
While some of the most powerful anti-imperialist arguments brought the imperial 
threat home for readers, the most sophisticated developed more complex critiques of 
global capitalism.  In one of the more interesting examples, the editor of the Independent 
explained the limited utility of the new emphasis on foreign trade.  If the quantity theory 
of money was correct, and those who advocated foreign trade justified it with the hope of 
increasing the gold and silver currency of America, the unequal trade necessitated by this 
policy would bankrupt the other nations.  Such trade could only be profitable into the 
future if America succeeding in getting its trading partners into a cycle of perpetual debt, 
though this too would lead to “the impoverishment of foreign nations after a while.”  
Fundamentally, the author declared that the talk of “overproduction,” which imperialist 
had employed to explain both economic decline and the sudden need for overseas 
markets, was bogus.  The solution to America‟s economic problems would be found at 
home, not abroad.
110
   
Still others considered overseas colonialism to be a policy designed to exploit the 
poor of both the United States and the world.   Thomas Patterson‟s Rocky Mountain News 
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pointed out that the war in the Philippines was costing $10,000,000 per month.  If the 
country had been willing to devote that much money to internal improvements, such as 
irrigation of the arid western lands, domestic producers could reap the benefits.  Within 
just a few years, the improved land from such a project could provide new homes for 5-
10,000,000 people in the West.  This would never happen, of course, because the 
“financial influences represented by the present national administration do not want the 
far West to grow too fast.”  They were to remain economically and politically dependent, 
just like those new subjects who were in the process of being subjugated on the other side 
of the world.
111
   
It was no accident that the remarks of some sounded conspiratorial.  The Populists 
and other western reformers had long ago developed a repertoire of theories that involved 
the nefarious plots of America‟s “aristocracy” to destroy free institutions and the 
independent men who maintained them.  The entire discussion of domestic militarism 
had hinted at these, but still others left nothing (or perhaps everything) to the imagination.  
In Denver, the local Old Soldiers‟ National Bryan Club warned members that “The 
money power of the country holds his [McKinley‟s] administration at home in all the 
fields of industry; and abroad in colonizing lands which will be used to give capital 
opportunities for aggrandizement and introduce a system of peonage at home and abroad.  
Wealth is the spouse of imperialism and militarism is the offspring of both.”112  The 
editor of a German-American paper in Nebraska stated that, “The great trusts, capitalists, 
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and oppressors of the poor want a king for the reason that a king, not owing his position 
to the people, will dare to favor the money power and do many things in their interest that 
a president would not do.”  Since the ascension of McKinley, “America has been drifting 
into a monarchical form of government.”  Common Americans could unite now to defend 
their rights or they would lose all that they held dear.
113
   
The reformers also perceived another more tangible threat to the freedom of white 
American breadwinners.  In September, McKinley‟s newly appointed judge to the 
District Court of the Territory of Hawaii handed down rulings with far-reaching 
implications.  In the first instance, he presided over the naturalization of Reymond Reyes, 
a resident of Guam.  After the proceedings, he stated that he believed that naturalization 
was unnecessary, and that by virtue of annexation the people of Guam were already 
American.  Just over two weeks later, Judge Estee made a second pronouncement that 
caught attention on the mainland.  This time, he overruled the actions of a local customs 
agent who had denied entry to Ah Sing, a Chinese sailor aboard an American ship.  
Hawaii was an America port, Estee stated, and could not be treated as legally different 
from any point along the mainland.
114
   
When the news of these decisions began to circulate in the American press, they 
created a storm of controversy that both campaigns were forced to address.  For the 
record, both sides wantonly misinterpreted Estee‟s words.  He had spoken with a degree 
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of uncertainty regarding the question of citizenship for the people of Guam.  In the case 
of the Chinese sailor Ah Sing, his ruling was made specific to the case of sailors.  Despite 
the limits of his statements, organized labor and anti-imperialists jumped on his 
pronouncements.  The Seattle Times issued a notice in late October that “A grand anti-
Asiatic mass meeting will be held tonight in the armory.”  The notice specifically 
attributed the motivation for the meeting to “The recent decision of Federal Judge Estee, 
in which he holds that the Chinese exclusion act and the alien contract law cannot be 
enforced as against Chinamen and contract laborers coming into the United States from 
the new island possessions.”115   
Few papers more fully embodied the reaction of the Democratic press than a 
small-town publication in Washington, the Aberdeen Herald.  In late October, it 
attributed a large anti-Asian rally held in Everett, Washington, to the last ruling by Estee 
that “holds that a Chinaman living in Hawaii has a perfect right to come to any portion of 
the United States and take up residence.”  The editor added that “If we pursue the policy 
as laid down by McKinley, subjugate and retain the Philippines, there can and will be 
absolutely no way by which we can prevent the millions of cheap laborers of those 
islands from coming to the United States.”  The immigration of a mere ten percent of the 
poor labor of the Philippines “would crush out every white laborer on the Pacific 
coast.”116  Less than a week before the election, the paper ran a prominent article on the 
front page under the headline “Filipinos Are Citizens.” The same edition included an 
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editorial column that warned of the approaching expiration of the Chinese Exclusion Act.  
Several prominent Republicans had suggested it should be allowed to expire, and the 
policies of the administration “in the past two years indicates that it wants this cheap 
labor in our country.  It seeks to retain islands 7,000 miles distant that our country may be 
flooded with coolie labor.  The homes of the American workingmen are endangered.”117    
Democrats and Populists throughout the West made the threat of Asian 
immigration a larger issue in the last month of the campaign.  Just previous to the 
decisions by Estee, several western railroads had hired large numbers of Asian (primarily 
Japanese) men to work on their lines, only increasing the sense of urgency connected 
with the issue.
118
  McKinley had remained relatively silent on matter.  Bryan, on the other 
hand, had made it clear that Asian immigration would be used by employers as a wedge 
to destroy labor solidarity and lower the standard of living.  The Democratic platform had 
also explicitly declared that “The Filipinos cannot be citizens without endangering our 
civilizations,” but also suggested that “they cannot be subjects without imperiling our 
form of government.”  Western reformers told attentive audiences that their only choices 
were between wage slavery and bankruptcy on one side and an independent Philippines 
on the other.
119
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Republicans responded to the claims in a variety of ways.  Some claimed that 
Estee‟s statements regarding citizenship had nothing to do with the Philippines.  Others 
(incorrectly) argued that, “of the Philippines, Chinese, Malays or what not, not a mother‟s 
son of them can immigrate to this country unless specifically permitted to by congress.”  
Still others suggested that it mattered not at all, because Filipinos “could no more reach 
the United States and become a factor in its economic life than he could go to Mars.”  
They could “become the servant of a white man venturing there, but there is nothing 
about him that would make a sane person think of him as a possible rival.”  They 
provided enough of a response to tamp down some of the public excitement.  But it was 
also rather late in the campaign for it to become a dominant issue.  Estee‟s decisions were 
not widely reported on the mainland for some time, and the election was only weeks 
away by the time anyone in the West took much notice.  Imperialists could also present 
such measures as the Foraker Act, which denied citizenship (if not admission) to the 
people of Puerto Rico.  The issue was not yet thoroughly defused, but it never had the 
chance to really alter the outcome of the campaign.
120
   
While they did have to fend off the talk of any “Yellow Peril,” Republican 
discussion of race and empire was necessarily complicated.  During the campaign, the 
bombastic rhetoric of racial greatness or the “white man‟s burden” was largely set aside 
by the supporters of McKinley.  They never emphasized the propriety of racial 
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domination per se, and outright denied that their enterprise was a truly a colonial project.  
Instead, they had steered a course that led to the liberation of millions, they claimed, and 
in the aftermath of liberation it was the nation‟s duty to protect the people of the new 
insular possessions.
121
   
As McKinley had in his July oration, Republicans defined the War of 1898 and 
the ongoing conflict in the Philippines as part of a great anti-colonial effort.  Because of 
the efforts of the administration, they said, “millions of men have been freed from a cruel 
tyranny.”  They also sought to enhance their image as benevolent protectors of the 
downtrodden by changing perceptions of the Filipinos.  In both editorials and 
supplemental materials (the latter certainly provided the national Republican campaign 
committee), they cast Aguinaldo as an ambitious potential dictator who was interested 
only in plundering the islands for his own benefit.  The people, too, were described as 
tribal and diverse, and this diversity itself was described as an obstacle to national unity.  
In most cases, the conflict in the Philippines was described by its supporters as a war to 
protect the many peoples of the archipelago against the Tagalogs—the ethnic group to 
which Aguinaldo belonged.  According to this view, Bryan was calling for the end of 
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Spanish (and American) domination, but the next “imperial” rulers of the Philippines 
would be Aguinaldo and his cronies.
122
      
The interpretation provided the administration and its backers was both 
misleading and portentous.  The war raged throughout much of the islands, not merely in 
the regions populated by the Tagalog ethnic group.
123
  But the statement that the Filipinos 
could not govern themselves because of their diversity—an idea taken directly from the 
reports of “experts” sent by McKinley to investigate the situation in the islands—
suggested that American control was to be of long duration.    
Just as white supremacy provided no direct enhancement to the arguments of 
western imperialists, neither did Rooseveltian conceptions of “rugged” manhood.  The 
Republican vice-presidential candidate actually toured the West as McKinley‟s surrogate 
in September and October, but his reception was somewhat mixed.  His speech in the 
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mining town of Victor, Colorado, was followed by a small riot which had Roosevelt as its 
clear target.  He had attempted to follow a fairly regular script, but when he derided the 
Democrats for their corruption he was met with the cry, “What about the rotten beef?”—a 
reference to the “embalmed beef” requisitioned by the corrupt or incompetent officials of 
the War Department in 1898, a story that Roosevelt had first brought to national 
attention.  The New York governor then responded that the men of the audience had 
nothing to fear from the meat, for they “will never get near enough to be hit with a bullet” 
to ever be served the product.  When the men then cheered for Bryan, he branded them 
traitors to the nation.  He had placed his own “manly” experience over that of the miners, 
and soon enough the remaining order left in the gathering completely dissolved.   
Roosevelt and his entourage of faux “Rough Riders” were forced to fight their way back 
to the train.  If the miners of Victor did not reject the concept of aggressive manhood, 
they did at least reject its apostle.
124
   
Perhaps the miners of Victor knew that Roosevelt‟s version of militarized 
manhood left them only a minimal place.  Several western newspapers noted that in some 
of his early writings he had noted with some disdain the habit of western cowboys to 
drink alcohol and participate in needless gunfights.  But, he said, no matter their defects 
“they are much better fellows and pleasanter companions than the small farmers or 
agricultural laborers, nor are the mechanics of a great city to be mentioned in the same 
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breath.”125  Roosevelt had come to advocate a kind of rugged manhood, but he intended 
his message for the increasingly refined upper and professional classes.  These men were 
to lead the industrial masses, and so their own fitness was paramount.  While he did not 
believe in a rigid class society, he nonetheless accepted hierarchy and order part of the 
natural order of things led him to favor paternalism over genuine equality.
126
   
In just this way, what discussion there was of “manhood” in the western campaign 
was not what Roosevelt or Lodge may have desired.  The basic fact was that neither was 
the presidential candidate of the Republican Party, but the fifty-seven-year-old William 
McKinley was.  While their own candidate was known for his caution and maturity and 
had waged his campaign as close to his home as possible, their rival was a forty-year-old 
who was known for his frenetic campaigns and energetic style.  Republicans were in no 
position to demand votes for the active, athletic nominee.  This also fit with the narrative 
that McKinley had demanded.  America was to be portrayed as a kindly protector rather 
than an aggressive conqueror.   
Democrats and Populists continued to emphasize a very different kind of 
manhood.  They argued that free men and concentrated wealth could not coexist, and that 
the battle against trusts was the battle to save American manhood.
127
  The campaign 
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against militarism and imperialism also affected the reformers‟ arguments.  At the heart 
of their critique of militarism was a fear that an army of unthinking drones could be 
unleashed upon workers or political opponents.  The regulars, they had frequently said, 
were not independent men but instead those who had failed at all other avocations.  After 
induction, what remained of their independence was driven out of them through the usual 
rigors of a life that was submerged into a rigidly hierarchal order.  As one critic put it, 
“the worst part about making a soldier of a man is not that a soldier kills brown men or 
white men, [but] that that the soldier loses his own soul.”128  Nebraska‟s governor soon 
found himself in an awkward position due to comments of the same sort.   
As the campaign activities reached their peak in early October, the worst of the 
mudslinging began.  Throughout September and October, Governor Poynter toured the 
state of Nebraska, emphasizing the dangers associated with militarism and imperialism.  
But as the campaign entered its last month, Republicans began to declare that he had 
made slanderous remarks regarding the American soldiery.  Some claimed that he had 
called members of the regular army “hired butchers,” while others said that the Governor 
referred to them as “$15-a-month hirelings.”  Poynter attempted to refute the story, but it 
proved too difficult to stop.  As he continued to denounce militarism, his remarks were 
frequently construed to be of the same sort as those he had denied making.  The actual 
evidence provided by his rivals was of dubious quality—the party‟s gubernatorial 
nominee, Charles Dietrich, was also the primary witness who attested to the story‟s 
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veracity—but articles on Poynter‟s slur were soon printed by those in regional and 
national media with little hesitation.  Roosevelt toured the state just as the rumors began 
to take off, and he repeated the story at nearly every stop.  In Omaha he suggested there 
was no difference between regular soldiers and the volunteers who had signed up for the 
war with Spain, and then declared that “The mould [sic.] is fresh on the graves of these 
„hirelings‟ who lay in the Philippines”—where many of the First Nebraska Volunteers 
had died.
129
   
Poynter‟s statement did not introduce the issue of “patriotism” into campaign; the 
loyalty of those opposed to the wartime president had been questioned ever since 1898, 
and the attacks had only escalated after the outbreak of the second war.  Western 
Republicans were more than happy to substitute the debate over political economy with 
the language of patriotic nationalism.  While they continued to play lip service to 
“prosperity” just as McKinley had wanted, they eagerly shifted the focus of the 
campaign.  Though they adopted this rhetoric in all of its guises, the easiest to use and 
simultaneously the most powerful allowed them to represent themselves as the true 
friends of the soldiers.  The reformers were often walking a fine line in their own 
speeches and remarks, and they were sometimes forced to transition between making 
statements in praise of the soldiers‟ bravery and lambasting the ongoing operations as an 
affront to humanity.  Republicans were all too happy to take advantage of the situation.  
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A writer for the Omaha Daily Bee suggested that “There are two sides to the question of 
assaulting the soldiers who are in the Philippines,” and the “fathers, brothers, and friends 
of those in the army and those who have died fighting against the insurgents do not take 
kindly to having them called murderers and supporters through force of bayonets of an 
unholy cause.”130  A reporter in eastern Washington also gleefully pointed out “how 
quickly Mr. Heifner [secretary of the State Single Tax League] lost prestige with his 
audience when he referred to the brave boys in the Philippines as being there on „a 
mission of murder and looting, and insulting men, women, and children.‟”131  The 
soldiers were in the Philippines “defending the American flag, American honor and 
American prestige,” said a Colorado editor.  “They have the right to demand that we shall 
rally to their support.”132  Their depiction of the situation suggested that individuals could 
choose to either support the policy of the president or their actions would serve as an 
insult to the nation‟s soldiers.   
Republicans argued that support for the anti-imperialists actually kept the war 
going.  While the administration was merely trying to secure the peace, “In the 
Philippines this is retarded by the position of the democratic party.”133  In many parts of 
the West, this was the point emphasized in the supplemental material that was especially 
distributed to the small-town party newspapers.  One titled “Bryan‟s Avowed Aid and 
Comfort to Aguinaldo” was distributed by several Nebraska newspapers, and its content 
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was just as damning as the name suggested.
134
  Once again, in claiming they wrote in 
defense of the soldiers, supporters of the President said that the men in combat “have a 
right to denounce as traitors those who for the advancement of selfish party and personal 
interests are making their task harder, who are encouraging their enemies, and are helping 
the attack upon that flag which they are all bound as loyal Americans ever to defend.”135  
They remorselessly attacked “the Byranism that still encourages the Tagal to ply the bolo 
or lurk in the swamps to ambush American soldiers, who, according to Bryan, are loafers 
walking about in idleness.”136   
To the charge of treason, the Republicans added historical context.  In 
Washington, Congressman Cushman told audiences that “There was a certain party 40 
years ago that maligned and attacked Abraham Lincoln, just as there is a certain party 
today which is attacking and maligning William McKinley.  Then it was the southern half 
of our own continent that was in insurrection, now it is the Philippines.”137  The 
Democrats had been the party of treason in 1861, they contended, and that legacy had 
continued to the present time.  When the Chicago Inter-Ocean ran a piece that compared 
Bryan to the infamous copperhead Democrat Clement Vallandigham, it was picked up 
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throughout the West.
138
  The editor of the Morning Olympian liked the piece so much he 
provided his own commentary on the parallels.   It was no surprise that the “notorious 
copperhead‟s thoughts are echoed in all of Mr. Bryan‟s recent speeches…. for Mr. Bryan 
now, like Vallandigham in 1863, advocates surrender to rebels.”  In the meantime, Bryan 
was “now encouraging rebels, just as Vallandigham and his party did then.”139   
Accusations of “copperheadism” and other reminders of the Civil War era were 
especially prominent in the Nebraska campaign, where that war‟s veterans and their 
descendants made up a large portion of the population.  Of course, Poynter‟s words were 
used to recall the memories of the great conflict.  “In 1861-5 the Knights of the Golden 
Circle and their copperhead allies called the union soldiers „Lincoln hirelings,‟” 
recounted one editor, “but it is now left to Governor Poynter to refer to the soldier boys in 
the Philippines in his speeches as „$15-a-month hirelings.‟”140  It was in the same vein 
that Roosevelt targeted veterans and their descendants in the speeches he gave as he 
toured the state.  “You, my comrades, remember when you were called Lincoln‟s 
hirelings—for the sake of the memory of the deeds done by those who preceded you, for 
the sake of the men who now wear the uniform of the American republic who are 
inspired by the memory of what our fathers did.”141  Others propagated the notion that 
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both wars were products of partisan discord.   One former Confederate told a local paper 
that the war in the Philippines would have ended quickly if not for the anti-imperialists, 
just as the Civil War “would not have lasted three months but for the northern 
Democratic encouragement.”142 An Omaha minister—and a former Bryan supporter—put 
it more powerfully when he wrote that the Democrats had “lied as they always have 
about our presidents from Lincoln to McKinley, then when the outbursts of war came, ran 
to their holes as they did in 1861 and left the republican party to clear up the mess while 
they stood around and found fault.  If Aguinaldo had not been encouraged, just as Jeff 
Davis was, the war would have been settled.”143   
  Articles and speeches that charged the Democrats with treason or appealed to the 
nationalism of the audience were often aimed directly at disgruntled Populists or Silver 
Republicans.  In the weeks leading up to the campaign, Republican papers rather 
suspiciously published accounts of the glowing reputation Populists had developed in the 
days before they were contaminated by fusion, and some even reported on mid-road 
meetings.
144
  They added to these articles and speeches by western reformers who had 
decided to renounce Bryan and fusion.  In many cases, to explain their actions they 
focused upon the new issue.  The former Silver Republican senator from Montana, Lee 
Mantle, stated that “the paramount issue today is the issue of maintain the honor and 
dignity of the nation and the supremacy of its flag.”  The alternative presented by the 
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Bryanites required the country to “abandon our advanced position, throw down our arms, 
cravenly hoist the white flag and admit to the world that we are incapable of solving the 
problems which confront us.”  Mantle‟s charge of cowardice was mild compared to the 
words of other one-time reformers.  In a speech he delivered in Denver, Senator William 
Stewart of Nevada declared that “This campaign had a parallel in the campaign of ‟64,” 
though he branded the contemporary Democrats worse than those of the previous 
generation.  “Mr. McClellan was not as treasonable as Mr. Bryan is,” he added for good 
measure.  Even the former Populists William Peffer considered the platform of the 
reformers to be a “brazen assault on the honor of the republic,” which amounted to “little 
less than treason.”145   
While the Republicans frequently talked of the soldiers, the real focus was on 
unquestioned obedience.  Opposition to the President was both damaging and disloyal, 
and the death of soldiers represented the collateral damage.  By contrast, one could 
represent their loyalty and love of country by following the course laid out by McKinley.  
Of all the campaign literature used in the western states, there were few pieces that 
exemplified this attitude more than a bit of serial fiction titled the “Dear Boy Letters.”  
These letters were supposed to represent the words of a respectable Republican father to a 
young, emotional son who was occasionally infatuated with the words of Bryan.  In one, 
the father pointed out how much respect America had gained around the world because of 
its defeat of Spain and responsible dealings in Asia.  While he hinted at the power that the 
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nation had demonstrated, the father claimed it was most important that the world had 
learned that Americans always “fight, not merely for money, but for ideas, for liberty, 
and for the deliverance of the oppressed of other lands and races.”  The father ended by 
telling his son to “Be honest, be true, be Christian, and BE AN AMERICAN.”146  In a 
later edition of the serial, the father informed the son that, even though he had not been 
allowed to enlist due to poor health in 1898, “I want you to realize that you can serve 
your country as truly when you cast an honest ballot as if you were a soldier in the field.”  
While “Your country did not seem to need you as a soldier,” he could still serve his 
country by following the Republican Party.  After the ballots were cast, he could “sleep 
sweetly that night, with a sense of duty faithfully done.”147   
 The goal of the Republicans was to project a need for nationalist unity in a time 
of war.  As they did so, they simultaneously understood that their opponents were casting 
them as dangerous militarists and aggressive expansionists.  Even when they appealed to 
a milder form of nationalism, there was fear that it could potentially drive off immigrants 
or others disinterested in a nationalist project.  German immigrants and German-
Americans, for example, were widely believed to have a distaste for overseas expansion, 
and there is considerable evidence that supports this suspicion.  In the case of Nebraska, 
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Germans were the largest immigrant group, and most German-language papers in the 
state openly opposed imperialism or policies they viewed as militaristic.
148
  While some 
western Republicans attempted to dismiss these claims by declaring that the “Germans 
who have the ballot in this country are American citizens, and they will vote as they 
please,” the large number of articles directed specifically at German voters suggests a 
fear of alienation.
149
  Many of these statements came from campaign supplements, and 
most told Germans not to be fooled by Bryan‟s anti-imperialism—free silver was his real 
object.
150
  Still, Republican apprehensions were not easily assuaged.   
In Nebraska, the party decided the solution could be found by granting the 
gubernatorial nomination to Charles Dietrich, a banker from Hastings who they chose to 
label as German-American.
151
  While Dietrich would prove to be an awful choice—in 
part because of a past that was best left forgotten, but also because of his “beer and 
sauerkraut” campaign that repelled both prohibitionists and those Germans who 
considered him a phony—his selection represented a deployment of nationalism that was 
designed to attract members of the state‟s ethnic communities.152  By identifying himself 
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as both German-American and the defender of the nation‟s soldiers, he showed how one 
could retain an ethnic identity and still act as a “proper” American.153  While 
campaigning in the state, Theodore Roosevelt had made a similar argument.  “In the big 
war we had Sherman and Sheridan.  Who cared that one was of New England and the 
other of Irish stock?  Or Siegel, who was of German stock; or Farrugut, whose father 
came from Majorca?”  Neither place of birth nor ethnicity mattered to those men, as long 
as “he was an American in heart and purpose.”154  By Roosevelt‟s reckoning, 
“Americanism” was a quality that any (European) immigrant could attain, so long as they 
were willing to serve the nation or follow its leaders obediently.    
 The Republicans were quite successful at emphasizing a militarized version of 
patriotic nationalism.  While Populists and other reformers did still occasionally make 
reference to the kind of civic nationalism or republican patriotism that they had appealed 
to for much of the decade, it appeared with much less frequency.  Now when they 
compared their struggle to that of the nation‟s founders it was often defensive.  A writer 
for the Aspen Democrat opened a column with a reminder that, “Now that we who 
oppose the taking of the Philippines and Puerto Rico and the annexation of Cuba are 
being denounced as „traitors‟ by the imperialistic advocates of such a policy… it is well 
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to bear in mind the life of Patrick Henry.”155  Their frequent responses to the epithets of 
“copperhead” and “traitor” also suggest these remarks were taken seriously.   
A Colorado editor lamented that the Republicans could not explain their foreign policy 
“without going into a frenzy and howling „Copperhead,‟ „traitor,‟ and similar „argument‟ 
[sic.] which constitutes most of their campaign stock-in-trade this year.”156  A 
Washington Democrat explained the wonderful logic used by the administration‟s 
defenders:  “All persons who oppose the McKinley policy in the Philippines are guilty of 
giving aid and comfort to the enemy, and are therefore traitors.  No traitor should be 
allowed to vote.  Consequently, the right to vote should be limited to persons who intend 
to vote for Mr. McKinley.”157   
Conscious of the power of such labels, some Democrats and Populists threw them 
back at their opponents.  In Colorado, the word “traitor” was as likely to be attached to 
Republican Senator Wolcott as it was to Bryan.  In a front-page cartoon ran by the Rocky 
Mountain News, Bryan was depicted as a gladiator who defended silver (here shown as a 
woman in distress) against a semi-human figure labeled “Money Trust.”  But lurking 
behind Bryan was Wolcott, knife in hand, ready to betray the defender of silver when the 
moment was right.
158
  The editor of Nebraska‟s leading Populist paper took a different 
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tack.  Under the headline “High Treason,” the author consciously replicated the language 
of the Republicans and accused them of statements worse than “Vallandingham [sic.] 
ever made during the civil war.”  Many of the old leaders of the Republican Party were 
working with conspirators who planned “to overthrow this government and establish a 
monarchy in its place.”  “These republican leaders are traitors,” claimed the editor.  
“They are committing high treason every day of their lives.  They are in collusion with 
the hereditary enemy of this country and the enemy of all republics.  They have made a 
secret alliance by which the upholders of monarchy in the old world shall assist the 
believers in that form of government in this country.”159  The editor had hit upon a key 
point that had been central to the debates of the 1890s.  When Populists and allied 
reformers accused their opponents of cooperation with the money power or the 
aristocracy or plutocracy, they had in fact accused them of being treasonous or un-
American.  But now that Americans were fighting a war overseas against a—
comparatively speaking—more tangible opponent, one could question the extent to which 
such definitions of “traitor” still held mass appeal.160    
Individual politicians had other means of defending themselves.  Governor 
Poynter‟s defenders liked to note his work to provide aid for the returning members of 
the First Nebraska.  When the state legislature refused to appropriate funds for the 
purpose, Poynter led efforts that took in charitable contributions designed for the same 
                                                 
159
 “High Treason,” Independent (NE), August 30, 1900, p. 4.   
160
 Another interesting conspiratorial piece that examined the recent use of traitor can be found in “Grand 
Democratic Party,” Aberdeen Herald, August 30, 1900, p. 1.   
  
534 
 
use.  As his opponents attempted to demonstrate the Governor‟s disdain for America‟s 
soldiers, he could try to hold up a record that said otherwise.
161
 
John R. Rogers chose a different path.  Rather than follow the national party‟s 
line, he continued to endorse “expansion.”  By midsummer, he toned down his statements 
on the issue, which Republicans universally declared to mean that he had been forced to 
change due to pressure from the Bryan campaign.
162
  Rogers had not totally renounced 
his earlier position, but he had decided to split the difference.  In his speech at the largest 
fusion rally in Washington during the campaign, he stated that he would emphasize local 
matters. “I will say, however, that I believe in commercial expansion in the fullest sense.”  
Puget Sound was to be “the future commercial emporium of the world,” and 
Washingtonians could not deny that destiny.  At the same time, he denied that expansion 
required “imperialism,” or rule by force of arms.  He made no reference to the 
Philippines or any present conflict, and his statements could be read as support for 
whatever the listener chose to believe.  McKinley himself had denied that his policies 
were imperialistic, and if Rogers even refused to explain whether or not he defined them 
as such there was little reason to believe the Governor specifically condemned the 
ongoing war.  Undoubtedly, that is exactly how he wanted it.
163
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Results of the Contest 
Bryan‟s defeat in the election of 1900 was no real surprise for many.  In 1896, he 
had failed to win any state in the Midwest or Northeast, and many sensed that was likely 
to continue.  The addition of anti-imperialism and anti-trust planks to the platform could 
sway some voters, and most have suggested that they did account for his improved 
showing in several eastern states.  However, the electoral map in the East looked very 
much like it had four years earlier, and that fact alone made his victory in the presidential 
contest impossible.
164
   
Far more devastating than his defeat was the decimation of his base of support in 
the West.  Among the states he had carried in 1896, Bryan lost Kansas, the Dakotas, and 
his home state of Nebraska, as well as Wyoming, Utah, and Washington.  The Populists, 
Democrats, and Silver Republicans who had been swept into office in the West in 1896 
had been nearly swept out altogether in 1900.  The results in Nebraska, Colorado, and 
Washington are especially telling.  In Nebraska, Bryan‟s majority of nearly twelve 
thousand votes had been turned into a defeat by nearly eight thousand.  The gubernatorial 
contest was closer, but Dietrich‟s narrow victory—by roughly eight hundred ballots—
was certainly due to a local campaign that repulsed traditional Republican voters.  He ran 
roughly eight thousand votes behind McKinley‟s tally.  The reformers fared better in 
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Colorado, where Bryan won by over thirty thousand and Orman secured the governorship 
with a somewhat smaller total.
165
   
Strangest of all were the results in Washington state.  Bryan had claimed a twelve 
thousand vote majority in 1896; four years later, he was defeated by the same margin.  
Despite defeat in the national contest, Governor Rogers was almost miraculously 
reelected.  Over his four years in office, Rogers had alienated mid-road Populists, single-
tax Democrats, and finally even mainstream Populists when he abandoned their party 
altogether.  Compared to his Republican rival, he also had rather little organizational 
support.  With all of those factors running against him, he outpaced Bryan‟s totals by 
over seven thousand votes (out of 107,000 cast).  When one considers how rare ticket 
splitting was at this time, the difference is even more impressive.
166
   
The defeat of reform in the West was nearly complete.  All along the Plains states, 
from the Dakotas down to Kansas, the results were much as they were in Nebraska.  The 
three Pacific Coast states also elected Republican governors and legislatures.  Among the 
congressional delegations from the Plains and Coast, remarkably four Nebraska fusion 
candidates won and so did one from Kansas, but all other districts went Republican.  
Only in the states of the mining West were the results different.  Much as they had in 
Colorado, Democrats won victories in states like Montana and Idaho with the aid of 
Populists.  Organized labor also applied pressure through the Populists, so that in Idaho 
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the Democrats had been forced to officially renounce the administration of their own 
governor.  But because of the relative strength of the Democrats in the mining states 
compared with the party elsewhere in the West, fusion arrangements had always faced 
serious obstacles.  Though Populists joined winning coalitions in the region in 1900, 
these victories painted no bright picture for the future of the party.
167
   
Bryan‟s explanation of the defeat was published the next month in the North 
American Review.  Though imbalanced in places and overly simplistic in others, a few 
substantive points remain worthy of note.  He observed that there was no national shift in 
votes toward McKinley, but instead that McKinley had taken the West while Bryan had 
improved in the East.  Perhaps most troubling considering the focus of his crusade, Bryan 
had lost substantially among rural voters while he gained in the biggest cities.  He knew 
well that his showing had been worse than it was four years earlier.  In accounting for 
that, he pointed to the Republican campaign chest—which overflowed while his own was 
empty—the war in the Philippines, and “better times.”  Though he acknowledged that 
many were likely influenced by ongoing war and the argument “that it is not safe to swap 
horses while crossing a stream,” and so preferred McKinley, he inevitably claimed that 
“prosperity” had won the day for the President.168   
Bryan all but accepted the McKinley campaign‟s arguments wholesale—not that 
he agreed with them, but that he deemed them to have been effective.  In fact, the 
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situation was far too complex to explain with simple economic determinism.  Of all the 
groups Bryan examined, he suggested that farmers were likely the most susceptible to the 
economic arguments of the administration.  But in his study of Bryan‟s home state, 
historian Robert Cherny demonstrated that although ethnic factors had been increasingly 
trumped by economic ones over much of the 1890s, the opposite was true for 1900.  
Farmers were at least as influenced by their cultural background as they were their 
pocketbooks.
169
  In Colorado, the single most important determinant was vocation.  
Miners provided solid support for Bryan and Orman, while farmers and ranchers were 
less interested.
170
  The miners‟ view of the events in Idaho and subsequent rejection of 
militarization likely played as substantial a role as did the faint hope that silver could still 
be remonetized.   
Rogers victory may be one off the most telling of all.  In Washington state, the 
Gorvernor outpaced Bryan by five to ten percent of the vote in nearly every county, 
whether urban or rural, eastern or western.  Though his victory is difficult to pin on any 
single factor, his acceptance of American empire and his willing participation as the 
state‟s leading booster surely made a difference.  Those who had identified with the 
Populists and Silver Republicans earlier in the decade supported McKinley in 1900, but 
no small number of them declined to renounce Rogers.  This may suggest support for 
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imperialism—or wartime support for the nation and its soldiers—alongside a continued 
to hope for reform.
171
   
 
The defeat of both Populism and anti-imperialism in 1900 was no small matter.  
The campaign had been waged on many fronts and it more fully demonstrated the 
complexity of American life and the nation‟s place in the world than had the celebrated 
contest of just four years earlier.  Political economy, an overseas war, and questions of 
American identity were discussed in detail, even if they were not resolved as neatly as the 
electoral contest had been.  But now the most substantial of the late nineteenth century‟s 
movements for economic justice was all but dead.  The triumph of conservatism was 
nearly complete, and it would be McKinley‟s vision of harmonious empire that would 
receive its trial run at the opening of the twentieth century.     
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CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has confronted a basic problem in the existing historiography.  
Historians of politics—especially those who have examined the last great reform 
movement of the nineteenth century—have largely been uninterested in the years after 
1896.  In the coverage they have provided to those years, they have generally had little to 
say regarding America‟s overseas activities or its impact upon domestic debates.  Those 
academics who have instead examined American imperialism and its opponents have 
likewise missed a great deal.  They have ignored the part played by those who questioned 
the form of American development in the foreign policy debates at the end of the decade.  
By ignoring the contribution made by western Populists and their allies, historians have 
failed to explain both the political impact of imperialism and the important place of 
industrial reform proponents among the anti-imperialists.   
Despite the little attention given to the Populists and their western allies in the 
aftermath of Bryan‟s first presidential run, the western half of the movement retained a 
great deal of vitality.  Its adherents continued to call for sweeping changes that would 
dramatically alter the way people engaged with their government and the market and, 
despite their idealistic rhetoric, they also proved capable of bringing tangible change that 
dealt with the immediate concerns of many farmers and laborers.  Bryan pulled together 
these myriad groups in 1896, but his defeat did not mark the death of the movement.  
Instead, as he and others suggested, the campaign for silver was to represent a new 
beginning.  The western reformers who continued their fight hoped to create bottom-up 
economic opportunity and accountable, responsive government, but they would soon hit a 
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roadblock.  Just over a year after the election, events overseas drew attention away from 
their domestic reform agenda.   
Western reformers were among the many drawn to the Cuban independence 
movement.  They had already developed a critique of uneven economic development and 
global exploitation based upon unequal trade.  By 1898, they had extended that analysis 
to the Cuban situation, identified the cause of the Cuban freedom fighters as one much 
like their own.  They successfully pushed for intervention on behalf of the Cubans, but 
only when war actually came did they see how a wartime president could use the power 
of a commander-in-chief to dictate policy and influence public sentiment.  Within just a 
matter of weeks, many among them knew that their hoped-for a war of liberation had 
become a war for empire.   
Hawaii—the long-coveted Pacific outpost for those with expansionist 
ambitions—was the first objective of the McKinley administration.  The president‟s 
backers argued that the islands were necessary for the war against Spain, and enough 
potential opponents of annexation were pressured to tow the line for the sake of 
patriotism to ensure that it would pass.  But the formal debate over annexation was 
important, for it was at this time that western reformers first demonstrated how they 
could deploy their own analysis of territorial expansion in the industrial age.  Unlike in 
previous eras, they argued, newly acquired territories offered no new homes or lands for 
yeoman farmers.  The plantation agriculture and exploited laborers of Hawaii represented 
a model antithetical to that envisioned by the nation‟s founders.  Instead, the Hawaiian 
situation as they saw it was more in tune with current trends in the global economy, but it 
was just this kind of exploitative systems that they hoped to avoid.  For the western 
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reformers, overseas imperialism signified yet another step down the road toward 
despotism.   
As it became apparent that the administration intended to acquire nearly every 
piece of territory it could lay its hands upon, the great majority of western reformers 
adopted an anti-imperialist position.  More than any other event, the annexation of the 
Philippines convinced them that the expansionists must be stopped.  They perceived the 
acquisition of an archipelago with several million Asian inhabitants as a racial, political, 
and economic threat.  They shared with others a fear that American citizenship would be 
“degraded” and that representative government could not withstand the contradictions 
that came with being an imperial republic.  They also believed that the colonial peoples 
would be used—either in place or upon their immigration to the United States proper—to 
lower the wages of labor.   
But the western reformers did not merely adopt anti-imperialism due to their 
notions of race and a desire to preserve the privileges of whiteness.  While imperialists 
followed McKinley‟s lead and declared that the addition of new territories would 
strengthen the nation‟s prospects for trade and investment overseas, western Populists, 
Democrats, and Silver Republicans declared that the American economic system was 
already too flawed to be extended to far-flung colonies.  The people and resources of 
Asia and Latin America would be subjugated to the needs of American capital—to their 
own detriment and to the disadvantage of farmers and laborers at home.  The reformers 
also channeled their traditional disdain for centralized authority into their attack upon the 
basis of colonialism.  With greater conviction than their sometime allies (conservative 
and muguwump anti-imperialists), westerners argued that rule at the point of a bayonet 
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would not be restricted to such places as the Philippines.  The force of the government 
had already been used to crush movements for change, and the recent fervor for conquest 
and colonies was just further proof of the elite‟s growing disdain for democracy and its 
principles.      
War and empire did provide conservatives a path to power, even if they did so in 
ways that proved less nefarious than the reformers had feared.  Before 1898, McKinley‟s 
party had been on the decline throughout West.  The Populists had succeeded in changing 
the political discourse from matters of culture and recent history to the concerns of 
economic and political power.  In that environment, Republicans had struggled.  Its 
candidates had been most successful in the previous era by pointing to their party‟s 
record of loyalty during the Civil War and promoting a vision of top-down prosperity in a 
society without class division.  With the coming of war, they sensed that events gave 
their old program new life.   
In the campaigns of 1898 and 1900, Republicans in the West came triumphantly 
back into power.  They did so by stressing national unity and painting their opponents as 
prophets of strife and traitors to their nation.  In 1898, they claimed that the threat of 
renewed war (including a chance of intervention by the great powers) required all to 
scorn opponents of the administration.  From McKinley on down to the editors of the 
smallest local press, Republicans demanded votes to save the nation.  Those Democrats 
and Populists who criticized the President or threatened to hold up the treaty negotiations 
provoked America‟s enemies, the Republicans said, and as traitors they should be driven 
from office.  With the echoes of war still in the air, western voters set aside their 
reservations about Republican economics and returned the “patriots” to office.   
  
544 
 
The lessons of 1898 were further demonstrated in 1900.  The Republican 
campaign, both nationally and in the West, was more nationalist than imperialist.  The 
little that was said of the new American empire stressed secure prosperity through 
forceful control of international markets and trickle-down wealth that benefitted all.  But 
the greatest emphasis was upon unquestioned loyalty at a time when American soldiers 
were in harm‟s way.  Opponents of McKinley‟s policies were no better than Aguinaldo‟s 
insurgents or the irrational Boxers, they declared.  Worse still, by vocalizing their 
opposition, they lent support to those who would kill Americans if given the opportunity.  
Republicans were again successful at labeling their partisan rivals, and no response 
would prove adequate to the persistent charge of treason.  The Republican “redemption” 
of much of the West in 1900 only added to the party‟s resurgent dominance at the 
beginning of the new century.   
 
The Republican Party was ascendant in the West and nationally, but the man who 
had returned them to power, William McKinley, would not long survive his reelection.  
In September of 1901, while visiting the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo, New 
York, he was shot by Leon Czolgosz, a son of Polish immigrants who claimed to have 
been influenced by the speeches and works of political anarchists.  Ironically, especially 
given the rhetoric of the last campaign, Czolgosz repeated in the days after the shooting 
“I done my duty.”  The President had been a servant of wealth, the assassin said.  
McKinley was targeted because of what he represented, and historians have been 
satisfied enough with the idea that they have used his death to mark a transition in 
American public life.  Roosevelt‟s elevation to the presidency supposedly marked a new 
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era of national politics, one in which the chief executive would be receptive to the 
reforms advocated by the nation‟s urban middle class.  This narrative has been persistent, 
and in a way it makes the defeat of Populism seem irrelevant.  Yet this view misses 
much, and it totally ignores the problems of the 1890s as seen by those in the West and 
elsewhere.
1
   
Following their defeat in 1900, the Populist parties in much of the West all but 
collapsed, and they would never recover.  The Pacific Coast Populists essentially 
disappeared after 1900.  The movement in Washington dissolved, and even the newly-
minted Democrat John Rankin Rogers died just over a year after his reelection.
2
  Along 
the Plains states, the parties continued for a few years but with such reduced membership 
that they became almost immediately irrelevant.  In Nebraska, the Populists remained a 
bit stronger than in most, and they were able to name the fusion gubernatorial candidate 
in 1902 and influence the selection in 1904.  Still, they too faded fast, and most members 
of the state organization were compelled to rejoin the old parties or abandon politics 
altogether.  Almost half joined the Democrats, and politics in Nebraska became far more 
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competitive than it had been before the 1890s, but the Republicans still dominated.
3
  As a 
consequence of the Populist defeat, the agrarian reform agenda was essentially without 
advocates after 1900.  A few of the eastern urban elite and academic professionals did 
advocate self-help reforms among the agrarians, but—as though they had somehow 
missed the events of the last decade—they contended that an excess of rural 
“individuality” was the greatest obstacle to change.  Farmers outside of the Northeast 
showed little interest in this “Country Life” movement, and they told its advocates that 
their ills required a different remedy.  What they really wanted was “a chance to make 
more money,” as one so bluntly put it.  But Populism‟s death meant that there were no 
longer proponents of the kind of structural reforms farmers still desired.
4
   
 The fate of Populism in the Mountain West was little different despite their 
victories in 1900.  In these states, where the Democrats were stronger than in much of the 
rest of the West, the Populists‟ position had always been tenuous.  The party had helped 
represent the demands of the most militant members of organized labor.  Though these 
labor activists had also begun to engage in non-partisan interest group politics, many of 
the most dedicated had been Populists.  The existence of such a party gave labor a voice 
in fusion arrangements, and in states like Colorado the Democrats had been forced to 
accept a large number of labor candidates and a pro-labor platform.  When the fusion 
process broke down, neither the party nor radical labor would survive.   
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   In the campaign of 1902, Colorado‟s Democrats refused to cooperate with the 
state‟s Populists.  The Populists then ran a separate ticket with no chance of victory as the 
Democrats were left to hope that Populist backers would willingly abandon their 
allegiance.  In this they were disappointed.  The avowedly pro-business Republican state 
ticket, headed by James H. Peabody, was victorious.  His term in office would be 
characterized by the suppression of organized labor on a scale that had been unknown in 
the history of the state up to that time.  Labor unrest in 1903 led Peabody to call out the 
Colorado National Guard and, under the leadership of former mine manager and one-time 
Rough Rider Sherman Bell, the state militia was used to crush the local chapters of the 
Western Federation of Miners.  Strikebreakers received official escort, union leaders 
were arrested without cause, and many WFM members were forcibly placed aboard 
trains and dropped off beyond the state line.  The WFM never fully recovered in 
Colorado, and the Populists died with them.
5
   
The new president, Theodore Roosevelt, looked on with approval.  Though he had 
never had the chance to line Populists up in front of a wall and shoot them (as he had 
once recommended), surely this was the next best thing.  While many Americans still 
thought of his intervention in the anthracite coal strike in 1902, for Roosevelt the events 
were not proper parallels.  First, the coal strike threatened the supply of a vital and 
commonly used good as winter was fast approaching; the metals produced by the 
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Colorado mines were not as directly a public interest.  The blatant arrogance of the coal 
mine owners also destroyed any public sympathy for their position and made it 
impossible for such a conscientious politician as Roosevelt to side with them.  The 
absentee owners of the Colorado mines, on the other hand, largely remained out of the 
headlines.  The most important factor, however, had to do with the politics of the West.  
Unlike the United Mine Workers, the union that dominated the eastern coal fields, the 
WFM called for a substantial restructuring of the capitalist order.  Radical organizations 
brought out class resentment and social disorder, and Roosevelt had no tolerance for 
them.
6
   
This represented the most fundamental difference between the Populists and the 
reform movement that followed them.  The middle-class progressives were troubled by 
both those above and those below, and they saw both the wealthy elite and disgruntled 
workers as selfish and potentially dangerous.  Those among them who were outside the 
political centers of power created organizations to support specific causes, but through 
these affiliations they hoped to create identities separate from those based upon 
socioeconomic status.  Those in high office held similar goals.  Their aim was to remove 
the worst sources of social tension and the most blatant abuses of power.  They did not 
imagine a new economic order, but sought just enough reform to stave off the conflicts 
that disrupted domestic peace.  Their analysis bears no real resemblance to the Populist 
view of the situation, particularly as it related to those at the bottom.  While they, too, 
occasionally stated a fear of the poorest members of society, their anxiety had been based 
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upon a belief that the most desperate could be manipulated by those who held power over 
them.  The Populists rarely displayed a fear of revolution from below; on the contrary, at 
least a few looked forward to such an event.
7
   
National progressivism should be considered in light of the destruction of the 
Populists.  As long as a group like the Populists existed in any substantial numbers, 
moderate progressive reform was not a viable position for most Republicans.  While 
some in the West had advocated reform positions in the 1890s, no state party in that 
region had accepted such a position, perhaps with the fear that it would legitimize the 
Populist critique.  But by the time Roosevelt entered office, the Populists were gone and 
even Democrats from outside of the South were few in number.  It also appeared that 
Bryan himself was discredited, and he announced shortly after the election that he would 
not accept his party‟s nomination in 1904.  Conservatives openly declared their intent to 
take back the Democracy, and no effective leader emerged to challenge them.  William 
V. Allen published a piece in the reform magazine Arena which explained that the 
regression of the Democrats demonstrated the need for a Populist alternative, but there 
was no one left to heed the call.  When conservative New Yorker Alton Parker received 
the Democratic presidential nomination in 1904, the western reformers discovered they 
no longer had a vehicle for their movement.  Roosevelt won in a landslide, and his 
majorities were even larger in the West than elsewhere.
8
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 With the elimination of their chief electoral and ideological rivals, Roosevelt and 
those Republicans who favored change could push through reform on their own terms.  
There was little chance that the government interventions that they initiated would be 
transformed into radical legislation or turned into fodder for a movement that advocated 
more thoroughgoing reform.  The elimination of the Populists and the humiliation of 
Bryan allowed the members of the comfortable classes to ameliorate the worst abuses of 
the industrial system while maintaining the essential imbalance in power that had allowed 
such abuses to occur in the first place.  
As their movement faded into the background, a handful of western reformers did 
manage to continue on in state and national politics.  However, their most notable 
contributions in the years that followed were not in debates over political economy.  
Instead they continued to attack American imperialism.  In January, 1901, months before 
McKinley‟s second inauguration, Senator Henry Teller introduced an address and 
petition signed by over two thousand residents of Manila.  The petitioners stated that the 
war against the Americans had been supported by the whole of the people and that a 
majority of them still demanded independence.  The war in the Philippines had 
continued, despite all of the Republican suggestions that the insurrection would collapse 
following Bryan‟s defeat, and Teller made this point clearly.9   
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As the war slogged on, stories of the brutality of the war came to circulate with 
increasing frequency in the American press.  In particular, American words and actions 
directed at the rebels of the province of Batangas and on the island of Samar brought 
attention to the methods employed by the Army.   Following the defeat of one isolated 
American detachment in late 1901, and almost immediately following his accession to 
the presidency, Roosevelt ordered more “stern measures” to be used against the rebels of 
the archipelago.  With this directive in mind, General J. Franklin Bell instituted a policy 
of “concentration” in Batangas, a policy not so dissimilar from the practices instigated by 
Weyler in Cuba.  On Samar, General Jacob H. Smith declared that his men should now 
take no prisoners and that all Filipinos above ten years of age were to be treated as 
enemies.  While his subordinates showed greater restrain than their commander had 
desired, it was nonetheless shocking for Americans to discover (as they soon did) that 
one of their generals demanded that an entire island be converted into a “howling 
wilderness.”  Reports of this sort led to a Senate investigation of conditions in the 
Philippines and the conduct of the war there.
10
   
It was certain that the investigation would make a report that Roosevelt would 
find acceptable.  Imperialists made up a clear majority of the committee members, which 
included Albert Beveridge, Henry Cabot Lodge as the chair, and the recently elected 
Senator from Nebraska, former governor Charles H. Dietrich.  George Hoar and Eugene 
Hale of Maine, the only two anti-imperialist Republicans in the Senate, were also on the 
                                                 
10
 Stuart Creighton Miller, “Benevolent Assimilation”:  The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-
1903 (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1982), 206-212.  See also Glenn A. May, Battle for 
Batangas:  A Philippine Province at War (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1991), chapter 9.     
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committee.  The rest of the committee was made up of western and southern anti-
imperialist Democrats, including Joseph Rawlins of Utah, Fred Dubois of Idaho, and 
another freshman senator, Thomas Patterson of Colorado.
11
   
The eastern media described Hoar as the top anti-imperialist of the lot, but it was 
Patterson who thoroughly embarrassed Lodge‟s witnesses.  He pressured William 
Howard Taft into an admission that the war in the Philippines had been conducted in an 
“uncivilized” manner; he dressed down a member of the clergy whom Lodge had allowed 
to pontificate upon “God‟s plan”; and he bickered with Beveridge when the latter 
questioned Patterson‟s statement that the “water cure” constituted torture.  He and the 
other anti-imperialists of the committee succeeded in making the war look ugly, but it 
was the hollowest of triumphs.  Despite the testimony of soldiers who openly admitted to 
torturing captives and burning villages, the official findings of the committee gave a 
sanitized account of American involvement.  Senator Beveridge, never satisfied with half 
measures, went even farther in a separate report that historian Stuart Creighton Miller has 
identified as a “deceitful cut-and-paste job.”  If nothing else, it was a fitting conclusion to 
an investigation that added little to the reputation of the United States Senate.
12
   
 No matter the objections, Roosevelt and his supporters were able to dominate in 
foreign policy and domestic politics.  In so doing they shaped the course that the country 
would follow in both arenas.  When Democrats finally did re-emerge as a force for 
                                                 
11
 For this and the following paragraph, see Stuart Creighton Miller, “Benevolent Assimilation”, 212-218, 
238-245.   
12
 Affairs in the Philippines:  Hearing Before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate, 
57th Cong., S. Doc. 331, pt. 1, p. 77-79; ibid., 331, pt.3, p. 1979, 2686-2687.  
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national reform, they still claimed elements of the agenda that Bryan had pushed at the 
opening of the century.  However, the nature of reform under the Roosevelt and then the 
Taft administrations had placed the emphasis upon the control of great corporations 
through regulation and judicial action.  They had rejected policies designed to shift the 
distribution of wealth.  When Woodrow Wilson entered office with new Democratic 
majorities to support him in Congress, few were inclined to dismantle the system that 
their predecessors had so effectively promoted.
13
   
The legacy of Roosevelt and Taft were just as strong in international affairs.  
Roosevelt‟s international engagement was with little precedent in American history up to 
that time.  In particular, his involvement in the affairs of Columbia and his part in the 
creation of an independent Panama in order to obtain an American policy objective was 
an act that stretched the bounds of propriety for a peacetime commander-in-chief.  Taft 
may have openly disdained such policies, but in Nicaragua his “dollar diplomacy” looked 
far more like the Rooseveltian “big stick” than he would have cared to admit.  Wilson 
himself had always been ambivalent toward the question of empire—whether formal or 
informal.  While he came to embrace a global reformist position that combined elements 
of modern Democrat‟s economic analysis with a desire to create a liberal world order, 
                                                 
13
 Some have attempted to describe the Democrats of the Progressive Era as fundamentally different than 
the progressive and “insurgent” Republicans of those years, but these works primarily demonstrate a 
difference of degree, not of kind.  See David Sarasohn, The Party of Reform:  Democrats in the Progressive 
Era (Jackson, MS:  University Press of Mississippi, 1989); Elizabeth Sanders, Roots of Reform:  Farmers, 
Workers, and the American State, 1877-1917 (Chicago:  University Press of Chicago, 1999).  The 
historians of “corporate liberalism” have explained the Wilsonian analysis in a more appropriate and 
thoughtful way.  See Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism:  A Reinterpretation of American 
History, 1900-1916 (1963; New York:  Free Press, 1977), especially 204-212, 255-260; Martin J. Sklar, 
The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916:  The Market, the Law, and Politics 
(New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1988), especially 381-394.   
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empire was at its core.  He demonstrated no interest in the abandonment of America‟s 
dominant position in the Caribbean and Central America to the violent and irrational 
people he believed lived there.  At its core, the Wilsonian perspective shared with its 
Republican predecessors a distaste—or perhaps even an outright fear—of revolution from 
below.  Wilson extended this view from internal politics into the arena of international 
affairs.   While his quest for stability eventually led to the development of the League of 
Nations, it had also brought about interventions in Mexico and Russia.  Even William 
Jennings Bryan, Wilson‟s Secretary of State for the first two years of the administration, 
posed no obstacle to the policy of informal empire.  Much of the Caribbean basin was so 
thoroughly under American influence by that time that to disengage would have created a 
power vacuum and likely only added to the turmoil of the region, or so the Commoner 
reasoned.  Once began, the cycle of involvement and intervention became normative. Put 
another way—or at least as one historian so aptly put it—empire became a way of life.14   
                                                 
14
 See Lloyd C. Gardner, Safe for Democracy:  The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923 
(New York:  Oxford University Press, 1987); Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (1987; 
New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 2009), 108-138; Edward S. Kaplan, U.S. Imperialism in Latin 
America:  Bryan’s Challenges and Contributions, 1900-1920 (Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 1998).  
Most histories still focus upon Wilson‟s idealism, but they often struggle to maintain this view (or are 
forced to admits its limitations) when they describe Wilson‟s policies toward Mexico.  See Alan Dawley, 
Changing the World:  American Progressives in War and Revolution (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University 
Press, 2003), 30-32, 75-82, 102-104; Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars:  Woodrow Wilson and the Quest 
for a New World Order (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1992), 24-30, 81-84.  For the phrase by the 
historian, see William Appleman Williams, Empire as a Way of Life (New York:  Oxford University Press, 
1980).   
  
555 
 
REFERENCES CITED 
Primary Sources 
 
Newspapers and Periodicals 
 
Aberdeen Daily News (SD) 
 
Aberdeen Herald (WA) 
 
Adams County News (Ritzville, WA) 
 
The Advocate (Topeka, KS) 
 
Akron Weekly Pioneer Press (CO) 
 
Albion Weekly News (NE) 
 
American Citizen (Kansas City, KS) 
 
Aspen Daily Leader (CO) 
 
Aspen Daily Times (CO) 
 
Aspen Democrat (CO) 
 
Aspen Union Era (CO) 
 
Castle Rock Journal (CO) 
 
Cherry County Independent (Valentine, NE) 
 
Colfax Gazette (WA) 
 
Colorado Springs Gazette (CO) 
 
Columbus Journal (NE) 
 
Custer County Republican (Broken Bow, NE) 
 
The Dawn (Ellensburg, WA) 
 
The Daily Camera (Boulder, CO) 
 
Daily Journal (Telluride, CO) 
  
556 
 
 
Denver Post (CO) 
 
Durango Wage Earner (CO) 
 
Evening Star (Washington, D.C.) 
 
Evening Tribune (San Diego, CA) 
 
Fairplay Flume (CO) 
 
Fort Collins Courier (CO) 
 
Frontier County Faber (Stockville, NE) 
 
Gibbon Reporter (NE) 
 
Goodland Republic (KS) 
 
Grand Forks Daily Herald (ND) 
 
Greely Tribune (CO) 
 
Gunnison Tribune (CO) 
 
Harper’s Weekly 
 
Hawaiian Star (Honolulu, HI) 
 
Herald Democrat, (Leadville, CO) 
 
Honolulu Republican (HI) 
 
Idaho Statesman (Boise, ID) 
 
The Independent (Lincoln, NE) 
 
The Islander (Friday Harbor, WA) 
 
Kearney Daily Hub (NE) 
 
Leadville Daily and Evening Chronicle (CO) 
 
Littleton Independent (CO) 
 
  
557 
 
Longmont Ledger (CO) 
 
Madison Chronicle (NE) 
 
McCook Tribune (NE) 
 
Miners’ Magazine  
 
Montezuma Journal (Cortez, CO) 
 
The Morning Times (Washington, D.C.)  
 
Morning Olympian (WA) 
 
Morning Oregonian (Portland, OR) 
 
National Labor Tribune (Pittsburgh, PA)   
 
Nebraska Advertiser (Nemaha City, NE) 
 
New Castle Nonpareil (CO) 
 
New York Times  
 
Norfolk Weekly News (NE) 
 
North Platte Semi-Weekly Tribune (NE) 
 
Omaha Daily Bee (NE) 
 
Omaha World-Herald (NE) 
 
Ouray Herald (CO) 
 
Pagosa Springs News (CO) 
 
Petersburg Index (NE) 
 
Pullman Herald (WA)  
 
Red Cloud Chief (NE) 
 
Rocky Mountain News (Denver, CO)  
 
Rocky Mountain Sun (Aspen, CO) 
  
558 
 
 
Salt Lake Herald (UT) 
 
San Francisco Call (CA) 
 
San Francisco Chronicle (CA) 
 
San Juan Islander (Friday Harbor, WA) 
 
San Juan Prospector (Del Norte, CO) 
 
Seattle Post-Intelligencer (WA) 
 
Seattle Daily Times (WA) 
 
Seattle Weekly Times (WA) 
 
Silver Cliff Rustler (CO) 
 
Silverite-Plaindealer (Ouray, CO) 
 
Silverton Standard (CO) 
 
Spokane Daily Chronicle (WA) 
 
Spokesman-Review (Spokane, WA) 
 
St. Edward Sun (NE) 
 
The Sun (New York, NY) 
 
Tacoma Daily News (WA) 
 
Topeka Weekly Capital (KS) 
 
Valentine Democrat (NE) 
 
Watchman and Southron (Sumter, SC) 
 
Western News-Democrat (Valentine, NE) 
 
Wet Mountain Tribune (Westcliffe, CO) 
 
Yakima Herald (WA) 
 
  
559 
 
Manuscript Collections 
 
Carl Schurz Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.    
 
Charles S. Thomas Papers, Colorado State Archives, Denver.   
 
Henry Moore Teller Manuscript Collection, Stephen H. Hart Library, History Colorado  
Center, Denver, Colorado.   
 
John Rankin Rogers Papers, Washington State Archives, Olympia.   
 
Richard F. Pettigrew Collection, Microfilm edition, Pettigrew Museum, Sioux Falls,  
South Dakota.   
 
Shafroth Family Papers, Western History/Genealogy Department, Denver Public Library,  
 Denver, Colorado.   
 
Western Central Labor Union, King County Labor Council Records, Special Collections,  
University of Washington.     
 
William Jennings Bryan Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. 
 
William A. Poynter Papers, Nebraska State Historical Society, Lincoln, Nebraska.   
 
 
Books, Pamphlets, and Articles 
 
Allen, William V.  “Necessity for the People‟s Party.” The Arena XXX (July 1903):  410- 
419.     
 
---.  “Western Feeling Toward the East.”  North American Review 162, (1896):  588-593. 
 
Atkinson, Edward.  Criminal Aggression:  By Whom Committed?  Brookline, MA:  1899.   
 
Bailey, Dana R. History of Mennehaha County, South Dakota.  Sioux Falls:  Brown &  
Saenger, 1899.   
 
Bell, George W.  The New Crisis.  Des Moines:  Moses Hull & Company, 1887.   
 
Boutwell, George S.  Bryan or Imperialism:  Address by the Hon. George S. Boutwell.    
New England Anti-Imperialist League, 1900.   
 
---.  The Crisis of the Republic.  Boston:  Dana Estes & Company, 1900.   
 
 
  
560 
 
Bryan, William Jennings.  The First Battle:  A Story of the Campaign of 1896.  Chicago:   
W. B. Conkey Company, 1896.   
 
Bryan, William Jennings, ed.  Republic or Empire? The Philippine Question.  Chicago:   
The Independence Company, 1899.   
 
Carnegie, Andrew.  Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie.  Boston:  Houghton Mifflin  
Company, 1920. 
 
---.  The Gospel of Wealth and Other Timely Essays.  New York:  The Century Co. 1901.   
 
Chicago Conference on Trusts:  Speeches, Debates, Resolutions, List of the Delegates,  
Committees, etc.  Chicago:  Civic Foundation of Chicago, 1900.   
 
Clark, Gordon.  Shylock:  As Banker, Bondholder, Corruptionist, Conspirator.   
Washington, DC:  American Bimetallic League, 1894.   
 
Eager, Frank.  History of the Operations of the First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., in the  
Campaign in the Philippine Islands.  San Francisco:  Hicks-Judd Publishing Co.,  
1899.   
 
Emery, Sarah E. V.  Imperialism in America:  Its Rise and Progress.  Revised ediion,  
Lansing, MI:  D. A. Reynolds & Co. Publishers, 1893.   
 
---.  Seven Financial Conspiracies Which Have Enslaved the American People.  Reprint,  
Lansing Michigan:  Robert Smith & Co., 1894.   
 
Harvey, William H. Coin’s Financial School.  Chicago:  Coin Publishing Company,  
1894.   
 
Hoar, George F.  Autobiography of Seventy Years.  Vol. 2, New York:  Charles Scribner‟s  
Sons, 1903.   
 
Johnson, Arthur C.  Official History of the Operation of the First Colorado Infantry, U. S.  
V., in the Campaign in the Philippine Islands.  San Francisco:  Hicks-Judd  
Publishing Co., 1899.   
 
Luhn, William L. Official History of the Operations of the First Washington Infantry, U.  
S. V., in the Campaign in the Philippine Islands.  San Francisco:  Hicks-Judd  
Publishing Co., 1899.   
 
Lumry, Oscar F.  National Suicide and its Prevention.  Chicago:  George F. Cram, 1886.   
 
Morgan, W. Scott.  History of the Wheel and Alliance and the Impending Revolution.   
Fort Scott, KS:  J. H. Rice & Sons, Printers and Publishers, 1889.   
  
561 
 
Peffer, William A.  The Farmer’s Side:  His Trouble and Their Remedy.  New York:  D.  
Appleton and Company, 1891.  
 
Pettigrew, Richard F.  Triumphant Plutocracy:  The Story of American Public Life from  
1870s to 1920.  New York:  Academy Press, 1921.   
 
Report of the Monetary Commission of the Indianapolis Convention.  Chicago:   
University of Chicago Press, 1898.   
 
Richardson, James D., ed.  A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents,  
1789-1908.  Vol. X, Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1908.   
 
Rogers, John Rankin.  The Inalienable Rights of Man.  Olympia, WA:  1900. 
 
---.  The Irrepressible Conflict, or an American System of Money:  A Compilation of  
Facts Leading to a Knowledge of the Money Question.  Puyallup, WA:  Rogers  
and Co., 1892.  
 
---.  Life.  San Francisco:  The Whitaker & Ray Company, 1899.   
 
---.  Politics:  An Argument in Favor of the Inalienable Rights of Man.  Seattle:  Allen  
Printing Co., 1894.   
 
Schurz, Carl. American Imperialism:  The Convocation Address Delivered on the  
Occasion of the Twenty-Seventh Convocation of the University of Chicago.   
1899.   
 
---.  Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz.  Edited by  
Frederic Bancroft.  New York:  G. P. Putnam‟s Sons, 1913.   
 
Smith, Edwin Burritt.  Essays and Addresses.  Chicago:  A. C. McClurg & Co., 1909.   
 
U.S. Works Progress Administration.  Messages and Proclamations of the Governors of  
Nebraska, 1854-1941. Vol. 2, Sponsored by the University of Nebraska, 1942.   
 
---.  Nebraska Party Platforms, 1858-1940.  Lincoln, Nebraska, 1940.   
 
Weaver, James B.  A Call to Action:  The Great Uprising, Its Source and Causes.  Des  
Moines:  Iowa Printing Company, 1892.   
 
Will, Allen S.  World Crisis in China, 1900. John Murphy Company, 1900.   
 
 
 
 
  
562 
 
Federal Government Documents 
 
Affairs in the Philippines:  Hearing Before the Committee on the Philippines of the  
United States Senate. 57th Cong., S. Doc. 331.   
 
Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, Including the Insurrection in the  
Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition.  Two volumes, Washington,  
D.C.:  Government Printing Office, 1902.   
 
Report on the Census of Cuba, 1899.  Washington, DC:  GPO, 1900. 
Statement of Hon. Lyman J. Gage, Secretary of the Treasury, Before the Committee on  
Banking and Currency, in Explanation of the bill H.R. 5181.  55th Cong.  
Washington, D.C.:  G.P.O., 1897.   
 
Report of the Industrial Commission on the Relations and Conditions of Capital and  
Labor Employed in the Mining Industry. Vol. XII, Washington, D.C.:   
Government Printing Office, 1901.   
 
U.S. Department of the Interior.  Twelfth Census of the United States, Taken in the Year  
1900. Vol. I, Part I. Washington, D.C.: United States Census Office, 1901. 
 
Federal and State Periodicals 
 
Congressional Globe.  
 
Congressional Record.     
 
House Journal of the Legislature of the State of Nebraska. 
 
The Journal of the Assembly During the Thirty-Third Session of the Legislature of the 
State of California, 1899 
 
The Journal of the Senate During the Thirty-Third Session of the Legislature of the State 
of California, 1899 
 
Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate (United States). 
 
Laws, Joint Resolutions, and Memorials of the Legislature of the State of Nebraska.  
 
Laws Passed at the Tenth Session of the General Assembly of the State of Colorado 
 
Senate Journal of the… Legislature of the State of Washington 
 
Senate Journal of the General Assembly of the State of Colorado 
 
  
563 
 
Session Laws of the State of Washington, 
 
United States Statutes at Large 
 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Books 
 
Anderson, Warwick.  Colonial Pathologies:  American Tropical Medicine, Race, and  
Hygiene in the Philippines.  Durham:  Duke University Press, 2006.   
 
Abbott, Carl, Stephen J. Leonard, and David McComb, Colorado:  A History of the  
Centennial State.  Third edition, Boulder:  University Press of Colorado, 1994.   
 
Aiken, Katherine G.  Idaho’s Bunker Hill:  The Rise and Fall of a Great Mining  
Company, 1885-1981.  Norman:  University of Oklahoma Press, 2005.   
 
Appleby, Joyce.  Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination.  
Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1992.   
 
Agoncillo, Teodoro A.  Malolos:  The Crisis of the Republic.  Quezon City, Philippines:   
University of the Philippines, 1960.   
 
Almaguer, Tomas.  Racial Fault Lines:  The Historical Origins of White Supremacy in  
California.  Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1994.   
 
Argersinger, Peter H.  The Limits of Agrarian Radicalism:  Western Populism and  
American Politics.  Lawrence:  University Press of Kansas, 1995.   
 
Ayers, Edward.  Promise of the New South:  Life After Reconstruction.  Second edition,  
New York:  Oxford University Press, 2007.   
 
Beeby, James M.  Revolt of the Tar Heels:  The North Carolina Populist Movement,  
1890-1901.  Jackson, MS:  University Press of Mississippi, 2008.   
 
Bederman, Gail.  Manliness and Civilization:  A Cultural History of Gender and Race in  
the United States, 1880-1917.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1995.   
 
Beisner, Robert L.  Twelve Against Empire:  The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900.  New  
York:  McGraw Hill, 1968.   
 
Bensel, Richard Franklin.  Passion and Preferences:  William Jennings Bryan and the  
1896 Democratic National Convention.  New York:  Cambridge University Press,  
2008.   
  
564 
 
 
---.  The Political Economy of American Industrialization:  1877-1900.  New York:   
Cambridge University Press, 2000.   
 
Berk, Gerald.  Alternative Tracks:  the Constitution of American Industrial Order, 1865- 
1917.  Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.      
 
Berkowitz, Peter.  The Making of Modern Liberalism.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton  
University Press, 1999. 
 
Bicha, Karel.  Western Populism:  Studies in an Ambivalent Conservatism.  Coronado  
Press, 1976.   
Blanke, David.  Sowing the American Dream:  How Consumer Culture Took Root in the  
Rural Midwest.  Athens, OH:  Ohio University Press, 2000.   
 
Blight, David W.  Race and Reunion:  The Civil War in American Memory.  Cambridge,  
MA:  Harvard University Press, 2001.   
 
Bodnar, John, ed.   Bonds of Affection:  Americans Define Their Patriotism.  Princeton,  
NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1996.   
 
Bouvier, Virginia M., ed.  Whose America?  The War of 1898 and the Battles to Define  
the Nation.  Westport, CT:  Praeger Publishers, 2001.   
 
Brown, David S.  Richard Hofstadter:  An Intellectual Biography.  Chicago:  University  
of Chicago Press, 2006.   
 
Brundage, David.  The Making of Western Labor Radicalism:  Denver’s Organized  
Workers, 1878-1905.  Chicago:  University of Illinois Press, 1994.   
 
Burns, James MacGregor.  Packing the Court:  The Rise of Judicial Power and the  
Coming Crisis of the Supreme Court.  New York:  Penguin Press, 2009.   
 
Butler, Leslie.  Critical Americans:  Victorian Intellectuals and Transatlantic Liberal  
Reform.  Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2007.  
 
Brazier, Don.  History of the Washington Legislature, 1854-1963.  Olympia, WA:   
Washington State Senate, 2000.   
 
Cherny, Robert W.   Populism, Progressivism, and the Transformation of Nebraska  
Politics.  Lincoln:  University of Nebraska Press, 1981.   
 
Clanton, O. Gene.  Congressional Populism and the Crisis of the 1890s.  Lawrence, KS:   
University Press of Kansas, 1998.   
 
  
565 
 
---.  Kansas Populism:  Ideas and Men.  Lawrence, KS:  University Press of Kansas,  
1969.   
 
---.  Populism:  The Humane Preference in America, 1890-1900.  Boston:  Twayne  
Publishers, 1991.    
 
Clements, Kendrick A.  William Jennings Bryan:  Missionary Isolationist.  Knoxville:   
University of Tennessee Press, 1982.   
 
Clinch, Thomas A.  Urban Populism and Free Silver in Montana:  A Narrative of  
Ideology in Political Action.  Missoula, MT:  University of Montana Press, 1970.   
 
Coletta, Paolo A.  William Jennings Bryan:  Political Evangelist, 1860-1908.  Lincoln:   
University of Nebraska Press, 1964.   
 
Cooper, Jerry M.  The Army and Civil Disorder:  Federal Military Intervention in Labor  
Disputes, 1877-1900.  Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 1980.   
 
Corry, John A.  1898:  Prelude to a Century.  New York:  Fordham University Press,  
1998.   
 
Cronon, William.  Nature’s Metropolis:  Chicago and the Great West.  New York:  W.  
W. Norton & Company, 1991.   
 
Cullinane, Michael Patrick.  Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism, 1898-1909.  New  
York:  Palgrave MacMillan, 2012.   
 
Curti, Merle Eugene.  Bryan and World Peace.  Reprint, New York:  Octagon Books,  
1969.   
 
Dagger, Richard.  Civic Virtues:  Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism.  New  
York:  Oxford University Press, 1997.   
 
Daniel, Cletus E.  Bitter Harvest:  A History of California Farmworkers,1870-1941.  
Ithaca, N.Y.:  Cornell University Press, 1981.   
 
Daniels, Roger.  Guarding the Golden Door:  American Immigration Policy and  
Immigrants Since 1882.  New York:  Hill and Wang, 2004.   
 
Dawley, Alan.  Changing the World:  American Progressives in War and Revolution.   
Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 2003.   
 
Deloria, Philip.  Playing Indian.  New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1998.   
 
 
  
566 
 
Dembo, Jonathan.  Unions and Politics in Washington State, 1885-1935.  New York:   
Garland Publishing, Inc., 1983.   
 
De Bevoise, Ken.  Agents of Apocalypse:  Epidemic Disease in the Colonial Philippines.   
Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1995.   
 
Downing, Sybil, and Robert E. Smith.  Tom Patterson:  Colorado Crusader for Change.    
Niwot, CO:  University of Colorado Press, 1995.   
 
Dubin, Michael J.  United States Gubernatorial Elections, 1861-1911:  The Official  
Results by State and County.  Jefferson, NC:  McFarland & Company, Inc., 2010), 
 
Durden, Robert F.  The Climax of Populism:  The Election of 1896.  Lexington, KY:   
University of Kentucky Press, 1965.   
 
Edwards, Rebecca.  Angels in the Machinery:  Gender in American Party Politics from  
the Civil War to the Progressive Era.  New York:  Oxford University Press,  
1997.   
 
Elliott, Russell R.  Servant of Power:  A Political Biography of Senator William M.  
Stewart.  Reno:  University of Nevada Press, 1983.   
 
Ellis, Elmer.  Henry Moore Teller:  Defender of the West.  Caldwell, ID:  Caxton  
Printers, Ltd., 1941. 
 
Enyeart, John P.  The Quest for “Just and Pure Law”:  Rocky Mountain Workers and  
American Social Democracy, 1870-1924.  Stanford, CA:  Stanford University  
Press, 2009.   
 
Esherick, Joseph.  The Origins of the Boxer Uprising.  Berkeley:  University of California  
Press, 1987.   
 
Ficken, Robert E.  Washington State:  The Inaugural Decade, 1889-1899.  Pullman, WA:   
Washington State University Press, 2007.   
 
Finkelman, Paul.  Slavery and the Founders:  Race and Liberty in the Age of Jefferson.    
Armonk, NY:  M. E. Sharpe, 1996.   
 
Flanagan, Maureen A.  America Reformed:  Progressives and Progressivisms, 1890s- 
1920s.  New York:  Oxford University Press, 2007.   
 
Foner, Eric.  Reconstruction:  America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877.  Revised  
edition, New York:  Perennial Classics, 2002.   
 
 
  
567 
 
Foner, Philip S.  The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American  
Imperialism, 1895-1902.  Vol. I, New York:  Monthly Review Press, 1972.    
 
Forbath, William E.  Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement.   
Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1989.   
 
Friedman, Milton, and Anna Jacobson Schwartz.  A Monetary History of the United  
States, 1867-1963.  Reprint, Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1993.   
 
Gaboury, William Joseph.  Dissension in the Rockies:  A History of Idaho Populism.   
New York:  Garland Publishing, Inc., 1988.   
 
Gardner, Lloyd C.  Imperial America:  American Foreign Policy Since 1898.  New York:   
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1976. 
 
---.  Safe for Democracy:  The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923.   
New York:  Oxford University Press, 1987.   
 
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., editor.  Lincoln on Race and Slavery.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton  
University Press, 2009.   
 
Go, Julian.  American Empire and the Politics of Meaning:  Elite Political Cultures in the  
Philippines and Puerto Rico During U.S. Colonialism.  Durham:  Duke  
University Press, 2008. 
 
Goldberg, Michael Lewis.  An Army of Women:  Gender and Politics in Gilded Age  
Kansas.  Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997.   
 
Goodwyn, Lawrence.  Democratic Promise:  The Populist Moment in America.  New  
York:  Oxford University Press, 1976.   
 
Gould, Lewis L.  The Presidency of William McKinley.  Lawrence:  University Press of  
Kansas, 1980. 
 
Guide to U.S. Elections.  Sixth edition, Washington, D.C.:  CQ Press, 2010.   
 
Hackney, Sheldon.  Populism to Progressivism in Alabama.  Princeton:  Princeton  
University Press, 1969.  
 
Hahn, Steven.  The Roots of Southern Populism:  Yeoman Farmers and the  
Transformation of the Georgia Upcountry, 1850-1890.  New York:  Oxford  
University Press, 1983.   
 
Hicks, John D.  The Populist Revolt:  A History of the Farmers’ Alliance and the  
People’s Party.  Third edition, Lincoln:  University of Nebraska Press, 1961. 
  
568 
 
Hilkey, Judy Arlene.  Character is Capital:  Success Manuals and Manhood in Gilded  
Age America.  Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 1997.   
 
Hofstadter, Richard.  The Age of Reform:  From Bryan to F.D.R.  New York:  Random  
House, 1955. 
 
---.  The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Other Essays.  Reprint, Cambridge,  
MA:  Harvard University Press, 1996.   
 
Hoganson, Kristin L.  Fighting For American Manhood:  How Gender Politics Provoked  
the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars.  New Haven, CT:  Yale  
University Press, 1998.   
 
Hollingsworth, J. Rogers.  The Whirligig of Poltics:  The Democracy of Cleveland and  
Bryan.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1963.     
 
Horsman, Reginald.  Race and Manifest Destiny:  The Origins of American Racial Anglo- 
Saxonism.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1981.   
 
Hunt, Geoffrey R.  Colorado’s Volunteer Infantry in the Philippine Wars, 1898-1899.  
Albuquerque, NM:  University of New Mexico Press, 2006.   
 
Hunt, James L.  Marion Butler and American Populism.  Chapel Hill:  University of  
North Carolina Press, 2003.   
 
Hunt, Michael H.  Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy.  Rev. edition, New Haven, CT:   
Yale University Press, 2009.   
 
Ileto, Reynaldo.  Pasyon and Revolution:  Popular Movements in the Philippines.   
Quezon City:  Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979.   
 
Jacobson, Matthew Frye.  Barbarian Virtues:  The United States Enounters Foreign  
Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876-1917.  New York:  Hill and Wang, 2000.   
 
Jameson, Elizabeth.  All that Glitters:  Class, Conflict, and Community in Cripple Creek.   
Chicago:  University of Illinois Press, 1998.   
 
Jensen, Richard.  The Winning of the Midwest:  Social and Political Conflict, 1888-1896.   
Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1971.   
 
Johnson, Robert David.  The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations.   
Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1995.   
 
Jones, Stanley L.  The Presidential Election of 1896.  Madison:  University of Wisconsin  
Press, 1964.   
  
569 
 
Kaplan, Amy.  The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture.  Cambridge, MA:   
Harvard University Press, 2002.   
 
Kaplan, Edward S.  U.S. Imperialism in Latin America:  Bryan’s Challenges and  
Contributions, 1900-1920.  Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 1998.   
 
Karp, Walter.  The Politics of War:  The Story of Two Wars which Altered Forever the  
Political Life of the American Republic, 1890-1920.  New York:  Harper & Row,  
1979.   
 
Kazin, Michael.  A Godly Hero:  The Life of William Jennings Bryan.  New York:   
Random House, 2006.   
 
Kent, Noel Jacob.  America in 1900.  New York:  M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2002.   
 
 
Keyssar, Alexander.  The Right to Vote:  The Contested History of Democracy in the  
United States.  New York:  Basic Books, 2000.  
 
Kleppner, Paul.  The Cross of Culture:  A Social Analysis of Midwestern Politics, 1850- 
1900.  New York:  The Free Press, 1970.   
 
Kloppenberg, James.  The Virtues of Liberalism.  New York:  Oxford University Press,  
1998. 
 
Knock, Thomas J.  To End All Wars:  Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World  
Order.  New York:  Oxford University Press, 1992.   
 
Koenig, Louis W.  Bryan:  A Political Biography of William Jennings Bryan.  New York:   
G. P. Putnam‟s Sons, 1971.  
 
Kohl, Lawrence Frederick .  The Politics of Individualism:  Parties and the American  
Character in the Jacksonian Era.  New York:  Oxford University Press, 1989.   
 
Kolko, Gabriel.  The Triumph of Conservatism:  A Reinterpretation of American History,  
1900-1916.  Reprint, New York:  Free Press, 1977.   
 
Kramer, Paul A.  The Blood of Government:  Race, Empire, the United States, & the  
Philippines.  Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2006.   
 
Lafeber, Walter.  New Empire:  An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898.   
Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1963.   
 
---.  The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913.  Vol. 2, The Cambridge History  
of American Foreign Relations.  New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1993.  
  
570 
 
Larson, Robert W.  Populism in the Mountain West.  Albuquerque:  University of New  
Mexico Press, 1986.   
 
Lasch, Christopher.  The True and Only Heaven:  Progress and Its Critics.  New York:   
W. W. Norton and Company, 1991.   
 
Laurie, Clayton D., and Ronald H. Cole.  The Role of Federal Military Forces in  
Domestic Disorders, 1877-1945.  Washington, D.C.:  GPO, 1997. 
 
Lee, R. Alton.  Principle Over Party:  The Farmers’ Alliance and Populism in South  
Dakota.  Pierre, SD:  South Dakota State Historical Society Press, 2011.   
 
Leonard, Gerald.  The Invention of Party Politics:  Federalism, Popular Sovereignty, and  
Constitutional Development in Jacksonian Illinois.  Chapel Hill:  University of  
North Carolina Press, 2002.  
 
Leonard, Stephen J., and Thomas J. Noel.  Denver:  Mining Camp to Metropolis.  Niwot,  
CO:  University Press of Colorado, 1990.   
 
Lester, Connie L.  Up From the Mudsills of Hell:  The Farmers’ Alliance, Populism, and  
Progressive Agriculture in Tennessee, 1870-1915.  Athens, GA:  University of  
Georgia Press, 2006.   
 
Linderman, Gerald F. The Mirror of War:  American Society and the Spanish-American  
War.  Ann Arbor:  University of Michigan Press, 1974.   
 
Linn, Brian McAllister.  The Philippine War, 1899-1902.  Lawrence, KS:  University  
Press of Kansas, 2000.   
 
Livingston, James.  Origins of the Federal Reserve System:  Money, Class, and  
Corporate Capitalism, 1890-1913.  Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1986.   
 
Love, Eric.  Race Over Empire:  Racism and US Imperialism.  Chapel Hill:  University of  
North Carolina, 2004.   
 
Luebke, Frederick C.  Immigrants and Politics:  The Germans of Nebraska, 1880-1900.  
Lincoln:  University of Nebraska Press, 1969.   
 
May, Ernest R.  Imperial Democracy:  The Emergence of America as a Great Power.   
Reprint, New York:  Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973.   
 
May, Glenn Anthony.  Battle for Batangas:  A Philippine Province at War.  New Haven,  
CT:  Yale University Press, 1991.   
 
 
  
571 
 
---.  Social Engineering in the Philippines:  The Aims, Execution, and Impact of  
American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913.  Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 1980.   
 
McCartney, Paul T.  Power and Progress:  American National Identity, the War of 1898,  
and the Rise of American Imperialism.  Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State University  
Press, 2006.   
 
McConnell, Stuart.  Glorious Contentment:  The Grand Army of the Republic, 1865- 
1900.  Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 1992.   
 
McCormick, Thomas J.  China Market:  America’s Quest for Informal Empire.  Chicago:   
Quadrangle Books, 1967.   
 
McCoy, Alfred W.  Policing America’s Empire:  The United States, the Philippines, and  
the Rise of the Surveillance State.  Madison, WI:  University of Wisconsin Press,  
2009.   
 
McCoy, Alfred W., and Francisco A. Scarano, eds.  Colonial Crucible:  Empire in the  
Making of the Modern American State.  Madison, WI:  University of Wisconsin  
Press, 2009. 
 
McGerr, Michael.  A Fierce Discontent:  The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement.   
New York:  Free Press, 2003.   
 
McMath, Robert C., Jr.  American Populism:  A Social History, 1877-1898.  New York:   
Hill and Wang, 1992.   
 
McSeveney, Samuel.  The Politics of Depression:  Political Behavior in the Northeast,  
1893-1896.  New York:  Oxford University Press, 1972. 
 
Mead, Rebecca J.  How the Vote Was Won:  Woman Suffrage in the Western United  
States, 1868-1914.  New York:  New York University Press, 2004.   
 
Miller, Stuart Creighton.  “Benevolent Assimilation”:  The American Conquest of the  
Philippines, 1899-1903.  New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1982.   
 
Miller, Worth Robert.  Oklahoma Populism:  A History of the People’s Party in the  
Oklahoma Territory.  Norman:  University of Oklahoma Press, 1987.   
 
Mojares, Resil B.  The War Against the Americans:  Resistance and Collaboration in  
Cebu, 1899-1906.  Quezon City, Philippines:  Ateneo de Manila University Press,  
1999. 
 
Morgan, H. Wayne.  William McKinley and His America.  Syracuse, NY:  Syracuse  
University Press, 1963.   
  
572 
 
Morgan, William Michael.  Pacific Gibraltar:  US-Japanese Rivalry over the Annexation  
of Hawaii, 1885-1898.  Annapolis:  Naval Institute Press, 2011.   
 
Mowry, George E.  The California Progressives.  Chicago:  Quadrangle Books, 1963.   
 
Mulanax, Richard.  The Boer War in American Politics and Diplomacy.  Lanham, MD:   
University Press of America, 1994.   
 
Murphy, Kevin P.  Political Manhood:  Red Bloods, Mollycoddles, & the Politics of  
Progressive Era Reform.  New York:  Columbia University Press, 2008.   
 
Nasson, Bill.  The South African War, 1899-1902.  New York:  Oxford University Press,  
1999.   
 
Nelsen, Jane Taylor, ed.  A Prairie Populist:  The Memoirs of Luna Kellie.  Iowa City:   
University of Iowa Press, 1992.   
 
Nugent, Walter T. K.  Money and American Society, 1865-1880.  New York:  Free Press,  
1968.   
 
---.  The Tolerant Populists:  Kansas Populism and Nativism.  Chicago:  University of  
Chicago Press, 1963.   
 
Osborne, Thomas J.  “Empire Can Wait”:  American Opposition to Hawaiian  
Annexation, 1893-1898.  Kent, OH:  Kent State University Press, 1981.   
 
Offner, John.  An Unwanted War:  The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain Over  
Cuba, 1895-1898.  Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 1992.   
 
Ostler, Jeffrey.  Prairie Populism:  The Fate of Agrarian Radicalism in Kansas,  
Nebraska, an Iowa, 1880-1896.  Lawrence:  University Press of Kansas, 1993.   
 
Paine, S. C. M.  The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895:  Perceptions, Power, and  
Primacy.  New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2003.    
 
Painter, Nell Irvin.  Standing At Armageddon:  A Grassroots History of the Progressive  
Era.  Reprint, New York:  W. W. Norton & Company, 2008.   
 
Palmer, Bruce.  “Man over Money”:  The Southern Populist Critique of American  
Capitalism.  Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 1980. 
 
Pascoe, Peggy.  Relations of Rescue:  The Search for Female Moral Authority in the  
American West, 1874-1939.  New York:  Oxford University Press, 1990.   
 
 
  
573 
 
Pederson, James F., and Kenneth D. Wald.  Shall the People Rule:  A History of the  
Democratic Party in Nebraska Politics.  Lincoln:  Jacob North, Inc., 1972.   
 
Pérez, Louis A., Jr.  Cuba Between Empires, 1878-1902.  Pittsburgh:  University of  
Pittsburgh Press, 1983.   
 
Pletcher, David M.  The Diplomacy of Involvement:  American Economic Expansion  
across the Pacific, 1784-1900.  Columbia, MO:  University of Missouri Press,  
2001.   
 
Pollack, Norman.  The Humane Economy:  Populism, Capitalism, and Democracy.  New  
Brunswick:  Rutgers University Press, 1990.   
 
---.  The Just Polity:  Populism, Law, and Human Welfare.  Chicago:  University of  
Illinois Press, 1987.   
 
---.  The Populist Response to Industrial America:  Midwestern Populist Thought.   
Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1962.   
 
Postel, Charles.  The Populist Vision.  New York:  Oxford University Press, 2007.     
 
Putnam, John C.  Class and Gender Politics in Progressive-Era Seattle.  Reno, NV:   
University of Nevada Press, 2008.   
 
Rana, Aziz.  Two Faces of American Freedom.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University  
Press, 2010. 
 
Rauchway, Eric.  Murdering McKinley:  The Making of Theodore Roosevelt’s America.   
New York:  Hill and Wang, 2004.   
 
Renda, Mary A.  Taking Haiti:  Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism,  
1915-1940.  Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2001.   
 
Riddle, Thomas W.  The Old Radicalism:  John R. Rogers and the Populist Movement in  
Washington.  New York:  Garland Publishing, Inc., 1991.   
 
Richardson, Heather Cox.  West from Appomattox:  The Reconstruction of America After  
the Civil War.  New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 2007.   
 
Robbins, William G.  Colony and Empire:  The Capitalist Transformation of the  
American West.  Lawrence:  University Press of Kansas, 1994.   
 
Robinson, Edgar Eugene.  The Presidential Vote, 1896-1932.  Reprint, New York:   
Octagon Books, 1970.   
 
  
574 
 
Rothbard, Murray.  A History of Money and Banking in the United States:  The Colonial  
Era to World War II.  Auburn, AL:  Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2002. 
 
Rothschild, Emma.  Economic Sentiments:  Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the  
Enlightenment.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 2001.   
 
Rystad, Göran.  Ambiguous Imperialism:  American Foreign Policy and Domestic  
Politics at the Turn of the Century.  Lund, Sweden:  Esselte Studium, 1975.   
 
Saldin, Robert.  War, The American State, and Politics Since 1898.  New York:   
Cambridge University Press, 2011.   
 
Sanders, Elizabeth.  Roots of Reform:  Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877- 
1917.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1999.   
 
Sarasohn, David.  The Party of Reform:  Democrats in the Progressive Era.  Jackson,  
MS:  University Press of Mississippi, 1989.  
 
Schirmer, Daniel B.  Republic or Empire:  American Resistance to the Philippine War.   
Cambridge, MA:  Schenkman Publising, 1972.   
 
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr.  History of American Presidential Elections. Vol. 3, New  
York:  McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1971.   
 
Schoonover, Thomas.  Uncle Sam’s War of 1898 and the Origins of Globalization.    
Lexington, KY:  University Press of Kentucky, 2003.   
 
Schwantes, Carlos.  Radical Heritage:  Labor, Socialism, and Reform in Washington and  
British Columbia, 1885-1917.  Seattle:  University of Washington Press, 1979.   
 
Shaw, Barton C.  The Wool-Hat Boys:  Georgia’s Populist Party.  Baton Rouge:   
Louisiana State University Press, 1984.   
 
Silber, Nina.  Romance of Reunion:  Northerners and the South, 1865-1900.  Chapel Hill:   
University of North Carolina Press, 1993.   
 
Siley, David J.  The Boxer Rebellion and the Great Game in China.  New York:  Hill and  
Wang, 2012. 
 
Silva, Noenoe K.  Aloha Betrayed:  Native Hawaiian Resistance to American  
Colonialism.  Durham:  Duke University Press, 2004. 
 
Sinopoli, Richard C.  The Foundations of American Citizenship:  Liberalism, the  
Constitution, and Civic Virtue.  New York:  Oxford University Press, 1992. 
 
  
575 
 
Sklar, Martin J.  The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916:  The  
Market, the Law, and Politics.  New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1988.   
 
Smith, Duane A.  Henry Teller:  Colorado’s Grand Old Man.  Boulder:  University Press  
of Colorado, 2002.   
 
---.  Rocky Mountain Boom Town: A History of Durango, Colorado (Boulder:  University 
Press of Colorado, 1992), 
 
Sparrow, Bartholomew H.  The Insular Cases and the Emergence of American Empire.   
Lawrence, KS:  University Press of Kansas, 2006.   
 
Sproat, John G.  “The Best Men”:  Liberal Reformers in the Gilded Age.  New York:   
Oxford University Press, 1968.  
 
Stromquist, Shelton.  Reinventing “The People”:  The Progressive Movement, the Class  
Problem, and the Origins of Modern Liberalism.  Chicago:  University of Illinois  
Press, 2006.   
 
Suggs, George G., Jr.  Colorado’s War on Militant Unionism:  James H. Peabody and the  
Western Federation of Miners.  Reprint, Norman:  University of Oklahoma Press,  
1991. 
Summers, Mark Wahlgren.  Party Games:  Getting, Keeping, and Using Power in Gilded  
Age Politics.  Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2004.   
 
Tate, Merze.  The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom:  A Political History.  New  
Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1965.   
 
Thomas, Sewell.  Silhouettes of Charles S. Thomas:  Colorado Governor and United  
States Senator.  Caldwell, ID:  Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1959.   
 
Timberlake, Richard.  Monetary Policy in the United States:  An Intellectual and  
Institutional History.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1993.   
 
Tompkins, E. Berkeley.  Anti-imperialism in the United States:  The Great Debate, 1890- 
1900.  Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970.   
 
Tone, John Lawrence.  War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895-1898.  Chapel Hill:  University  
of North Carolina Press, 2006.   
 
Trask, David F.  The War with Spain in 1898.  Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press,  
1981.   
 
Trefousse, Hans L.  Carl Schurz:  A Biography.  Knoxville:  University of Tennessee  
Press, 1982.   
  
576 
 
Tucker, David M.  Mugwumps:  Public Moralists of the Gilded Age.  Columbia, MO:   
University of Missouri Press, 1998. 
 
Unger, Debi, and Irwin Unger.  The Guggenheims:  A Family History.  New York:   
Harper Collins, 2005.   
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel.  World-Systems Analysis:  An Introduction.  Durham, NC:  Duke  
University Press, 2004.   
 
Watkins, Albert.  History of Nebraska, from the Earliest Explorations to the Present  
Time.  Vol. III, Lincoln:  Western Publishing and Engraving Company, 1913.   
 
Weibe, Robert H.  Search for Order, 1877-1920.  New York:  Hill and Wang, 1967.   
 
Weir, Robert E.  Beyond Labor’s Veil:  The Culture of the Knights of Labor.  University  
Park, PA:  The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996.   
 
Welch, Richard E.  George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans.  Cambridge,  
MA:  Harvard University Press, 1971.   
 
---.  The Presidencies of Grover Cleveland.  Lawrence:  University Press of Kansas,  
1988.   
---.  Response to Imperialism:  The United States and the Philippine-American War,  
1899-1902.  Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 1979.   
 
Weston, Rubin Francis.  Racism in U.S. Imperialism:  The Influence of Racial  
Assumptions on American Foreign Policy, 1893-1946.  Columbia, SC:  University  
of South Carolina Press, 1972. 
 
White, Richard.  “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own”:  A New History of the  
American West.  Norman:  University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.   
 
---.  Railroaded:  The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America.  New York:   
W. W. Norton & Company, 2011.   
 
Wiebe, Robert H.  The Search for Order, 1877-1920.  New York:  Hill and Wang, 1967.   
 
Williams, R. Hal.  Realigning America:  McKinley, Bryan, and the Remarkable Election  
of 1896.  Lawrence, KS:  University Press of Kansas, 2010.   
 
Williams, William Appleman.  Empire as a Way of Life.  New York:  Oxford University  
Press, 1980.   
 
 
 
  
577 
 
---.  The Roots of Modern American Empire:  A Study of the Growth and Shaping of  
Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society.  New York:  Random House,  
1969.   
 
---.  The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.  Rev. edition, New York:  Dell Publishing Co.,  
1962.   
 
Wilson, Keith, ed.  The International Impact of the Boer War.  New York:  Palgrave,  
2001.   
 
Wisan, Joseph E.  The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press (1895-1898).    
New York:  Columbia University Press, 1934.   
 
Woodward, C. Vann.  Tom Watson:  Agrarian Rebel.  Reprint, Galaxy Book, 1963.   
 
Wright, James Edward.  The Politics of Populism:  Dissent in Colorado.  New Haven,  
CT:  Yale University Press, 1974.   
 
Young, Marilyn Blatt.  The Rhetoric of Empire:  American China Policy, 1895-1901.   
Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1968.  
 
Zwick, Jim, ed.  Mark Twain’s Weapons of Satire:  Anti-Imperialist Writings on the  
Philippine-American War.  Syracuse:  Syracuse University Press, 1992.   
 
 
Published Articles 
 
Auxier, George W.  “Middle Western Newspapers and the Spanish American War, 1895- 
1898.”  The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 26, no. 4 (1940):  523-534.   
 
Bailey, Thomas A.  “Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate on Imperialism?”  
The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 24, no. 1 (1937):  43-52.   
 
Beisner, Robert L.  “1898 and 1968:  The Anti-Imperialists and the Doves.” Political  
Science Quarterly 85, no. 2 (1970): 187-216.   
 
Bicha, Karel.  “Peculiar Populist:  An Assessment of John Rankin Rogers.”  Pacific  
Northwest Quarterly 65,no. 3 (1974):  110-117.   
 
Cabranes, José A.  “Citizenship and the American Empire:  Notes on the Legislative  
History of the United States Citizenship of Puerto Ricans.”  University of  
Pennsylvania Law Review 127, no. 2 (1978):  391-492.   
 
Coletta, Paolo E.  “Bryan, McKinley, and the Treaty of Paris.”  Pacific Historical Review  
26, no. 2 (1957):  131-146.   
  
578 
 
---.  “A Tempest in a Teapot?  Governor Poynter‟s Appointment of William V. Allen to  
the United States Senate.”  Nebraska History 38 (June 1957):  155-163.   
 
Cosmas, Graham A.  “Military Reform After the Spanish-American War:  The Army  
Reorganization Fight of 1898-1899.” Military Affairs 35, no. 1 (1971):  12-18. 
 
Dubovsky, Melvyn.  “The Origins of Western Working Class Radicalism, 1890-1905.”  
Labor History 7, no. 2 (1966):  131-154. 
 
Ferkiss, Victor C.  “Populist Influences on American Fascism.”  The Western Political  
Quarterly 10, no. 2 (1957):  350-373.   
 
Gerteis, Joseph, and Alyssa Goolsby.  “Nationalism in America:  The Case of the  
Populist Movement.” Theory and Society 34, no. 2 (2005):  197-225.   
 
Gramm, Marshall, and Phil Gramm.  “The Free Silver Movement in America:  A  
Reinterpretation.”  The Journal of Economic History 64, no. 4 (2004):  1108- 
1129.   
 
Harrington, Fred H. “The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898-1900.”   
The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 22, no. 2 (1935):  211-230.   
 
Holbo, Paul S.  “The Convergence of Moods and the Cuban-Bond „Conspiracy‟ of 1898.”   
Journal of American History 55, no. 1 (1968):  54-72.   
 
Johnson, Claudius O.  “George Turner, Part I:  The Background of a Statesman.”  The  
Pacific Northwest Quarterly 34, no. 3 (1943):  243-269.   
 
Johnston, Robert D. “„The Age of Reform‟:  A Defense of Richard Hofstadter Fifty Years  
On.” Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 6, no. 2 (2007):  127-137. 
 
Key, V. O.  “A Theory of Critical Elections.”  The Journal of Politics 17, no. 1 (1955):   
3-18.   
 
Lanzar, Maria C.  “The Anti-Imperialist League.”  The Philippine Social Science Review  
3, no. 1 (1930):  7-41.    
 
Muncy, Robyn.  “Trustbusting and White Manhood in America, 1898-1914.”  American  
Studies 38, no. 3 (1997):  21-42.   
 
Ostler, Jeffrey.  “The Rhetoric of Conspiracy and the Formation of Kansas Populism.”  
Agricultural History 69, no. 1 (1995):  1-27.   
 
Peal, David.  “The Politics of Populism:  Germany and the American South in the  
1890s.”  Comparative Studies in Society and History 31, no. 2 (1989):  340-362.   
  
579 
 
Riddle, Thomas W.  “Populism in the Palouse:  Old Ideals and New Realities.”  Pacific  
Northwest Quarterly 65, no. 3 (1974):  97-109.   
 
Robbins, William G.  “The „Plundered Province‟ Thesis and the Recent Historiography  
of the American West.” Pacific Historical Review 55, no. 4 (1986):  577-597.   
 
Thorson, Winston B.  “Washington State Nominating Conventions.”  Pacific Northwest  
Quarterly 35, no. 2 (1944):  99-119.   
 
Turner, James.  “Understanding the Populists.”  The Journal of American History 67, no.  
2 (1980):  354-373.   
 
Wills, Jocelyn.  “Respectable Mediocrity:  The Everyday Life of an Ordinary American  
Striver, 1876-1890.” Journal of Social History 37, no. 2 (2003):  323-349.    
 
Wooddy, Carroll H.  “Populism in Washington:  A Study of the Legislature of 1897.” The  
Washington Historical Quarterly 21, no. 2 (1930):  103-119. 
 
 
Unpublished Works (Theses, Dissertations) 
 
Fisch, Richard Evans.  “A History of the Democratic Party in the State of Washington,  
1854-1956.”  Ph.D. Diss., University of Oregon, 1975.   
 
Fuller, Leon W.  “The Populist Regime in Colorado.” Ph.D. Dissertation. University of  
Wisconsin, 1933.    
 
Hendrickson, Kenneth Elton ,Jr.  “The Public Career of Richard F. Pettigrew of South  
Dakota, 1848-1926.”  Ph.D. Diss., University of Oklahoma, 1962.   
 
Hoelscher, David Wayne.  “Genuine Populist:  William V. Allen in the United States  
Senate, 1893-1901.” M.A. Thesis, University of Nebraska at Omaha, 2003.   
 
Leger, Ann L.  “Moorfield Storey:  An Intellectual Biography.”  Ph.D. Diss., University  
of Iowa, 1968.   
 
Murphy, Erin Leigh.  “Anti-Imperialism During the Philippine-American War:   
Protesting „Criminal Aggression‟ and „Benevolent Assimilation.”  Ph.D. Diss.,  
University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, 2009.   
 
Neather, Andrew.  “Popular Republicanism, Americanism, and the Roots of Anti- 
Communism, 1890-1925.”  PhD Dissertation, Duke University, 1993.   
 
Parsons, Stanley B.  “The Populist Context:  Nebraska Farmers and Their Antagonists,  
1882-1895.” PhD. Dissertation, University of Iowa, 1964. 
